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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
It is appropriate that feminist response in the days and weeks following September 11 are
brought together and documented, so there may be no mistake as to the fact that women’s
voices were raised, publicly and massively across the world. But they were not listened
to. Even those women on whose behalf Bush’s war was supposedly waged—Afghan—
were not listened to (Hawthorne & Winter, 2002, p. xix-xx)
1.1 Background of Problem
Within rhetoric and writing studies (RWS) the term “citizen(ship)” is used, but it is
infrequently analyzed directly and/or critically. Much of the scholarship which uses the term
glosses over the powerful meanings that it entails, and as such, there is an opportunity for a more
critical look at the potential for how citizenship may be considered through a transnationalfeminist-rhetorical lens. This project addresses the various constructions of citizenship and
considers an alternative perspective: a citizenship that utilizes women’s rhetorical practices, and
asserts their citizenship through active participation in society.
A strong rhetorical history of notable women has been established through the research of
feminist rhetors such as Cheryl Glenn (1997), Jacqueline Jones Royster (2000), Shirley Wilson
Logan (1995, 2008), Andrea Lunsford (1995), as well as Joy Ritchie and Kate Ronald (2001) as
they provide a foundation of scholarship for the consideration of the rhetorical stances used by
outsiders to frame Afghan women, as well as how Afghan women have refuted the frame in
order to negotiate their citizenship. The history of Afghanistan is one fraught with violence, war,
and the apartheid and persecution of Afghan women. The United States’ involvement in
Afghanistan during both the Soviet invasion, as well as the post-9-11 war, has brought attention
to the burqa-clad image of Afghan women, which has been translated as weak, silent, and
1

without the ability to advocate for themselves. What has been ignored by the global community,
and particularly the United States and European governments and media, are the voices of the
women who speak out on behalf of Afghan women, as well as on behalf of their fellow citizens.
As a result of these issues, this project looks at how the Revolutionary Association of the
Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), an organization that was founded almost 40 years ago, in
1977, advocates for the rights of women through their agency. While RAWA does not articulate
a definition of citizenship, the actions of the members place their work within the context of a
participatory citizenship. I discuss RAWA’s actions in contrast with the misplaced focus that
entities in the United States government have placed on Afghan women in a desire to go to war,
which in effect work to silence women by speaking for them instead of responding to their1
requests for humanitarian aid.
In this project, I consider how a transnational feminist organization such as RAWA
demonstrates and defines Afghan women’s citizenship, as well as develops their agency for a
participatory citizenship through their online texts/publications. The themes that I analyze
include how citizenship is constructed through the tropes of veiling, resistance and freedom. I
assert that RAWA is able to advocate for citizenship. While the established groups, both
domestic and foreign, indirectly silence Afghan women RAWA demonstrates how the women in
the organization resist the narrow frame of perceived silence.
1.2 What does it mean to be a citizen?
Historically in the United States and Europe, the definitions of citizenship have been
illustrated through Greek and Roman laws. These constructions influence how citizenship is
1 I am choosing to refer to RAWA as “they/their” instead of ‘it,” as a way to humanize the work that the members of
RAWA are doing. While the organization speaks with one voice, as is typical of institutions/organizations, it is to
protect the identities of the women involved. The organization provides cover for multiple women’s voices to be
shared, under the protection of anonymity. This is for more than political conflict; women’s lives are in danger when
they are aligned with RAWA or speak out for women’s rights.
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thought of today as they determined citizenship to be for “native free men who were the
legitimate sons of other native free men” (Bellamy, 2008, chapter 2, section 4). As the Roman
Empire expanded, citizenship took on another perspective as governments allowed conquered
citizens to maintain a dual-citizenship as both a citizen of their community, as well as claim legal
Roman citizenship with the caveat that they did not have the right of the vote (Bellamy, 2008,
chapter 2, section 4). What this means is that citizens were allowed to maintain their community
rituals, provided that they were integrated with the Roman society. With over 2000 years of
scholarship, philosophers, political leaders, and scholars such as Aristotle, Machiavelli,
Rousseau, Hobbes, Locke, as well as American republicans Jefferson and Madison have debated
the historical constructions of citizenship, influencing the implementation of it in countries
around the world today.
In the United States, while Jefferson and Madison philosophized about the definition of
citizenship, the legal definitions have been framed through a myriad of laws that are addressed in
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and
currently through the work of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)2.
Influenced by English Common Law during the early colonial times, the United States has
assumed a birthright citizenship since its inception. Birthright citizenship asserts that children
born in the United States or born to at least one parent who is United States citizen instantly
receive citizenship, but there are many other ways that people may become citizens3. Citizenship
is generally framed through a seemingly neutral, equal, and objective process; however the
issues of race and class impact those who are eligible to become citizens. Alternatives to
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Prior to September 11 and the formation of the Department of Homeland Security, the USCIS was formally known
as the Immigration and Naturalization Service/INS
3 Obtaining citizenship is different from becoming a Permanent Resident, which is obtained through the Green Card
program.
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citizenship status in the United States include options to apply for refugee status, with the
eventual option to apply for citizenship, based on violence and persecution in his/her home
country; wealthy individuals may enter through an “Entrepreneur Initiative,” in which
investment of capital into a United States-based business, will entitle individual investor and
his/her family to a fast-track of citizenship through naturalization (United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services, n.d.). These examples contradict how immigration is presented, as a
simple process of waiting one’s turn for the appropriate visa. Instead, the process creates a
hierarchy of those who are permitted citizenship and those who are not. There is also great
debate over undocumented people who live in the United States and their ability to obtain either
a permanent residence or citizenship status4. These varied processes of eligibility fuel the debate
over immigration and what citizenship means for all people living in the United States. In
contrast to a birthright-constructed citizenship, the concept of a participatory citizenship as
demonstrated through RAWA’s texts and actions provides an opportunity to consider an
alternate definition of citizenship, one that is achieved through advocacy and action.
1.2.1 Constructions of Afghan Citizenship
The construction of citizenship in Afghanistan is a multifaceted one, as the Afghan
people and foreign governments are actively defining it in multiple ways. These multiple
perspectives include definitions created by the nation-state of Afghanistan, Afghan tribal groups,
the United States government, and even the vision of citizenship for Afghan women developed
by RAWA. All are working to construct a vision of citizenship for Afghans, but these
perspectives have overlapping and conflicting views. The nation-state identity is defined by the
Afghan constitution, which asserts some equal rights for men and women, whereas tribal4

The Dream Act in particular, is under increased discussion, as children who were born outside the United States,
but raised in the United States and consider themselves “American” have changed some of the debate.
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community identities, especially in rural areas, informally supersede the national identity. Thus
citizenship for Afghan women is conflicted through the nation-state and tribal identities and
further complicated by the United States’ intervention in creating a new Afghan government in
2001-2002. In addition, RAWA has been working since its founding to define women’s
citizenship in contrast to how the political-social construction manifests itself. It is important to
consider not only how the Afghan nation-state defines citizenship in contrast to the citizens, but
also how the United States and its allies frame Afghan women’s citizenship in both formal and
informal ways.
1.2.2 Afghan and United States Constructions of Afghan Citizenship
Afghan laws provide women with equal citizenship and access to government services
and protections under the law. Afghanistan’s Laws of Citizenship documents, from 1965 and
2000, as well as the 1936 and 2004 constitutions, all assert birthright citizenship, provide equal
access to education, and state that men and women have “equal rights under the law” (Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan, 2004). While women’s rights are overtly addressed in Afghanistan’s
current and historical constitutions, as well as its laws of citizenship documents, how women’s
rights have manifested themselves in day-to-day life looks quite different, depending on who was
in power and where the women lived. For example, in the capital of Kabul, which at times was a
very contemporary, metropolitan place, women had access to education and employment. This is
in contrast to rural women, who were living in a more tribal/ethnic system in their region, and
did not have access to education or a contemporary way of life. It should be noted that Afghan
women from both rural and urban regions have advocated and worked to further women’s rights
and to provide an education for their children. National citizenship does not address the informal
tribal/ethnic citizenships that arise in the different regions of Afghanistan, and the construction of
5

citizenship may vary greatly in a country that is physically hard to navigate due to the rough
terrain and lack of infrastructure. The different regions of Afghanistan have strong ties among
tribal groups, and as such, place more value on the informal citizenship of ethnic/regional groups
than on national identity.
Documents produced by the United States Army, as well as academic researchers,
address the issue of citizenship, but in very different ways. From the United States Army’s
perspective, the concept is problematic, as the Army views the tribal areas with a very specific
lens in order to create allies. Such allies would help the United States Army overcome conflict,
provide a less-violent situation for the soldiers in the short term, and create long-term stability
for Afghanistan’s government. The United States Army frames many of the issues through the
concept of tribalism, reinforcing informal citizenship. Summarizing many of the Afghan people
as people whose “loyalty is first to their local leaders and their tribe” before the national identity,
the Army also notes that “tribal affiliation is still the most significant organizing principle in
parts of rural Afghan society” (Army Training Support Center, n.d.). This frames the Afghan
people as not being able or willing to unite under a common nation-state, leaning on the informal
notions of citizenship. This is in direct contrast to the mythology of the United States as an
undivided nation. As the Pledge of Allegiance states “one nation, under God, indivisible…” in
which the common value supported is that those who are citizens of the United States are
identified as “Americans.” The United States Army is positioned as needed support and
leadership to help the Afghan people create a stable unified nation. This is the Army’s way of
working with the people, restructures or reinforces power structures based on United States
priorities and takes the agency of citizenship away from the Afghan people.
Anthropologists (Simonsen 2004, Tavakolian 1984, Tapper 2008) address the issues of
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tribalism and ethnicity as these issues manifest themselves in Afghanistan. Afghans, connected
either by ethnicity, language, or family are viewed as fixed entities, with historical alliances and
conflicts with other cultures and countries (such as in Pakistan where there is an overlap of
ethnic groups). In addition, Afghan identities may come from outsiders such as the United States
and European governments, academic researchers, and news media all of whom have placed
their own opinions and/or support on the alliances between groups of Afghan people. It is
important to note that the connections and identities of Afghans are complex. Simonsen (2004)
points out that there are identities that may be more important to the Afghan people, as “tribe,
region, and sub-groups within the ‘ethnic’ groups… [as well as] rural-urban… literate
(educated)-illiterate are also highly important dichotomies” (p. 708), and these provide important
considerations when addressing issues with the Afghan people and how they articulate their
identities. In addition, as relationship and resources shift within and among those multiple layers
of identity, the meaning and importance of those layers change over time. Consequently, these
divisions created both inside and outside Afghanistan assert varied constructions of citizenship.
Identity is a complex issue: however, an Orientalist identity that was framed by Middle
Eastern and Asian classical texts, as asserted by Edward Said in 1978, created a binary space
identifying “the other” in contrast to dominating powers, particularly the United States and
Europe. This binary is reinforced by the United States and European governments’ work in
identifying people from the Orient (which historically covers the Middle East and Asia). In
Afghanistan, this concept of “the other” continues to replicate itself through Said’s version of
this colonial lens. For Said colonialism is comparable to Orientalist scholarship which takes “a
fixed, more or less total geographical position towards a wide variety of social, linguistic,
political, and historical realities” (Said, 2002, p. 16). This is demonstrated when researchers ask
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an

Afghan

subject

about

his

or

her

family,

ethnic

or

tribal

connections,

the

interviewer/interrogator “may receive different answers from the same person, varying according
to who is asking the questions, for what purpose, in what situation, and who is listening to the
answer” (Tapper, 2008, p. 100-1). As a result, discussing how citizenship is addressed and when
it is addressed by tribal associations causes complex issues to arise in who is asking about one’s
identity and why. This narrow construction of citizenship in connection with tribal associations
ignores the potential for fluidity with how an individual or group frames identity and how that
identity manifests itself in the assertion of citizenship.
Other groups that are frequently discussed in respect to Afghan alliances or tribal
connections are framed as creating an ethnic issue where none exists, as “there is no real ethnic
conflict… [Afghan] politics… is ethnicised—and has been consciously manipulated to become
so by political leaders” (Simonsen, 2004, p. 207-8). As a result, political groups such as the
Taliban, who are mostly identified as the ethnic Pashtun, create a conflict between those who
identify as Pashtun, but are not a part of the Taliban and those of other ethnic groups. These
oversimplifications of tribal identities and alliances by the United States (which build on the
Orientalist history of reductionism by Europe of the Middle East and Asia regions articulated by
Said) ignore the complexities of how to address the issues going on in Afghanistan. This
minimization of the complexities in Afghan identity by external parties is what allowed for the
Afghan war 5 to commence without much debate in the United States.
Parallel to how Edward Said’s (1978) Orientalism produces binary categories, Afghan
culture has also been reduced to oversimplified identities for both men and women. While
Afghan women have legal rights, as outlined in the Constitution for Afghanistan, the central
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United States led, Operation Enduring Freedom, commenced on October 7, 2001.
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government not only lacks the ability to enforce these rights consistently countrywide, but also
lacks the will to address issues of violence against women and to build a national infrastructure
that can support women (and men) through education, job training, and economic growth. For
women, this Orientalist framing has been particularly harsh. Postcolonial feminist scholar
Chandra Mohanty (2004), in her book Feminism Without Borders, states that through a colonial
frame the “average Third World woman leads an essentially truncated life based on her feminine
gender (read: sexually constrained) and her being ‘Third World’ (read: ignorant, poor,
uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family oriented, victimized” (p. 22). As a result, Afghan
women are viewed as in need of “saving” by an outside force and colonized women are
marginalized, not only by the United States government, but also by the global news media.
Some feminist and human rights organizations overlook Afghan women’s ability to assert their
knowledge on issues such as education, healthcare, and raising families in safe communities.
This contributes to the flattening of not only Afghan identities, but also of the concepts that
Afghan women possess varied and complex identities, in that not all Afghan women are silent,
weak and lacking the ability to advocate for themselves and others. Positioning Afghan women
as Mohanty’s disempowered “Third World” women, prevents outside entities from recognizing
the ability of Afghan women to resolve community issues and reduces the likelihood of outside
financial support for women’s citizenship activities. Afghan women’s identities and their
constructions of citizenship can be addressed through a feminist lens provided by a variety of
scholars in order to develop a more nuanced view of identity and citizenship.
1.2.3 Feminist definitions of citizenship
Founded in 1997, the journal Citizenship Studies brought the discussion of citizenship
into contemporary study, as sociology scholars reconsidered definitions of citizenship (Lister,
9

2003, p. 3). Feminists, including political scientist Iris Marion Young and sociologist Ruth
Lister, began to reconsider the concept of citizenship directly through their respective
disciplinary lenses. These two feminist scholars developed a critical lens to address the issue of
citizenship so that the definition of citizenship “can be reformulated so as to satisfactorily
include (and not simply append)” women (Lister, 2003, p. 4). In other words, women are not an
afterthought in the construction of citizenship; women are an integral part of what it means to
define citizenship. This assertion is important as it means that women have to be a part of the
discussion; women must participate and be included when looking at what it means to be a
citizen and establishing the rights that accompany that status. For the women of RAWA, this
means that they have an opportunity to voice their opinion when addressing women’s rights and
responsibilities as citizens of Afghanistan. While her lens is focused on the United States, Iris
Marion Young (1989) provides an opportunity to draw parallels between the issues that arise
with women and citizenship and allows for specific issues on Afghan women’s rights to be
addressed. To help consider the postcolonial perspective, the work of feminist anthropologist
Aihwa Ong (1999) in her text Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality
interrogates postcolonial concepts in her focus of constructing citizenships. While this text in
itself does not focus on women’s issues, it explores the conflict of change that is happening in
South Asia as it pertains to emigration and the global economy.
Indirectly supporting Lister, Young, and Ong’s critiques, feminist-rhetorical scholars
Jacqueline Jones Royster (2003) and Jessica Enoch (2008) demonstrate how women in the
United States have resisted the restrictions on their citizenship and provide a model of how to
look at other women’s rhetorical work. Citizenship is indirectly discussed through the context of
women’s participation in the public sphere, particularly as women work to speak and advocate
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publicly for themselves and others. Jacqueline Jones Royster (2003) addresses the historical
context of women advocates in the public sphere, as women rhetors provide opportunities for the
expansion of what are considered the traditional activities of citizenship, such as voting. This
construction also provides a voice not only for women, but also for other marginalized groups
throughout history. Historically, the recovery of women’s texts have provided a window into
how women’s issues and actions have been brought to light because of their efforts to enter the
public sphere and assert their rights as fully-participating and empowered citizens of their
communities. We can draw upon the works of historically notable women’s rights speakers, such
as abolitionist Maria Stewart to provide a framework for public advocacy. For example, Stewart
demonstrates how a woman places herself in the public eye, with the goal of advocating for
women’s right to speak in the public sphere, much as RAWA is doing today. While Stewart was
in the public eye for only a year, based on her first and last public speech, the influence of her
work reverberates through the speeches of women who come later, developing a foundation for
other rhetors to build on.
1.2.4 Action Oriented Literacies as Participatory Citizenship
Discussed in depth in Chapter 2: Literature Review, there are important connections
between citizenship and literary. Surveying the historical landscape of oppressed people’s
literacy is frequently discussed historically by rhetors Shirley Wilson Logan (2008), Jacqueline
Jones Royster (2000), as well as in contemporary terms by Victor Villanueva (1993), Gloria
Anzaldúa (1987), Richard Rodriguez (2005), and Morris Young (2004) in which they discuss the
intersection of race, language, and rhetoric. These rhetors provide a lens in which to consider
what it means to be literate, and what privileges are provided for those literacies.
In the texts, Shirley Wilson Logan’s (2008) Liberating Language: Sites of Rhetorical
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Education in Nineteenth-Century Black America, and Jacqueline Jones Royster’s (2000) Traces
of the Stream: Literacy and Social Change among African American Women offer detailed
examples of the historical development of literacies and ways in which literacy can be defined,
particularly for African-American communities. Logan (2008) asserts that Deborah Brandt’s
definition of literacy in which the “underlying language abilities that may be common to both
reading and writing” (p. 392), allows for an inclusive interpretation, including reading, writing
and rhetoric, and enabling scholars to “admit the experiences of such rhetors as Sojourner Truth
into consideration though conventional definitions would classify her as illiterate” (p. 4). This
provides an opportunity for scholars to consider how to define literacy and its connections to
citizenship. Royster (2000) asserts that the “ability to gain access to information and to use this
information variously to articulate lives and experiences and also to identify, think through,
refine, and solve problems, sometimes complex problems over time” (p. 45) in order to have
access to and to use information. This concept is identified by Logan (2008) as “action-oriented”
where individuals are able to actively pursue their literacy and as a result provides the
opportunity for groups and individuals to assert their citizenships through these literacies.
Utilizing the concept of “action-oriented” literacies provides an opportunity to consider the
formal and informal educational work of RAWA in teaching women to advocate for themselves
and other women.
Considering the construction of “action-oriented” literacies, I examine the ways women’s
rhetorical agency is “action-oriented” for citizenship by RAWA as members perform their
citizenship work engaging with both local and international communities. In order to consider
the intersections of citizenship on a global level, I want to utilize aspects of transnational
feminist theories of citizenship. Transnational issues transcend a single nation-state model as it
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considers global economic and social policies in the formation of a global citizen (Lister, 1997,
p. 56). For RAWA, while it is an organization by and for Afghan women, their issues go far
beyond the country’s borders. With refugee camps in Pakistan, historical ties with Iran, the
1980s war with the Soviet Union, and current war with the United States and allied forces,
RAWA is addressing more than the Afghan government; they are also negotiating Afghan
women’s place in the world. While RAWA’s texts do not articulate citizenship specifically, we
can see the term defined indirectly. This analysis will demonstrate how a participatory
citizenship is implied and how external sources respond to their texts.
1.3 Why the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan?: The Rationale for
Investigation
I am choosing the established organization of the Revolutionary Association of the
Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) because of the complicated way that RAWA has both been
selected to be a part of the conversation in the United States, as well as have their assertions
ignored by the United States government, media and non-governmental organizations. Founded
in 1977, they have been working for women’s rights and developing a history of subverting the
traditional frame of Afghan women as victims of circumstance and without any collective or
individual agency. RAWA’s work appears to have retained a grassroots-style organization
despite the violence permeating Afghanistan and Pakistan for much of twentieth and twenty-first
centuries. In the years since the start of the United States war in Afghanistan, RAWA has
expanded their presence on the Internet, utilizing their website (www.rawa.org), YouTube, and
social media outlets (such as Facebook and Twitter) to get their message to the international
community. Their website is primarily in English, but also a variety of European languages and
Japanese demonstrating the desire to reach a wider community of support.
RAWA identifies as an “independent social organization” (2014c), as their work focuses
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on providing social services to women, children and their community, advocating for women’s
rights and asserting the need for a secular government in Afghanistan. One of their early goals as
a group was “agitation for women’s rights and democracy” (2014c), but RAWA’s goals
transformed from only using agitation and they started to develop social programs to help the
community.
While there is global interest in Afghan women’s issues, women’s advocacy within
Afghanistan is frequently framed through the perspective that the United States is needed to save
Afghan women, while marginalizing the work that is being done by the local women. The lack of
attention on RAWA’s work (as well as that of other active Afghan women), reduces Afghan
women’s issues to a mere stump-speech.
Questioning the United States government’s motivation, Leila Abu-Lughod (2002)
articulates why the United States would advocate for the saving of Afghan women from their
culture, instead of addressing the opposition of the regime in power (p. 784). Abu-Lughod
expresses many of the concerns that started in postcolonial theory, such as why the United States
and Europe are so insistent on framing people as other and ignoring the nuances of life for
Afghan women and relying instead on their media representations. Abu-Lughod’s assertion is
derived from the United States and Britain’s claims that an invasion of Afghanistan was
necessary, in order to “save” Afghan women from their men, their government, their culture, and
their religion.
RAWA provides support to the women of Afghanistan by advocating for their rights. As
mentioned, the texts they produce include a website in English, as well as in local and other
European languages, as mentioned earlier. They also create printed texts in English and Pashto
for public dissemination, including a journal Payam-e-Zan (Woman’s Message), as well as
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pamphlets outlining their issues. Their sister-organization, the Afghan Women’s Mission, is a
fund-raising and awareness-building arm of RAWA in the United States. The Afghan Women’s
Mission helps disseminate information to the American public as well as raise funds for
RAWA’s cause. In one such text, RAWA provides its mission statement:
RAWA’s objective was to involve an increasing number of Afghan women in social and
political activities aimed at acquiring women’s human rights and contributing to the struggle for
the establishment of a government based on democratic and secular values in Afghanistan.
Despite the suffocating political atmosphere, RAWA very soon became involved in widespread
activities in different socio-political arenas including education, health and income generation as
well as political agitation (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, 2011).
This statement summarizes RAWA’s focus for action in both the political and social
realm. In this instance, Afghan women are working to fill in the gaps of understanding and
provide awareness of their work to the governments, news media, and non-governmental
organizations in the United States and Europe, yet in this instance, no one is listening. RAWA is
negotiating how governments and organizations are not listening to their needs, essentially
silencing Afghan women.
1.3 Review of research questions
This project examines how the organization of RAWA asserts Afghan women’s rights on
a global stage and how the United States government and non-governmental entities have
responded to and/or ignored their claims. RAWA’s work in letting the world know about the
atrocities happening against Afghan women is rooted in the concept that if the world knew, than
international pressure to improve women’s lives would happen, starting with ending the
occupation by foreigners (in other words the United States and their allies). This is a complicated
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notion of requesting international assistance, while also dictating the terms of the assistance.
However, RAWA believes that Afghan women understand the problem and can provide
solutions to the problem, if they have the support and resources available to them. The problem
has arisen with the international community in that the message that RAWA sends to the world
and the message the world hears is lost in (figurative) translation. RAWA is very explicit about
the assistance they need, but as outsiders’ action seem to state that they know what to do better
than Afghan women, thus creating a parent-child relationship with the women of Afghanistan.
Through the analysis of texts produced by RAWA, as well as United States governmental and
non-governmental texts, this project attempts to fill in the gaps of critical commentary on both
how Afghan women define their citizenship through their own agency and how the world
interprets their work in asserting their right to citizenship.
I consider the following questions as part of this project.
•

How does a transnational feminist organization such as RAWA demonstrate and define
their citizenship, as well as develop their agency for a participatory citizenship through
their online texts/publications?

•

How do outside forces, such as the United States government, media, and nongovernmental organizations frame the citizenship practices of Afghan women?

•

How do the tropes of the veil, resistance, and freedom manifest themselves in the words
and actions of RAWA, the United States government, and non-governmental
organizations?

•

How are the texts of RAWA changed for reinterpretation by these outside forces?

These questions help consider the rhetorical devices used in order to address the issues of
citizenship through the very specific tropes of the veil, resistance and freedom. These terms are
16

used frequently and generally without much context. The issue of the veil is complex and entails
many different social, political, cultural, religious and legal reasons why women wear the veil, as
it is contextual to the location, class and culture of the women who wear it6. Resistance and
freedom are political rally cries for multiple social, political and cultural viewpoints, and they
have varied historical significance for multiple groups of people. In order to analyze the use of
these terms, I am using feminist critical discourse analysis method for this project as it is an
effective means by which to answer these questions. The written texts that have been chosen for
this project include:
•

CNN documentary, Beneath the Veil: The Taliban’s Harsh Rule of Afghanistan,
transcript

•

United States Congressional Hearing, Afghan People vs. The Taliban: The Struggle for
Freedom Intensifies, transcript

•

2002 State of the Union Address, transcript

•

Four short documents from RAWA’s website including: “RAWA’s Education Policy;”
interpretation of their slogan, “Freedom, Democracy and Social Justice”; the booklet
Afghanistan, World’s Largest Forgotten Tragedy; and “RAWA’s Standpoints,” an
outline of their stances on women’s rights, the veil, and goals for the Afghan government.

I have chosen to focus on the written transcripts of these events, rather than the videos of the
events themselves, in order to emphasize the textual aspects representing the events. While there
are limitations to only looking at the text, in that I will not be addressing the important aspects of
body language and the visual rhetoric of the videos, the textual analysis provides an opportunity
to create a deeper understanding of the specific words and phrases used to construct a narrow

6

See Appendix G for a detailed explanation of the veil.
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image of Afghan women and their ability to refute the frame. This project interrogates the
rhetorical situation of Afghan women as they assert their rights for public participation and
develop a transnational rhetoric in order to change the oppression by both the local as well as
foreign entities.
1.4 Limitations of study
While my study is limited to English-language texts produced by RAWA that are
available over the Internet, as web-based documents, it provides an opportunity for rhetorical
scholars to consider how citizenship is not only constructed through language, but also how
women’s rhetorical agency manifests itself as a form of resistance to local, national, and
international pressures. Analyzing documents that were produced and/or translated into English
presents an occasion in which I can consider the outreach that RAWA is making to the
international community in order to make their policies and ideology known.
In addition to the limitations of analyzing only texts mentioned above, other limitations
include the lack of translators available in order to translate RAWA’s documents which are
available in Persian/Pashto and Urdu. This makes it difficult to assess all of the texts they
produce. In addition, the geo-political climate makes on-site research impossible, due to the
volatility of travel in the region, in both Afghanistan and Pakistan where RAWA primarily
works.
1.5 Overview of Chapters
While I briefly reviewed my literature and methods in this chapter, I expand on these
ideas in Chapter 2 with my literature review. I provide an overview of theories and research from
within rhetoric and writing studies, as well as other disciplines, which provide insight to this
study. This discussion begins with considerations of what is a citizen, briefly acknowledging
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Ancient Greek and Roman philosophies, as well as American republican value of citizenship
ideals, but I quickly move forward toward modern discussions of citizenship through a feminist
and critical race lens. I utilize scholars including political scientist Iris Marion Young and
sociologist Ruth Lister, as they question the concepts of citizenship through a feminist lens.
Arguing against the perception that citizenship is applied universally, I use Young’s (1989)
argument that those living outside the norms of society are not given the same privileges and as
such I assert that organizations such as RAWA need to fill in those gaps in the system. I bring in
critical race theory through the work of Victor Villanueva, Morris Young, and Gloria Anzaldúa
as they consider the intersections of language and race. With Afghanistan divided among
languages and cultures, I want to recognize how these issues impact how citizenship is viewed
socially and politically, as well a through formal government policy in which again, RAWA is
addressing how to navigate between these roadblocks while at the same time moving forward
with their agenda of advocating for women’s rights, providing job training to women, and
education to women, boys, and girls.
In Chapter 3, I describe the methodology and theoretical background for this project. I
use feminist critical discourse analysis as my method in order to outline my critical approach. I
am using Norman Fairclough (2010) as a foundational aspect to critical discourse analysis
(CDA), Ruth Wodak’s (2008, 2009) work on the intersections of gender in the analysis, and
Michelle Lazar (2005, 2007) who proposes the concept of a feminist CDA. Critical discourse
analysis addresses social justice, hegemony, and the oppressive nature of how language is used,
especially by those in power, from governments to the media. In critical discourse analysis, it “is
claimed that cultural rather than merely economic dimensions are significant in the creation and
maintenance of power relations… [and] there is no strict separation between infrastructure and
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superstructure” (Jenner & Titscher, 2000, p. 145). One debate is how does feminist CDA differ
from a traditional definition of CDA, in light of the fact that both address oppression. Instead of
using women as simply an additive to CDA, I want to assert that more needs to be considered
beyond the simple addition of gender to the issues of politics and economics. In this aspect,
feminist CDA provides the tools and feminist theory provides a specific political stance for
analysis. For this project, I assert that incorporating postcolonial and intersectional feminist
theory will help develop a feminist lens within CDA and also help explain the problems for
women in Afghanistan as they have been colonized for centuries from different invaders.
Applying the work of Chandra Mohanty (2004) and Leila Ahmed (1999) in post-colonial
feminist theorists and the work of Patricia Hill Collins (2002), bell hooks (1989) and Audre
Lorde (2007) as scholars in intersectional feminist theory, I have created a lens in which to use
CDA in articulating feminist methodology for analysis.
Chapter 4 highlights the work of the genre chain and how it manifests itself in this
project. I provide a discussion of how genre theory works through the texts, and I explain the
texts and how in each of the texts there are many voices found. This chapter is important as it
provides an opportunity to only the relationship between the texts and demonstrate the need for
analysis. Here I present the concept of a Norman Fairclough’s “genre chain” as a mode for
connecting the texts together, starting with a video produced by RAWA titled Zarmeena’s
Execution. While this video is not a part of the analysis, as there is no narration of the events that
happened, it provides a foundational piece, as it demonstrates how the video of an action is
transformed into words, and later in to actions of war in the name of Afghan women.
Chapter 5 addresses the use of the tropes as presented in the CNN documentary Beneath
the Veil transcript. Using excerpts of the Zarmeena execution video, news correspondent Saria
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Shah provides detailed commentary on her version of events on both the execution and overlaps
that experience with the experience with other Afghan women. This documentary is important as
it demonstrates that the words used by the news media forecasts how outsiders can interpret the
events and actions by Afghan women. As a result, actions such as the war in Afghanistan was
used as a tool for the concept of freedom through violence.
In Chapter 6, I review the transcripts of the United States Congressional Hearing Afghan
People vs. The Taliban: The Struggle for Freedom Intensifies held on October 31, 2001, which
addresses the issues for Afghanistan, but particularly focuses the issues for Afghan women. This
particular hearing is very informative as it not only gives a sense of the attitude of the United
States government, but also of the various groups that provided testimony at the hearing.
Testimony was provided by representatives from Amnesty International, Feminist Majority, the
Central Asia Research and Development Center at George Washington University, the United
Front/Northern Alliance (an Afghan military/political group), and a representative from RAWA.
In Chapter 7, I analyze the transcript from the 2002 State of the Union address, given
three months after September 11th, which is soon after the start of the United States war in
Afghanistan and the establishment of a new Afghan national government in December of 2001.
While President Bush’s address to the Congress and the nation, is frequently known as the “axis
of evil” speech, what has been forgotten is the perception that this war was waged to save
Afghan women from the other Afghans. In this speech, President Bush asserts that Afghan
women’s agency is lost and is in need of being saved, thus reinforcing the need for continued
military action. Considering this State of the Union speech in full provides an opportunity to
engage with the text critically and in a way the moves beyond the reductive sound-bites that
lingered long after the speech itself.
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In Chapter 8, I review four online texts produced by RAWA in an effort to counter the
frame that their citizenship is in need of saving by innovation of a foreign power. RAWA’s
publications, produced in English, provide a detailed look into the work that they are doing for
the Afghan people. These texts, working to reach an international audience, alert people to not
only the atrocities that are happening to women, but also how international help, in the way of
humanitarian aid, can go far at helping women and children assert their citizenship and rebuild
Afghanistan. I present my findings as a way to argue for a participatory-based citizenship. I
focus on multiple short texts including a booklet titled Afghanistan, World’s Largest Forgotten
Tragedy which provides a history of RAWA, outlines their services in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and provides a brief statement about the problems in Afghanistan. This booklet gives a thorough
outline of their philosophy, their advocacy and the day-to-day work of the organization. While an
image heavy document, the booklet provides an overview of their work. The other documents
analyzed were created for the web and include: a statement in order to explicate their slogan of
“Freedom, Democracy and Social Justice”; RAWA’s “Educational Policy,” where they outline
the goals and outcomes in their educational programs; and “RAWA’s Standpoints,” a position
statement which present their stance on women’s rights, the veil, and the future governance of
Afghanistan.
I present these texts from governmental, non-governmental, and RAWA sources as a way
to demonstrate how text has the power to assert social and political influence over how
citizenship is imposed, acted upon, and resisted by Afghan women.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
As was addressed in the introduction, the constructions of citizenship are typically
defined in very general terms, such as a nationalistic identification connecting an individual to a
specific nation-state. Other ways that the concept of citizenship is addressed is through
education, in that public education is seen as a way to develop citizens based on the values
developed through a formal system. However the term citizen(ship) has not been interrogated in
depth within rhetoric and writing studies. When considered, rhetoric scholars address the issue of
multiple identities including, language, ethnicity, gender, class, as well as literacy. Drawing upon
works that have addressed these issues in the United States provides a way to turn the lens
outward towards a broader construction of citizenship.
Feminist analysis of citizenship, particularly through an intersectional and postcolonial
lens, provides a way to consider how the issues of race, class, gender, ethnicity, as well as
language and literacy overlap and work to define citizenship outside of a national identity. While
feminist theory and methods will be addressed in-depth in Chapter 3, I want to introduce these
concepts for additional depth of understanding.
2.1

Citizenship: A Feminist Analysis
Developing a feminist construction of citizenship provides an opportunity to consider the

impact of gender, in addition to race and class. I consider how political scientist Iris Marion
Young and sociologist Ruth Lister use a feminist lens to explore the construction of citizenship.
This includes how citizenship is then applied to individuals and their possibilities for initiating
change. Much of their work reflects complicated and critiqued notions of citizenship as it relates
to more than a nationality and instead develops into the construction of a member of a
community, particularly for women. As feminists reconsider the concept of citizenship, it
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requires a critical lens to address the issues to that the ideas “can be reformulated so as
satisfactorily include (and not simply append)” women (Lister, 2003, pg. 4). In exploring the
research of these two scholars, I want to keep in mind the issues of colonial-based oppression,
which has worked to define citizenship through a non-inclusive lens.
2.1.1

Iris Marion Young’s Critique of Citizenship
Young’s work addresses the issue of who should be a citizen in the United States through

her analysis of a “universal” citizenship, which is created to bring together individuals for larger
cause. The contemporary view of citizenship is frequently connected with a national identity,
specifically identifying who is allowed to live in the United States and who is not. However, the
many definitions of citizenship are finite and more contested than whether someone is simply a
United States citizen. Early in American history many of the rights that are identified with
citizenship, including the right to vote, were limited to land-holding males of European origin.
The goal was to create a system in order to avoid divisiveness amongst the citizens and hence,
detrimental to the country. This “universality of citizenship, in the sense of the inclusion and
participation of everyone, stands in tension with the other two meanings of universality
embedded in modern political ideas: universality as generality, and universality as equal
treatment” (Young, 1989, p. 253). While sounding ideal on the surface, a desire for a unifying
citizenry asserts a parental-like guardianship over the nation, suggesting that citizens do not
know what is best for their community. The universal idea of citizenship assumes shared values
among all of the citizenry. In order to promote the inclusion of all persons involved in citizenship
activities, society requires that a homogenization of ideas become normalized. Based on the
notions of
citizenship as expressing the universality of humanity, they [nation’s leadership]
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consciously excluded some people from citizenship on the grounds that they could not
adopt the general point of view, or that their inclusion would disperse and divide the
public. The idea of a common good, a general will, a shared public life leads to pressures
for a homogeneous citizenry” (Young, 1989, p. 253).
Universality does not consider participants living contrary to the norm—which results in member
of a society not having opportunities to participate legally, socially, or economically and
ultimately are unable to participate fully in the rights and responsibilities of being a citizen.
Young presents an argument that provides a theoretical foundation on how people may be
marginalized from their community, as well as address the benefits of citizenship within a
community.
Young discusses an alternative to the frame of citizenship in recognizing that “citizenship
can properly be differentiated among groups who choose to cluster but recognize that they are
together with differentiated other in a common polity” (Young, 1989, p. 237). These clusters of
people provide opportunities to recognize groups outside of traditional institutions in society.
These groups could include women’s organizations formed out of social, political, or economic
necessity in order to change the status quo of society.
These considerations are needed in that “defining citizenship as generality avoids and
obscures this requirement that all experiences, needs, and perspectives on social events have a
voice and are respected” (Young, 1989, p. 262) and as a result, marginalizes those who do not fit
into society’s framework for a citizen. Young proposes a solution for active citizenry through a
“rainbow coalition, by contrast, each of the constituent groups affirms the presence of the others
and affirms the specificity of its experience and perspective on social issues” (Young, 1989, p.
264). This coalition is more than a group’s ability to tolerate each other’s needs instead groups

25

work together to achieve the goals of the others’ movements in coalition with each other.
A rainbow coalition affirms the presence and supports the claims of each of the oppressed
groups or political movements constituting it, and it arrives at a political program not by
voicing some “principles of unity” that hide differences but rather by allowing each
constituency to analyze economic and social issues from the perspective of its experience
(Young, 1989, p. 265).
These “principles of unity” include recognizing and respecting the needs of the members to be
able to negotiate their differences as well as their similarities. “Cultural assimilation should not
be a condition of full social participation, because it requires a person to transform his or her
sense of identity, and when it is realized on a group level it means altering or annihilating the
group’s identity” (Young, 1989, p. 272-3). Maintaining groups’ identity would include the “the
right [for the group] to maintain their language and culture and at the same time be entitled to all
the benefits of citizenship, as well as valuable education and career opportunities” (Young, 1989,
p. 272). Young (1989) also addresses the issues surrounding the requirements for citizenship.
Historically, masculinity has frequently defined the requirements for citizenship since the times
of ancient Greece. Honored values include “militarist norms of honor and homoerotic
camaraderie; respectful competition and bargaining among independent agents; discourse framed
in unemotional tones of dispassionate reason” (Young, 1989, p. 253). Considering this
perspective on masculinity, the inverse would discount women’s citizenship as they are
perceived as using emotions to frame their decision-making processes, which would be
considered detrimental to the larger community. Hence, the option for women to be included in
the citizenship process is hindered because of biology. It is because of the perceived biological
differences that have also kept many marginalized groups out of participating as a citizen.
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As long as political ideology and practice persisted in defining some groups as unworthy
of equal citizenship status because of supposedly natural [read biological] differences
from white male citizens, it was important for emancipatory movements to insist that all
people are the same in respect of their moral worth and deserve equal citizenship
(Young, 1989, p. 267).
In attempting to define who should be a citizen and who should be left out, scholars routinely
looked toward “human nature” as a measuring tool. “Early bourgeois liberalism explicitly
excluded from citizenship all those who reason was questionable or not fully developed and all
those not independent” (Young, 1990, pg. 54). This provides a wide definition of who is allowed
to participate and receive benefits of the citizenry and leaves out anyone who is dependent on
society for their survival. Historically, arguments for a biological division among people was
commonly used during slavery and the eugenics movements in the United States.
Connected to the concept of rationality is the concept of logic, as it is considered “one
construction of the meaning and operations of reason: an urge to think things together, to reduce
them to unity… [something] that can be identified, counted, measured” (Young, 1990, p. 98). As
a result of this identifying, counting, and measuring, people’s differences are not considered and
alternative ways of viewing the world is not measured. Those who are not able to conform to the
standards of “reason” are left with a marginalized identity. Rousseau views that “normative
reason reveals an impartial point of view… that all rational persons can adopt” (Young, 1990, p.
109) and this normative reason is viewed in contrast to emotion, creating a binary of rational and
emotional and as such is applied to the binary between the genders.
The United States creates layers of restrictions on citizenship and the boundaries of
rationality are not a part of the current discussions, but the constructions of difference are a
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foundational part of the arguments. Frequently claims are made that “they” are not like “us,”
reinforcing the argument for only accepting normative markers, such as behavior and ethnicity,
as a pathway to citizenship. This reinforces the historical arguments made by “theorists and
politicians [who] extol the virtues of citizenship because through public participation persons are
called on to transcend merely self-centered motivation and acknowledge their dependence on and
responsibility to others” (Young, 1989, p. 262). In other words, difference is identified as selfish
and those who do not fit into the societal norm are expected to do so, otherwise they are
marginalized from society. This frame is decided on by the majority of society, which citizens
can take advantage of for their own benefit. “Acknowledging group difference in capacities,
needs, culture, and cognitive styles poses a problem for those seeking to eliminate oppression
only if difference is understood as deviance or deficiency” (Young, 1989, p. 268). For example,
people who are dependent on the public welfare programs in the United States are framed as
deficient and subject to additional laws proving their need for assistance. Hence, the view of
people who are deemed deficient by either the formal (e. g. government) or informal (e.g.
community) entities, may result in the questioning of people’s legitimate citizenship, no matter
how they choose to participate in society.
By addressing the issues of some of the more difficult to accept members of society, such
as people who are deemed as deficient, Young provides a frame in which to consider individuals
who are actually considered citizens, what rights and privileges are they entitled to and which
ones are actually put into practice. This is effectively developing a method for recognizing the
most vulnerable citizens and asserting what they have a right to expect from their community
and nation. Constructing citizenship requires looking at the intersectional aspects of oppression
and providing solutions.
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One of the gaps in Iris Marion Young’s work is that it is theoretical in nature and lacks
specific examples of how these issues manifest themselves in society. Even so, by using her
work, I am able to demonstrate the core issues, which are reflected in the work of rhetoric and
writing studies scholars. Iris Marion Young provides an opening to be able to discuss various
constructions of citizenship with a feminist lens.
2.2.1 Feminist Socialist, Ruth Lister
Lister’s text Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives (2003) provides a survey of scholarship
in sociology and political science, reviewing many constructions of citizenship through a
feminist lens. While citizenship is “ostensibly gender-neutral concept [it] is, in fact, deeply
gendered” (Lister, 2003, p.1). The results need to be looked at more closely to bring this to light.
When identifying nationality “culture and identity are seen as pivotal to processes of ‘nationbuilding,’ in which national and citizenship identity all too easily become conflated” (Lister,
2003, p. 14). This conflation of identity and citizenship creates problems in the discussions
surrounding the issues and concerns connected to immigration, the rights of people without
appropriate documentation, people’s access to public services, and the debate over how public
education is taught. Lister asserts that the changing of national boundaries, the movement of
people across national borders, claims of indigenous peoples, and the constructions presented by
the forming of the European Union with the “desire to foster a stronger European identity”
(2003, p.2) works in contrast with the identities that people hold in their pre-EU communities.
Lister considers how globalization, climate or ecological change, as well as “new formulations
are emerging such as cultural, sexual, intimate and ecological citizenship[s]” (2003, p. 4) change
how citizenship is constructed and discussed. Lister provides a foundation for my discussion
about a participatory citizenship, as she brings in the debates and presents the gaps in
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“recognising women’s agency and achievements as citizens, both individually and collectively,
without losing sight of the deep-seated inequalities that still undermine many of their citizenship
rights and particularly those of ‘minority group’ women” (2003, p. 6). While Lister’s arguments
specifically address events in Europe, her arguments can be used to help develop critiques and
arguments for women in other countries, particularly when using constructions of citizenship in
conjunction with postcolonial and intersectional feminist theory. The concept of nation building
and what that means for women as citizens creates a problem in that “culture and identity are
seen as pivotal to processes of ‘nation-building’, in which national and citizenship identity all too
easily become conflated” (Lister, 2003, p. 14). As a result of this conflation, women who are
identified as citizens by the nation-state are seen as responsible for raising future citizens. In
contrast, women who are not identified as citizens are framed as having a negative impact on
society by raising non-citizen children.
Other debates that arise when discussing citizenship within feminist theory are the issues
of paid and unpaid labor and the citizenship rights that are provided for each group (2003, p. 19).
Lister counters the debate about active citizenship, as the focus of paid labor versus unpaid labor
creates a privileged citizenship, which “has prompted feminist criticism of the contemporary
preoccupation with paid work obligations and a more fundamental critique of dominant
constructions of obligation, rooted in individualistic and legalistic notions of contract” (2003, p.
23). This privileged hierarchy of citizenship discounts the unpaid labor that many women do in
raising children or in service to their community. This issue offers an opportunity to examine
what “participatory democracy” looks like when the social and the political are intertwined. For
Lister, the intersections between the social and political have also been defined as the
intersection between the private and public. “Although their main focus has been workplace
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democracy, some have broadened the case for democratic participation,” which also includes
those who are contributing to society in other ways (Lister, 2003, p. 26). Broadening of what is
considered workplace democracy, as Lister defines it, can also apply to student participation in
their communities, as is articulated by Juan Guerra (2008), which is discussed at length later in
the chapter.
Lister (2003) asserts that “politics is about power; that is about the capacity of social
agents, agencies and institutions to maintain or transform their environment, social or physical”
(p. 27). However, she also asserts that those outside the system can have agency in order to resist
governmental power. Actions have the ability to “take place outside formal political and
institutional channels” as well as the use of political propaganda in art and literature (Lister,
2003, p. 27). Her arguments about a participatory democracy provide a framework for my own
articulation of a participatory citizenship with RAWA. Also supporting the wide range of
definitions from Lister, Aihwa Ong provides a postcolonial frame for citizenship, helping expand
perspectives on the issue.
2.1.3 Postcolonial critique
Feminist anthropologist, Aihwa Ong’s (1999) text Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural
Logics of Transnationality addresses the issues of citizenship through a global, postcolonial
perspective. While Ong does not focus on gender in this text, she provides an alternative
perspective on the developing transnational issues of emigration and the influence of a global
economy on the populace. Her focus on Asia and South Asia does not detract from the important
issues and critiques of how people construct their identity and their citizenship. Her book works
to demonstrate “how our cultural insights and our attention to everyday practice and the relations
of power can illuminate how the operations of globalization are translated into cultural logics
31

that inform behavior, identities, and relationships (Ong, 1999, p. 22). This can illustrate how
culture and power can also influence how citizenship is constructed, based on behavior and
identity.
Ong heavily critiques the use of postcolonial theory, as it maintains the binary frame of
the West othering the East (1999, p. 34). However she does acknowledge that postcolonial
theory may have a role in places where colonialism is still an issue, as she wants to
move beyond an analysis based on colonial nostalgia or colonial legacies to appreciate
how economic and ideological modes of domination have been transformed in excolonial
countries, as well as how those countries’ positioning in relation to the global political
economy has also been transformed (Ong, 1999, p. 35).
This critique may have a role in Asia and parts of South Asia, where their economies have grown
and the governments are redefining their global positionality. However in countries such as
Afghanistan, exterior influences are still defining social and political roles of the government and
citizens of the country. As part of her critique, Ong glosses over Edward Said’s (1977) work in
postcolonialism, contrasting how he portrayed the “objects of orientalism as silent participants in
Western hegemonic projects” (1999, p. 112). She instead focuses on Samuel Huntington’s
(1993) essay “The Clash of Civilizations?” and asserts that Huntington does not see a
“convergence of countries in the process of modernization but rather divergences caused by
profound cultural differences” (Ong, 1999, p. 187). With the focus on Huntington’s framing of
the other instead of Said’s, the concept of citizenship is redirected in how to think about conflict
and framing of people from the industrial and wealthy countries to those countries that are poor
and do not have a global economic development, such as Afghanistan. Huntington asserts that
global conflict will not be based on ideological or economic issues, but instead it will be based
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on cultural and religious identities (p. 22-25). While the framing maybe appropriate for Ong’s
study on Asia, this construct does not address the contemporary network of the global economic
reliance that countries have with each other, as well as issues of access to natural resources and
the coming impact of climate change on countries around the world.
While Ong’s work is focused on the economic issues of citizenship in Asia when used in
conjunction with the work of Young and Lister, it provides a foundation into the construction of
postcolonial-intersectional feminist citizenship, helping to build additional definitions.
2.2 Rhetoric and Writing Studies: Working to Identify the Issues
Citizenship is not frequently deconstructed in rhetoric and writing studies. Scholars
writing inside the field and those who have been appropriated by the field, discuss issues which
can be attributed to citizenship, including linguistic, cultural, and ethnic identity. The
connections between citizenship and language are articulated by Victor Villanueva (1993),
Gloria Anzaldúa (1987), and Richard Rodriguez (2005), but their connections are opaque and the
concept of citizenship is not explicitly defined. Citizenship is also connected to issues of ethnic
and racial identity, which is argued by Morris Young (2004) and Ellen Cushman (2008) as they
address the issues of who belongs within a community based on birthright and/or race. However,
language and identity issues are not the only issues connected to citizenship. Commonly
discussed within composition studies is the concept of the writing classroom as a place to create
citizens, which is discussed by Kathleen Blake Yancey (2009) and Amy J. Wan (2011). Overtly
addressing the issues of citizenship and literacy is Juan Guerra (2008, 2012), who presents
additional ways of looking at the issue.
While citizenship is not overtly discussed in their work, Villanueva (1993), Anzaldúa
(1987), and Rodriguez (2005) work to insert themselves in society through the construction of
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how to use the standard and dominant language. These scholars use their personal experiences
with language in order to develop their place in society, while also articulating the social and
political issues on language and belonging. Victor Villanueva’s (1993) memoir Bootstraps:
From an American Academic of Color addresses the issue of citizenship opaquely through the
lenses of language and race. He asserts that “language is also race in America” (Villanueva,
1993, p. xii). In other words, language creates markers on people just as race does; it can change
the perception of one’s citizenship within society and as a result other someone from their local
and national community by questioning their citizenship based on language usage.
Anzaldúa (1987) also critiques her own experiences with language, as it is constructed
through community. This provides an opportunity to consider Anzaldúa’s complex construction
of what constitutes a citizen in her text Borderlands / La Frontera: The New Mestiza. Anzaldúa
advocates for a broader acceptance of the many languages that people speak, asserting that
bridges need to be crossed in both directions for understanding. She asserts that some languages
are created for reasons other than their simple proximity to each other and instead as a way to
communicate needs that are not simply located on one side of the border or the other (Anzaldúa,
1987, p. 77). Anzaldúa reinforces the connections between language and citizenship, as she
advocates for multilingual people to be able to have full linguistic participation in their
communities.
Rodriquez’s (2005) memoir Hunger of Memory implies that his citizenship would be in
question if he did not master the dominant language of English. He asserts that “as a socially
disadvantaged child, I considered Spanish to be a private language. What I needed to learn in
school was that I had the right—and the obligation—to speak the public language of los gringos”
(Rodriquez, 2005, p. 18). As a result of negating his home language in favor of the “public”
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language he “accepted and internalized the tenets of a racist, classist society that deemed
everything about him... wrong, unacceptable, and un-American” (Castañeda, 2004, p. 67). In
other words, Rodriquez viewed that his citizenship was dependent on learning English, otherwise
he would endanger his citizenship within society.
In contrast, Morris Young (2004) and Ellen Cushman (2008) take a look at citizenship
and its connection to race and culture. Morris Young’s (2004) book, Minor Re/Visions: Asian
American Literacy Narratives as a Rhetoric of Citizenship addresses the rhetoric of citizenship
through the lens of cultural citizenship. Quoting Renato Rosaldo, Young states that citizenship is
tied “’not only to dominant exclusions and marginalizations, but also to subordinate aspirations
for and definitions of enfranchisement’ (37)” (2004, p. 7). This definition positions the issue of
culture as a method of othering people, in order to deny them legal and informal citizenship
within communities of the dominant culture. Similar to Villanueva and Anzaldúa, Young asserts
his construction of citizenship through the issues of adapting to dominant norms of literacy, race,
and language in the United States.
Ellen Cushman’s (2008) article “Toward a Rhetoric of Self-Representation: Identity
Politics in Indian Country and Rhetoric and Composition” focuses on the issue of Native
American rights in relation to identity and the ability for individuals to assert citizenship within
the Native American community. She frames this concept through a traditional definition of
citizenship that focuses on the benefits to individuals who claim their citizenship within the
Native American community. She claims that “the stakes can include the rights that citizenship
provides, such as access to health care, land ownership, and the right to vote; while for nations,
deciding who counts as a citizen is a practice central to the maintenance of sovereignty itself”
(Cushman, 2008, p. 323). Cushman (2008) addresses the issue that indigenous tribal citizenship
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is based on the evidence of biological parentage to identify the members of the tribe, maintaining
a strictly birthright citizenship in order to reinforce a privilege-based citizenship that protects
Native American tribal sovereignty. Similarly to the constructions of language, culture, and
ethnicity that are demonstrated in the United States, the people of Afghanistan also struggle to
develop a national identity and construction of citizenship as they work to bring together the
many tribal groups and languages of the region.
2.2.1 Use of Citizenship in Composition Studies
In composition studies, the rhetorical use of citizen(ship) is developed from a broad range
of specialties. This includes the work of writing teachers ranging from adult literacy programs,
K-12 education, and first-year writing programs. Scholar Kathleen Blake Yancey’s (2009) report
“Writing in the 21st Century” calls for “citizen writers” in order to provide a “new kind of
citizenship” (p. 7). She advocates for literacies inside and outside the classroom and claims that
writing to others in the community is a “new kind of citizenship” (Yancy, 2009, p. 7). Yancey’s
assertion for the creating of citizens does not provide an in-depth look at what it means to be a
citizen, what the literacies that need to be included, nor articulates the reasoning for writing
teachers to shoulder the responsibility in the creation of citizens.
More recently critiques are developing surrounding the issues of citizenship. Amy J.
Wan’s (2011) article “In the Name of Citizenship: The Writing Classroom and the Promise of
Citizenship” provides a critique of Yancey’s assertions in creating citizen writers. Wan asks
critical questions regarding about the “assumptions and implications” (2011, p. 29) about the use
of the term citizenship and how it translates in the classroom. Wan wants to critique the assertion
that particular pedagogies develop citizens and asserts that scholars must look at the ideological
implications when using the term citizen(ship) (2011, p. 29). Wan considers what the concept of
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citizenship means as a pedagogical stance through the “cultivation of habits of citizenship”
(2011, p. 30). She relies on classical notions of citizenship, which includes a democratic, active
(voting) person (Wan, 2011, p. 29) in order to define “citizenship” and articulates how students
can participate in citizenship habits through the lens of literacy.
Juan Guerra (2008, 2012) overtly intersects the concepts of citizenship and literacy in his
work, as he articulates a transcultural citizenship where “educators must signal and privilege our
students’ local communities as forcefully as they signal and privilege the influences of
globalization on them” (2008b, p. 299). Transcultural citizenship considers the culture in which
students come from as they negotiate the cultures of their home, community, and institutions,
such as school. Guerra also asserts that writing across the curriculum provides a “view of
students as citizens of multiple spheres” (2008b, p. 299), supporting a transcultural citizenship as
students who participate in the curriculum in order to actively contribute to their citizenship.
These specific classroom constructions of citizenship provide an opportunity to consider
what it means for students to be active in their own construction of citizenship inside and outside
the classroom.
2.2.2 Constructions of Literacy and Citizenship in Rhetoric and Writing Studies
Originally published in 1970, Paulo Freire’s seminal essay “The Adult Literacy Process
as Cultural Action for Freedom and Education and Conscientazação” reflects his experience
teaching in adult literacy programs in Brazil. His essay outlines the problems with standard
literacy texts that do not reflect the students’ lives and how traditional literacy programs remove
the agency of learning from the students, leaving the responsibility with the instructors. He
critiques how both literacy students are perceived, as well as the lessons that students are given,
as they do not reflect the students’ reality outside the classroom. According to Freire, students
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are considered deficient and literacy education is seen as a fix for the “’eradication’ of illiteracy”
(Freire, 2001, p. 617). He asserts that it is “the teacher who chooses the words and proposes them
to the learner” (Freire, 2001, p. 618 ). The authors of the texts used by the teachers do not
recognize adult students’ ability to develop their own curriculum, creating a “difficult
apprenticeship in naming the world” (Freire, 2001, p. 619 ). In other words, students become
unable to comment and critique the communities in which they live. Freire sees the
[e]ducator’s role is fundamentally to enter into dialogue with the illiterate about concrete
situations and simply to offer him the instruments with which he can teach himself to
read and write. This teaching cannot be done from the top down, but only from the inside
out, but the illiterate himself, with the collaboration of the educator (2001, p. 621).
He notes that the responsibility for education should be placed with the students, with the teacher
serving as their guide. Students should be given the tools to be able to make connections
themselves, so that they can develop what is important. Freire emphasizes “that in educating
adults, to avoid a rote, mechanical process one must make it possible for them to achieve critical
consciousness so that they can teach themselves to read and write” (2001, p. 622). When students
have a say in their curriculum development, they can create their education with their own
words.
Freire’s methods were experiential and contained no empirical data to draw from. There
were quotes from some of the students and anecdotal evidence. The problems with this method
are that it is hard to ascertain the length and breadth of the study and its overall effectiveness.
The future potential of this work is to expand Freire’s experience into a more ethnographic study,
in addition to gathering data in order to compare the success of students’ ability to develop their
own curriculum and navigate their literacy into their discourse communities.
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Deborah Brandt’s articles “Accumulating Literacy: Writing and Learning to Write in the
Twentieth Century” (1995) and “Drafting U.S. Literacy” (2004), discusses the issues that frame
literacy in the United States. Brandt addresses the different views of literacy, how both
economics and war influenced the perception of literacy and the national imperative to educate
the “illiterate.” The problem that Brandt asserts in these two essays is that there is a simplistic
view of the socio-economic issues that influence how literacy is viewed today. In the transition
from nineteenth to twentieth century America, the literacy imperative has changed. Historically,
“literacy marked the end of formal schooling,” whereas in the twenty-first century basic literacy
is seen as the beginning of formal schooling (Brandt, 1995, p. 650). The value of literacy and
what literacy has meant has changed over the decades, as Brandt explains that
World War II changed the rationale for mass literacy. Literacy was irrevocably
transformed from a nineteenth-century moral imperative into a twentieth-century
production imperative-transformed from an attribute of a “good” individual into an
individual “good,” a resource or raw material vital to national security and global
competition (2004, p. 485).
The transition from a moralistic value to an economic value is connected with wartime; Brandt
demonstrates how contemporary perceptions of literacy are intertwined with the historical
definitions. Through interviews and historical research, Brandt guides the reader through the
history of not only how literacy was constructed, but also how individuals themselves
constructed their own literacy, in order for literacy to construct a “good” citizen.
2.2.3 Bridging the Gaps Between the Institution and Community
The gaps between formal education and community are difficult to bridge according to
Ellen Cushman and Mike Rose. In their texts they assert the inherent problems that arise with the
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intersection of the institution and those whose race, class, gender, and language conflict with
dominant society. Ellen Cushman’s article “The Rhetorician as an Agent of Social Change”
(1986) addresses the discussion about what it means for academics to position themselves as the
authority on oppressed/ colonized people, with whom they have little or no contact. Quoting
Freire she asserts that
[t]hrough dialogue, the teacher of the students and the students of the teacher cease to
exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with students-teachers. The teacher is no
longer the one who teaches, but the one who himself is taught in dialogue with the
students, who in turn while being taught also teach (Cushman, 1986, p.18-19).
This is in contrast to the hierarchical top-down structure of institutionalized education, where
knowledge is evaluated, responded to, and graded. I interpret Cushman as implementing new
ideas about what is considered a valid means of knowledge production and what classifies as
education. This has the potential to provide a variety of options for teacher-researcher-activists
and their ability to expand and develop a more personal and effective framework for action as
they respond to the needs of the community that they are working within. Helping individuals
with alternative forms of knowledge production may result in bridging gaps of understanding
between the academic and local communities, eventually allowing for more effective use of
researchers’ resources in the community, instead of the researchers solely benefiting from the
resources provided by the community.
Cushman demonstrates the lack of connections between university and community as she
attempts to use feminist action research, ethnographic research, and interviews to bridge gaps in
her own understanding of community she is working within. She realizes that inserting herself in
a community is not as easy as simply going in and “helping” community without creating a
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relationship with that community first (Cushman, 1986). Cushman realized that she must stop
seeing those in the community as deficient and instead she needed to see them with the ability to
contribute to both her and their learning processes. Cushman’s essay wants academia to consider
their positions within the university and how it relates to the communities who are impacted by
the research. In addition, academics need to consider what is done with the knowledge they
produce, who it is for, how it is gathered, and how academics situate themselves in the
community, both inside and outside of the university (Cushman, 1986). Cushman (1986) asserts
that scholars should consider their responsibility to the communities that they use for research.
While her essay provides ethnographic evidence, there is no quantitative data to support how
researchers can help the communities in which they work.
In Lives on the Boundary (1989), Mike Rose provides an autoethnographic look at how
class, race, and language influence students’ education. Using his own experiences as a student
growing up in a working-class, immigrant neighborhood, Rose shows how his own academic
progress was diverted by the school’s perception of his ability, as he was placed on a track for
trade school. Once he was recognized for his academic ability, Rose moved into the college prep
program. He found out later that a shift between the academic and trade tracks “is virtually
impossible. Kids at that level rarely cross tracks” (Rose, 1989, p. 30). Rose integrates his own
story with the assertions about how other students perform, particularly as he connects his
experiences with students in the “so-called remedial classes” (1989, p. 31). Students’ negative
reflection about themselves “attribute their difficulties to something inborn, organic: ‘That part
of my brain just doesn’t work’” (Rose, 1989, p. 31). Rose demonstrates the failure of
institutionalized education to communicate with students on a level that is meaningful. Rose
expresses his “uncomfortable waver between a celebration of the individual potential and a
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despair over the crushing power of the environment: the children’s literate affirmations versus
the economic assault and psychological injury” (1989, p. 114) which impacts students in lowincome communities and/or those from unsupportive home lives. He critiques the English
curriculum with textbooks “almost entirely oriented toward grammatical analysis” (Rose, 1989,
p. 109). For Rose, the combination of living in the margins and an educational system that could
not manage students’ individual needs created a situation in which students were not able to
negotiate their community and academics effectively. It is difficult for students to see that they
are able to negotiate a participatory citizenship, understand that their abilities have value, and
have knowledge to contribute to their community.
2.2.4: Race, gender as it relates literacy & Citizenship
Using a feminist framework, Shirley Wilson Logan (1995, 1999, 2005) and Jacqueline
Jones Royster (2000) present issues of race and gender for nineteenth-century African-American
women. Logan’s argues in her book With Pen and Voice: A Critical Anthology of NineteenthCentury African-American Women that “women needed to gain the right to speak before they
would be allowed to address other issues” (Logan, 1995, p. 3). Here women were asserting their
right to public citizenship, supporting women’s right to speak in the public sphere. Women who
were able to gain access to the public sphere, worked to not only negotiate their right to be there,
but used the pulpit to advocate for other issues, such as abolition of slavery, alcohol prohibition,
and women’s and African-American’s suffrage.
Jacqueline Jones Royster (2003) also argues for women’s agency through language.
“Women have used their language resources to construct public identities, to define and solve
socio-political problems, to exert influence on social and political forces, and to garner respect
and consideration as agents of change” (Royster, 2003, p. 157-8). Through this definition, she is
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arguing for a public, participatory citizenship for women. As women become part of the
conversation, they can help shape the field of rhetoric for “when we shift the view to a more
deliberate commitment to inclusiveness… the landscape of rhetorical performance changes”
(Royster, 2003, p. 158). Purposeful inclusion of women’s citizenship activities in the public
sphere provides an opportunity for women to be able to advocate for themselves and others,
assuring that a more balanced voices are heard from the citizenry.
2.3 Previous Research on The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan
The United States government has accepted the view that Afghan women lacked agency,
continuing the dependent status of foreign women on the United States and Europe for
assistance. Women in many Islamic states (ranging from North African states such as Morocco
to Saudi Arabia on the Arabian peninsula) continue to be considered minors or dependents of a
male in the family, whether it is a father, husband, brother, or even a son. This overt
demonstration of patriarchal domination is one that needs to be addressed, but should not be
superseding other needs and other definitions of feminism articulated by women living in these
countries. News media and feminist organizations provide a contrary view in that “third-world
women” need to be “saved” from the men in their society. As a result, women living in the
Middle East and North Africa are deemed unable and/or unwilling to advocate for their own
citizenship, and as a result without violence against the men in their community ensuing.
Scholar Leila Abu-Lughod (2002) addresses this issue directly in her article “Do Muslim
Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its
Others,” which looks specifically at the United States “war on terror” that is going on in
Afghanistan and asks questions about the United States claims that Afghan women do not have
agency. Abu-Lughod asserts that feminist organizations in the United States have worked to
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frame Afghan women through the lens of Western feminism, instead of addressing the issues
discussed by Afghan women. She questions why reporters and the United States government
have frequently looked at the history of culture and religion, while ignoring the current issues of
colonization and occupation. She notes that when considering the invasion of Afghanistan,
“religious beliefs and treatment of women, was more urgent than exploring the history of the
development of repressive regimes in the region and the U.S. role in this history” (Abu-Lughod,
2002, p. 784). This kind framing reduces women’s roles to victims of history, culture, and
religion, instead of acting as agents of change, ignoring women who are willing and able to work
with others to ensure a positive future for themselves and their families7.
One of the reasons to focus on RAWA for this project is because of the lack of research
on both RAWA specifically and Afghan women in general. Much has been written about the
plight of Afghan women, which is certainly very dire and in need of assistance. However, what
kinds of assistance are being provided? What is the basis for the determinations on what needs to
be done for women in Afghanistan and women in similar situations? An important text, which
offers the most in-depth look at RAWA from an outsider’s perspective, is from community
psychology scholar Ann Brodsky, titled With All Our Strength: The Revolutionary Association of
the Women of Afghanistan. Researched before and post-9-11, Brodsky, whose research focuses
on community psychology, addresses the history of RAWA through on-site interviews with
women who identify as members of RAWA. Because of the decentralized nature of the
organization and the need for secrecy amongst members, many women meet behind closed doors
7

While it is true that Afghanistan is an extremely patriarchal country, with many issues that need to be addressed,
many women activists frequently receive support for their activities by their fathers and/or their husbands.
Prominent Afghan, feminist women, such as former Afghan Parliament member Malalai Joya, whose father
encouraged her into politics, have male bodyguards who support their work in promoting women’s rights. Much of
this is not discussed when considering the role of women and their ability to work against oppression within the
patriarchal system. While this is not the focus of this research, this provides an opportune moment to explore how
men have influenced the feminist movement in patriarchal systems.
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and members may not know of other members outside their small network. Many of the women
use pseudonyms and claim that even their families do not know of their membership in RAWA,
in order to protect them8. For Brodsky, the main aim of the book is to share how RAWA forms a
community for the women, providing support and training for the women and their families,
while focusing “in particular on understanding how the resilience and resistance of RAWA as an
organization, and of the individuals who are a part of it, are developed, fostered, and maintained”
(2004, p. 8). This goal helps provide a framework for how to view RAWA’s efforts through their
participatory citizenship work.
One scholar in rhetoric and writing studies addresses the work of RAWA. Mary Queen’s
(2008) essay “Transnational Feminist Rhetorics in a Digital World” examines the “digital
circulations of representations” of RAWA in order to “demonstrate the importance of a global
and digital field for feminist rhetorical analysis” (p. 471). Queen looks at how the circulation of
Afghan women’s images are “fixed” in time and othered through the frameworks of terms such
as “democracy” and “women’s rights.” (2008, p. 471). She addresses how non-profit
organizations, which identify as feminist, provide narrow interpretations to these women’s lives,
and how their digital presence was not fully considered when addressing the issues for women in
that space. Queen provides a foundation in showing how the framing of Afghan women presents
a hurdle for them achieving a participatory citizenship when there is foreign intervention and that
the outsiders (namely the United States and United Kingdom) are presented with a narrow and
incomplete view of Afghan women.
This dissertation examines how the Revolutionary Association of the Women of
Afghanistan asserts their agency in the face of an othered status within the United States even as
8

The founder of RAWA, Meena, was assassinated for her work and is revered by the women in RAWA. Also, note
that men may be involved with RAWA and support their work, but they cannot be members of the organization.
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many Westerners claim to want to help Afghan women. This project works to dispel the myths
perpetuated by the news media and offers an alternative definition of citizenship to the
discussion, a definition that works to create the concept of participatory citizenship, one that is
defined based on participation and activism, instead of only on nationality. The analyses in the
following chapters examine the frame that was placed upon Afghan women by the United States
government, United States-based non-governmental organizations, and the news media. This
project also shows how RAWA refutes these frames and provides a foundation of support,
training, and education for Afghan women and men, effectively demonstrating what
participatory citizenship could look like.
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this research is to understand how Afghan women, who appear to have
little ability to socially advocate for their own rights in modern day Afghanistan, negotiate their
citizenship through their online texts. My concern is with the relationship between gender and
power as it has been portrayed both through the news media, as well as through the United States
and Afghan government policies since it is through these lenses that Afghan women’s assertion
of their citizenship has been disregarded. The actions of governments, the news media, and nonprofit organizations have imposed a narrow view on Afghan women, resulting in a diminished
perception of Afghan women’s agency within Afghanistan. The United States and its allies’ war
in Afghanistan was justified for the retaliation for the events on September 11, 2001, but also
was asserted as a way to help the women of Afghanistan.
Since their founding in 1977, the Revolutionary Association of the Women of
Afghanistan (RAWA) has looked for ways to get the message out to a global, (mostly) Englishspeaking audience about the treatment of women in Afghanistan, by the Afghan government, by
local groups such as the Taliban, and by foreign governments. While utilizing a unique and
rhetorical performance in the late twentieth century, RAWA has moved from printed books and a
journal Payam-e-Zan (Women’s Message) to digital press releases and videos posted on the
Internet. However, their message has not been addressed, as multiple wars have taken place
within the past forty years, which were initiated by foreign powers, resulting in a marginalization
of Afghan women’s concerns. The history recorded by RAWA, which includes press releases,
print and online publications, and announcements sent through social media sites such as
Facebook and Twitter, have been received with mixed and inappropriate responses. RAWA posts
YouTube videos, as well as maintains a log of the articles produced by multiple news media
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outlets about the issues concerning women in Afghanistan. While not directly dialoging with the
international audience, RAWA addresses many of the concerns that they feel have been ignored
by the global community, particularly the United States and Europe.
The texts created by RAWA provide an insight into how they work in asserting their
agency. Not only has RAWA demonstrated that women around the world can speak for
themselves, but this work can be used to help other women in their own communities to have a
voice against the oppression that comes with foreign occupations and regional regimes. In 1999,
RAWA started using video as a departure point for dialogue for the first time, when they filmed
the execution of Zarmeena by the Taliban regime. This video provides a starting point in a genre
chain in which their initial video provided a connection (or misconnection) to future events. A
genre chain, as defined by Fairclough (2010), is where “genres which are regularly and
predictably chained together such that meanings are moved and transformed along the chain, and
recontextualised and transformed in regular ways” (p. 76). In using RAWA’s first video, it
creates a beginning of a genre chain, to which governments, news media outlets, and feminist
activists reacted, sometimes without full knowledge or understanding of the situation. As the
beginning of a genre chain, RAWA’s first video makes available an opportunity to analyze the
direct and indirect reactions to the video, thus demonstrating how a specific rhetorical event
could morph and change based on social and political angling.
While many rhetoricians have examined the intersections between texts, society, and
culture, little has been done to demonstrate how critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 2010;
Wodak 1997, 2008, 2009) can be viewed through an intersectional and postcolonial feminist lens
(Collins 1990; Mohanty 2004; Spivak 1988; hooks 1986, 1989, Lorde 2007, Ahmed 1999). In
this research, I have used a feminist lens in order to develop a critical perspective for analyzing
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the texts. Using intersectional and postcolonial feminist theory and critical discourse analysis as
my method, I was able to critique issues from multiple perspectives, addressing how the tension
between the powerful and powerless affects the nature of discourse and as such requires that
texts be read and responded to outside of a vacuum. Keeping this in mind, my goal is to look at
the texts produced by RAWA, as well as the direct and indirect responses by the government and
the news media in the United States in order to develop a critical understanding of the
implications in these narrow and colonial framings.
Addison and McGee’s (1999) definition of feminist empirical research in which the
researcher not only considers his or her political position, but also considers one of the goals of
research to be “social and individual change” (pg. 3) allows for me to recognize my position and
goals for this research. The need to consider the goal of change is an important part of feminist
research, in that the researcher works to acknowledge not only what is observed or studied, but
that the results of that work have a possibility to help those who were the subject of the research.
It should also be noted that “research conducted by feminist-oriented women should by no means
be equated with either research conducted by women or research on women” (Wodak, 1997, p.
7), which means that it is more than the gender of the researcher or of the subject matter that
makes research feminist; it is the theory and methods employed in the research process that
define feminist research.
In using feminist research methods, I acknowledge where I position myself with the
issues of gender, race, and class within the study. I am mindful of bell hooks (1989) on the
ethical issues of research as part of feminist scholarship. She states that “[w]hen we write about
the experiences of a group to which we do not belong, we should think about the ethics of our
action, considering whether or not our work will be used to reinforce and perpetuate domination”
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(p. 43). I consider the colonial attitudes towards Afghan women and assert that my project is not
intended to be an authoritative text on the issues of colonized, Middle Eastern or Afghan women.
Rather it is intended as a contribution to a larger dialogue on the issues of women’s abilities for
agency in controlling their representation and identity within the context of asserting their
citizenship and demonstrates how women can be agents for change.
3.1 Feminist Theory
The foundational lens in which I view critical discourse analysis is through an
intersectional, postcolonial feminist frame, which address the interconnections between systems
of power, privilege and oppression. This would include issues such as racism, classism, sexism,
patriarchy, ageism, heterosexism, colonialism, and neo-liberal globalization/capitalism, in
addition to others.
Built on the work of feminist rhetorical scholars such as Royster (2000, 2003), Logan
(1995), Schell and Rawson (2010), and Glenn (1997), I look at re-envisioning how to interpret
the works that women are currently producing. Adrienne Rich (1972) argues that “Re-vision—
the act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an old text from a new critical
direction—is for us more than a chapter in cultural history: it is an act of survival.” (p. 18-19).
This re-vision is one in which I examine how Afghan women have been framed by many
sources, which has been perpetuated through the creation of official public policies on
Afghanistan and how to help Afghan women. Revision involves considering the resistance to
multiple and intersecting oppressions and how re-vision can be applied to textual analysis
through the use of multiple feminist theories.
Intersectional feminism developed out of Black Feminist Thought as articulated by
Patricia Hill Collins. She states,
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as opposed to examining gender, race, class, and nation, as separate systems of
oppression, intersectionality explores how these systems mutually construct one another,
or, in the words of Black British sociologist Stuart Hall, how they “articulate” with one
another (Slack 1996). Current scholarship deploying intersectional analyses suggests that
certain ideas and practices surface repeatedly across multiple systems of oppression and
serve as focal points or privileged social locations for these intersecting systems (Collins,
2003, p. 63).
These initial explorations into the intersectionality of oppression have developed into a language
in which feminist scholars look at how all oppressions ultimately result in poor policies and
misguided versions of citizenship.
Postcolonial feminism works to counter the frame of the “average third-world woman”
(Mohanty, 2004) that is reproduced, constructed, and represented within Western discourse. It
counters the construction between the relationship of knowledge production and ways of
knowing and the ongoing process of imperialization through Western neo-capitalism. Mohanty
(2004) asserts that “[t]his average Third World woman leads an essentially truncated life based
on her feminine gender (read: sexually constrained) and her being “Third World” (read: ignorant,
poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family oriented, victimized, etc.)” (p. 22). This
narrow perspective on colonized women demonstrates how Afghan women have been
marginalized as they assert their knowledge and work to improve their own communities.
Postcolonial feminism was derived from postcolonial theory articulated in Edward Said’s
1978 book Orientalism which created an impetus to start a dialogue on postcolonial issues and
developing theory. He addresses the Western perspective of the “Orient” through the lens of
classical texts and the need to look at how entire regions have been collectively grouped and

51

viewed as one “Orientalist” identity. Said critiques how Orientalist scholars created a binary,
through an imaginative geography which was viewed as a conflict between “our land versus
barbarian land” (2002, p. 20). This simplistic view creates an othering of the “Orientals” and
asserts a position that the differences amongst outsiders does not require a specific distinction
between cultures and identities. And while there are critiques of Said’s work, Leila Ahmed
(1999) describes Said’s Orientalism as a theory that
gave us… a language with which to begin to talk of some aspects of the experience of
being Arab. Most particularly it gave us a way to speak of being Arab in the West and of
what it was to live embattled in a sea of prejudices… that come at us as ‘knowledge,’ and
as ‘objective,’ ‘neutral,’ ‘transcendent,’ ‘unbiased,’ ‘truths’ (p. 240).
And in turn, Said provides feminists with a language to bring postcolonial ideas into feminist
theory for development.
3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) considers some of the key issues, such as social and
political power structures, that are found in feminist theory, especially when considering
hegemony as it “cuts across and integrates economy, politics and ideology” (Fairclough, 2010, p.
61). In using critical discourse analysis, I used the work of Ruth Wodak and Norman Fairclough,
as well as recent scholarship on feminist CDA by Michelle M. Lazar. CDA addresses the issues
of social justice, hegemony, and the oppressive nature of how language is used, especially by
those in power, including governments and the news media. Critical discourse analysis claims
that “cultural rather than merely economic dimensions are significant in the creation and
maintenance of power relations…[and] there is no strict separation between infrastructure and
superstructure” (Jenner & Titscher, 2000, p. 145). One current debate is over how feminist CDA
52

differs from a traditional definition of CDA, in light of the fact that both address oppression.
Lazar (2005) asserts that feminist CDA needs “to theorize and analyse the particularly
insidious and oppressive nature of gender as an omni-relevant category in most social practices”
(p. 3). One of the reasons that Lazar (2005) asserts a feminist form of CDA was that the
foundational scholars were “straight white men” and that the women who were conducting
feminist CDA research were not “sufficiently organized” (p. 3-4). However, under these
definitions women are simply an additive to CDA and a more critical foundation needs to be
considered beyond the simple addition of gender to the issues of politics and economics. In this
respect, CDA provides the tools and postcolonial and intersectional feminist theories provide a
specific political stance for analysis. For this project, I assert that incorporating postcolonial and
intersectional feminist theories helps develop a feminist lens within CDA in order to examine the
problems for women in Afghanistan, as they have been colonized for centuries from different
occupying forces.
Articulating a feminist form of critical discourse analysis through the incorporation of
intersectional and postcolonial feminist arguments, I consider Audre Lorde’s (2007) argument
that “the master’s tools will not dismantle the master’s house” (112). In other words, those
resisting oppression cannot use the language or methods of the oppressor in order to be free.
While CDA works against oppression on economic and political terms in Western countries, it
does not overtly address the intersections of race, class, gender, sexuality and other aspects of
oppression that have been imposed on societies. Developing a critical and intersectional form of
feminist CDA expands how this method can be used to consider colonized women’s citizenship
work.
Using feminist CDA to address the texts by RAWA as well as the United States
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government’s and the news media’s responses to women’s issues in Afghanistan provides a lens
into how power structures work to inform, detract, and/or manipulate messages between those
who are viewed without agency and those who have the power to appropriate RAWA’s work for
their own political agendas.
3.3 Selecting the Texts
The rationale for selecting the texts for analysis is based both on practicality and
appropriateness of how the sources address the topic of citizenship. Since the events on
September 11, 2001 and the subsequent United States’ war in Afghanistan, the volume of
discourse has grown exponentially on a global level by governments, news media outlets, and by
international non-governmental organizations. As a result, I focus both on the locations in which
the texts were produced and on the timeframe in which they were produced.
In this project, I review texts focusing on the years immediately surrounding 9-11, from
2001-2002. I analyze transcripts from four specific sources: a CNN documentary, a United States
Congressional hearing on human rights in Afghanistan, the 2002 State of the Union address, and
policy statements from RAWA. The transcripts have been selected based on how well they frame
citizenship through either Afghan women’s actions or how their agency has been denied.
Also, texts have been selected based on how broad an impact they could potentially have
because of frequency of appearance or importance of the event. For example, the State of the
Union address is viewed as a text with broad impact as it is broadcast nationally, with much
focus brought on from the national news media. The CNN documentary is important because of
the national audience, particularly with a show that was rebroadcast multiple times, expanding
the number of people it reached. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, I only look at the transcripts of
the events in order to focus on specific words and phrases being used by the speakers. In order to
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look at the power of the discourse in both empowering and hegemonic ways, I focus on how
forms of citizenship are constructed through the tropes of the veil, resistance, and freedom.
Using Wodak and Reisigl (2008), I recursively categorize the analysis and consider the
political problems which provided the motivation for RAWA to create their first video. I focus
on specific tropes (veiling, resistance and freedom), taking into account the social, historical and
political context; and formulate a critique considering the “opaque, contradictory and
manipulative relations among power, language and social structures” as well as keeping in mind
the issues of gender as it has been played out through patriarchal hegemony.
In addition to looking at what is said, I also look for what is not being said in the texts. I
identify which aspects of the tropes are missing, especially considering which parts of the whole
are not being expressed. Borrowing from Stuart Hall (1985) Huckin has noted, “‘Positively
marked terms “signify” because of their position in relation to what is absent, unmarked, the
unspoken, the unsayable. Meaning is relational within an ideological system of presences and
absences’” (2002, p. 398). Considering the silences or what was absent will help me reflect on
how the absence of information changes the frame of the texts.
3.4 Data Analysis
The primary source for the analyses comes from the transcripts for the CNN
documentary, the United States Congressional Hearing, and the 2002 State of the Union address.
For each text, I created a table in which I noted specific words and phrases that pertained to an
aspect of participatory citizenship, which included phrases outlining activities conducting by
citizens and terms such as veiling, freedom, and resistance. The charts are provided in Appendix
C, D, E, and F. To begin the analysis, I first separated the text into paragraphs. I then reviewed
each text three times. For the first review, I sorted the information in to preliminary categories. I
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then reviewed the material again to eliminate redundant categories and clarify the content in each
category. Finally, I reviewed the text and the categories a third time and made final decisions
about which pieces of textual evidence fit into each category. During the review of information I
considered two questions:
•

What does this text say about citizenship in general?

•

What does this text say about citizenship for Afghan women?

In each of the texts I considered what language and rhetorical strategies were being used to
answer these two questions. I looked at how the intersections of identity, agency and citizenship
are being demonstrated in the texts. I highlighted smaller sections of the texts that have the
potential for addressing citizenship and on each chart noted how the words and/or phrases
address the construction of participatory citizenship.
As I worked through the transcripts, I also looked to find recurring tropes within the
texts. The tropes of veiling, resistance, and freedom come up repeatedly. Figure 3.1 contains a
simple sum of the mentions of the three tropes. The concept of freedom comes up frequently,
especially in the State of the Union address and the Congressional Hearing. Also, veiling shows
up frequently in the Congressional Hearing and the CNN documentary, but does not show up in
the State of the Union address. The trope that came up the least in the three transcripts was
resistance. While the trope of resistance appeared less frequently, it is still significant enough to
be worthy of analysis as it is an important aspect of RAWA’s citizenship work.
FIGURE 3.1 FREQUENCY OF TROPES
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It is important to note that the frequency of the terms coincided with how Afghan women’s
agency was being framed. Many of these tropes were used in order to justify the war in
Afghanistan and to save Afghan women from the Taliban. Repeated through the texts, these
terms provided an opportunity for analysis and comparison to RAWA’s stance.
After analyzing the transcripts for both the constructions of a participatory citizenship
and the tropes of veiling, resistance, and freedom, I reviewed multiple texts from RAWA in
order to find which documents responded to the tropes and constructions of citizenship. The
RAWA documents chosen for the analysis were:
•

“RAWA’s Education Policy”

•

Interpretation of the slogan “Freedom, Democracy and Social Justice”

•

Afghanistan, World’s Largest Forgotten Tragedy

•

“RAWA’s Standpoints”

I chose these documents because they concisely state RAWA’s position on the tropes of veiling,
freedom, and resistance and are able to address the question of participatory citizenship. The
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texts are written in English and available on their website, which provided me with both access
to the documents and demonstrated the desire for RAWA to reach a global, English-speaking
audience.
The texts produced by RAWA provided detailed explanations of their position on the
tropes, suggesting that these issues have been a constant debate for Afghan women. They
provided precise examples of the tropes and they were reviewed and analyzed in the same
process used with the other transcripts. These texts were read with the goal to find a response to
the texts produced by CNN, the Congressional Hearing, and the State of the Union address.
RAWA’s texts were then re-read in order to refine the interpretation and clarify the connections
between what was said about Afghan women and what RAWA was stating. The third re-reading
was to help ensure that the RAWA’s texts did respond to the transcripts, even though some were
written prior to the events of the transcripts. This analysis provides an opportunity to make
connections between the imagined vision of Afghan women and how RAWA has resisted
colonial frames by outsiders.
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CHAPTER 4: TRACING THE GENRE CHAIN
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, the Revolutionary Association of the Women of
Afghanistan (RAWA) started using video in 1999 in order to bring attention to the plight of
women under the Taliban. A woman’s execution in a soccer stadium exemplifies that the
destruction of women had become a national sport. By creating this video, RAWA creates a
visual record of events for the world. This action makes Afghan women more visible through the
use of an article of clothing that is most condemned as making women invisible, the burqa.
While the world denounces the mandatory use of veiling, especially in reference to the use of the
burqa, RAWA used the burqa as a tool of subterfuge in order to smuggle a video camera into the
stadium and record the execution of a woman through the eye-mesh9.
This video provides an opportunity to begin a genre chain, as articulated by Norman
Fairclough (2010), who suggests that the connections between the genres allow for alterations in
the context of the source (p. 76). Genre chains “are among the semiotic conditions of possibility
of ‘globalisation’ as ‘action at a distance’, and intensification and shifts in globalisation are
conditional upon changes in this semiotic resource” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 76). In other words,
RAWA’s initial video has the opportunity to transform how the world reacts to the situation for
Afghan women. The Zarmeena video fundamentally changed how RAWA got their message out
to the international community. RAWA did not have to rely on foreign governments or media
outlets to provide the visuals of their stories. (Initially, they did have to rely on news media
agencies to show their videos; however, the increase in the availability of the Internet has
changed their outreach to the public.) RAWA’s production of their own images gave them the
ability to tell the story from their perspective, demonstrating what RAWA wants the world to

9

As is discussed in Chapter 8, RAWA simultaneously condemns the Taliban’s mandatory veiling laws.
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see. However, sending information into world does not mean that the creator has control over
how images or the message is used—whether it is contorted or kept true to the creator’s intent.
Fairclough’s articulation of genre chains provides an opportunity to make connections that “are
removed from each other in time and space” (2001, p. 76). The Zarmeena video provides an
opportunity to make broader connections between the actions of the United States government,
in asserting the need for war in the name of Afghan women and RAWA’s ability to assert their
citizenship against the power structure in the Taliban-dominated Afghanistan.

Afghan People vs. The Taliban: The Struggle Continues
Congressional testimony
31 October 2001

RAWA's Zarmeena video
November, 1999

Operation Enduring Freedom
begins 7 October 2001

11 September 2001

Beneath the Veil: The Taliban's Harsh Rule of Afghanistan
CNN documentary
August, 2001

President of the United States
State of the Union address 2002
"Axis of evil speech"
29 January 2002

FIGURE 4.1 THE GENRE CHAIN OF RAWA’S ZARMEENA VIDEO.
Figure 4.1 models the timeline and the movement of the Zarmeena video through the
genre chain. Filmed in November 1999, the Zarmeena execution video was offered to the
“Associated Press, the BBC and others” (RAWA Afghanistan, 2011), but was rejected due to the
violent nature of the footage (an irony that was not lost on RAWA). As a result of the news
media’s resistance to publicly distribute the video, it did not receive widespread viewing until
after the events on September 11, 2001. What was too violent for the United States audience in
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1999 was no longer taboo by late 2001. The video was broadcast in August 2001 on the United
States-based news channel CNN. The Zarmeena video was a small part of a longer CNN
documentary, which highlighted the issues for women in Afghanistan under the rule of the
Taliban10.
Table 4.1 demonstrates the fluctuation of the interest in the issues for women in
Afghanistan. In 1998 the Taliban took over much of Afghanistan, including Kabul,
Afghanistan’s capital. Soon after, as women’s ability to move around and general freedoms were
restricted, the interest in Afghan women’s issues by outsiders increased during the years of 19981999 in the news media reports, as well as the interest from non-governmental organizations
such as Amnesty International and the Feminist Majority11. By 2000 and prior to September 11,
2001, interest in the status of Afghan women waned considerably, to less than half of the news
reports and press releases of previous years.
TABLE 4.1 REPORTS OF AFGHAN WOMEN BY THE MEDIA, NGOS AND UNITED STATES CONGRESS12
Afghan NYT* CNN* Congressional
women
Records
1998
14
2
9
1999
2
0
81
Recording of Zarmeena video
2000
1
1
51
1/012
1
7
9/10/01
September 11, 2001
9/11/01- 101
31

104

Congressional Amnesty Feminist SubHearings
Majority totals
4
5
4
38
86
14
4
187
42
0

1
2

101
17

Total for pre-9/11 (45 months)

343

15

268

10

5
5

13

4

An uncut version of the video was later posted by RAWA on their own YouTube channel in 2011.
I am only looking at Amnesty International and Feminist Majority because they testified to Congress, which
demonstrates their access to the government structure and prominence in what is viewed as activist circles.
12 This chart list mentions in the media, press releases and United States Congressional Records and Hearings,
where “Afghan women” were the main story. It only lists unique broadcasts from CNN; rebroadcasts are not noted.
New York Times (NYT) statistics are not for analysis but for comparison only, data from NYT archives; CNN data
collected from LexisNexis Academic search.
11
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12/01
2002

110

8

90

50
12
5
Totals for post 9-11 (15 months)

275
543

The New York Times and the 24-hour news broadcast station CNN are examples of the
interest in Afghan women. What is particularly interesting is that in the three-and-a-half month
period from September 11, 2001 through the end of December 2001, there are more articles
about the issues on Afghan women than the previous three years and eight month period before
9-11. For example, in the nine months prior to 9-11 there were two articles about Afghan women
in the New York Times and one report on CNN. From September 11 through the end of the year,
the New York Times had 101 articles and CNN had 31 news reports on Afghan women. This is
an increase of over four-thousand percent in the interest of Afghan women’s issues by the news
media. This is a pattern that is mirrored through all of the sources presented.
The non-governmental organizations Amnesty International and Feminist Majority have
significant access to Congress and actively lobby in Washington D.C. Amnesty International, a
human-rights non-governmental organization based in the United Kingdom, works on issues
related to the Declaration of Human Rights and confronts governments who violate these
principles. Most of their work is lobbying governments to free political prisoners, assuring that
people in prison have access to counsel, and bringing to light the human rights abuses happening
around the world. The Feminist Majority Foundation, a non-governmental organization based in
the United States, is “dedicated to women’s equality, reproductive health, and non-violence”
(Feminist Majority, 2014). Their work mainly focuses on women’s issues in the United States,
until they started a campaign on the rights of Afghan women, in 1998. Feminist Majority’s fundraising campaign on the issues of Afghan women was controversial and was criticized as
imposing colonial definitions of feminism. The Feminist Majority was “more interested in
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portraying Afghan women as mute creatures covered from head to toe, [as] the Feminist
Majority aggressively promotes itself and its campaign by selling small squares of mesh cloth,
similar to the mesh… [on] the traditional Afghan burqa” (Kolhatkar, 2002). The focus on veiling
detracted from Afghan women’s agency and created a situation where the Feminist Majority is
framing RAWA’s claims for them, instead of letting them speak for themselves.
United States Congressional Records and Congressional Hearings documents (which can
be accessed through a search of the Federal Depository Library at http://www.gpo.gov)
demonstrate the inconsistent nature of their interest in women’s issues in Afghanistan from the
members of the United States Congress. While the United States government has been critiqued
for focusing too much and/or wrong type of time and money on foreign affairs, there is a
demonstrated flow of concern that mirrors public interest in the topic and a significant change
when the United States is advocating for its own interests.
While the data presented in Table 4.1 is raw data with minimal analysis, it provides an
opportunity for future research to explore the fluctuation of information, providing additional
examples for future exploration in the use of genre chains.
4.1 The Flow of Information from RAWA to the United States War in Afghanistan
From the Zarmeena video, the genre chain demonstrates the reaction to that video, either
directly or indirectly. In Figure 4.1, a path is mapped out that highlights the different entities that
are influenced by the 1999 video. The Zarmeena video was first presented to a United States
audience through a documentary on CNN in August 2001. Initially the broadcast received little
fanfare. After the events on September 11th, the documentary and additional news stories were
replayed. (See Appendix A for a timeline of events.) As a result of the attention now paid to the
video, news media outlets and United States government reacted by othering Afghan women by
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demonstrating their vulnerability. Though RAWA’s initial claims for assistance were initially
ignored and manipulated, it was not until later when the United States’ interests coincided with
critiques of the Taliban leaders, that attention was paid to Afghan women’s issues.
4.2 RAWA and their Work on the Chain
In contrast to the United States response to Afghan women’s issues, RAWA builds their
evidence about the atrocities against women that are happening under the Taliban through their
texts. RAWA produces both physical and online texts in order to provide outreach to the
international community. Founded in 1977 by Meena, RAWA was created as a “freedom-loving
and anti-fundamentalist” (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, 2014c)
organization13. While advocating for the rights of women specifically, they also advocate for
children and families by running schools for both boys and girls, providing job training and
literacy programs for adults. They also participate in activist work in Pakistan where there are
large refugee camps. RAWA’s slogan claims “freedom, democracy and women’s rights”
(Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, 2014c) and they actively speak out
against those who want to oppress women. Not only does this include the Taliban, but also the
United Front/Northern Alliance14, Afghan warlords, and many members of the Afghan
government. RAWA’s outreach to the international community is through their website,
(www.rawa.org) where there are translations in English, Spanish, Italian, French, German,
Portuguese, and Japanese. They also utilize social media, such as Twitter and Facebook, in
addition to a dedicated YouTube channel.
RAWA provides numerous publications in English, in addition to Persian (Farsi), Urdu
and Pashto. These print publications include pamphlets, books, and posters. Online, RAWA
13
14

Meena was assassinated in 1987 for her work on RAWA.
The official name is United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan.
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produces press releases and some of their printed texts are available in digital form. For this
project, I specifically look at four short documents that demonstrate a framework for
participatory citizenship and are in English. These documents include the booklet titled
Afghanistan, World’s Largest Forgotten Tragedy; a statement explaining their definitions of
“Freedom, Democracy and Social Justice”; their “Educational Policy”; and “RAWA’s
Standpoints,” their position statement on women’s rights, the veil, and the future of Afghanistan.
While these texts are concise, they provide a detailed overview of RAWA’s work and their goals
for the Afghan people. These texts work as a response to the frames on the genre chain, always
present in order to counter the recontextualized representations of Afghan women.
4.3 Deviations From RAWA’s Zarmeena Video Navigating the Genre Chains
In asserting that RAWA’s Zarmeena execution video forms the base of the genre chain, I
am not claiming that the contents of the video shows up in each of the texts that are being
analyzed. Rather the influence of the video is pervasive in how different entities and events
interpret the Zarmeena video. As Fairclough suggests with a genre chain, the Zarmeena video
which is used to frame Afghan women is recontextualized and transformed in order to provide an
alternative perspective to the event. The result is that the construction of Afghan women’s
citizenship is through narrow ideological frames by the entities involved in attempting to help
with women’s rights in Afghanistan.
4.3.1 CNN and Co-opting of RAWA’s Message
For this project, one of the texts I focus on is the transcript of the CNN documentary,
Beneath the Veil. This documentary was first shown in United Kingdom in July 2001 and later
shown in United States in August 2001. The journalist Saria Shah, who is British of Afghan
descent, first visited Afghanistan as a reporter during the Soviet invasion. She demonstrated
65

conflicting ideas of the country. Her reflections included romantic notions of Afghanistan, from
stories told to her by her father, mixed in with the current situation of the Taliban domination of
the country (CNN Transcript, 2001). This documentary did not receive much attention until after
September 11, when in the United States the documentary and news media interviews of Shah
and her film crew on CNN were broadcast repeatedly during the month following the attacks.
4.3.2 United States Congressional Hearing: Defining Priorities for Afghan Women
For this section I am focusing on the testimony presented to the United States
Congressional committee, the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of
the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives on October 31, 2001.
This hearing, titled Afghan People vs. The Taliban: The Struggle for Freedom Intensifies, is a
review of the human rights issues going on in Afghanistan. Originally scheduled for September
15, 2001, this scheduling change demonstrates that human rights in Afghanistan were of serious
concern to the United States prior to the 9-11 attack. Delayed because of the government
shutdowns following 9-11, the hearing was held six weeks later. In Figure 4.2 I outline the
representatives who provided testimony to the committee on the status of the Afghan people.
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A. Quadir Amiryar, Ph.D.,
Executive Director, Central
Asia Research and
Development Center, George
Washington University

Tahmeena Faral (alias)
Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan

Representatives of Afghanistsan

Jeffrey J. Lundstead, Senior Advisor and
Afghanistan Coordinator, Bureau of South Asian
Affairs, U.S. Department of State;

United States Department of State

Haron Amin, Special
Representative/Spokesperson,
United Front (Northern Alliance)

The Honorable Joseph R. Pitts, a
Representative in Congress from the
State of Pennsylvania.

Lorne W. Craner, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S.
Department of State;

Congressional testimony
Participants

T. Kumar, Advocacy Director
for Asia & Pacific, Amnesty
International USA;

Congressional

Non-Governmental Organizations
The Honorable Cynthia A. McKinney,
a Representative in Congress from
the State of Georgia

The Honorable Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative
in Congress from the State of
Florida, and Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on
Eleanor Smeal,
President, The
Feminist Majority;

FIGURE 4.2 TESTIMONY PROVIDED TO THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
This visual outlines who was chosen to represent the human rights issues in Afghanistan.
The multiple speakers who represent different social and political points of view, results in a
conflict between how Afghan women are represented and talked about, even when their interests
are represented by RAWA. Based on the chart in Figure 4.2, the people who provided testimony
to the committee are as follows:
Representatives of Afghanistan
•

Quadir Amiryar, Ph.D., Executive Director, Central Asia Research and Development
Center (CARDC), professor with the Elliot School of International Affairs George
Washington University. (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 48). Amiryar
frequently provides testimony to the United States Congress on issues in Afghanistan.

•

Haron Amin, Special Representative/ Spokesperson, United Front/Northern Alliance of
Afghanistan. “Afghan diplomat at the UN... He and his family fled Afghanistan and
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settled in the U.S. However, he returned to fight Soviet occupation under his mentor,
Commander Massoud, recently assassinated by Taliban forces. In the U.S., he has
continued to work with the Afghan government in exile at the UN, and in other
capacities.” (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 48)
•

Tahmeena Faryal, representative, Revolutionary Association of the Women of
Afghanistan (RAWA). Faryal testified by phone to Congress and used a pseudonym in
order to protect her identity.

Representatives from the United States Department of State
•

Lorne W. Craner, the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor, United States Department of State, (non-career/political appointee). Craner is
a political appointee to the State department. Craner “served as the President of the
International Republican Institute… served as the Director of Asian Affairs at the
National Security Council, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative
Affairs… [and was] an advisor for Congressman Jim Colby and Senator John McCain”
(Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 22).

•

Jeffrey J. Lundstead, Senior Advisor and Afghanistan Coordinator, Bureau of South
Asian Affairs, United States Department of State (career service officer). Lundstead is in
a civil service position and “served as the Director of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and Bangladesh… has served in various capacities in U.S. embassies throughout South
Asia, and was the country officer for Sudan” (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p.
22).

Representatives from Non-Governmental Organizations
•

T. Kumar, Advocacy Director for Asia & Pacific, Amnesty International USA. Kumar
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represents the views of Amnesty International and their very specific issues on human
rights that they address, including those outlined in the Declaration of Human Rights.
Kumar “has debated with Taliban representatives, and testified before the House and
Senate concerning conditions there. He himself has been a victim of human rights
violations. He has been imprisoned and tortured in Sri Lanka for his student human rights
activities” (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 41)
•

Eleanor Smeal, President, The Feminist Majority. Unable to attend the hearing, Smeal
provided written testimony that was added to the transcript of the hearing. According to
the Feminist Majority website, Smeal identifies as “a political analyst, strategist, and
grassroots organizer” (2014).

United States Congressional Representatives
•

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, United States Representative from the State of Florida, and Chair of
the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights. Ros-Lehtinen
identifies with the Republican party.

•

Cynthia A. McKinney, United States Representative from the State of Georgia.
McKinney identifies with the Democratic party.

•

Joseph R. Pitts, United States Representative from the State of Pennsylvania, Vice-Chair
of the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights. Pitts identifies with
the Republican party.

•

Representative Dana Rohrabacher, United States Representative from the State of
California. Rohrabacher identifies with the Republican Party.

•

Representative Christopher H. Smith, United States Representative from the State of New
Jersey. Smith identifies with the Republican Party.
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With the testimonies provided by various representatives, there are multiple lenses from which
the view of Afghan women is framed and recontextualized.
4.3.3 The President of the United States and the 2002 State of the Union Address
President George W. Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address was delivered three months
after the invasion of Afghanistan. While it is known as the “axis of evil” speech, it also frames
how the United States constructs citizenship and works to save Afghan women through military
action. As is traditional with State of the Union addresses, the president reviews current issues
for the country, as well as lays out an agenda for the next year. In this particular speech,
President Bush discusses multiple issues including the war in Afghanistan, hints at a future war
with Iraq, introduces a new female cabinet member for the government in Afghanistan, honors
United States soldiers and their families for their sacrifice, and honors the victims of 9-11. In this
speech the frame of Afghan women is further removed from RAWA’s Zarmeena video, as Bush
transforms the simple veiling trope to one of freedom for Afghan women.
4.3.4 The Digital Texts of RAWA: Answering Questions
The digital texts of RAWA extends their global outreach in disseminating information.
RAWA speaks in one voice and most members are unknown to the larger group for their own
protection. Hence, none of the publications has a single author, but instead the author is
identified only as RAWA. Exceptions to this are noted, as with Faryal, who uses a pseudonym
and whose face is never shown. Faryal is the name that is always used for the representative from
RAWA in television interviews and public testimonies about the issues for Afghan women in the
United States.
In this project, the beginning of the genre chain starts with RAWA’s work. The are
overtly represented in the CNN documentary (which is discussed at length in Chapter 5) and in
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the testimony before Congress. While RAWA is not referenced in the 2002 State of the Union
address nor is RAWA’s voice directly heard, the speech provides a frame from which RAWA
works to counter the tropes that limiting their ability to be heard and hinders their participation in
citizenship practices.
4.4 Conclusion
These sources provide a framework in which to construct both how the United States
addresses issues of participatory citizenship for both its citizens and for the people of
Afghanistan. Utilizing Fairclough’s genre chains, these charts work to provide visual
connections between RAWA’s initial video, how the video impacted other texts produced, and
how the women of Afghanistan were constructed as needing help by an outside force.
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CHAPTER 5: LOOKING INTO THE OTHER: CNN’S EXPLORATION OF
THE PLIGHT FOR WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN
In this chapter I address the question of how language from the news media works to
frame Afghan women’s citizenship. Within this issue, I examine the transcript of the
documentary Beneath the Veil: The Taliban’s Harsh Rule of Afghanistan broadcast on CNN,
addressing how the video works to define citizenship through the tropes of the veil, resistance,
and freedom for Afghan women. The foundation of the genre chain is RAWA’s first video,
containing the execution of Zarmeena. This video is used in the documentary, which is first
broadcast to an American audience on CNN15. The genre chain is demonstrated through the
direct use of the Zarmeena video within Shah’s documentary. The link between RAWA’s work
and Shah’s interpretation demonstrates the narrow lens of how Afghan women’s citizenship is
viewed by Shah and in turn CNN.
Demonstrated in Figure 5.1, the events for this link on the chain are embedded within
each other. The event of the actual Zarmeena execution is embedded in a video recorded by a
member of RAWA, which is then embedded in the Beneath the Veil documentary, which is then
embedded within the CNN news report. Within this chain of texts is an increasing lack of
emphasis on the execution, as it was placed as a small part of the larger story and as a result, the
significance of the Zarmeena video was progressively diminished.

15

The documentary was first broadcast in the United Kingdom before the United States.
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Zarmeena
Execution
RAWA Video
Documentary
CNN News
Report

FIGURE 5.1 SITUATING THE SERIES OF EVENTS.
It is important to note that only the actual execution was recorded, events prior and after
the event were not recorded. From RAWA’s Zarmeena video, the documentary takes an even
smaller piece and shows only excepts from the original RAWA video. The documentary is then
taken and placed within a news report. These continued reductions changes how the audience
interprets the events, especially when placed within a different context than what may have been
intended by RAWA.
During the time-period between 1999-2002, the issues in Afghanistan were frequently
glossed over and the media created a singular view of Afghan women’s concerns, as RAWA’s
work was only seen through the lens that was already imagined by filmmakers, including
traditional tropes, such as that the veil equals silence and that priorities for women should
include getting rid of the veil, as well as suggested connections between the veil and the
assertions of peace and freedom through an act of war. While the issues of domestic violence and
the segregation of women from public life are acknowledged, the general framework included in
the asserting of a backwards nature for the people of Afghanistan as a whole and the weakness of
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Afghan women to be able to resolve the issues for women in particular, diminishing women’s
agency in their citizenship practices.
While news media outlets, such as CNN, reported on the issues of Afghan women prior
to 9-11, the interest in their plight was made myopic by the media in the United States, as the
violent actions on September 11 changed the nature of the conversation in the United States.
During this time the media was generally framed as neutral, without a specific ideological stance
that is dictated by the political parties. This analysis demonstrates how the broadcast of the
documentary asserts an ideological stance on women’s issues in Afghanistan that is exacerbated
by the use of a narrow lens.
Edward Said (1997), in his book Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts
Determine How to See the Rest of the World, critiques how the media has addressed the issues
related to Islam and expands on his critique of Orientalist interpretations of political events going
on in the world. While his work does not focus on the issues for women, it provides a foundation
for how we consider the interpretations of what is happening in Afghanistan, how the Afghan
people are respond to those events, and what the Afghan people are saying that might conflict
with the United States’ view of the situation. Building on his argument of Orientalism, Said
(1997) demonstrates how “experts” in the United States are brought out to reinforce a specific
view of the Muslim world (p. 97). He states that
We are probably going to have an even more dramatic cleavage separating good Muslims
from bad, more news hailing the achievements of good Muslims… and more equating of
good Islam with “moderation,” if possible with freedom and democracy, which
principally means a “free” market economy, not an enhanced human rights situation
(Said, 1997, p. 121).
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Ultimately, the claims put forward in a post-September 11 world includes an argument for war
that was framed around freedom and democracy, particularly for Afghan women instead of a
frame focused on retaliation. As a result, I am considering how the general public in the United
States is introduced to the public treatment of women in Afghanistan and how the specific frame
of the Zarmeena’s execution video influences everything from support of non-governmental
organizations to the United States justification for war.
Shah’s documentary focuses on the issues that have arisen for women since the Taliban
took over the majority of Afghanistan in 1996. As was previously mentioned, Shah is a British
war journalist of Afghan descent. She goes into Afghanistan discussing the conflicts and
difficulties as a woman herself, both working as a reporter in the country and sharing her own
personal and complex relationship with Afghanistan (CNN Transcript, 2001). From this
documentary I address the issue of participatory citizenship through three main tropes: how the
veiling frames Afghan women; how Afghan women are demonstrating their resistance and
subversiveness; and how they are defining the complicated notion of freedom.
The CNN news report and documentary was first broadcast in the United States in
August 2001. The hour-long documentary highlighted issues for women in Afghanistan in
dramatic ways, but it was not brought to the forefront until after September 11 when the
documentary broadcast was repeated multiple times reinforcing the plight of women from this
singular perspective. The documentary transcript that I am analyzing, Beneath the Veil: The
Taliban’s Harsh Rule of Afghanistan was made to highlight the problems and suffering of
women under Taliban rule, but it was also an exploration of Shah’s own relationship with the
country of her heritage. This 2001 CNN broadcast was also where most of the people in the
United States initially saw RAWA’s first video of the execution of Zarmeena on CNN. This
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documentary is compelling as it takes footage from the Zarmeena video and asserts a very
specific framework about Afghan women. This documentary is important to look at because in
addition to utilizing RAWA’s Zarmeena footage, it provides a detailed account of what life was
like for women in Afghanistan in 2001.
As mentioned previously, the first video produced by RAWA was the execution of
Zarmeena, on the pitch of a football (soccer) stadium. Zarmeena, who was married with children,
was accused of killing her husband. As is custom, if the husband’s family forgives the wife or if
the family denies the charges, than no punishment comes to the wife (Brodsky, 2003, p. 20). As
problematic as this law is, Zarmeena was forgiven by her husband’s family and as a result no
harm should have come to her. Nevertheless, the Taliban was determined to make an example of
Zarmeena. While there were frequent public floggings and amputations of limbs, Zarmeena
would be the first public execution of an Afghan woman by the Taliban (Brodsky, 2003, p. 17).
RAWA provides little commentary to the events presented in the video. Zarmeena is driven onto
the football pitch, where another woman escorts her off the bed of the truck (Illustration 5.1).

ILLUSTRATION 5.1 STILL OF ZARMEENA’S EXECUTION FROM RAWA’S VIDEO
Zarmeena kneels down, and she is shot three times in the back of the head (Illustration 5.2). The
viewer can hear the crowds in the stadium. The noise from the crowd consists of general
background noise of a crowd who are milling about, but there is no organized chanting or
cheering from the crowd (RAWA Afghanistan, 2011, 0-2:27, 2:29-3:47).
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ILLUSTRATION 5.2 THREE WOMEN, THE MIDDLE ONE ZARMEENA, DRIVEN INTO THE FOOTBALL
STADIUM

As the video shakily pans around the stadium, people (mostly men) are shown milling about. Just
shy of four minutes in length, the video provides little commentary or text. It appears that
RAWA is letting the event stand for itself. There are some notes at the beginning in English.
“Full video of / Public Execution of Zarmeena by Taliban / Nov. 16, 1999 – Kabul” RAWA
Afghanistan, 2001, 0-0:08). and “Filmed secretly by a RAWA member using a hidden camera”
(RAWA Afghanistan, 2001, 0:09-0:18). As a result viewers are required to interpret the events
themselves16.
RAWA’s short video provides a foundation for future perceptions of Afghan women, and
while the information presented is accurate within the video, there were opportunities for
misinterpretations by many agencies, including the news media, to further their own ideological
stance. Since RAWA’s video was shown to the public as part of the documentary when it was
first broadcast on CNN, this would be an appropriate place to make the connection in the genre
chain. In 2001, CNN was making an effort to bring the work of foreign journalists to the
forefront, while also exploiting the voyeuristic desire of the public to see what is happening to
women in other locations. RAWA’s video presents a deviation from what had been happening in
16

This video is available unedited on YouTube at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G4l267pCGdA
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Afghanistan prior to Zarmeena’s execution, as Afghan women were used to seeing floggings and
amputations, but the public execution of a woman was new, and that the Taliban decided to use
Zarmeena as an example, as a warning to other women (Brodsky, 2003, p. 14).
5.1 The issues of the veil for Muslim women pervasive in the text of the video.
One of most pervasive critiques of women’s issues, and the one that is framed as denying
agency to women in the Muslim world, revolves around the issue of the veil. As a result,
women’s bodies, both in the United States and in Islamic countries are open for political debate.
In reference to Muslim women, a variety of words are used to imply covering up and are
frequently used when referring to the country of Afghanistan or to Afghan women, commonly
denying that they are able to have agency over their citizenship. This frame overshadows many
of the real issues that affect Afghan women. Consumers of United States-based news media have
been bombarded with narrow perspectives on what it meant to be a woman living in a
predominately Muslim country, post 9-11. Portraying women in Afghanistan as living in a
different century posed problems for the work women were already doing to demonstrate their
citizenship, as they negotiated the liminal spaces between honoring their local culture, resisting
the oppression of domination between the Taliban, the Northern Alliance, and other occupying
forces, working with refugees in Pakistan, and advocating their cause to the United States and
Europe.
Frequently ignored in the media are the voices of Afghan women, as they negotiate their
citizenship. While there are significant problems for Afghan women in asserting their
citizenship, these problems are not as simple as was claimed by news agencies such as CNN.
According to RAWA, women suffer oppression at the hands of Taliban and the Northern
Alliance, as well as from a legacy of colonial rule and occupying forces of multiple occupations
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(Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, 1999). Not widely addressed in the
United States media is that Afghan women are concerned about access to health care, domestic
violence, and how to help the many widows and orphans. Afghan women living outside an
industrialized country have the additional burden of needing to focus their concerns on the issues
of a foreign-supported war in their community, in addition to access to food and the availability
of clean water. The issues surrounding the burqa have blinded news media viewers in the United
States to the real issues of women living in Afghanistan.
What also is not addressed in this critique of the veil is the implication that the Taliban
focused only on women, but the Taliban also had an influence on Afghan men. While the Quran
addresses the need for dressing modestly for both men and women, the Taliban imposed rules on
men in regards to appearance, which included having their beard a specific length and wearing
Islamic clothes and head cover. (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, n.d.).
The Afghan Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice polices the streets
to publicly punish men for their “transgressions” just as they would punish a woman. As a result
of the bias towards condemnation of the veil, much of the language used in Shah’s documentary
references this ancient practice as shorthand for Afghan women’s subjugation and lack of
agency. The narrator of Beneath the Veil opens with this statement,
Women, according to observers, are reduced to little more than shut-ins. It is a dangerous
and secretive world, one that journalist Saira Shah risked her freedom and her life to
uncover. What she found ‘Beneath the Veil’ is unimaginable (CNN Transcript, 2001).
By applying the frequently used trope of the veil to represent Afghan women’s identities, the
opening of the CNN documentary provides an example of the issues that are pervasive in the
European and United States’ critique of the treatment of women in the Middle East. It is a
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simplistic assertion that veils are “dangerous” and “secretive,” that those who wear veils are
oppressed. This suggests that the burqa, which is only worn in Afghanistan, is the ultimate
demonstration of Afghan women’s oppression. The burqa is the physical extension of a woman
who is shut in her home and what is underneath the veil has provided as much titillation as it
does condemnation for Muslim women.
In the documentary, Shah uses the frame that the veil equals silence. As the transcript
shows, an outsider’s perspective is used to explain the issues for women in Afghanistan. Shah
excerpted and used RAWA’s Zarmeena execution video as a way to demonstrate the violence
against women. However, when Shah reflects on the execution she focuses on the fact that
Zarmeena cannot see effectively through the mesh of the burqa. Standing in the middle of an
empty football/soccer stadium where Zarmeena was killed, Shah states,
And the women who they [the Taliban] executed here were not allowed to take off their
veils. So, they must have had hardly any idea of what was happening. They must have
been very confused. They must have been hearing the crowd screaming. They were
pushed up to the penalty line and made to kneel down (CNN Transcript, 2001).
Through this quote, Shah misleads the viewer and suggests that she was not listening closely to
the sounds on the audio. In RAWA’s unedited video, there were three women in the truck, but
only Zarmeena was executed. RAWA member Salima states that the other two women in the
back of the truck with Zarmeena may have been relatives, but she believes that they were jail
wardens and that Zarmeena may have been expected to be flogged and not executed (Brodsky,
2003, p.17). The crowd was loud and can be heard in the background, but they were not
chanting, as Shah imagines a crowd “baying for the blood” (CNN transcripts, 2001) that would
be expected from a frenzied crowd. There was no evidence of a frenzied crowd in the Zarmeena
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execution video. It was if this was something that many people in audience had seen frequently
already. According to Salima,
the stadium was filled with many children, some of whom were selling food and drinks,
as well as adults, many of whom were beggars who use this opportunity to work the
crowd for money. In addition to the radio announcements, the Taliban had been making
public address announcements near the stadium all morning, as well as stopping people
on the streets outside and, depending on the individual approach, either asking or
ordering the people to go inside the stadium to watch (Brodsky, 2003, p. 17).
These public announcements are not recorded on RAWA’s video. The radio announcement was
broadcast the night before the execution and stated that “a woman would be publicly shot the
next day” and that “especially women, were exhorted to attend” (Brodsky, 2003, p. 15). When
listening to the unedited Zarmeena execution video, the sounds are ones of a large crowd, not the
sounds of a frenzied group chanting for an execution. Instead it is a restless group waiting for
something to happen (RAWA Afghanistan, 2011). What is also missing from RAWA’s video are
the announcements by the Taliban and twenty minutes of speeches reported by Salima. Speakers
included
Taliban officials and… Islamic religious leaders who preached that ‘today they were
happy that God’s Sharia was being implemented in the land of God’ and that the Taliban
Supreme council, …. Highest Sharia law authority, and Taliban leader Mullah
Mohammad Omar… approved this execution (Brodsky, 2003, p. 18).
In carrying out the punishment, the Taliban worked toward imitating a court of law with the
primary focus of intimidating women and their families.
This information is not addressed by Shah, as she does not provide any background to

81

RAWA’s video. This is an important slight to note. Shah’s privileged position, as editor and
interpreter of RAWA’s text, asserts a colonial interpretation of the video. Shah continues with
her own voice-over of the event that she is interpreting.
Veiled women hunched in the back of a pickup truck. Football stadium in Afghanistan, a
place of entertainment turned into an execution ground. Secret pictures showing scenes
the country’s rulers want to keep hidden. We are trying to uncover the truth behind
Afghanistan’s veil of terror. (CNN Transcript, 2001)
During the introduction of the documentary, Shah uses the scene of the three women in the pickup truck (shown in Illustration 5.2) to set a tone for the entire documentary. With Shah’s voiceover the viewer sees an excerpt of RAWA’s video with three women sitting in the back of a
pickup truck. In the lower, left-hand corner, it states “hidden camera” (Abdul Matin Little, 2001,
0:42) letting the viewer know about the subversive nature of the filming. As a result, there is a
disconnect between the use of the images from RAWA’s video and the interpretation by Shah.
She does not identify who the women are in the back of the truck, suggesting to the audience that
maybe all of the women were there to be executed.
Other references to the veil can be found in the documentary, including when Shah
describes the desolation of an Afghan family, “the villagers take us to another house, a place
veiled in sorrow” (CNN Transcript, 2001). The reporter, Shah, utilizes classical United States
and European critiques of the veil in Muslim society and presents it as an overarching concept
that uses this object to represent all women and people submitting to an oppressive regime. The
veil in this situation provides an analogy to a death shroud, impacting the family and community.
This is in direct contrast to the active citizenship work that Afghan women are doing both under
and without the burqa.
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5.2 CNN’s Framing of Resistance for Women in Afghanistan
Afghan women of RAWA have been resisting oppression since Meena formed the
organization in 1977. Working to resist the occupation by the USSR, as well as religious groups
such as the Taliban, the women involved with RAWA have resisted domination in all forms,
including those from United States allies, such as the Northern Alliance. The documentary works
to assert RAWA’s agency, but with limitations. Shah repeats her issue with Afghan women’s
veiling. She states
But it’s also from the most vulnerable, children and women that the first voice of protest
has risen. This is RAWA, the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan.
They are everything the Taliban hate, highly political, left-wing Afghan feminists. They
are determined to fight for human rights in a country where women have been forced
under the veil (CNN Transcripts, 2001).
In this quote, Shah suggests that RAWA formed out of the domination of the Taliban instead of
acknowledging their long history of fighting for women’s rights. She also ignores RAWA’s call
to eliminate all oppression, including from forces inside and outside Afghanistan. She does not
address the citizenship work RAWA has been doing including their work in creating schools, job
training, and building community infrastructure. Keywords that Shah uses, such as “fight for
human rights” frames RAWA’s resistance, while also insisting on Afghan women’s weaknesses,
as they are “forced under the veil,” which provides contradictory frames. Shah argues that the
women of RAWA are the “voice of protest” and “highly-political, left-wing” (CNN Transcript,
2001). While she identifies them as political, Shah does not identify what “left-wing” means in
Afghanistan. Since this video was filmed for broadcast in the United Kingdom, as well as the
United States, “left-wing” politics may look different not only within each country that the
documentary is broadcast, but also may look different for the Afghan women who are practicing
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their politics. When groups in Afghanistan wants to criticize activist women, they are generally
associated with Marxist ideology, drawing connections to the Soviet invasion, thereby creating
an unsavory association in order to discredit RAWA’s work (Brodsky, 2003, p 53). Shah
continues on a trope of resistance through the use of the phrase “determined to fight for human
rights,” (CNN Transcript, 2001) but Shah does not address where RAWA is successful and what
it means for Afghan women to fight for their participation in public life. Using the phrase “to
fight” brings in other connotations, as it suggests violence and connects this notion to an
organization that eschews all kinds of violence. RAWA identifies as a peace-loving organization
and is anti-violence and anti-war (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan,
2014), even in the face of oppressive and violent forces, such as the Taliban and the Northern
Alliance. However, Shah also undermines RAWA’s resistance with the continued trope of
veiling in that they are “forced under a veil” (CNN Transcript, 2001). Shah’s continued
insistence in reinforcing the oppressive nature of the veil fails to address RAWA’s activism and
instead depicts Afghan women as a victim of their culture, leaving the audience to conclude that
Afghan women are unable to assert their citizenship and are in need of a violent, foreign
intervention.
Considering how the trope of the veil is frequently drawn upon to frame Afghan women,
especially when RAWA has a need for secret and undercover work, she does also not address the
(limited) benefits of the burqa and the fact that much can be hidden from the Taliban, making it
ideal for subversive work. When Shah has an opportunity to visit a location of RAWA’s work,
she states, “We arrive at their secret headquarters. RAWA tell me they have an underground
opposition network inside Afghanistan’s capital Kabul. The operatives use hidden cameras as
their most powerful weapon” (CNN Transcripts, 2001). Shah again misrepresents the work of
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RAWA. While the clandestine nature of their work is imperative, there is much about RAWA
that she does not share with the audience. RAWA is very much a de-centralized organization, in
order to protect all of the members. One member may only know a few other members as they
work in their own communities, with connections to one or two members outside of the
community. Shah’s discussion of RAWA’s secret, underground location and using the term
“operatives,” creates a tension that is dramatic, insinuating to the viewer that RAWA works
much like a spy movie.
While the use of hidden cameras is a powerful tool of resistance for RAWA, Shah does
not discuss the potential of the burqa to hide other illicit work from the Taliban. The
videographer of Zarmeena’s execution, while satisfied that they completed their goal of
“documenting this crime,” also noted that they “even laughed ruefully afterward about how
RAWA might have to change its standpoint against burqas because, ironically, they couldn’t
have carried out this task without the protection of these mandatory garments” (Brodsky, 2003,
18). This demonstrates the complicated nature of RAWA’s work and how they utilized the tools
of oppression as a method for subversion and resistance.
Resisting the Taliban looks vastly different as restrictions on women’s citizenship
activities became more confining. Shah addresses the state of schools and beauty parlors, as she
talks with the women who run and participate in these activities, as both were banned by the
Taliban. As Shah is brought to an underground school for girls, she asserts the danger that she is
taking by going to the school, as well as the risk to the women. Shah claims
Now RAWA are taking me to see their riskiest activity: not a bomb factory or undercover
newspaper, just a class for girls. The Taliban have made no education available to girls
over the age of 12. Every woman in the room is breaking the law (CNN Transcripts,
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2001).
The distinction for Shah is that she emphasizes the clandestine nature of RAWA’s work.
Highlighting the “risk,” she equates education with bomb building, which is a very violent
activity, as well as equating education, with running a newspaper. However, Shah does not
acknowledge the publication work that RAWA already was doing with their journal, titled
Payam-e-Zan (Women’s Message). Shah addressed the issue of resistance through education, as
women are both the teachers and the students are framed as criminals instead of patriots in the
eyes of the Taliban. It is through civil-disobedient acts such as education, where patriots (and
martyrs) are made. This is highlighted through the words of one of the teachers, as she claims
that “All our courses have to be secret and underground because of the Taliban. If they find out,
they could hang us all. All our girls are left uneducated because of their cruelty” (CNN
Transcripts, 2001). Emphasizing the use of “secret” and “underground” reinforces the civildisobedient nature of the activities that Afghan women are participating in and the risk that is
involved. For many of these women, possible punishments include flogging or death for
educating their daughters.
Shah emphasizes the creation of a beauty parlor as an act of resistance. She states that she
is visiting “the most subversive place of all. I have been invited to a secret beauty parlor. If they
are caught, these women will be imprisoned, but they still paint the faces they can never show in
public” (CNN Transcripts, 2001). Shah identifies this as a very “subversive place,” reinforcing
the civil-disobedient acts that the women are asserting by utilizing a beauty parlor. A woman at
the beauty parlor states, “[t]his is a form of resistance. We are defying the Taliban. It means that
whatever the circumstances, we will carry on doing thing we want to do like studying, doing our
job—you know, all these things.” (CNN Transcripts, 2001) In this scene, Shah highlights how
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something that would be classified as everyday is in fact subversive in resisting the power
structure of Afghanistan. Here Shah also highlights how women equate the trope of resistance
with studying and working, emphasizing how their act of civil disobedience consist of many
forms of citizenship work for women. In the documentary, Shah only uses the term “subversive”
once and the term “resistance” was only used by a woman Shah interviewed. Shah works to
frame the oppressive nature of the Taliban, but does not highlight the extensive citizenship work
that is done by Afghan women. This frame limits the perception of RAWA’s agency in their
communities.
5.3 Defining the Constructions of Freedom
The concept of freedom is frequently used in order for the United States to justify the
Afghan war and is a historical part of the United States’ ideology. In the documentary, Shah
addresses the complex issue of freedom in a simplistic way. She addresses freedom as what
should be the norm, and not the violence that permeates much of Afghan society. Shah closes her
visit with RAWA with this quote,
Women trying to keep life normal in a world gone completely mad. That was the image
RAWA left me with. (on camera): If you’re living here, the trivial things that are imposed
on people lead to serious things that are imposed on people like torture, death, execution.
There are no minor freedoms, but there are no major freedoms either. And this is really
an incredibly serious, terrifying place to be if you are an Afghan (CNN Transcripts,
2001).
For Shah, freedom was something that had been eliminated, as she asserts that “major” and
“minor” freedoms were taken way from women and all Afghans. In this context, freedom is not
defined, except to say that violence against the Afghan people is not freedom.
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5.4 Presenting a Frame of Afghan Women to the United States Population
The news media’s construction of RAWA by Shah and CNN works to frame Afghan
women’s citizenship through very specific lenses. Reinforcing Orientalist concepts, Shah
employs the veil as an oppressive tool, discounting the agency of women’s ability to work within
an oppressive regime. When articulating concepts of resistance, Shah’s commentary highlights
RAWA’s work, but fails to discuss the background of RAWA and the other citizenship work.
Shah selects work that will move the audience, such as an underground school that is educating
girls and a beauty parlor, but does not address the health care clinics, community building, job
training, and the schools for boys that RAWA runs, limiting the public’s understanding of what it
means to resist a government and provide the services of a failing nation-state. This is in direct
contradiction to the concept of “freedom.” Shah does not use this term frequently, there is an
understanding that Afghan women do not have the freedom to do what they want, hence the
resistance and subversiveness required by RAWA in order to advocate citizenship for women.
For RAWA, Shah and CNN worked to bring the issues of Afghan women to the attention
of the United States audience, especially since no news media outlets previously wanted to
broadcast

RAWA’s

Zarmeena

execution

video.

However,

the

broadcast

portrays

colonial/Orientalist frames, as Shah (in emphasizing the horror) gives inaccurate or misleading
interpretations about the Zarmeena video, and dramatizes the already emotional events of
Zarmeena’s execution for her audience.
Lister articulates what the news media should consider when working with the oppressed,
and how the media presents an “idealized actor” in contrast to “helpless victims” (Lister, 2003, p.
86). This is important to note as Afghan women have been framed as helpless victims through
the burqa. RAWA is framed as the idealized actor in that they are actively advocating for the
rights of women, but only through a lens that would be acceptable to audiences in the United
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States and Europe. These concepts need to be analyzed more deeply in order to resist what Lister
(2003) asserts as “replicated in media representations. At the same time, though, we need to
avoid creating a new source of division between the image of an idealized actor and that of an
even more stigmatized victim” (p. 86). This requires a look at not only how the news media, such
as Shah and CNN have represented Afghan women, but also how Afghan women’s images and
situations have influenced the United States government and the resulting violence of war.
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CHAPTER 6: RAWA AND THE DEBATE ABOUT AFGHAN WOMEN’S
ISSUES IN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE HEARINGS
In order to consider the human rights issues that were happening in Afghanistan, the
United States House of Representatives, Congressional Subcommittee on International
Operations and Human Rights convened a hearing to address the problems with human rights in
Afghanistan under the Taliban. Originally scheduled for September 12, 2001, the hearing was
postponed until October 31, 2001. This particular hearing is important as it not only presents the
attitudes of the United States government, but also the viewpoints of the representatives from
multiple non-governmental organizations that provided testimony at the hearing, including
Amnesty International, the Feminist Majority, the Central Asia Research and Development
Center (CARDC) at George Washington University, the United Front/Northern Alliance, and the
Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan.
The hearing, titled Afghan People vs. The Taliban: The Struggle for Freedom Intensifies,
received testimony on the human-rights problems that were happening in Afghanistan under the
Taliban at that time. Demonstrating previous concerns about human rights in Afghanistan, the
hearing was originally scheduled for September 12, 2001, for deliberation by the United States
Congress before the events on September 11. As outlined in Chapter 4, both governmental and
non-governmental representatives testified on the status of human rights in Afghanistan, with
much of the focus on Afghan women, providing an opportunity to analyze the construction of
Afghan women’s citizenship. Locating the hearing on the genre chain, this transcript
demonstrates how influential images of violence against Afghan women can influence public
policy. Testimony was provided by multiple individuals, who were concerned about the violence
against women, demonstrating how the Zarmeena video is recontextualized through the concerns
about veiling and how this singular issue is hiding the violence against Afghan women.
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Scheduled six weeks after 9-11 and two weeks after the start of Operation Enduring
Freedom, this hearing indicates how both the Afghan and American government officials as well
as non-profit organizations view the human rights situation in Afghanistan. This hearing also
demonstrates how the views between each group or individual do not always match with the
stance by the United States government, nor do the testimonies provide a clear, consistent
picture, as each group privileges their own interests as they consider Afghan women’s role in
Afghanistan.
In an effort to consider how this hearing frames participatory citizenship, I analyze the
familiar tropes of veiling, resistance, and freedom that were used as a way both to construct
Afghan women’s citizenship and to justify the United States’ military operations in Afghanistan.

6.1 Representations of the veil
Similar to the CNN reporter Saria Shah and her usage of the veil trope in her
documentary, the representatives from the United States Congress, non-governmental
organizations, and other governmental organizations all provided testimony on Afghanistan’s
oppressive nature of the veil. These representations are unlike CNN’s, as they do not have the
need of news-station ratings. However, the United States Congress used these tropes to create a
visual narrative for the general public that is a visible, tangible object. The assertion is that
simply removing the veil symbolizes the movement towards other freedoms for women in
Afghanistan (as well as much of the Muslim world). This assertion works to marginalize the
ability of Afghan women to be able to decide for themselves their priorities and actions for
“freedom.”
The hearing started with Representative Ros-Lehtinen, the chair of the subcommittee,
who also provides the first testimony of the day. She opens with a statement using the veil as her
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frame.
In 1996, a heavy shroud was placed on the people of Afghanistan when the Taliban
captured Kabul. Since then, the Taliban has taken the peaceful and sacred scriptures of
the Prophet Muhammad, and distorted them into a rulebook of terror (Afghan People vs.
The Taliban, 2001, p. 1).
While working to demonstrate a respect for Islam, as she employs terms such as “sacred” and
“peaceful,” Ros-Lehtinen dismisses women’s agency through the frame of veiling. This
statement provides an early allusion to the veil, suggesting a negative connotation to the burqa
that many women wear in Afghanistan. Through the use of the term “shroud” she implies death
and destruction. She displays a contradiction in that Ros-Lehtinen wishes to demonstrate respect
for the religion of Islam, but she fails to understand the relationship between the use of veiling as
a political, historical, and cultural garment of clothing. The issue of the veil for Muslim women
is complicated as the veil encompasses both the use of headscarves/hijab, which is found
throughout the Muslim world and the use of the burqa, which is found only in Afghanistan17.
This frame of veiling continues as Ros-Lehtinen’s statement addresses violence
perpetrated against women, facilitated through the use of the veiling trope. She states,
Bearing the scars of the Taliban’s crimes against its own people, Afghanistan’s women
have been buried beneath a veil. The burqa, the forcible cover of women, is an attempt by
the Taliban to hide from the world the violence and pain that the regime has imposed on
Afghanistan under the pretext of religion.” (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 2)
She declares both the veil and the burqa oppressive articles of clothing, as women are “buried
beneath a veil” thus continuing the allusion of death. Ros-Lehtinen does not give a thorough

17

See Appendix G for details about the veil.
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background of the veiling issues in Afghanistan. She asserts that the burqa was forced upon
women in order to hide the violence that was happening to them. During this time, it is true that
much of the violence was perpetrated upon women, publicly by the Taliban and privately
through acceptance of domestic violence. Also, RAWA’s official stance on the burqa was that
governments should not have a stance on women’s use of veiling. However, while the terms
“veil” and “burqa” are used interchangeably by Ros-Lehtinen (as well as others), they are not
necessarily the same thing. There are many ways of veiling and women in Afghanistan may use
different kinds of veiling, everything from a simple hijab to the burqa, which is only use in
Afghanistan.
Ros-Lehtinen continues with her veiling references, littered throughout her testimony as
she states, “We hope that today’s hearing will further lift the heavy veil which shrouds the
Afghan people, and will allow the truth and the suffering that they have endured to step and
creep out into the light” (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 3). The death reference is
strong and repeated in her testimony. Veiling is not only related to death, but also to
secretiveness and oppressiveness with her use of “heavy” as a burden for women to carry. RosLehtinen removes Afghan women’s ability to activate their citizenship, as she views the burdens
for women to be the veil, instead of the burdens of war, a shortage of food, and lack of
educational and employment opportunities for women. However, Ros-Lehtinen’s testimony is
not the only one that makes these allusions. Representatives of women’s and human rights
organizations continue the narrow frame.
Eleanor Smeal, the president of the Feminist Majority, provided a written testimony to
Congress, as she did not testify in person. Her testimony focused on the issue of the violence
against women, but also took on the issue with the veil. Smeal states,
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The public has now seen broadcast on television again and again film footage of women
being beaten and executed for violating the Taliban’s decrees banning women from
employment, from attending school, from leaving their homes without a close male
relative and without wearing the head-to-toe burqa shroud (Afghan People vs. The
Taliban,, 2001, p. 11).
Smeal’s testimony addresses many of the important issues that Afghan women need help
confronting, such as employment, education, and the ability to move freely in order to conduct
professional and personal business. However, Smeal concludes this part of her statement with the
phrase “head-to-toe burqa shroud,” continuing Ros-Lehtinen’s arguments over the oppressive,
death-like nature of this piece of clothing. As a representative of the Feminist Majority, Smeal’s
statement dismisses Afghan women’s citizenship and ability to control their own bodies by
framing the burqa through the lens of death. Smeal lost an opportunity to advocate for Afghan
women to be able to perform their citizenship by selecting their own garments and that
governments need to stop dictating what women wear on their bodies. Instead of empowering
Afghan women, Smeal is imposing different restrictions on Afghan women, as she is articulating
a narrow, United States-based view of women’s rights. Chandra Mohanty (1991) asserts that
feminisms needs to be considered more adaptable, as the term is frequently debated (p.7).
Constructions of feminism used by the news media in the United States is frequently flattened
out to a singular definition and does not consider the wants and needs of the women and/or
feminists in alternative situations, much like what is happening in Afghanistan.
Representatives from the United States Department of State also testified using the trope
of the veil. Craner, a political appointee to the State department, includes in his testimony on
Afghan women a continuation of the veiling frame.
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Particularly in cities, when women go out they must wear a traditional long robe, the
burqa, covering them from head to toe and obscuring their vision. While many Afghan
women wore the burqa before they [the Taliban] took control, it is now part of a legally
enforced dress code decreed by the Taliban. (Afghan People vs. The Taliban,, 2001, p.
23-4)
Here Craner is more factual in this statement about his discussion of the burqa, and avoids much
of the previous hyperbole that is suggested by Ros-Lehtinen and Smeal. Craner makes a brief
reference to the fact that the burqa was worn prior to the Taliban, loosely suggesting a cultural
and/or historical precedence that may have been addressed by women in the past, yet also he
makes sure to emphasize the nature of the covering, as it covers the whole body and there is a
lack of vision for the women wearing it. However, his bias is one of only reporting what he
considers important, as Craner leaves out the details about how Afghan women actually feel
about the wearing the burqa and what their priorities are for liberation and creating active
citizenship practices. His testimony is not the only one that reflects this attitude, for other
representatives also demonstrate this same bias.
The human rights organization Amnesty International also provided testimony about
rights for Afghan women and reinforced the issue of veiling. Kumar, the United States
representative for Asia and the Pacific at Amnesty International, discussed the veil and issues
related to keeping women out of sight. “Under the Taleban’s18 strict rules, women are not
allowed to study, work, or move around without wearing the all-enveloping burqa’’ (Afghan
People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 43). The mere mention of the burqa demonstrates a displaced
concern in the needs of Afghan women. Kumar makes an even stronger case with the suggested
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In Kumar’s testimony, he uses an alternate spelling of the Taliban.
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veiling. In his statement he continues the frame,
women are required to remain out of sight… the Taleban ordered Kabul residents to
block the windows in their homes at the ground and first floor levels to ensure that
women could not be seen from the street… [and that] the face of a woman is a source of
corruption for men who are not related to her (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p.
43).
Kumar touches upon the issues of education and employment, but these terms are always
emphasized in conjunction with veiling, again diminishing women’s ability to negotiate a
participatory citizenship. Here the veil is drawn with parallels to keeping women out of view.
The burqa is an “all-enveloping” garment and Kumar’s statement provides the Taliban’s reason
for the use of veiling, in that a woman’s face corrupts men. While Kumar condemns the forcible
use of the burqa, he fails to advocate for women to have the freedom to control their bodies and
have freedom of movement, in order to be active citizens in their community.
6.2 The Frame of Resistance
The focus of RAWA’s work is resistance, and as such the language they use both overtly
and subversively addresses their work to proactively advance women’s rights, as well as human
rights in Afghanistan. The references to resistance by women in this Congressional hearing were
exclusively presented by a representative from RAWA, Tahmeena Faryal. Delivering her live
testimony by phone and using a pseudonym19, Faryal provided evidence of RAWA’s work in
actively pursuing women’s rights in Afghanistan20. She states,
RAWA’s work is also aimed toward giving voice to our down-trodden people, especially
19

I was only able to discover that Faryal testified by phone through the CSPAN video and not through the written
testimony.
20 Due to the dangers of standing out as a RAWA member, all members are anonymous and speak with the same
voice. As such, all documents created by RAWA do not have individual author’s names, but are signed as RAWA.

96

the women—and empowering women and men not to forget that they—we all—deserve
human rights and freedoms and to look toward a day when the guns and rockets will stop
and we can begin to rebuild (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 49).
In this statement, Faryal outlines the work that RAWA is doing in order to resist oppression.
Using phrases such as “giving-voice,” and “empowering women and men” RAWA demonstrates
how the organization is working towards providing tools to the Afghan people in order to gain
their rights as citizens through peaceful means.
The issue of resistance was only overtly addressed by one of the other representatives
from Afghanistan, Haron Amin, who is a special representative from the United Front / Northern
Alliance. He used the term in reference to the Mujahedeen. Amin stated that, ‘‘[i]n fact since
Kabul fell to the Mujahedeen [resistance fighters] in 1992, our policies have created a wave of
criticism and even hatred for Pakistan amongst many Afghans” (Afghan People vs. The Taliban,
2001, p. 61). By using the Mujahedeen to reflect resistance, Amin reinforces the violent ways
that governments view resistance and how anti-oppressive goals are obtained. This is in contrast
to RAWA which advocates resistance through peaceful and humanitarian means, including nonviolent protests, education and job training. For RAWA, women and men can develop
citizenship practices that work to promote positive rebuilding of the physical and social
infrastructure of Afghanistan.
In the testimony provided to Congress, resistance is supported by those who have
complementary interests. Just as the United States supported the Northern Alliance, even if it
was not in the best interest of the people of Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance was the best
situated to defeat the Soviet invasion. However, these groups claimed “the same repressive
sentiments that RAWA had been found to fight” (Brodsky, 2003, p. 85), resulting in United
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States support for groups that may not be in the best interest of Afghan women.
In his testimony, Amin also presents a quote by Ahmad Shah Massoud, a member of the
Mujahedeen. He states that the United States has an obligation to help assure many things
including the “resistance against religious extremism… Afghans—being multi-ethnic—want to
gain their right to self-determination through a democratic mechanism acceptable to our nation”
(Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 62). Using terms that are attractive to the United States
government, Amin articulates the “resistance to religious fundamentalism,” which provides a
frame in which he would receive a favorable response from the Congressional committee, and in
essence the United States government. Since this is framed from a governmental standpoint,
while advocating for democracy, Amin places the agency for action outside the general
population of Afghanistan, with a foreign force (namely the United States), negating any agency
that the Afghan people may have for creating a democratic country.
Between these two representations of resistance, the trope is framed differently
depending on the positionality of the speaker and whom they represent and as a result changes
the context in which citizenship can be viewed.
6.3 Asserting Definitions of Freedom
Freedom is a term that was frequently used by the United States government in
articulating a plan for invading Afghanistan. The military operation was titled Operation
Enduring Freedom, and the title for this hearing, Afghan People vs. The Taliban: The Struggle
for Freedom Intensifies, utilizes the trope of freedom that is common in American politics. These
frames do not specifically articulate what “freedom” means, but the term is only employed
through the discussion of affairs in Afghanistan. Eliminating the burqa has been argued as a way
to “free” Afghan women from oppression, but other definitions also arise from various
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testimonies.
Calling on a political term, the representatives of the United States government utilize the
term “freedom,” and Ros-Lehtinen frequently exploits this term in her opening statement.
However, before it became evident to the world, there were those who understood that
the welfare and freedom of the Afghan people are directly intertwined with the safety and
security of the world, because a regime which commits such heinous acts against its own
people cannot be expected to place any value on the lives of others (Afghan People vs.
The Taliban, 2001, p. 2)
Ros-Lehtinen equates freedom with global “safety and security,” as well as the “value on the
lives of others” (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 2). This correlation is in direct response
to the events on 9-11, as she is asserting claims about the Taliban. She is conflating the two
groups of terrorists, the hijackers of the 9-11 airplanes and the Taliban, in order to work on the
justification for the United States actions in Afghanistan. Yet, she is not the only representative
who works to conflate these two groups and place the responsibility for eliminating both groups
squarely on the United States. In testimony by other representatives we can see this mingling of
identities.
Congressional representative Joseph Pitts provides testimony utilizing the term
“freedom” supporting traditional arguments on its definition.
News reports detail thousands of Pakistanis lining up at the borders to join the jihad of
the Taliban against the forces of freedom. Our nation must work with the Afghan people
to combat the scourge of humanity, the terrorists, so that Afghanis and Americans and the
rest of the world can live in peace. (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 17)
Pitts has expanded the groups who are against “freedom” in a way that works to broaden the
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scope of who needs to be defeated in the name of freedom. He draws parallels between the
Pakistanis and the Taliban. For Pitts, freedom is connected to concepts of “humanity” and
“peace,” but these terms are vague and have not been defined well. In this context, what does
“humanity” mean and how does one construct “peace” while simultaneously going to war? There
is no clear definition of these terms provided in his testimony, as they are not used frequently and
while they could have a positive impact on the construction of citizenship, the lack of definitions
makes it difficulty to draw close connections.
Congressional Representative Dana Rohrabacher makes a very direct association to
American freedoms in his statement: “Anyone who did not become part of their insidious little
cult became a victim of this cult, and freedom of the press and freedom of speech was not even
thought about, much less freedom of religion” (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 19).
Here is a direct correlation to the United States Constitution: for Rohrabacher the term
“freedom” is directly connected to the first amendment, which includes the freedoms of the
press, speech and religion. Though Rohrabacher claims that these terms were not thought about
by the Taliban, I would argue that the Taliban felt so threatened by these rights they felt the need
to oppress people, particularly Afghan women from participating in their citizenship.
State Department political appointee Lorne Craner uses the term “freedom” frequently
throughout his testimony, but he only focuses on the issue of religious freedom. His cites the
concept multiple times asserting that the “Taliban rely on … the Ministry for the Promotion of
Virtue and the Suppression of Vice, to enforce rules on such matters as appearance, dress,
employment, access to medical care, behavior, religious practices and freedom of religion”
(2001, p. 25). Craner affirms that the United States government has “called for a…
government… that accepts international norms… particularly regarding human rights,
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particularly religious freedom, and issues concerning women, and that facilitates safe delivery of
humanitarian and economic assistance” (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 24). For
Craner, other issues such as human rights have importance, but in the context of his testimony he
argues for a very specific kind of freedom, which is religious freedom. While some may argue
that religious freedom may encompass many of the other freedoms, such as whether one’s dress
may be dictated by religion, Craner does not plainly make the connection in how he defines the
term.
Congressional representative Christopher Smith addresses the issue of freedom briefly
and only through a quote by Dr. Abdullah, the minister of foreign affairs of the Northern
Alliance. Smith states “for an institutional framework based on moderate Islam and democracy
to embody human rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals, including those of women,
political pluralism, devolution of power to local administration to local elections on provincial
and lower levels” (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 32). Using Abdullah’s words, Smith
articulates broad definition of freedom within specific contexts. He mentions the work of
individuals, but also what freedom means for larger communities. For Smith, active citizenship
allows for a pluralistic government with a distribution of local power.
The testimony provided by T. Kumar of Amnesty International targets the usage of
“freedom” in relationship to Afghan women’s rights. Kumar states that the “Taleban’s policies
deny basic and fundamental rights to women, including freedom of association, expression, and
movement. Under the Taleban’s strict rules, women are not allowed to study, work, or move
around without wearing the all-enveloping burqa” (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 43).
Here Kumar equates freedom with education, the ability to work, and the ability to move around
in the community without wearing a burqa. While this is not his complete statement, he
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continues to articulate that women should be able to move about without clothing restrictions,
which is a is very specific view of how women can negotiate their community.
The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan also utilizes the term
“freedom” in their testimony. As a part of RAWA’s slogan, they utilize the term “freedom” to
create a connection21. Faryal, the representative from RAWA, states that “RAWA’s work is also
aimed toward giving voice to our downtrodden people, especially the women—and empowering
women and men not to forget that they—we all—deserve human rights and freedoms. (Afghan
People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 52). While Faryal does not articulate specific freedoms in her
testimony, she works to utilize plural definitions, acknowledging the varied and multiple
freedoms that are needed for men and women, which is explained in depth in Chapter 8.
The representative of the CARDC, Quadir Amiryar, uses the term “freedom” in more
narrow way. For he states that “[a]fter 23 years of occupation, loss of fundamental freedoms,
foreign interference and civil war, the people of Afghanistan deserve to insist on retaining a large
measure of autonomy over their lives” (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 57). Amiryar
focuses on what he considers the fundamental freedoms and while he does not articulate
specifically how he defines “freedom,” he connects it to the Afghan people’s ability for selfdetermination.
Haron Amin, representative from the United Front, uses a quote from Pakistani journalist
Ahmad Rashid, who states ‘‘I would like to apologize for the part that we have played in the
destruction of your cities, your culture, your traditions and your freedom to choose your own
government’’ (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001, p. 61). For Amin this definition is very
specific as he frames freedom in the ability for the people to choose their own government. Both
21

The slogan is “If you are freedom-loving and anti-fundamentalist, you are with RAWA” (Revolutionary
Association of the Women of Afghanistan, 2014)
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Amin and Amiryar leave out specific details about what freedom looks like in Afghanistan, not
acknowledging the multiple meanings.
6.4 Connections to participatory citizenship
Representatives from the United States government, Afghan government, and non-profit
organizations framed citizenship through very specific lenses, just as the journalist Shah
represented citizenship in the documentary, where she presented a narrow frame of Afghan
women and their ability to activate their citizenship. In this hearing the audience can see this as a
continuation of that narrow frame, transforming the message on the genre chain. Indirectly using
language from the documentary, the United States Congressional representatives used similar
terminology and presented a view of Afghan women as helpless and unable to advocate for
themselves, especially from under the burqa. This is in contrast to the testimony from Faryal, the
representative of RAWA, who did not discuss the burqa as the main problem. Faryal instead
addressed Afghan women’s ability to resist the current Taliban regime, the prevention of other
oppressive from regimes taking over, and the support of freedom for women and the people of
Afghanistan. These ideas are more in focus as RAWA’s main goals and represents women
actively working towards participatory citizenship practices.
As a result of the varied groups represented at this hearing, this text provides an
opportunity to demonstrate the conflicting representations on the issues surrounding Afghan
women and human rights for all Afghan citizens. As a link on the genre chain, the testimony at
this Congressional hearing provides connections to previous connotations about Afghan women
and their inability to advocate for themselves. While Zarmeena could not save herself, nor could
RAWA save her from the execution, the Congressional testimony emphasized the helplessness
of women in Afghanistan, instead of their agency. “Subsequent uses of [Zarmeena’s execution
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video] filtered into a variety of media outlets, largely without crediting RAWA members or more
importantly without their analysis of this public execution” (Fluri, 2006, p. 103). Ignoring who
made the video and RAWA’s assertion for agency, the news media and Congress use this
opportunity to interpret the video themselves, without considering the context of the video or
RAWA’s stance on the issues for Afghan women.
The United States government provided a narrow view of Afghan women’s ability to
affect change from underneath a burqa and non-governmental organizations worked toward
“freeing” women from the oppression of the burqa. While these frames diminish Afghan
women’s agency and the representative from RAWA was dismissed by the many of the
individuals at the hearing, Faryal addressed RAWA’s concerns and thus RAWA was able to
articulate how they actively support citizenship women’s practices.
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CHAPTER 7: REINTERPRETATIONS OF RESISTANCE AND FREEDOM
IN THE STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS
The 2002 State of the Union address given by President George W. Bush highlights many
of the values that can be used to define citizenship. Commonly known as the “axis of evil”
speech, this was the first major speech given by President Bush since the events of September 11
and took place three months after the start of military operations in Afghanistan. In addition to
addressing domestic and international issues, President Bush emphasized that the issues for
women in Afghanistan were one of the major reasons for taking on the Taliban. I am using this
speech as part of the genre chain, because it continues to demonstrate how the Bush
administration viewed the need for military intervention in order to “free” Afghan women from
oppression.
In this address, President Bush does not refer to the burqa or veil, unlike the government
representatives in the Congressional hearings, but he indirectly refers to resistance and freedom
through a frame that is reinforced by the United States’ ideology. The primary focus of this
speech is highlighted through the trope of freedom, as the speech is filled with a variety of ways
in which the term is used directly. Building on the name of the military operation in Afghanistan,
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Bush works to inject the term “freedom” repeatedly
throughout the speech22. As with the other analyses, I have employed a careful use of critical
discourse analysis in order to highlight how Bush interprets these specific constructions.
Through the State of the Union address, President Bush constructs a version of
citizenship that was based on loosely-defined notions of freedom. For Bush, this meant that
citizens were willing to sacrifice both money and life in order to assure that American-style
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OEF officially represents the global operation on terrorism, but it is most commonly used in reference to
Afghanistan.
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freedom will be ensured for the future.
7.1 Resistance Reframed: The United States Helping Afghan Women Defy the Taliban
In advocating for the defeat of the Taliban, removing the ongoing oppression of Afghan
women was high on the President’s agenda. According to Bush, “the mothers and daughters of
Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to school.
Today women are free, and are part of Afghanistan’s new government” (2002). He asserts that
the military actions of the United States government ensured the freedom of women and their
ability to activate their participatory citizenship, by working and going to school. In these
sentences, Bush articulates what Afghanistan looked like before United States involvement and
after. Emphasizing what happened to women under the Taliban, stating that they were
“captives,” suggests that women were living in a prison. While he reminds the audience what
was banned for women, including important civic aspects of their lives, Bush neglects to mention
the physical violence that was happening against women. Here he provides an early assertion of
“freedom” in that women are now able to work and attend school, and he suggests that the
United States had a hand in assuring that Afghan women were able to leave their homes in order
to participate in civic life.
As a result of this frame, the United States has denied Afghan women the option of
fighting for freedom on their own terms, which includes utilizing methods that do not involve
violence. RAWA’s official position on the instability of Afghanistan is to “[disarm] all the armed
groups… [and] by a peace-keeping force not including troops from countries that have involved
themselves in the Afghan infighting” (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan,
2014). In other words, the United States and United Kingdom (and their allies) needed to step
back and let the United Nations create a peacekeeping force that would help stabilize the
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country.
As evidence of the work the United States is doing in order to ensure that women have
access to representation in government, President Bush welcomes “the new Minister of
Women’s Affairs, Doctor Sima Samar” (2002). Bush highlights the creation of a ministry post to
address issues for women, and he is able to present the woman who has been chosen for this
post. When creating the Afghan parliament, the United States provided requirements for setting
up the new government, assuring that women would have representation in parliament and
suggesting that through women’s participation in parliament, Afghanistan would provide more
rights and opportunities for women.
However, there were critiques of how Afghan women participated in the government and
continued to support laws that oppressed women. Samar is accused of not wanting to change the
way women were treated by the Afghan government and her complacency in regards to women’s
rights supports the patriarchal system currently in place. In a speech by Malalai Joya (19 Oct
2013), given at the All Saints’ Church in Pasadena, California, she criticized men and women
involved with Afghan National Assembly. Joya claims that the women involved with the
government were just as oppressive towards Afghan women as the men were. She stated that
“women were only symbolic in the state” and that many of the “women in parliament are only
fundamentalists [standing for] cosmetic-symbolic changes” in Afghanistan (Joya, 2013). Joya
was a representative to the first session of the Afghan parliament and while she does not claim to
be a RAWA member, she supports their work. Representing her community in Farah Providence,
Joya was the youngest person elected to parliament (Joya, 2009, p. 11). While in parliament she
argued for the rights for women, children and families and worked to support the roles of
minority groups, Joya asserts that she was told by some of the other women in parliament to be
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quiet and not make waves, but she refused. While she received some support by other
parliamentarians, the dominant forces eventually suspended Joya in 2007 for the rest of her fiveyear term (Joya, 2009, p. 13). Joya’s criticism of Samar is a result of the policies put into place
by the Bush administration. President Bush’s assertions on the war freeing Afghan women
overlooked at how Samar refused to confront the profound inequities between women and men.
Bush did not consider what it would mean to have women in the parliament and how they would
be able to assert for the rights of women and families without undue pressure to conform to a
patriarchal system.
Leila Ahmed has worked to find the intersections for Muslim women through the
political, personal, and religious, and in her work she finds resistance. Ahmed (1999) realized
that Muslim women
could not pursue the investigation of our heritage, traditions, religion in a way that white
women were investigating and rethinking theirs. Whatever aspect of our history of
religion each of us had been trying to reflect on, we would be besieged, at the need of our
presentations, with furious questions and declarations openly dismissive of Islam… the
implication was that in trying to examine and rethink our traditions rather than dismissing
them out of hand, we were implicitly defending whatever our audience considered to be
indefensible…[and the] presumption was that… we had to abandon our [religions and
traditions] because they were …intrinsically, essentially, and irredeemably misogynist
and patriarchal in a way that theirs (apparently) were not (p. 291-2).
With these constructions women in Europe and the United States have continued to frame
women living in Muslim countries as “irredeemably” unable to advocate for themselves. The
frames for women and their ability to resist a dominant power has been compromised at best and
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undermined at worst. In his repeated use of the term “citizen,” Bush implies that the United
States is returning Afghan women their citizenship. In considering the statements discussed
earlier, Afghan women are now free to go to school and participate in public life, assuring their
ability to activate their citizenship, but only through the work of the United States. However,
Bush does not address what will happen to Afghan women’s ability to advocate for their
citizenship once the United States leaves Afghanistan.
7.2 Freedom Asserted through the United States Presidential Frames
Throughout his State of the Union address, Bush frequently employed the use of the term
“freedom,” emphasizing the connections between the United States’ concept of freedom and how
the term can be employed in multiple ways for a participatory citizenship. It was used to
introduce volunteerism as a patriotic duty, to condemn other countries for their lack of freedom,
and to honor those who “gave their lives for freedom” (Bush 2002). However, the speech was
also used to justify the United States actions in Afghanistan. While this quote refers to a CIA
agent who lost his life in Afghanistan, this also could provide a subtext that everyone, Afghan
and American citizens alike, should be willing to sacrifice the lives of their loved ones for the
cause of freedom. However, the sacrifice works only for the cause of Bush’s (and by definition
American) constructions of freedom.
In working to frame the operations of terrorists, Bush provides a stark contrast between
the terrorists and citizens of countries. Early in the speech, he asserts that as “long as nations
harbor terrorists, freedom is at risk. And America and our allies must not, and will not, allow it”
(Bush 2002). This is an interesting construct, in that the terrorists are stateless and are not tied to
a nationality. Bush stripped them of their citizenship and denied them an opportunity to claim a
nationalistic citizenship through their actions. Bush is asserting that the United States is not at
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war with individual countries or citizens of those countries, but only with those people whose
loyalty is to an ideology outside of the state. As a result, this allows for freedom to be
endangered in the United States and around the world.
As a result of this global construction of freedom, President Bush asserts that “History
has called America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to
fight freedom’s fight” and that “the forces of terror cannot stop the momentum of freedom”
(2002). In other words, it is the responsibility of American citizens support a war under the cause
of freedom. In this speech Bush is harking back into America’s early history during
Revolutionary times, in which American colonists were fighting for freedom. While not directly
quoting Patrick Henry, Bush embarks on a path that emulates Henry’s famous speech “Give Me
Liberty or Give me Death,” where Henry advocates for freedom and claims that the
revolutionary forces will not fight alone, but with allies and that the war has already come23
(Henry, 1775).
Bush draws on many parallels with the United States and the concept of freedom, though
he does little to articulate exactly what freedom specifically means. However, notions of freedom
are indirectly defined in the speech through his assertions of security, sacrifice, and working in
the community, suggesting a participatory fame to citizenship. Repeatedly, Bush claims that
“America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security” (2002), thus asserting that
the connections between freedom and security are strong and not contrary constructions. Bush
asserts that security is equated to winning “this war; we’ll protect our homeland; and we will
revive our economy” (2002), which in turn means that freedom is derived from winning foreign
wars and protecting the American economy at home. While the following quote is inserted in the
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The strong connections between the two speeches will not be explored in this project.
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section on the United States budget for the coming year, there are other implied notions of cost.
“While the price of freedom and security is high, it is never too high. Whatever it costs to defend
our country, we will pay” (2002). Bush does not articulate how else the United States will pay
for freedom and security, but it is a thinly concealed notion that the cost of life is in addition to
the financial cost for the country. Hence, the cost of life is the most extreme expectation for
participatory citizenship.
The closing of the State of the Union address utilizes “freedom” multiple times, in a very
concentrated form. Bush asserts,
We choose freedom and the dignity of every life…We have known freedom’s price. We
have shown freedom’s power. And in this great conflict, my fellow Americans, we will
see freedom’s victory (2002).
This closing statement draws on all of the concepts he has articulated throughout the address,
with freedom being communicated in many different forms. He equates “freedom” with the
United States military power that is dominant over the Taliban. It is equated with sacrifice, as the
“price” for freedom is expensive and the United States version of freedom is always successful
through “victory.”
Throughout the speech, Bush works to create a connection with citizens of the United
States as they are needed to protect what is ideologically “American” and also as an obligation to
a global community. He opens his speech to “fellow citizens” and this is important as he is
asserting that he, along with other Americans, are a part of the work of freedom, which could be
construed as a form of citizenship practices. The the use of “fellow” creates a unification with
the President, the United States Congress and the American public. It allows those who are
watching at home to feel a part of the actions that are taking place and, and have a sense of
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responsibility in carrying out the President’s call for continued action.
Bush also works to deny citizenship to the people he identifies as terrorists in the State of
the Union address. Post 9-11 enemies of the state are not identified explicitly by name or by
group, and they are never identified as citizens of any country. When Bush uses the terms
“hijackers,” “killers,” and “outlaw regimes” to identify the enemies of the United States and to
imply that they are located “throughout the world citizenship” (2002), he denies the citizenship
of these people by failing to mention where they were from or how they identified outside of a
terrorist frame. Bush suggests that enemies of the state show their allegiance to a cause and not a
country. As such, terrorists do not identify through a nationality, but through commonly held
beliefs. The address expands on how to view citizenship political lens of the United States,
suggesting that good Americans come together in order to resolve their differences, show unity
for the war and the defense of freedom.
The State of the Union address worked to confront issues of resistance and freedom, both
through American lenses, while also working to impose those frames on other countries. As the
last link analyzed on the genre chain, this speech both demonstrates that a reference to the
RAWA’s video is not necessary. The video lacks commentary from RAWA and as a result
allows Shah, Congress, and President Bush to fill in the commentary for them. As a result, the
Bush administration worked to advocate for war, asserting that a in violent action requires a
violent response. The organization of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of
Afghanistan, as well as other Afghan women have resisted the assertion that they needed help in
advocating for their rights and citizenship in a violent way. Prior to 9-11 and since the beginning
of the Afghan war, RAWA has asserted that violent intervention was not the desired goal. In the
past, they have requested help through humanitarian means, which includes disarmament of their
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communities instead of through war.
Bush’s constructions of freedom are in direct contrast to RAWA’s, in that RAWA works
to firmly articulate what freedom means to them. They work to develop a proactive citizenship,
one that provides support through education and job training for the Afghan people. RAWA’s
work both complements and conflicts with how President Bush represents freedom and how the
United States government historically frames freedom and the influence it plays on the
expectations on how citizens are expected to enact their citizenship.
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CHAPTER 8 – RAWA SPEAKS FOR THEMSELVES
Since 1977, the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan have been
outspoken on the rights of women, as well as all Afghan citizens. With the advancements of
communication technology, RAWA has connected with a global audience, giving people an
opportunity to see the issues that are going on through a different lens, without the mediation of
news agencies and foreign governments. Through their multi-modal publications, RAWA has
been able to demonstrate a participatory citizenship. Though it is not the goal of RAWA to
define citizenship, they highlight their construction of participatory citizenship through their
resistance to the traditional tropes of veiling, resistance, and freedom. While I am presenting the
analysis of RAWA’s work last, it is not the last part of the genre chain. The genre chain can be
seen as a recursive chain where documents speak back and forth to each other, as they move
thorough time, morphing in through the process. RAWA’s texts that are analyzed here represent
both a precursor to the events of 9-11, as they were written prior to that event, as well as a
response to the frames that have been analyzed in this project.
Through RAWA’s website and their outreach on YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter,
RAWA creates a network of information in order to bring attention to the atrocities that are
happening to Afghan women and encourage those who live outside of Afghanistan to consider
humanitarian assistance to their cause. However, while much of their work is dedicated to
bringing the problems to a global audience, they are also able to demonstrate a participatory
citizenship through these texts.
For RAWA, their website24 is the primary source for information that they produce, as
well as an archive on news about Afghan women from other sources. From the website one can
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RAWA’s website can be found at www.rawa.org.
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connect to their social media sites, as well as their information on their activities, in seven
different languages. The primary website is in English, demonstrating a desire to reach a large,
international audience. However, many of RAWA’s texts have been translated into Italian,
Spanish, French, German, Portuguese, Japanese, as well as one of the local languages of
Persian/Urdu. RAWA and their supporters work to connect RAWA’s work with people in a
global arena. In addition to highlighting news events that are happening in Afghanistan and the
Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, RAWA’s website provides access to their previous
documents, that were originally only available in print.
RAWA’s YouTube channel (https://www.youtube.com/rawa77/) is frequently updated
with videos, providing visual evidence of the violence that continues against women, both from
domestic violence, as well as violence from the Afghan war. RAWA also produces videos
celebrating RAWA and its founder Meena, as well as share cultural aspects of Afghanistan.
Highlighting these celebrations, RAWA is able to demonstrate to both the local and international
community the citizenship work they are able to teach and participate in as Afghan citizens.
RAWA also maintains two social media pages on Facebook25 and Twitter26, but those pages are
interestingly not used in social ways. They are used as a news feed rather than a way for people
to connect with each other. RAWA provides a way to get out information to a global audience
and to connect with each other, but not overtly with RAWA. In fact many times it is the
supporters of RAWA that are posting much of the news on Facebook, but on Twitter much of the
news appears to be from a representative from RAWA. All of the social media sites present
information in a variety of languages, though most of the languages being used are English and
Persian/Urdu. This outreach demonstrates less of their citizenship and instead emphasizes the
25
26

RAWA’s Facebook page can be found at https://www.facebook.com/groups/66110928494/.
RAWA’s Twitter handle is @RAWA77.
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news that is being reported on both Afghan women and men.
For this project I am analyzing how RAWA addresses the issues of veiling, resistance,
and freedom and how these tropes connect to participatory citizenship. In the texts, some of these
words are used directly and other times the concepts are implied. I have chosen to investigate
these issues using four documents from their website.
8.1 Documents Reviewed
The first is a booklet that they originally created for print use that is titled Afghanistan,
World’s Largest Forgotten Tragedy. It was later posted as JPEG images on their website. The
booklet highlights the work that RAWA is doing in Afghanistan and the refugee camps in
Pakistan (n.d.b). The image-heavy booklet outlines both the struggles and the accomplishments
of RAWA and contains quite a bit of meta-activity that the organization is accomplishing. In
other words, RAWA frequently discusses the work they are doing in order help the community
and encourage other community members to help out. This booklet accomplishes two goals, as it
works to raise monetary donations from the sale of the booklet to the international community
and it provides information on how women in the community are doing citizenship work. While
the concepts of citizenship work is never overtly stated in any of RAWA’s documentation, this
booklet describes the active work that they are doing, as they promote their actions and activism.
While the document primarily contains images with minimal text, the text demonstrates the
citizenship work they are doing on a regular basis.
The second document is an announcement posted on their website, in which RAWA is
answering the request for “clarification in regard to the slogan ‘Freedom, Democracy and Social
Justice” (2000). This is a short statement in order for RAWA to define how they use these terms.
The “RAWA Educational Policy” is a document in which RAWA explicitly outlines their policy
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on what values they deems important for their students to learn (2014b). These documents not
only provide insight into RAWA’s educational philosophy, but also to how education informs
citizenship work. “RAWA’s Standpoints” is a statement of their position on women’s rights, the
veil, how RAWA wants Afghanistan to be governed, and the role of foreign intervention in
Afghanistan (2014).
I chose these four documents because they represent the ideological stance of RAWA in
reaction to the war in Afghanistan, before it started and helps in defining how they constructed a
participatory citizenship.
8.2 Views on Veiling
RAWA’s official stance on the veil (see Appendix G for details about veiling) is that “the
Islamic veil is a completely personal issue and no one has the right to interfere with this decision
or impose the veil upon” women (RAWA, 2014). For RAWA, the veil is a tool which can be
used for subversion, as was done to create the Zarmeena execution video and to hide their
identity in order for the members complete their work. However, they also state that they will not
wear the “Islamic veil” and instead use it as a form of resistance. RAWA asserts that “[a]s far as
security and social discretion allow us, for we [RAWA] regard rejection of the veil as a symbolic
form of resistance and defiance of the fundamentalists” (2014). RAWA identifies the veil as a
cultural symbol and not an Islamic one. As a result, veiling is used as a tool of participatory
citizenship as a way to resist the extreme gender apartheid in Afghanistan. This active resistance
towards the veil (and by extension the burqa), asserts how RAWA is defining what citizenship
looks like in very physical terms.
Although the burqa became a symbolic representation of the Afghan women’s struggle, it
is not specifically addressed in most of RAWA’s literature. Instead, RAWA works to focus on
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citizenship issues, such as women’s rights, reducing domestic and national violence in
Afghanistan, and assuring education, health care, and community support are provided to all
Afghan citizens. In their booklet, Afghanistan, World’s Largest Forgotten Tragedy, the majority
of the references to the veil are through the images of Afghan women. The booklet uses images
from the public spaces of Afghanistan, in which women are required to wear the blue burqa, to
other spaces which include semi-private, women’s only spaces. They also include images from
Pakistan, where the burqa is not required and women may be seen wearing a hijab (headscarf).
There are images from schools and at RAWA functions with women in different states of
veiling, everything from a loose headscarf to the burqa. For example, Illustration 8.1 shows

ILLUSTRATION 8.1: RAWA OPENING A HEALTHCARE CLINIC (REVOLUTIONARY ASSOCIATION OF
THE WOMEN OF AFGHANISTAN, N.D.B).

includes the opening of a healthcare clinic, in which they can be seen in these different states of
veiling. While the viewer cannot see the women’s faces, one can notice the variety of
headscarves being used, as well as some women without a head covering at all, suggesting that
women’s agency over their choice of head coverings. In the photo we can also see some
women’s faces, rejecting the Taliban’s decrees for burqa-style coverings.
In the booklet, the only direct reference to the veil comes from the caption of a photo that
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represents a moment in a theatrical play “Islamic Veil” performed by students at a RAWA
school (RAWA, n.d.b, p. 18). While no context is provided for Illustration 8.2, RAWA’s other

ILLUSTRATION 8.2: STUDENT PLAY, “ISLAMIC VEIL” (REVOLUTIONARY ASSOCIATION OF THE
WOMEN OF AFGHANISTAN, N.D.B).
texts provide some ideas on what could be addressed in the play. Using this image and
considering RAWA’s “Standpoints” statement, as well as their “Educational Policy,” a viewer
might assume that the context of the play is to denounce the mandatory wearing of the veil and
advocate for respect for women and people of other religions. The actions of students putting on
plays highlights the issues that are going on in the community. The play works to develop
citizenship practices that help the students internalize what participatory citizenship may look
like, as students are actively practicing participatory citizenship through their actions, instead of
simply talking about them in an academic setting.
8.3 RAWA Defining Resistance in Contrast to Local and International Frames
For RAWA, resistance is one of the hallmarks of their work and one of the most visible
parts of their articulation of participatory citizenship. All of the texts examined both directly and
indirectly address the issue of resistance. These texts demonstrate how women have the ability to
resist the patriarchal system while also working within the confines of gender apartheid and the
violence perpetrated in Afghanistan by local and international forces.
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The intersection of resistance overlaps with the concepts of veiling and freedom. As I
discussed in the previous section, RAWA uses the veil or more accurately, demonstrates their
resistance towards veiling, as an action of civil-disobedience and subversive activities against the
Taliban. However, RAWA’s resistance towards misogyny and patriarchy are the main focus of
their work and they want to redirect the message of their work toward “freedom, democracy and
social justice” (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, 2000) instead of the
United States’ frames of veiling as the primary focus of women’s oppression.
In RAWA’s “Standpoints” statement, they articulate their stances on main issues,
including what is important for their resistance. On the issue of women’s rights they assert that
“women must continue their hard, long struggle against fanaticism and carry it through to the
end” (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, 2014). Here they emphasize
how resistance is not a short-term commitment, but instead a long-term one, a commitment to
ensuring that participatory citizenship takes effort and is not something that is simply given to
women or men. For almost 40 years, RAWA has been advocating for women’s rights, and there
have been many set-backs with the control of the Northern Alliance, the Taliban. and the United
States invasion of Afghanistan.
In RAWA’s definition of their “Main Slogans” (2000), they define the terms “freedom,”
“democracy,” and “social justice,” and also demonstrate their resistance to those who work to
oppress people and prevent them from achieving these ideals. RAWA articulates their resistance
in that they are working for the “annihilation of criminal fundamentalism and thereby foreign
intervention from our internal affairs that the most crucial step towards attainment of Freedom
can be taken” (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, 2000). What this means
is that RAWA is actively resisting fundamentalism from within, as well as from foreign
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intervention27 and it requires that people resist fundamentalist activities in order to achieve
freedom in Afghanistan for women and all Afghan citizens.
RAWA’s “Educational Policy” is surprisingly filled with statements regarding the
concept of resistance and demonstrates that RAWA not only practices in the world, but that they
also use it as a frame in education. Whether they are talking about religious, ethnic, gender
tolerance, advocating for “environmental sensitivity,” or educating students to avoid violence,
RAWA teaches the values of resistance against fundamentalist regimes, such as the Taliban.
RAWA’s statements are direct and while they provide a list for what students should do,
such as “respect,” “understand,” and “encourage” the values listed, RAWA also admonishes
students to “not allow criminals in the future to dare commit crimes in the name of religion, as
did the Jihadis and Taliban” (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, 2014)
and that they should “prevent ethnic divisions” and “invalidate antiquated myths… that portray
women as powerless and less equal than men” (Revolutionary Association of the Women of
Afghanistan, 2014). RAWA uses language to discourage oppression including “do not allow,”
“prevent,” and “invalidate,” asking students to actively resist dominant forces of subjugation.
These phrases work to support both what should be done, with what students should view as
active resistance, as well as helping articulate the activities for an active, participatory citizen.
The booklet, Afghanistan, World’s Largest Forgotten Tragedy, also provides more
creative cues in identifying resistance. By using the words of the founder Meena to demonstrate
the current work that RAWA is doing in Afghanistan and Pakistan, RAWA demonstrates their
resistance to what they call the “fundamentalist regimes” of the Taliban and the Northern
Alliance. Meena is a powerful image for members of RAWA and is frequently used as a
27

From the dates of the text, Afghanistan was still recovering from the recently expelled Soviets, and it forecasts the
potential for future invasions
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reminder for what it means to be a participatory citizen. A photo of Meena accompanied by her
words can be found on most of RAWA’s documents. Assassinated in 1987, Meena is framed as a
martyr and her work lives on, as she is frequently referred to in times of needed inspiration and
hope for the members of RAWA.

ILLUSTRATION 8.3 FOUNDER OF RAWA, MEENA WITH HISTORY AND POEM ON RAW
(REVOLUTIONARY ASSOCIATION OF THE WOMEN OF AFGHANISTAN, N.D.B).

It is not surprising that the first page one sees in the booklet contains Meena’s image and
one of her untitled poems (Illustration 8.3). Mentioning her own awakening for activist work,
Meena asserts her resistance to the oppression of women as she states “no longer regard me weak
and incapable, / My voice has mingled with thousands of arisen women ” (Revolutionary
Association of the Women of Afghanistan, n.d.b, p. 3). Meena not only refuses to consider
weakness, instead she asserts her agency in that she is joining other women to oppose
oppression.
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The booklet addresses much of the citizenship work that RAWA does, which includes
providing education, healthcare, and job training to women. These acts of citizenship
demonstrate overt forms of resistance in addition to traditional public protests. In Pakistan,
women from RAWA protested publicly through demonstrations and by distributing their journal
Payam-e-Zan (translated as Women’s Message). Illustration 8.4 is from a public RAWA protest
in 1999. Note that they are protesting without covering their faces with a burqa, and some are not
even wearing a hijab. Many are carrying signs with statements in Urdu (and more recently can be
found in English), along with Meena’s image. The image’s caption states “Peaceful RAWA
demonstrations in Peshawar [Pakistan] are attacked by fundamentalist terrorists. But nothing can

ILLUSTRATION 8.4: RAWA MEMBERS PROTESTING IN PAKISTAN (REVOLUTIONARY ASSOCIATION
OF THE WOMEN OF AFGHANISTAN, N.D.B).
deter RAWA from agitating and struggling for democracy and women’s rights” (Revolutionary
Association of the Women of Afghanistan, n.d.b, p. 13). In the caption RAWA asserts the
resistance through what is generally considered controversial means, as they work at “agitating”
the opposition, as well as asserting their struggle for rights. This booklet highlights many of the
different forms of resistance that are being practiced by RAWA in their citizenship work.
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8.4 Definitions of Freedom
RAWA also frequently uses the term “freedom” as part of their established goals for
women as citizens. Contrary to hearings by the United States Congress and the State of the
Union address, RAWA’s texts work to clearly define what freedom means to them. One of
RAWA’s slogans, which can be found on their homepage, clearly asserts freedom, as they state
“If you are freedom-loving and anti-fundamentalist, you are with RAWA” (Revolutionary
Association of the Women of Afghanistan, 2014c). While it is not clear exactly what “freedomloving” means (or what it means to be an anti-fundamentalist), it provides an opportunity to
explore potential definitions.
Many of their documents assert frames of freedom, but the term is generally saved for
slogans instead of detailed policies or information. In the document “Freedom, Democracy and
Social Justice,” RAWA formally answers the question of how they define these terms. While
using the term as a way to articulate resistance, “freedom” is broken down into various parts.
RAWA identifies freedom as: freedom for the country of Afghanistan, freedom for the citizens
and freedom for the community.
For RAWA, freedom for Afghanistan includes “political, economic and cultural freedom
and independence for our country” (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan,
2000). This suggests a right for Afghanistan’s self-determination from outside rule. Afghanistan
has a history of external forces working to dominate the country that predates Soviet and
American occupation. RAWA also asserts the “freedoms of expression, belief, congregation,
profession and travel” (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, 2000), as these
rights are reserved for individuals within Afghanistan to assert their own personal freedoms
within the country. In their community, people start activating their citizenship in conjunction
with other citizens which would include the “ freedom of the press… to form political parties and
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unions… to elect and be elected” (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan,
2000), which help create and support their community. Other freedoms that RAWA articulates in
their statement includes the “separation of religion from the State” and “rights of national and
ethnic minorities… [and] of women” (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan,
2000). These statements echo many of the same rights that are asserted in the United States and
work to provide an avenue for all Afghan people to participate in their citizenship.
The values presented in their “Standpoints” statement are also shown in RAWA’s
educational philosophy. In developing new citizens, RAWA works on developing the concept of
freedom in more detail, as they list “respecting freedom of thought” and that “freedom doesn’t
exist without justice” (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, 2014), as part
of the policy. They also break it down to teach that humans “do not have to think alike or live the
same way” nor that “no human being is superior or any other” (Revolutionary Association of the
Women of Afghanistan, 2014). The basic language and phrasing works to help keep the policy in
the direction of how to teach children rights and responsibilities in regards to being active
citizens within their community, resulting in RAWA being able to change their community over
the long term.
8.5 Asserting a Participatory Citizenship
RAWA is working to construct a participatory citizenship through their words and
actions. The members create policies, such as the “Education Policy,” in order to articulate clear
goals for the people who work with them. However, the concept of participatory citizenship is
most clearly seen through their actions that are documented in their texts. They are able to
clearly show how their actions are working to contribute to their larger community, encouraging
actions by other community members and working to organize for both an ideological, as well as
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a practical improvement in the lives of the Afghan people. In creating these and other texts, the
Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan provides a window into how an
oppressed group of people is able to assert their citizenship even when it is effectively denied to
them by the state.
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CHAPTER 9: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The purpose of this dissertation has been to address the constructions of a participatory
citizenship, defined as the ability for individuals to assert their citizenship through their agency
within their community. My claim is that the Revolutionary Association of the Women of
Afghanistan is actively defining participatory citizenship through their actions, instead of
citizenship being simply decided by their place of birth. I am claiming that feminist participatory
citizenship works as is stated by Ruth Lister in that “recognising women’s agency and
achievements as citizens, both individually and collectively, without losing sight of the deepseated inequalities that still undermine many of their citizenship rights” (2003, p.6), and as a
result provides a way to construct an analysis of the texts.
9.1 Connecting the Genre Chains Together
For this project I use the concept of “genre chains” as asserted by Norman Fairclough
(2010) where “genres which are regularly and predictably chained together such that meanings
are moved and transformed along the chain, and recontextualised and transformed” (p. 76) in
order to analyze the texts for this project. I am asserting that the Zarmeena execution video,
which was originally produced by RAWA, was filtered through various genres including a CNN
documentary, a United States Congressional hearing, and the 2002 State of the Union Address,
with the genre itself transformed from a video into text.
Initially the Zarmeena execution was transformed by RAWA’s video recording. The
camera-person did not record the whole event, only a very specific part. With little commentary,
the video was offered to news outlets in order to let the world know what was happening to
women in Afghanistan. It is only through reviewing additional research about RAWA that the
viewer is able to understand the story behind the execution.
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In the next link on the chain, the video was transformed into a second video with audio
commentary provided by the British reporter Shah. The event was reduced again, into the
sections that Shah wanted to show in her documentary. She provided her own commentary,
filling in for RAWA, without presenting the exact nature of the event she was showing to the
viewers of the documentary. Shah recontextualizes the video by providing additional footage
from Afghanistan, interviews with RAWA (though they did not comment on the Zarmeena
video), as well as footage of Shah in the football stadium where Zarmeena’s execution took
place. The documentary, which uses segments of the Zarmeena video, provides a very specific
context and interpretation as provided by Shah.
In the transcript of the Congressional hearing, the video is not addressed, but instead the
hearing focused on the violence against women and issues of the veil, a trope which was
highlighted by Shah throughout her documentary. The veil trope was used repeatedly as a
physical manifestation of the oppression of women, and as a result, those who testified at the
Congressional hearing did not have to see the veil or burqa in order to understand what was
meant by the use of the term. Because of the documentary Beneath the Veil, images and evidence
of the violence by the Taliban was already been provided. This is a more radical
recontextualization of the Zarmeena video. In the Congressional testimony the video is not
needed in order to understand the concepts presented. Post 9-11, the documentary was shown
repeatedly on CNN, as well as additional interviews with Shah which provided additional
constructions of Afghan women the images for the audience.
In the last text, the 2002 State of the Union address is the most distant on the genre chain
from the original event. President Bush presents an alternate images, one that is without violence
against women and without the veil. This image portrays freedom, as he does not mention the
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issue of veiling. Instead, Bush articulates that women are already free, hence no need to discuss
Smeal’s “death shroud burqa” (Afghan People vs. The Taliban, 2001). Bush further
recontextualizes the execution as a victory speech, in that the United States has freed Afghan
women through the election of women into parliament and appointments to other prominent
roles within the Afghan government.
The last link on the genre chain is the texts in which RAWA responds to these
constructions. RAWA’s texts provide a lens into how seemingly indirect power structures work
to inform, detract, and/or manipulate messages between those who are viewed without agency
and those who have the power to appropriate RAWA’s work for alternate political agendas.
However, these texts are not the end of the chain, but instead they link back RAWA’s Zarmeena
video and connect the multiple texts back to each other.
9.2 Revisiting a Participatory Citizenship and Looking Towards the Future in Rhetoric and
Writing Studies
In exploring the concept of participatory citizenship, this dissertation is concerned with
how RAWA asserts their citizenship, as well as how they are framed by the United States
government, news media, and non-governmental organizations. The texts analyzed work to resist
how colonial concepts impact Afghan women including dictating what feminism looks like and
how Afghan women are agents in their citizenship. Feminist rhetorical work provides
opportunities for scholars to see the connections between activist work and rhetoric.
Royster asserts that “knowledge is less truth for all time, space, and conditions than it is
interpretation” (2003, p. 149). This assertion allows for contemporary rhetors to look at not only
the works themselves, but the contexts in which they were written. Addressing the historical
context becomes important when scholars look at the “recovery of specific women rhetors within
these territories and time frames” (Royster, 2003, p. 152), as this provides opportunities for the
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expansion of what is considered the canon of the rhetorical tradition. As scholars continue
making visible those who have not been considered in the past, Royster asks “who actually
constitutes an appropriate rhetorical subject…? On what basis do we determine worthiness,
viability, or credibility?” (Royster, 2003, p. 156). It is through these questions that we can
recover alternative narratives, while being mindful of how the narratives contribute to the larger
rhetorical discussion.
In order to claim women’s rightful place in the public sphere and resist the frame that
veiling equals silence, the women of RAWA assert their right to speak and argue for their rights
as “women needed to gain the right to speak before they would be allowed to address other
issues” (Logan, 1995, p. 3). RAWA demonstrates how women could be brought into the public
sphere by finding a way “of connecting the real with the discourse, and at the point where this
link cannot be imagined, historiography must work as if the real and the discourse were actually
being joined” (Glenn, 1997, p. 6). RAWA does this through their connections with their many
multi-modal texts they have posted on the Internet.
Feminist rhetorics demonstrate how to use history as a guide to advocate for marginalized
writers and speakers within the field of rhetoric. “Women have used their language resources to
construct public identities, to define and solve socio-political problems, to exert influence on
social and political forces, and to garner respect and consideration as agents of change” (Royster,
2003, p. 157-8). These works provide a framework to argue for a larger scope of what is
considered part of the rhetorical tradition. As women become part of the conversation, rhetors
can help shape the field of rhetoric, for “when we shift the view to a more deliberate
commitment to inclusiveness… the landscape of rhetorical performance changes” (Royster,
2003, p. 158), and with those changes we can see farther and wider into the rhetorical canon.
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Historically Western-European rhetorics have been privileged over non-Western, nonwhite and non-male writers. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an Orientalist
identity framed Middle Eastern and Asian classical texts (Said, 2002). For the past twenty years,
scholars have been advocating for the expansion of the rhetorical landscape, looking beyond the
traditional canon for the inclusion of non-Western, non-privileged rhetorics. Nearly fifteen years
ago, Bizzell and Herzberg (2001) acknowledged that rhetoric should look for what has been
excluded, especially as women and people of color have been marginalized from canonical texts
(p. 15). However, while women historically have been excluded from the texts, RAWA has been
asserting their right to the public sphere for almost forty years. This contrasts with Orientalist
scholarship which takes “a fixed, more or less total geographical position towards a wide variety
of social, linguistic, political, and historical realities” (Said, 2002, p. 16). While the call to look
for texts composed by oppressed people who have been left out of history is an important
concept to continue pursuing, I assert that looking in alternative places is also important as the
new medias are no longer fixed, particularly texts produced on the Internet, as the text is
ephemeral.
There are methodologies that we can use for research in order to help scholars discover,
read and analyze rhetorical texts. Feminist scholarship provides a starting point for consideration.
Since the 1990s, feminist scholars (Binkley & Lipson, 2004; Bizzell, 2000; Ede, Glenn &
Lunsford, 1995, Glenn, 1997; Jarratt, 1997; Lunsford, 1995; Richie & Ronald, 2001; Royster,
2003; Swearingen, 1991) have been advocating for the expansion of the rhetorical cannon.
Scholars can draw from rhetorical feminist theory to help develop methodologies in order to find
ways to respect the text and recognize differences in the rhetorical style (Royster, 2003; Glenn,
1997). Feminist theory and methodology is constantly morphing as it reconsiders how to expand
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the landscape of who is included in the canon. Royster and Kirsch (2012) build on the idea that
proposes to “rescue, recover, and (re)inscribe women in rhetorical history” by articulating a
“dynamic framework” (p. 131-132). These ideas are defined as “rescuing,” in which historical
individuals are now being recognized; “recovering,” in which what is considered as acceptable
rhetorical actions are becoming more inclusive; “(re)inscribing,” in which non-Western
“participants in rhetorical arena” are now being recognized; and “reforming” the landscape as
transnational and alternate histories are being defined (Royster & Kirsch, 2012, p. 133).
Feminist rhetorics have looked back and recovered text from many traditions in Europe,
the United States, and from other parts of the world focusing on women. However, there are
many gaps and many voices that have not been explored. The long history of recovery for
women’s rhetorics stretches back to Sappho and now includes more recent histories from
African-American, Asian-American, and Chicana rhetorics as part of the canon. There are events
that are currently developing that are not getting enough attention. There are women’s rhetorics
that are happening in the world similar to RAWA’s that are waiting to be explored.
Contemporary feminist organizations have a rich history both in the United States, such as La
Mujer Obrera in El Paso, Texas and in countries around the world, such as Mujeres Creando in
La Paz, Bolivía. These organizations work on behalf of local women, articulating their concerns
for the local population, contributing in multiple ways to actively pursue their citizenship
practices.
In addressing contemporary issues for women in the public sphere and how women
respond to those issues, further research can look at how non-profit organizations are activating
members’ citizenship through their activities in their local community. This allows for
researchers to consider the implications for individuals to create a community by participating
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both within formal institutions, such as schools and government, as well as in grass-roots style of
organization outside the formal structure of nation-states.
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APPENDIX A: TIMELINE OF EVENTS
Chart:
RAWA
1998
16 Nov
1999
Oct 2000
13 March
2001
April-May
2001
27 June
2001
26 Aug
2001
27 Aug
2001
27 Aug
2001
18 Sept
2001
19 Sept
2001
22 Sept
2001
4 Oct 2001
7 Oct 2001
13 Oct
2001
31 Oct
2001
9 Nov 2001
17 Nov
2001
17 Nov

Events

U.S.

CNN

NGO’s

Analyzed
Texts

Feminist Majority video: Shroud of Silence: Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan
UTEP library: DS354.5 .S56 1998 VIDEO
Video of Zarmeena execution in Kabul, Afghanistan
http://www.rawa.org/zarmeena.htm
Pay;am-e Zan (Women’s Message) (in Persian) [Produced by RAWA, still images
of Zarmeena video on cover] http://pz.rawa.org/53-54/index.htm
Democracy Now: An Afghani Woman Speaks Out Against Continuing Attacks On
Afghani Women (Statement by RAWA)
http://www.democracynow.org/2001/3/13/an_afghani_woman_speaks_out_against
US aid package to Afghanistan / Taliban response
BBC: Inside Afghanistan: Behind the veil
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1410061.stm
CNN PRESENTS Beneath the Veil: The Taliban's Harsh Rule of Afghanistan
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0108/26/cp.00.html
CNN Presents: Unholy War
http://www-cgi.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/presents/index.unholywar.html
Journalist Saira Shah: Life in Afghanistan under the Taliban,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/COMMUNITY/08/24/shah/
September 11, 2001
Feminist Majority Special message to Afghanistan
CNN Tonight: America's New War: Beneath the Veil
http://transcripts.cnn.com/transcripts/0109/19/tonight.01.html
Encore Presentation: Beneath the Veil: The Taliban's Harsh Rule of Afghanistan
http://transcripts.cnn.com/ transcripts /0109/22/cp.00.html
Larry King Live: Interviews With Saira Shah, Sari Horwitz, Michael Ruane,
Michael Starr, Herb Cohen
http://transcripts.cnn.com/transcripts/0310/04/lkl.00.html
United States War in Afghanistan starts “Operation Enduring Freedom”
CNN: An In-Depth Look at Islam: The Realities and the Rhetoric
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0110/13/cp.00.html
US Congressional Testimony on the plight of Afghan women
CNN: Mavis Leno: Lives of Afghan women
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/COMMUNITY/11/09/leno.cnna/index.html
US FLOTUS: radio address on Afghani women
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=24992
CNN Presents: Unholy War (encore)
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2001
14 Dec
2001
26 Dec
2001
23 Jan 2002

Feminist Majority Statement on Afghan women

CNN Larry King Live: Journalists Behind 'Beneath the Veil' and 'Unholy War'
Tell Their Stories http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0112/26/lkl.00.html
CNN Larry King Live: Guests Discuss Future of Afghanistan
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0201/23/lkl.00.html
29 Jan 2002 US State of the Union address
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/2002012911.html
8 April
Feminist Majority Women Leaders Call for Expansion of International Peace
2002
Troops and More U.S. Funds to Restore the Rights of Afghan Women
http://www.feminist.org/news/pressstory.asp?id=6449
1 Aug 2002 Feminist Majority: victory for Afghan women
http://www.feminist.org/news/pressstory.asp?id=6750
15 Oct
US Congress: Funds for Afghan women
2002
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APPENDIX B: ANALYSIS CHART FOR
ZARMEENA EXECUTION VIDEO
Scene Plot of RAWA video of Zarmeena execution in Kabul, Afghanistan
http://www.rawa.org/zarmeena.htm and http://www.rawa.org/murder-w.htm
3:47 minutes – total length
Time stamp
Image
Written Text
Verbal dialogue / Audio
Throughout
RAWA.org [in English]
The crowd in the
video
background, hear two
woman speaking closer to
the mic
0=0:08
Red truck with 3 women in Full video of / Public
blue burkas in the back of
Execution of Zarmeena by
the truck.
Taliban / Nov. 16, 1999 –
Dirt ground
Kabul [in English]
0:09 – 0:17
Filmed secretly by a
RAWA member using a
hidden camera [in English]
0:17-0:50
Blurry blue
0:50 – 1:40
Comes in and out of focus,
quickly scanning around
the scene, people standing
around, white truck
1:41
Comes into focus, Afghan
men standing around, 2-3
women in blue burka
1:50
Comes in and out of focus,
quickly scanning around
the scene, people standing
around,
2:22
One woman in burka,
kneeling on ground, dirt
sports field (white lines);
one woman standing
2:24
Standing woman walks
away, kneeling woman left.
Men wondering about.
2:27
Man with gun, assault-type
rifle
2:28
Man with gun walks up to
3 Shots fired, crowd
kneeling woman and shoots
continues in background,
her in the back of the head.
hear someone go whoo,
with each shot.
2:29
Camera jumps, moves
The women continue
down towards ground
talking and the sounds of
the crowd continues until
the end of the video
2:37
Picture in Picture: Main
frame shows woman who
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2:40

2:42

2:52

2:54-3:04
3:04-3:06
3:07
3:11

3:18

3:33
3:42

3:47

fell backward and is laying
on the ground with her legs
(with pants) visible; burka
is up around her waist. Men
standing around; the small
frame replays the execution
Main: Woman standing
walks over to woman on
the ground woman and
pulls down the burka; small
frame: executioner pulls
the trigger
Picture in Picture is
removed; Standing woman
continues to pull the burka
over the woman on the
ground
Standing woman walks
away from woman on the
ground; no men in the
frame
Woman alone laying on the
ground
Camera points at dirt field,
no people in frame.
White SUV pulls up to
woman on the ground, 3-5
men walking around,
one woman in black,
chador-like garment, walk
over to body, with one
man. Woman in black
waves over to other people
Frame widens and see two
women in blue burkas, 3
more men, one opens back
of SUV; seven men walk
on the field
More men on the field,
walking around the
woman’s body
Last frame of video
described above.

Watch more videos of /
The Revolutionary
Association of women of
Afghanistan (RAWA): /
www.youtube.com/rawa77

Goes black
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APPENDIX C: TRANSCRIPT ANALYSIS OF BENEATH THE VEIL
Narrator/voiceover	
  (Shah)	
  from	
  video	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  in	
  general?	
  

	
  
SHAH	
  (voice-‐over):	
  Veiled	
  women	
  hunched	
  in	
  
the	
  back	
  of	
  a	
  pickup	
  truck.	
  Football	
  stadium	
  in	
  
Afghanistan,	
  a	
  place	
  of	
  entertainment	
  turned	
  
into	
  an	
  execution	
  ground.	
  Secret	
  pictures	
  
showing	
  scenes	
  the	
  country's	
  rulers	
  want	
  to	
  
keep	
  hidden.	
  We	
  are	
  trying	
  to	
  uncover	
  the	
  
truth	
  behind	
  Afghanistan's	
  veil	
  of	
  terror.	
  	
  
The	
  (UNINTELLIGIBLE),	
  gateway	
  to	
  the	
  
Islamic	
  emirate	
  of	
  Afghanistan.	
  I'm	
  trying	
  to	
  
find	
  out	
  more	
  about	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  most	
  
repressive	
  and	
  mysterious	
  places	
  in	
  the	
  world,	
  
Afghanistan.	
  	
  
The	
  country	
  is	
  ruled	
  by	
  the	
  Taliban,	
  an	
  Islamic	
  
militia.	
  In	
  1996,	
  these	
  former	
  religious	
  
students	
  seized	
  power	
  and	
  imposed	
  a	
  strict	
  
Islamic	
  regime.	
  They	
  have	
  made	
  the	
  headlines	
  
by	
  blowing	
  up	
  the	
  country's	
  ancient	
  Buddhist	
  
monuments.	
  What	
  the	
  world	
  doesn't	
  know	
  is	
  
what	
  they	
  are	
  doing	
  now	
  to	
  their	
  own	
  people.	
  	
  
	
  
For	
  me,	
  this	
  is	
  personal.	
  I	
  was	
  raised	
  in	
  Britain,	
  
but	
  my	
  father	
  was	
  an	
  Afghan,	
  and	
  I	
  grew	
  up	
  
with	
  a	
  very	
  different	
  vision	
  of	
  Afghanistan.	
  He	
  
used	
  to	
  tell	
  me	
  stories	
  of	
  my	
  family's	
  
homeland,	
  a	
  place	
  called	
  Paghman.	
  He	
  
described	
  gardens	
  and	
  fountains,	
  a	
  kind	
  of	
  
Eden.	
  I	
  have	
  never	
  been	
  to	
  Paghman.	
  Now	
  I'm	
  
trying	
  to	
  get	
  there.	
  I'm	
  hoping	
  my	
  journey	
  will	
  
help	
  me	
  understand	
  what	
  is	
  happening	
  to	
  my	
  
father's	
  country.	
  	
  
My	
  journey	
  begins	
  this	
  side	
  of	
  the	
  border,	
  in	
  
Pakistan.	
  I	
  find	
  a	
  human	
  disaster.	
  These	
  are	
  
the	
  biggest	
  refugee	
  camps	
  in	
  the	
  world,	
  almost	
  
four	
  million	
  Afghans	
  have	
  escaped	
  two	
  
decades	
  of	
  war,	
  but	
  thousands	
  more	
  are	
  now	
  
fleeing	
  famine,	
  drought	
  and	
  their	
  own	
  
government,	
  the	
  Taliban.	
  Everyone	
  has	
  a	
  story	
  
to	
  tell.	
  	
  

	
  
	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  for	
  Afghan	
  
women?	
  
	
  
This	
  is	
  the	
  video	
  of	
  
Zarmeena’s	
  execution	
  
recorded	
  by	
  RAWA	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  

fleeing	
  a	
  government	
  (Taliban)	
  
that	
  does	
  not	
  recognize	
  the	
  
people	
  as	
  active	
  citizens,	
  
especially	
  women.	
  	
  

Refugees,	
  unable	
  to	
  be	
  
citizens.	
  Displaced	
  people	
  /	
  
stateless	
  people	
  /	
  the	
  activism	
  
is	
  from	
  people’s	
  stories	
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Narrator/voiceover	
  (Shah)	
  from	
  video	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  in	
  general?	
  

UNIDENTIFIED	
  FEMALE	
  [young	
  girl]	
  (through	
  
translator):	
  I	
  was	
  hiding	
  in	
  (UNINTELLIGIBLE).	
  
I	
  could	
  see	
  the	
  Taliban,	
  but	
  they	
  couldn't	
  see	
  
me.	
  They	
  asked	
  my	
  father	
  for	
  a	
  huge	
  sum	
  of	
  
money,	
  or	
  else	
  they	
  would	
  kill	
  him.	
  He	
  said,	
  
"Where	
  could	
  I	
  make	
  that	
  much	
  money?	
  I'm	
  a	
  
simple	
  shopkeeper."	
  And	
  then	
  they	
  killed	
  him.	
  	
  
SHAH:	
  I	
  asked	
  these	
  children	
  how	
  many	
  of	
  
their	
  parents	
  were	
  killed	
  by	
  the	
  Taliban.	
  	
  
(on	
  camera):	
  Seven	
  out	
  of	
  10	
  had	
  their	
  parents	
  
killed	
  by	
  the	
  Taliban.	
  	
  
(voice-‐over):	
  Three-‐quarters	
  of	
  Afghan	
  
children	
  have	
  lost	
  a	
  relative	
  since	
  the	
  Taliban	
  
took	
  power.	
  But	
  it's	
  also	
  from	
  the	
  most	
  
vulnerable,	
  children	
  and	
  women	
  that	
  the	
  first	
  
voice	
  of	
  protest	
  has	
  risen.	
  	
  
This	
  is	
  RAWA,	
  the	
  Revolutionary	
  Association	
  
of	
  the	
  Women	
  of	
  Afghanistan.	
  They	
  are	
  
everything	
  the	
  Taliban	
  hate,	
  highly	
  political,	
  
left-‐wing	
  Afghan	
  feminists.	
  They	
  are	
  
determined	
  to	
  fight	
  for	
  human	
  rights	
  in	
  a	
  
country	
  where	
  women	
  have	
  been	
  forced	
  under	
  
the	
  veil.	
  But	
  the	
  Taliban	
  are	
  powerful	
  even	
  in	
  
Pakistan.	
  	
  
Suddenly,	
  the	
  Taliban	
  supporters	
  appear	
  from	
  
nowhere.	
  	
  
(on	
  camera):	
  Behind	
  me	
  are	
  an	
  extremist	
  
Islamic	
  group,	
  and	
  they're	
  shouting	
  "Long	
  live	
  
the	
  Taliban."	
  And	
  it's	
  driven	
  the	
  women	
  
(UNINTELLIGIBLE)	
  
(voice-‐over):	
  The	
  peaceful	
  demonstrations	
  
turns	
  into	
  a	
  street	
  battle.	
  The	
  police	
  struggle	
  
to	
  contain	
  the	
  crowd.	
  In	
  seconds,	
  there	
  is	
  tear	
  
gas	
  everywhere.	
  A	
  moment	
  later,	
  the	
  police	
  
lose	
  control.	
  More	
  and	
  more	
  Taliban	
  
supporters	
  appear.	
  RAWA	
  run	
  for	
  their	
  lives.	
  	
  
Afghan	
  brutality	
  spilling	
  out	
  onto	
  the	
  street	
  of	
  
Pakistan.	
  What	
  could	
  drive	
  such	
  aggression?	
  
Why	
  terrorize	
  this	
  one	
  tiny	
  opposition	
  group?	
  	
  
(END	
  VIDEOTAPE)	
  (COMMERCIAL	
  BREAK)	
  
(BEGIN	
  VIDEOTAPE)	
  
SHAH:	
  I've	
  just	
  been	
  picked	
  up	
  by	
  RAWA.	
  I	
  
don't	
  know	
  where	
  we're	
  going	
  now,	
  because	
  
even	
  here	
  in	
  Pakistan	
  they	
  are	
  under	
  threat	
  
from	
  the	
  Taliban.	
  But	
  I	
  think	
  they	
  might	
  be	
  
able	
  to	
  help	
  me	
  find	
  out	
  what	
  is	
  going	
  on	
  
inside	
  Afghanistan.	
  

	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  for	
  Afghan	
  
women?	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

What	
  is	
  not	
  said,	
  is	
  that	
  RAWA	
  
has	
  been	
  fighting	
  oppression	
  
(in	
  different	
  forms)	
  since	
  1977.	
  	
  
Demonstrates	
  active	
  women,	
  	
  
	
  
veil=silence	
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Narrator/voiceover	
  (Shah)	
  from	
  video	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  in	
  general?	
  

(voice-‐over):	
  We	
  arrive	
  at	
  their	
  secret	
  
headquarters.	
  RAWA	
  tell	
  me	
  they	
  have	
  an	
  
underground	
  opposition	
  network	
  inside	
  
Afghanistan's	
  capital	
  Kabul.	
  The	
  operatives	
  
use	
  hidden	
  cameras	
  as	
  their	
  most	
  powerful	
  
weapon.	
  
Their	
  pictures	
  reveal	
  the	
  destitution	
  created	
  by	
  
the	
  world's	
  most	
  stringent	
  restrictions	
  on	
  
women.	
  They	
  show	
  women	
  forced	
  to	
  beg	
  on	
  
the	
  streets	
  because	
  their	
  own	
  government	
  has	
  
forbidden	
  them	
  to	
  go	
  out	
  and	
  work.	
  Their	
  
children	
  go	
  hungry.	
  This	
  is	
  no	
  ordinary	
  third-‐
world	
  poverty;	
  it's	
  been	
  created	
  by	
  the	
  
Taliban's	
  social	
  policies.	
  
But	
  RAWA's	
  most	
  shocking	
  images	
  reveal	
  how	
  
the	
  Taliban	
  have	
  turned	
  sports	
  stadiums	
  into	
  
execution	
  grounds.	
  In	
  today's	
  Afghanistan,	
  you	
  
can	
  be	
  executed	
  for	
  anything	
  from	
  adultery	
  to	
  
murder,	
  even	
  for	
  prostitution	
  or	
  
homosexuality.	
  RAWA	
  have	
  risked	
  their	
  lives	
  
to	
  take	
  these	
  images.	
  
Speen-‐Bovak	
  (ph)	
  border	
  crossing,	
  Pakistan.	
  
It's	
  taken	
  over	
  two	
  months	
  to	
  get	
  visas	
  for	
  
Taliban-‐ruled	
  Afghanistan.	
  The	
  Taliban	
  have	
  
all	
  but	
  closed	
  the	
  country.	
  Most	
  of	
  all,	
  they	
  
want	
  to	
  keep	
  out	
  journalists	
  like	
  us.	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  MALE:	
  No,	
  no,	
  no,	
  no,	
  no.	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  MALE:	
  No	
  filming?	
  No	
  filming.	
  
SHAH:	
  But	
  with	
  one	
  last	
  Pakistani	
  checkpoint	
  
cleared,	
  we're	
  finally	
  in.	
  I'm	
  now	
  getting	
  closer	
  
to	
  Paghman,	
  the	
  family	
  home	
  I've	
  never	
  seen.	
  
Our	
  first	
  stop	
  is	
  the	
  southern	
  city	
  of	
  Qandahar.	
  
Everywhere	
  on	
  the	
  streets	
  are	
  men	
  in	
  back	
  or	
  
white	
  turbans.	
  Some	
  are	
  from	
  a	
  place	
  called	
  
the	
  ministry	
  of	
  vice	
  and	
  virtue.	
  It's	
  not	
  a	
  joke:	
  
These	
  are	
  the	
  feared	
  secret	
  police.	
  	
  
(on	
  camera):	
  It's	
  almost	
  impossible	
  to	
  film	
  
here.	
  We've	
  been	
  told	
  we	
  are	
  not	
  allowed	
  to	
  
have	
  a	
  camera	
  to	
  film	
  anything	
  at	
  all,	
  so	
  we're	
  
trying	
  to	
  film	
  covertly	
  from	
  inside	
  our	
  van.	
  
There	
  is	
  the	
  ministry	
  for	
  the	
  prevention	
  of	
  vice	
  
and	
  the	
  promotion	
  of	
  virtue,	
  and	
  these	
  are	
  the	
  
really	
  the	
  religious	
  police.	
  
(voice-‐over):	
  Simply	
  driving	
  past	
  the	
  
headquarters	
  of	
  the	
  Taliban's	
  notorious	
  secret	
  
police	
  is	
  enough	
  to	
  terrify	
  our	
  translator,	
  and	
  
us.	
  Their	
  spies	
  watch	
  everything,	
  as	
  we	
  soon	
  
find	
  out.	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  MALE:	
  Sorry.	
  

	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  for	
  Afghan	
  
women?	
  
In	
  Pakastan?	
  
silence/anonymity	
  necessary	
  	
  
hidden	
  cameras,	
  activism	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

The	
  recording	
  of	
  the	
  images	
  
are	
  the	
  citizenship.	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  

Government	
  legislates	
  v&v	
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Narrator/voiceover	
  (Shah)	
  from	
  video	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  in	
  general?	
  

SHAH:	
  Minutes	
  after	
  arriving	
  in	
  Qandahar's	
  
marketplace	
  we're	
  in	
  big	
  trouble.	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  MALE:	
  You	
  want	
  me	
  to	
  shut	
  it	
  
off?	
  
SHAH:	
  The	
  Taliban	
  arrest	
  us	
  on	
  the	
  spot	
  for	
  
filming	
  illegally.	
  We	
  switch	
  to	
  a	
  hidden	
  
camera.	
  	
  
(on	
  camera):	
  Why	
  are	
  we	
  going	
  to	
  the	
  police	
  
station?	
  Can	
  you	
  translate?	
  
(voice-‐over):	
  We	
  find	
  ourselves	
  heading	
  back	
  
to	
  the	
  ministry	
  for	
  vice	
  and	
  virtue,	
  the	
  very	
  
same	
  building	
  that	
  terrified	
  our	
  translator	
  
earlier.	
  This	
  time	
  we	
  go	
  straight	
  through	
  the	
  
gates.	
  Things	
  don't	
  look	
  good.	
  
But	
  then	
  are	
  our	
  arrest	
  is	
  interrupted.	
  It's	
  time	
  
for	
  the	
  most	
  feared	
  men	
  in	
  Afghanistan	
  to	
  say	
  
their	
  evening	
  prayers.	
  Only	
  then	
  do	
  they	
  lead	
  
our	
  producer	
  inside,	
  but	
  not	
  me.	
  Women	
  are	
  
banned	
  from	
  the	
  building.	
  	
  
(on	
  camera):	
  Can	
  I	
  not	
  be	
  your	
  guest	
  here?	
  	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  MALE:	
  Only	
  man,	
  man,	
  man.	
  
SHAH	
  (voice-‐over):	
  The	
  last	
  person	
  the	
  Taliban	
  
caught	
  filming	
  them	
  secretly	
  was	
  thrown	
  into	
  
jail.	
  An	
  hour	
  passes;	
  but	
  this	
  time	
  we've	
  been	
  
lucky.	
  	
  
(on	
  camera):	
  They	
  demanded	
  all	
  our	
  tapes	
  off	
  
us.	
  They	
  demanded	
  to	
  know	
  what	
  we	
  had	
  
been	
  filming.	
  (UNINTELLIGIBLE)	
  but	
  they	
  
knew	
  we'd	
  been	
  filming	
  in	
  the	
  market.	
  We	
  
managed	
  to	
  slip	
  them	
  a	
  blank	
  tape	
  and	
  they	
  let	
  
us	
  go,	
  but	
  they're	
  escorting	
  us	
  back	
  home.	
  	
  
(voice-‐over):	
  We	
  couldn't	
  have	
  had	
  a	
  better	
  
illustration	
  of	
  the	
  power	
  of	
  the	
  religious	
  police.	
  
They've	
  made	
  it	
  clear	
  we	
  should	
  get	
  out	
  of	
  
town.	
  
The	
  next	
  day	
  we	
  hit	
  the	
  road	
  for	
  Kabul,	
  
Afghanistan's	
  capital.	
  	
  
(COMMERCIAL	
  BREAK)	
  
(BEGIN	
  VIDEOTAPE)	
  
SHAH:	
  Arriving	
  in	
  Kabul,	
  Afghanistan's	
  capital,	
  
is	
  a	
  shock.	
  All	
  this	
  damage	
  was	
  caused	
  by	
  civil	
  
war	
  before	
  the	
  Taliban	
  came.	
  When	
  they	
  took	
  
over,	
  people	
  hoped	
  life	
  would	
  get	
  better.	
  But	
  
four	
  years	
  later,	
  nothing	
  has	
  been	
  repaired.	
  We	
  
have	
  come	
  to	
  a	
  city	
  without	
  buildings,	
  without	
  
joy.	
  The	
  Taliban	
  say	
  they	
  have	
  other	
  priorities.	
  	
  

commerce	
  not	
  safe	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  for	
  Afghan	
  
women?	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

Colonial	
  outsiders	
  filming	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

Humanizing	
  Taliban?	
  Even	
  this	
   	
  
does	
  not	
  interrupt	
  the	
  call	
  to	
  
prayer?	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
	
  
failed	
  nation	
  state	
  /	
  no	
  
infrastructure	
  	
  
without	
  joy	
  /	
  compare	
  to	
  the	
  
pursuit	
  of	
  happiness	
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Narrator/voiceover	
  (Shah)	
  from	
  video	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  in	
  general?	
  

WAKIL	
  MOTAWAKIL,	
  TALIBAN	
  FOREIGN	
  
MINISTER	
  (through	
  translator):	
  The	
  rest	
  of	
  the	
  
world	
  has	
  misunderstood	
  us.	
  It	
  used	
  to	
  be	
  no	
  
law.	
  In	
  the	
  past	
  four	
  years,	
  we	
  have	
  brought	
  
law	
  and	
  order.	
  Our	
  government	
  has	
  disarmed	
  
the	
  population,	
  brought	
  security,	
  improved	
  
commerce	
  and	
  created	
  jobs.	
  We	
  have	
  proved	
  
we	
  are	
  a	
  proper	
  government.	
  	
  
SHAH:	
  There	
  is	
  no	
  sign	
  of	
  jobs,	
  but	
  there's	
  
plenty	
  of	
  security.	
  Every	
  few	
  hundred	
  meters,	
  
we	
  pass	
  roadblocks,	
  they	
  are	
  decorated	
  with	
  
confiscated	
  cassette	
  tapes.	
  Even	
  music	
  has	
  
been	
  banned.	
  	
  
We	
  try	
  to	
  film	
  it.	
  And	
  again,	
  it	
  seems	
  we	
  are	
  in	
  
trouble.	
  They	
  force-‐march	
  us	
  into	
  a	
  derelict	
  
building.	
  Inside,	
  we	
  find	
  a	
  Taliban	
  security	
  
chief	
  sitting	
  with	
  his	
  friends.	
  To	
  our	
  surprise,	
  
they	
  invite	
  us	
  to	
  tea.	
  Then	
  unexpectedly,	
  they	
  
ask	
  us	
  to	
  film	
  them.	
  This	
  time,	
  far	
  from	
  
detaining	
  us,	
  they	
  take	
  us	
  on	
  a	
  tour	
  to	
  boast	
  
about	
  their	
  rigid	
  control	
  on	
  the	
  city.	
  	
  
(on	
  camera):	
  The	
  man	
  in	
  the	
  front	
  seat	
  is	
  the	
  
head	
  of	
  Taliban	
  intelligence	
  in	
  the	
  capital.	
  I	
  
know	
  he	
  is	
  responsible	
  for	
  the	
  information	
  
which	
  is	
  that	
  of	
  the	
  hanging	
  of	
  at	
  least	
  two	
  
men.	
  But	
  now	
  he	
  is	
  driving	
  through	
  this	
  district	
  
of	
  Kabul	
  that	
  he	
  is	
  responsible	
  for.	
  	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  MALE	
  (through	
  translator):	
  My	
  
duty	
  is	
  to	
  watch	
  for	
  opponents.	
  If	
  they	
  enter	
  
this	
  area,	
  I	
  can	
  find	
  out	
  about	
  it.	
  If	
  only	
  upon	
  
entering	
  this	
  area,	
  we	
  find	
  them	
  and	
  arrest	
  
them	
  within	
  minutes.	
  	
  
SHAH:	
  Who	
  exactly	
  are	
  you	
  looking	
  for?	
  	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  MALE	
  (through	
  translator):	
  
Anybody,	
  Afghan	
  or	
  foreigner,	
  who	
  is	
  involved	
  
in	
  political	
  activities.	
  Anybody	
  that	
  even	
  
speaks	
  against	
  the	
  Taliban	
  or	
  causes	
  problems	
  
for	
  them,	
  we	
  arrest	
  these	
  kinds	
  of	
  people.	
  	
  
SHAH	
  (voice-‐over):	
  We	
  escape	
  the	
  hospitality	
  
of	
  the	
  intelligence	
  chief.	
  Now	
  we	
  are	
  heading	
  
to	
  the	
  place	
  where	
  some	
  of	
  his	
  victims	
  have	
  
ended	
  up.	
  This	
  is	
  where	
  the	
  Taliban	
  enforce	
  
their	
  extreme	
  religious	
  laws.	
  It's	
  the	
  symbol	
  of	
  
their	
  repression,	
  the	
  football	
  stadium.	
  

citizens	
  disarmed,	
  secure,	
  
commerce	
  &	
  jobs	
  

no	
  jobs	
  for	
  the	
  people,	
  but	
  the	
  
people	
  are	
  secure,	
  	
  
	
  
music/no	
  joy	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  for	
  Afghan	
  
women?	
  
	
  

	
  

government	
  control	
  of	
  citizens	
   	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
political	
  activities;	
  	
  
speaking/acting	
  	
  against	
  the	
  
Taliban,	
  	
  

	
  
	
  

football	
  stadium	
  is	
  now	
  a	
  place	
   	
  
for	
  execution	
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Narrator/voiceover	
  (Shah)	
  from	
  video	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  in	
  general?	
  

(on	
  camera):	
  It's	
  an	
  extraordinary	
  feeling,	
  
because	
  I	
  have	
  actually	
  seen	
  pictures	
  of	
  
women	
  being	
  shot	
  at	
  this	
  penalty	
  area	
  here	
  
that	
  we	
  are	
  just	
  coming	
  up	
  to.	
  And	
  also,	
  I	
  have	
  
seen	
  pictures	
  of	
  men	
  being	
  hung	
  from	
  this	
  goal	
  
post.	
  	
  
This	
  stadium	
  was	
  actually	
  financed	
  by	
  the	
  
international	
  community	
  to	
  try	
  to	
  raise	
  the	
  
spirits	
  of	
  the	
  people	
  of	
  Afghanistan	
  after	
  the	
  
Taliban	
  took	
  power.	
  Instead	
  of	
  using	
  it	
  for	
  
football,	
  this	
  is	
  now	
  their	
  public	
  execution	
  
ground.	
  	
  
The	
  thinking	
  was	
  what	
  it	
  must	
  be	
  like	
  when	
  
these	
  stands	
  are	
  all	
  full	
  of	
  people	
  and	
  they	
  are	
  
all	
  shouting	
  and	
  screaming,	
  and	
  the	
  Taliban	
  
drive	
  their	
  victims	
  in	
  through	
  the	
  entrance	
  and	
  
do	
  a	
  parade	
  around.	
  	
  
And	
  the	
  women	
  who	
  they	
  executed	
  here	
  were	
  
not	
  allowed	
  to	
  take	
  off	
  their	
  veils.	
  So,	
  they	
  
must	
  have	
  had	
  hardly	
  any	
  idea	
  of	
  what	
  was	
  
happening.	
  They	
  must	
  have	
  been	
  very	
  
confused.	
  They	
  must	
  have	
  been	
  hearing	
  the	
  
crowd	
  screaming.	
  They	
  were	
  pushed	
  up	
  to	
  the	
  
penalty	
  line	
  and	
  made	
  to	
  kneel	
  down.	
  	
  
Just	
  the	
  concept	
  that	
  you	
  can	
  pack	
  a	
  stadium	
  
with	
  people	
  baying	
  for	
  the	
  blood	
  of	
  another	
  
human	
  being,	
  and	
  then	
  shoot	
  them	
  on	
  the	
  
pitch.	
  	
  
(voice-‐over):	
  The	
  Taliban	
  leadership	
  is	
  proud	
  of	
  
the	
  things	
  they	
  do	
  here.	
  	
  
MOTAWAKIL	
  (through	
  translator):	
  The	
  
football	
  stadium	
  is	
  a	
  place	
  of	
  leisure,	
  a	
  place	
  
for	
  playing	
  games,	
  a	
  place	
  for	
  joy.	
  When	
  justice	
  
is	
  done	
  on	
  behalf	
  of	
  a	
  victim,	
  that	
  too	
  is	
  a	
  joyful	
  
event,	
  which	
  brings	
  order	
  and	
  security	
  to	
  
society.	
  	
  
SHAH	
  (on	
  camera):	
  But	
  the	
  international	
  
community	
  paid	
  for	
  the	
  football	
  stadium.	
  They	
  
wanted	
  the	
  Afghan	
  people	
  to	
  play	
  football	
  
there.	
  Instead,	
  you	
  are	
  executing	
  people	
  there.	
  	
  

	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  for	
  Afghan	
  
women?	
  
Execution	
  of	
  zarmeena	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

In	
  the	
  video	
  of	
  Zarmeena,	
  
which	
  there	
  are	
  sounds	
  of	
  the	
  
people,	
  it	
  is	
  not	
  the	
  chanting	
  
of	
  is	
  found	
  of	
  a	
  group	
  of	
  
people	
  at	
  a	
  sporting	
  event.	
  	
  
If	
  this	
  was	
  a	
  pattern,	
  the	
  burka	
  
is	
  not	
  a	
  burlap	
  sack,	
  they	
  can	
  
see	
  somewhat,	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  
mystery	
  to	
  where	
  they	
  are	
  
going,	
  once	
  they	
  are	
  there.	
  	
  

	
  

	
  

This	
  was	
  not	
  the	
  case	
  in	
  
Zarmeena,	
  RAWA’s	
  
statements.	
  

	
  

	
  

execution	
  =	
  justice,	
  joy,	
  
security,	
  order	
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Narrator/voiceover	
  (Shah)	
  from	
  video	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  in	
  general?	
  

MOTAWAKIL	
  (through	
  translator):	
  I	
  will	
  make	
  
the	
  international	
  community	
  an	
  offer.	
  In	
  
Afghanistan,	
  everything	
  has	
  been	
  destroyed.	
  If	
  
they	
  help	
  us	
  to	
  build	
  a	
  separate	
  place	
  suitable	
  
for	
  carrying	
  out	
  executions,	
  we	
  have	
  no	
  
problem	
  with	
  that.	
  When	
  they	
  criticize	
  us	
  10	
  
times,	
  they	
  should	
  at	
  least	
  help	
  us	
  once.	
  They	
  
should	
  build	
  a	
  place	
  for	
  executions	
  and	
  get	
  
financial	
  support	
  so	
  that	
  football	
  could	
  be	
  
played	
  at	
  the	
  stadium	
  and	
  our	
  work	
  can	
  be	
  
done	
  as	
  well.	
  
(END	
  VIDEOTAPE)	
  
(COMMERCIAL	
  BREAK)	
  
(BEGIN	
  VIDEOTAPE)	
  
SHAH:	
  Todays's	
  Afghanistan	
  is	
  a	
  world	
  away	
  
from	
  the	
  liberal	
  Islam	
  I	
  grew	
  up	
  with.	
  So	
  far,	
  
I've	
  been	
  an	
  outsider	
  here.	
  Now	
  I	
  want	
  to	
  get	
  
inside	
  the	
  world	
  of	
  ordinary	
  Afghans.	
  It's	
  time	
  
to	
  meet	
  up	
  with	
  the	
  secret	
  opposition	
  network	
  
of	
  RAWA,	
  the	
  women's	
  group	
  I	
  met	
  in	
  
Pakistan.	
  
I'm	
  going	
  undercover.	
  From	
  now	
  on	
  I'll	
  live	
  the	
  
life	
  of	
  an	
  Afghan	
  woman.	
  I'll	
  have	
  to	
  go	
  alone	
  
and	
  leave	
  my	
  crew	
  behind.	
  
(on	
  camera):	
  As	
  a	
  foreigner,	
  I	
  do	
  at	
  least	
  have	
  a	
  
little	
  bit	
  of	
  protection.	
  As	
  an	
  Afghan,	
  which	
  I	
  
will	
  be	
  travelling	
  as,	
  I'll	
  have	
  no	
  protection	
  at	
  
all.	
  	
  
(voice-‐over):	
  But	
  I	
  can	
  enter	
  the	
  Kabul	
  
foreigners	
  don't	
  see.	
  Under	
  the	
  Taliban	
  the	
  
World	
  Food	
  Program	
  must	
  help	
  feed	
  up	
  to	
  a	
  
third	
  of	
  the	
  city's	
  population.	
  
I	
  discover	
  a	
  man	
  selling	
  scraps	
  of	
  bread	
  with	
  
mold	
  on	
  them	
  for	
  animal	
  feed.	
  A	
  woman	
  
buying	
  a	
  handful	
  at	
  a	
  time.	
  But	
  she	
  is	
  not	
  
feeding	
  it	
  to	
  animals.	
  She	
  grinds	
  it	
  up	
  for	
  her	
  
seven	
  children.	
  
She	
  has	
  invited	
  me	
  home	
  to	
  film	
  her	
  to	
  tell	
  me	
  
that	
  since	
  the	
  Taliban	
  stopped	
  women	
  going	
  
out	
  to	
  work	
  she	
  has	
  to	
  beg.	
  	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  FEMALE	
  (through	
  translator):	
  
There	
  is	
  nobody	
  in	
  the	
  household	
  who	
  can	
  
work,	
  and	
  so	
  there	
  is	
  no	
  money.	
  I	
  give	
  this	
  dry	
  
bread	
  to	
  my	
  children	
  to	
  get	
  them	
  quiet.	
  It's	
  all	
  
we	
  have	
  to	
  eat.	
  

	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  for	
  Afghan	
  
women?	
  
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
liberal	
  Islam	
  in	
  Britain;	
  	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
  

Afghan	
  women	
  are	
  alone	
  

	
  

No	
  protection	
  for	
  afghan	
  
women	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

unable	
  to	
  feed	
  family	
  

work=citizenship	
  

women	
  not	
  citizens	
  

ability	
  to	
  work	
  =	
  citizenship;	
  
non	
  citizens	
  cannot	
  work	
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Narrator/voiceover	
  (Shah)	
  from	
  video	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  in	
  general?	
  

SHAH:	
  The	
  Taliban	
  say	
  they	
  encourage	
  
women	
  to	
  stay	
  at	
  home	
  for	
  their	
  own	
  
protection.	
  But	
  women	
  aren't	
  just	
  forbidden	
  to	
  
earn	
  a	
  living.	
  They're	
  deprived	
  of	
  access	
  to	
  
basic	
  things	
  like	
  medical	
  care.	
  Mal-‐Alai	
  (ph)	
  
Gynecological	
  Hospital.	
  A	
  higher	
  percentage	
  
of	
  women	
  die	
  in	
  Afghanistan	
  than	
  almost	
  
anywhere	
  in	
  the	
  world,	
  and	
  one	
  in	
  four	
  children	
  
die	
  before	
  theirs	
  fifth	
  birthday.	
  I	
  find	
  filthy	
  
wards	
  and	
  lavatories.	
  There	
  is	
  barely	
  a	
  doctor	
  
to	
  be	
  seen,	
  few	
  medicines.	
  This	
  is	
  what	
  
happens	
  when	
  one	
  half	
  of	
  society	
  has	
  been	
  
shut	
  down.	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  FEMALE	
  (through	
  translator):	
  
The	
  government	
  of	
  Afghanistan	
  is	
  trying	
  to	
  
make	
  women	
  redundant,	
  and	
  they	
  don't	
  want	
  
them	
  to	
  work	
  in	
  the	
  hospitals	
  at	
  all.	
  In	
  this	
  
hospital,	
  there	
  are	
  not	
  enough	
  female	
  doctors,	
  
as	
  a	
  large	
  number	
  of	
  them	
  have	
  fled	
  
Afghanistan.	
  This	
  has	
  made	
  the	
  condition	
  in	
  
the	
  hospital	
  very	
  poor.	
  	
  
SHAH:	
  My	
  escorts,	
  RAWA,	
  are	
  one	
  of	
  most	
  be	
  
wanted	
  opposition	
  groups	
  in	
  Afghanistan.	
  
Even	
  traveling	
  by	
  taxi	
  could	
  blow	
  my	
  cover;	
  
taxi	
  drivers	
  act	
  as	
  Taliban	
  spies.	
  
Now	
  RAWA	
  are	
  taking	
  me	
  to	
  see	
  their	
  riskiest	
  
activity:	
  not	
  a	
  bomb	
  factory	
  or	
  undercover	
  
newspaper,	
  just	
  a	
  class	
  for	
  girls.	
  The	
  Taliban	
  
have	
  made	
  no	
  education	
  available	
  to	
  girls	
  over	
  
the	
  age	
  of	
  12.	
  Every	
  woman	
  in	
  the	
  room	
  is	
  
breaking	
  the	
  law.	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  FEMALE	
  (through	
  translator):	
  
All	
  our	
  courses	
  have	
  to	
  be	
  secret	
  and	
  
underground	
  because	
  of	
  the	
  Taliban.	
  If	
  they	
  
find	
  out,	
  they	
  could	
  hang	
  us	
  all.	
  All	
  our	
  girls	
  are	
  
left	
  uneducated	
  because	
  of	
  their	
  cruelty.	
  
I	
  used	
  to	
  be	
  a	
  teacher	
  in	
  a	
  school.	
  I	
  was	
  made	
  
redundant	
  (UNINTELLIGIBLE)	
  the	
  Taliban	
  
stopped	
  woman	
  from	
  teaching.	
  
SHAH:	
  Excluded	
  from	
  every	
  part	
  of	
  society,	
  
but	
  some	
  women	
  are	
  still	
  holding	
  on	
  to	
  their	
  
dignity.	
  I	
  was	
  led	
  past	
  overflowing	
  sewers,	
  
through	
  what	
  were	
  once	
  luxury	
  apartment	
  
blocks.	
  My	
  destination:	
  the	
  most	
  subversive	
  
place	
  of	
  all.	
  I	
  have	
  been	
  invited	
  to	
  a	
  secret	
  
beauty	
  parlor.	
  If	
  they	
  are	
  caught,	
  these	
  women	
  
will	
  be	
  imprisoned,	
  but	
  they	
  still	
  paint	
  the	
  faces	
  
they	
  can	
  never	
  show	
  in	
  public.	
  

citizens	
  receive	
  medical	
  care	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  for	
  Afghan	
  
women?	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

Education	
  =	
  active	
  citizenship	
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Narrator/voiceover	
  (Shah)	
  from	
  video	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  in	
  general?	
  

UNIDENTIFIED	
  FEMALE	
  (through	
  translator):	
  
This	
  is	
  a	
  form	
  of	
  resistance.	
  We	
  are	
  defying	
  the	
  
Taliban.	
  It	
  means	
  that	
  whatever	
  the	
  
circumstances,	
  we	
  will	
  carry	
  on	
  doing	
  thing	
  we	
  
want	
  to	
  do	
  like	
  studying,	
  doing	
  our	
  job	
  -‐-‐	
  you	
  
know,	
  all	
  these	
  things.	
  	
  
SHAH:	
  Women	
  trying	
  to	
  keep	
  life	
  normal	
  in	
  a	
  
world	
  gone	
  completely	
  mad.	
  That	
  was	
  the	
  
image	
  RAWA	
  left	
  me	
  with.	
  
(on	
  camera):	
  If	
  you're	
  living	
  here,	
  the	
  trivial	
  
things	
  that	
  are	
  imposed	
  on	
  people	
  lead	
  to	
  
serious	
  things	
  that	
  are	
  imposed	
  on	
  people	
  like	
  
torture,	
  death,	
  execution.	
  There	
  are	
  no	
  minor	
  
freedoms,	
  but	
  there	
  are	
  no	
  major	
  freedoms	
  
either.	
  And	
  this	
  is	
  really	
  an	
  incredible	
  serious,	
  
terrifying	
  place	
  to	
  be	
  if	
  you	
  are	
  an	
  Afghan.	
  
(voice-‐over):	
  But	
  I	
  was	
  soon	
  to	
  discover	
  just	
  
how	
  terrifying	
  life	
  under	
  the	
  Taliban	
  can	
  be.	
  	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  MALE	
  (through	
  translator):	
  
Mass	
  murder	
  was	
  committed	
  by	
  the	
  Taliban	
  in	
  
our	
  village,	
  in	
  our	
  district.	
  SHAH:	
  This	
  man	
  has	
  
just	
  fled	
  from	
  Yakalang	
  (ph)	
  in	
  central	
  
Afghanistan.	
  He	
  is	
  telling	
  me	
  that	
  when	
  
Taliban	
  fighters	
  took	
  his	
  village	
  last	
  month	
  
they	
  massacred	
  150	
  civilians.	
  
This	
  footage	
  was	
  filmed	
  by	
  locals	
  in	
  the	
  same	
  
village	
  a	
  few	
  days	
  later.	
  It	
  shows	
  the	
  hospital	
  
smashed	
  and	
  devastated,	
  and	
  mass	
  graves.	
  
The	
  bodies	
  of	
  civilians	
  executed,	
  some	
  of	
  them	
  
in	
  truly	
  horrific	
  ways.	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  MALE	
  (through	
  translator):	
  
From	
  my	
  own	
  family,	
  11	
  people	
  have	
  been	
  
killed.	
  There	
  was	
  a	
  boy	
  of	
  17	
  or	
  18	
  whom	
  they	
  
even	
  skinned.	
  They	
  skinned	
  his	
  head.	
  The	
  
Taliban,	
  they	
  skinned	
  him	
  with	
  knifes	
  and	
  
bayonets.	
  I	
  even	
  saw	
  it	
  with	
  my	
  own	
  eyes.	
  
Then	
  those	
  of	
  us	
  who	
  had	
  survived	
  the	
  killing	
  
got	
  together	
  and	
  went	
  to	
  collect	
  our	
  dead.	
  We	
  
picked	
  up	
  and	
  removed	
  the	
  dead	
  with	
  the	
  help	
  
of	
  women	
  and	
  old	
  men.	
  	
  
SHAH:	
  The	
  man	
  I	
  spoke	
  to	
  is	
  now	
  safely	
  in	
  
Pakistan.	
  But	
  was	
  his	
  story	
  unusual,	
  or	
  part	
  of	
  
a	
  wider	
  pattern	
  of	
  atrocities?	
  	
  
(END	
  VIDEOTAPE)	
  
(COMMERCIAL	
  BREAK)	
  
(BEGIN	
  VIDEOTAPE)	
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Narrator/voiceover	
  (Shah)	
  from	
  video	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  in	
  general?	
  

SHAH:	
  Up	
  until	
  1996,	
  the	
  Taliban	
  held	
  only	
  a	
  
fraction	
  of	
  the	
  country.	
  Now	
  they	
  have	
  almost	
  
all	
  of	
  it.	
  But	
  there	
  are	
  still	
  people	
  opposing	
  
them.	
  They	
  are	
  an	
  alliance	
  of	
  different	
  ethnic	
  
groups.	
  They	
  are	
  fighting	
  a	
  last-‐ditch	
  battle	
  for	
  
their	
  own	
  culture	
  and	
  identity,	
  and	
  they	
  claim	
  
that	
  the	
  Taliban	
  have	
  massacred	
  civilians	
  in	
  
this	
  area,	
  away	
  from	
  the	
  eyes	
  of	
  the	
  world.	
  	
  
(on	
  camera):	
  We	
  finally	
  arrived	
  at	
  the	
  
northeast	
  corner	
  of	
  Afghanistan.	
  The	
  
opposition	
  forces	
  have	
  been	
  pushed	
  right	
  back	
  
to	
  here,	
  and	
  the	
  frontline	
  is	
  there,	
  right	
  directly	
  
behind	
  me.	
  There	
  are	
  plumes	
  of	
  smoke	
  going	
  
up	
  there	
  at	
  the	
  moment,	
  because	
  there	
  is	
  an	
  
artillery	
  battle	
  going	
  on	
  between	
  the	
  Taliban	
  
front	
  and	
  the	
  opposition	
  front.	
  We	
  have	
  to	
  try	
  
and	
  get	
  up	
  there,	
  because	
  these	
  are	
  where	
  our	
  
witnesses	
  are	
  likely	
  to	
  be.	
  	
  
(voice-‐over):	
  The	
  opposition	
  forces	
  are	
  barely	
  
managing	
  to	
  hold	
  these	
  positions.	
  Their	
  
commander	
  points	
  out	
  the	
  Taliban	
  trenches	
  on	
  
the	
  far	
  side	
  of	
  the	
  valley.	
  In	
  between	
  lie	
  four	
  
villages,	
  caught	
  between	
  the	
  frontlines.	
  	
  
He	
  tells	
  me	
  that	
  a	
  few	
  weeks	
  ago	
  the	
  Taliban	
  
briefly	
  took	
  these	
  villages	
  before	
  being	
  pushed	
  
back.	
  The	
  commanders	
  heard	
  disturbing	
  
rumors	
  that	
  dozens	
  of	
  civilians	
  have	
  been	
  
massacred.	
  Atrocities	
  that	
  have	
  never	
  been	
  
reported	
  to	
  the	
  outside	
  world.	
  To	
  find	
  out	
  the	
  
truth,	
  we	
  must	
  get	
  even	
  closer	
  to	
  the	
  Taliban	
  
positions	
  and	
  go	
  down	
  into	
  the	
  valley	
  itself.	
  	
  
The	
  countryside	
  here	
  reminds	
  me	
  of	
  the	
  
Afghanistan	
  my	
  father	
  knew.	
  There	
  has	
  never	
  
been	
  a	
  single	
  Afghan	
  culture,	
  no	
  one	
  version	
  of	
  
Islam.	
  It's	
  a	
  mosaic	
  of	
  different	
  ethnic	
  groups.	
  
The	
  peoples	
  in	
  this	
  area	
  have	
  lived	
  peacefully	
  
side	
  by	
  side	
  for	
  centuries,	
  it's	
  a	
  world	
  the	
  
Taliban	
  are	
  intent	
  on	
  destroying.	
  	
  
We	
  soon	
  come	
  across	
  our	
  first	
  witness.	
  He	
  says	
  
that	
  when	
  the	
  Taliban	
  entered	
  his	
  village,	
  Bahi	
  
Zahra	
  (ph),	
  they	
  killed	
  unarmed	
  civilians.	
  He	
  
describes	
  how	
  he	
  found	
  the	
  bodies	
  of	
  11	
  men.	
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Narrator/voiceover	
  (Shah)	
  from	
  video	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  in	
  general?	
  

UNIDENTIFIED	
  MALE	
  (through	
  translator):	
  
There	
  were	
  two	
  bodies	
  where	
  they	
  must	
  have	
  
taken	
  them	
  all	
  captive.	
  They	
  had	
  tried	
  to	
  
escape,	
  and	
  they	
  had	
  been	
  shot	
  on	
  the	
  spot.	
  
The	
  others	
  had	
  been	
  taken	
  away	
  to	
  the	
  center	
  
of	
  Bahi	
  Zahra	
  (ph).	
  Their	
  hands	
  and	
  feet	
  had	
  
been	
  tied,	
  and	
  they	
  had	
  been	
  tortured	
  and	
  
then	
  killed.	
  	
  
SHAH:	
  He	
  tells	
  me	
  a	
  story	
  of	
  what	
  seemed	
  to	
  
be	
  organized	
  violence	
  -‐-‐	
  soldiers	
  running	
  from	
  
house	
  to	
  house,	
  pulling	
  out	
  any	
  man	
  they	
  
found,	
  shooting	
  on	
  the	
  spot	
  anyone	
  who	
  dared	
  
resist.	
  For	
  10	
  nights,	
  they	
  ran	
  wild	
  while	
  the	
  
village	
  men	
  were	
  held	
  captive.	
  As	
  they	
  left,	
  
they	
  lined	
  up	
  12	
  of	
  their	
  prisoners	
  against	
  a	
  
wall,	
  and	
  shot	
  them	
  in	
  the	
  head.	
  	
  
An	
  old	
  man	
  from	
  the	
  same	
  village	
  corroborates	
  
his	
  story.	
  As	
  he	
  does	
  so,	
  there	
  is	
  a	
  reminder	
  of	
  
just	
  how	
  close	
  we	
  are	
  to	
  the	
  war,	
  the	
  Taliban	
  
jet.	
  	
  
From	
  now	
  on,	
  our	
  journey	
  will	
  get	
  even	
  more	
  
dangerous.	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  MALE:	
  (SPEAKING	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  LANGUAGE)	
  
SHAH	
  (on	
  camera):	
  He	
  says	
  there's	
  mines	
  over	
  
there.	
  	
  
(voice-‐over):	
  We	
  decided	
  to	
  try	
  to	
  get	
  to	
  one	
  of	
  
the	
  four	
  villages.	
  A	
  place	
  called	
  Momai	
  (ph).	
  
The	
  village	
  is	
  close	
  to	
  no-‐	
  man's	
  land.	
  To	
  get	
  
there,	
  we	
  have	
  to	
  cross	
  the	
  Coctu	
  (ph)	
  river,	
  a	
  
mile	
  upstream	
  from	
  the	
  Taliban	
  guns.	
  No	
  
reporter	
  from	
  the	
  outside	
  world	
  has	
  been	
  here	
  
to	
  report	
  on	
  these	
  massacres.	
  	
  
As	
  soon	
  as	
  we	
  arrive,	
  villagers	
  rush	
  out	
  to	
  greet	
  
us.	
  They	
  take	
  us	
  to	
  see	
  an	
  old	
  woman	
  called	
  
Bibijon	
  (ph).	
  When	
  the	
  Taliban	
  came,	
  she	
  was	
  
at	
  home	
  with	
  her	
  two	
  sons,	
  both	
  civilians.	
  	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  FEMALE	
  (through	
  translator):	
  
They	
  shot	
  Umder	
  (ph).	
  It	
  was	
  my	
  little	
  boy	
  who	
  
I	
  brought	
  up.	
  The	
  other	
  one	
  they	
  captured	
  and	
  
took	
  away.	
  I	
  was	
  standing	
  here	
  when	
  the	
  
Taliban	
  came,	
  my	
  son	
  was	
  standing	
  over	
  there.	
  
He	
  couldn't	
  speak	
  their	
  language,	
  and	
  they	
  the	
  
shot	
  him.	
  They	
  shot	
  him	
  here	
  in	
  this	
  place,	
  we	
  
took	
  his	
  blood	
  and	
  covered	
  it	
  up.	
  It	
  was	
  here	
  
we	
  covered	
  over	
  the	
  spot	
  where	
  he	
  died.	
  	
  

	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  for	
  Afghan	
  
women?	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

157

Narrator/voiceover	
  (Shah)	
  from	
  video	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  in	
  general?	
  

SHAH:	
  Then,	
  the	
  villagers	
  take	
  us	
  to	
  another	
  
house,	
  a	
  place	
  veiled	
  in	
  sorrow.	
  The	
  first	
  
person	
  I	
  see	
  is	
  an	
  old	
  man	
  staring	
  into	
  space.	
  
Then	
  I	
  see	
  three	
  girls	
  of	
  9,	
  12	
  and	
  15	
  years	
  old.	
  
Their	
  father	
  says	
  they	
  have	
  been	
  crying	
  for	
  
weeks	
  ever	
  since	
  the	
  Taliban	
  came	
  to	
  their	
  
home.	
  	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  FEMALE	
  (through	
  translator):	
  
The	
  Taliban	
  told	
  my	
  mother	
  to	
  leave	
  the	
  house	
  
because	
  they	
  were	
  going	
  to	
  make	
  it	
  their	
  
headquarters.	
  My	
  mother	
  cried	
  and	
  pleaded	
  
with	
  them.	
  She	
  said,	
  "You	
  have	
  taken	
  my	
  
husband	
  prisoner,	
  where	
  should	
  I	
  take	
  my	
  
children	
  in	
  the	
  snow?"	
  And	
  then,	
  they	
  shot	
  her.	
  
I	
  heard	
  the	
  shot.	
  My	
  younger	
  sister	
  was	
  
watching	
  from	
  the	
  doorway.	
  She	
  said,	
  "they	
  
have	
  shot	
  my	
  mother."	
  I	
  ran	
  over	
  and	
  found	
  
that	
  she	
  was	
  dead.	
  	
  
SHAH:	
  I	
  asked	
  them	
  how	
  long	
  the	
  Taliban	
  
stayed	
  in	
  the	
  house	
  while	
  their	
  mother's	
  body	
  
lay	
  in	
  the	
  yard?	
  	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  FEMALE	
  (through	
  translator):	
  
The	
  Taliban,	
  after	
  shooting	
  my	
  mother,	
  they	
  
stayed	
  here	
  for	
  two	
  days.	
  	
  
SHAH:	
  I	
  asked	
  what	
  the	
  men	
  did	
  to	
  her	
  and	
  to	
  
her	
  sisters	
  in	
  those	
  two	
  days.	
  They	
  won't	
  say.	
  	
  
(END	
  VIDEOTAPE)	
  
(COMMERCIAL	
  BREAK)	
  
(BEGIN	
  VIDEOTAPE)	
  
SHAH:	
  Finally,	
  the	
  villagers	
  take	
  us	
  up	
  to	
  a	
  
nearby	
  hill	
  side.	
  	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  MALE	
  (through	
  translator):	
  
This	
  is	
  where	
  they	
  took	
  them	
  and	
  killed	
  them.	
  	
  
SHAH:	
  They	
  demonstrate	
  to	
  us	
  how	
  they	
  
found	
  seven	
  bodies	
  bound	
  with	
  their	
  own	
  
turbans.	
  They	
  say	
  the	
  Taliban	
  lined	
  them	
  up,	
  
then	
  killed	
  each	
  with	
  a	
  single	
  shot.	
  The	
  men	
  
say	
  that	
  when	
  the	
  Taliban	
  withdrew,	
  they	
  
loaded	
  most	
  of	
  their	
  captives	
  into	
  pickup	
  
trucks.	
  There	
  was	
  no	
  room	
  for	
  the	
  last	
  seven	
  
men,	
  so	
  they	
  simply	
  shot	
  them.	
  	
  
UNIDENTIFIED	
  MALE	
  (through	
  translator):	
  I	
  
saw	
  the	
  bodies	
  aligned	
  like	
  sheep,	
  and	
  I	
  called,	
  
"come	
  here,	
  they're	
  here."	
  Then	
  everybody	
  
came	
  here.	
  All	
  the	
  people	
  came	
  here.	
  
Everybody	
  said,	
  "that's	
  my	
  father,	
  that's	
  my	
  
brother."	
  Then	
  we	
  took	
  them,	
  weeping.	
  We	
  
took	
  them	
  home,	
  our	
  brothers	
  and	
  our	
  fathers.	
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Narrator/voiceover	
  (Shah)	
  from	
  video	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  in	
  general?	
  

SHAH:	
  We	
  found	
  the	
  same	
  pattern	
  of	
  
massacres	
  in	
  village	
  after	
  village.	
  In	
  one	
  
community,	
  the	
  local	
  wedding	
  photographer	
  
captured	
  the	
  scene	
  on	
  video.	
  	
  
The	
  Taliban	
  say	
  no	
  massacres	
  took	
  place,	
  that	
  
their	
  enemies	
  have	
  made	
  up	
  evidence	
  like	
  this.	
  	
  
MOTAWAKIL	
  (through	
  translator):	
  I	
  don't	
  
accept	
  this,	
  that	
  except	
  for	
  wars	
  that	
  Taliban	
  
are	
  killing	
  women	
  and	
  children.	
  The	
  reason	
  we	
  
don't	
  accept	
  this	
  is	
  because	
  Taliban	
  
commanders	
  are	
  religious	
  figures.	
  You	
  know	
  
that	
  except	
  for	
  someone	
  who	
  is	
  fighting	
  a	
  war,	
  
be	
  it	
  a	
  woman	
  or	
  a	
  child	
  or	
  regular	
  folks,	
  that	
  
they	
  are	
  human	
  beings.	
  They	
  have	
  livelihoods.	
  
We	
  believe	
  in	
  judgment	
  day.	
  	
  
SHAH:	
  In	
  the	
  graveyards,	
  white	
  flags	
  mark	
  the	
  
Taliban's	
  victims,	
  unarmed	
  civilians	
  killed	
  not	
  
for	
  the	
  sake	
  of	
  Islam	
  but	
  because	
  they	
  come	
  
from	
  a	
  different	
  ethnic	
  group	
  to	
  the	
  Taliban.	
  	
  
In	
  their	
  trenches,	
  the	
  opposition	
  soldiers	
  -‐-‐	
  old	
  
men	
  and	
  young	
  boys	
  -‐-‐	
  are	
  exhausted,	
  unable	
  
to	
  protect	
  the	
  villages	
  or	
  to	
  withstand	
  the	
  next	
  
Taliban	
  onslaught.	
  The	
  Taliban	
  claim	
  they	
  are	
  
bringing	
  peace	
  and	
  uniting	
  the	
  country,	
  but	
  
here	
  they	
  are	
  destroying	
  lives.	
  	
  
Unlike	
  the	
  Afghans	
  I've	
  met,	
  I'm	
  only	
  passing	
  
through.	
  But	
  before	
  I	
  leave,	
  I	
  still	
  hope	
  to	
  visit	
  
the	
  place	
  my	
  family	
  is	
  from,	
  my	
  father's	
  home,	
  
Paghman.	
  	
  
(on	
  camera):	
  This	
  is	
  the	
  first	
  time	
  I	
  have	
  seen	
  
Paghman,	
  it's	
  the	
  place	
  I	
  was	
  told	
  I	
  come	
  from,	
  
and	
  I	
  was	
  told	
  that	
  it	
  was	
  the	
  most	
  beautiful	
  
place	
  in	
  the	
  world,	
  I	
  was	
  told	
  it	
  was	
  pleasure	
  
gardens,	
  there	
  were	
  waterfalls,	
  there	
  were	
  
fruit	
  trees.	
  It	
  was	
  a	
  place	
  where	
  the	
  people	
  
would	
  come	
  up	
  from	
  the	
  capitol	
  Kabul	
  and	
  
have	
  picnics	
  on	
  a	
  Friday	
  afternoon.	
  It	
  was	
  a	
  
place	
  of	
  pleasure,	
  these	
  were	
  pleasure	
  
gardens.	
  	
  
What	
  I	
  found	
  was	
  bombed	
  out,	
  any	
  wall	
  or	
  
building	
  has	
  been	
  bombed.	
  The	
  mountains	
  are	
  
here	
  and	
  it's	
  beautiful	
  and	
  the	
  view	
  over	
  Kabul	
  
is	
  beautiful,	
  but	
  the	
  gardens	
  are	
  gone.	
  
Anything	
  made	
  by	
  human	
  beings	
  is	
  gone.	
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Narrator/voiceover	
  (Shah)	
  from	
  video	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  in	
  general?	
  

(voice-‐over):	
  During	
  the	
  Cold	
  War,	
  Afghanistan	
  
made	
  headlines	
  across	
  the	
  world.	
  Now,	
  my	
  
journey	
  has	
  brought	
  me	
  to	
  a	
  land	
  where	
  the	
  
government	
  publicly	
  kills	
  its	
  own	
  people,	
  
where	
  civilians	
  are	
  slaughtered,	
  and	
  the	
  
outside	
  world	
  no	
  longer	
  seems	
  to	
  care.	
  	
  
But	
  I	
  have	
  found	
  courage	
  where	
  I	
  least	
  
expected	
  it,	
  among	
  the	
  poor	
  and	
  the	
  weak,	
  
living	
  their	
  lives	
  as	
  best	
  they	
  can,	
  struggling	
  to	
  
survive	
  as	
  best	
  they	
  can.	
  This	
  is	
  their	
  daily	
  
victory	
  against	
  tyranny.	
  	
  
(END	
  VIDEOTAPE)	
  
HARRIS:	
  The	
  Taliban	
  show	
  no	
  signs	
  of	
  
loosening	
  their	
  stranglehold.	
  Afghanistan	
  
recently	
  banned	
  a	
  wad	
  of	
  imports,	
  including	
  
chess	
  boards,	
  playing	
  cards,	
  lipstick,	
  and	
  neck	
  
ties.	
  Computer	
  discs,	
  movies	
  and	
  fashion	
  
catalogs	
  have	
  also	
  been	
  deemed	
  as	
  un-‐Islamic.	
  
That's	
  this	
  edition	
  of	
  CNN	
  PRESENTS.	
  I'm	
  
Leon	
  Harris.	
  We'll	
  see	
  you	
  next	
  week.	
  

	
  

What	
  does	
  this	
  say	
  about	
  
citizenship	
  for	
  Afghan	
  
women?	
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APPENDIX D: TRANSCRIPT ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL
HEARING AFGHAN PEOPLE VS. THE TALIBAN: THE STRUGGLE FOR
FREEDOM INTENSIFIES

1

Testimony text

2

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The Subcommittee will
now come to order.
‘‘[He who wrongfully slays another] would be as
if he slew the whole people; and if one save a life,
it would be as if he saved the life of the whole
people, ’’these are the words that one can find in
Surah 5 of the Holy Koran.
But in 1996, a heavy shroud was placed on the
people of Afghanistan when the Taliban captured
Kabul. Since then, the Taliban has taken the
peaceful and sacred scriptures of the Prophet
Muhammad, and distorted them into a rulebook of
terror.
Through the creation of their Department of
Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice,
the Taliban has enforced a perverse rendition of
Islam which gruesomely joins constant and
faithful prayer, with the barbaric practices of
beatings, torture, rape, and executions.
The Taliban’s reign of terror has riddled the
country with death and sorrow. Well before the
September 11th attacks, the Taliban engaged in
widespread ethnic cleansing, littering the ground
of Afghanistan with the mass graves of ethnic and
religious minorities.
For instance, when the Taliban captured one of
the cities in Central Afghanistan, an estimated 2 to
5,000 males were executed, often without making
the distinction between combatant or civilian. The
raping of women and girls during the seize was
savage and rampant.
But the Taliban’s brutality is best reflected among
half of its population, the women of Afghanistan.
Made widows and orphans by the will of the
Taliban, they have been made destitute, sick, and
marginalized.
Not allowed to work, the same women that once
made up 50 per- cent of Afghanistan’s doctors,
nurses, teachers, civil servants and students, now
have no choice but to beg for food, daily, as a
means of providing for themselves and their
children.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Definitions of
Citizenship

Afghan women’s citizenship

allusion to the veil, negative

Intersections of religion
and citizenship – power
of the “gov” over the
people, citizens spy on
other citizens
Gov killing its citizens,
especially ethnic and
religious minorities

connection with killing,
males: combatant ok,
civilian not ok. Females
particularly x

Women & girls are particular
targets for brutality

women are made destitute,
sick, and marginalized by a
failed nation state

Women no allowed to work,
once were half the work force
(is that true?, need to check
this out. Afghanistan is a poor
country and only a small
percentage of people were
educated enough to have
these profession jobs. Maybe
½ workforce in Kabul?)
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10

They are further restricted from leaving their
homes without the company of a male relative and
from receiving any education past the age of 8.
And at that, the curriculum of that education is
limited to the Taliban’s perverted version of the
Koran.

11

This segment of the population is further alienated
by the denial of proper medical treatment. Women
cannot be treated by a male doctor in most
hospitals, and when allowed to be treated by a
male physician, he is prohibited from examining
her unless she is fully clothed in Taliban-approved
garb. Further, the doctor cannot touch her, thus
limiting the possibility of any medical diagnosis
or meaningful treatment.
Bearing the scars of the Taliban’s crimes against
its own people, Afghanistan’s women have been
buried beneath a veil.
The burqa, the forcible cover of women, is an
attempt by the Taliban to hide from the world the
violence and pain that the regime has imposed on
Afghanistan under the pretext of religion.
The Taliban is far from being students of the true
Muslim faith. As President George W. Bush has
stated repeatedly, the Taliban has ‘‘hijacked
Islam,’’ arrogantly prescribing its interpretation of
the Koran on a population that never practiced nor
endorsed such a violent and incorrect view.

12

13

14

15

16

17

As. Dr. Sima Samar, an Afghan physician who
operates schools and clinics for Afghan girls and
women, has said: ‘‘The Taliban took Islam and
turned it on its head . . . Islam does not teach
terror. Islam does not teach violence. Islam does
not teach lack of respect for women. Islam is
civilized.’’
In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, the
dreaded Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and
Prevention of Vice has reportedly unleashed an
intense terror campaign, targeting young men
perceived as possible sources of insurgency or
unrest. They are being beaten, locked into cargo
containers being used as cells or taken away to
one of Kabul’s most notoriously brutal jails.
This Subcommittee has been planning on holding
this hearing for quite some time. Originally
scheduled, ironically enough, for September 12th,
it was overtaken by events.

Forbidden from leaving their
homes (this goes back to
harems)
Forbidden edu after age 8?
Thought forbidden
completely for girls? Only
Koranic edu?
No medical care, can’t
interact w/ male doctors,
women not allow to be drs.

More negative veil references

More negative veil references

US authority on Islam?
Gov authority on the
religion of people.
Provides a window for
the US to determine
what is the “correct”
view.
Who is . Dr. Sima
Samar?

Men who are considered
dangerous to the gov are
removed from their
citizenship.
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Provides a window for the US
to determine what is the
“correct” view.

“respect for women. Islam is
civilized.’’
In contrast – RAWA wants a
secular gov.

18

However, before it became evident to the world,
there were those who understood that the welfare
and freedom of the Afghan people are directly
intertwined with the safety and security of the
world, because a regime which commits such
heinous acts against its own people, cannot be
expected to place any value on the lives of others.

19

The reality sadly hit home for us on September
11th. Suddenly there was a convergence of
interest and priorities.
The United States finds itself, once again, with the
ability to support the Afghan people in their
struggle to be free from a foreign presence—a
presence which is not foreign geographically, but
one which invaded the lives of Afghans; one who
holds the Afghan people hostage; one which
imposes a false and foreign ideology on the
Afghan people. That foreign ideology is terrorism,
and radial militant Islam. Yet the U.S. must learn
from history and avoid repeating the mistakes of
the past.

20

21

22

23

24

As Afghanistan broke loose from the grip of
Soviet occupation, the United States viewed its
Cold War obligations as having been met. We left
a vacuum which was then filled by civil strife,
drugs, and warlords.
All agree that it is the Afghan people themselves
who have to build the nation that will succeed the
Taliban’s cruel and unjust rule. However, there is
also consensus on the need for the U.S. and the
international political and material support to help
the Afghan people.
A post-Taliban scenario is one of the main things
that we are here to discuss today with our mostly
Afghan panel. The U.S. role is not to dictate what
a post-Taliban government will look like. Our role
is to empower and enable, in order to ensure that
the true and unfettered voice of the Afghan people
is heard loudly and clearly.
While the Rome Process’ work toward a Loya
Jirga has been underway for a few years, it has
gained significant momentum in the aftermath of
the September 11th terrorist attacks.

our citizenship is
intertwined with the
Afghan citizenship. Is
this a form of
colonialism? How?
What is the difference
between defending
people’s rights in other
countries and colonizing
them?
conflates Afghan with
hijackers
The US helps
Afghanistan to be free
from “foreign” presence,
by occupying the
country? Considering
the Taliban as other.
Local violent radicals as
other.
This contrasts to how
the US deals with local,
violent groups.
American, Anti-US
groups .

This creates a problem when
foreign ideology is othered, in
can be wrong. Such as the
veil

The Afghan people must
create a nation free from
the Taliban with help
from the US. Political
and material support.
What will Afghanistan
look post-Taliban?

Define Rome Process’
and Loya Jirga
(footnote)
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This contrasts with other
statements. They want to hear
RAWA here, but not later.
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In a September 18th letter to President Bush, the
former Afghan king outlined the renewed focus of
the Rome Process and prescribed the ‘‘formation
of a broad based supreme council consisting of
representatives of various ethnic groups . . . until
an emergency Loya Jirga is convened.’’

26

As it stands, the ‘‘Supreme Council for the
National Unity of Afghanistan,’’ has been agreed
to by the king, by the Northern Alliance and by
other participants. Its composition will hold 120
members; 50 representing the royalists, 50
representing the Northern Alliance, and another
20 seats would be chosen by both sides or left
open for defecting Taliban leaders.
However, there are various ideas about how to
proceed during the Rome process and thereafter.
There are those who argue the true representative,
broad-based government in Afghanistan must
include moderate Taliban leaders. However, what
constitutes moderate? How is it defined?
When the Taliban executes opposition leaders in 1
weekend, including one who had proposed raising
a small force of ex-guerrillas and Taliban
defectors to carry him into Kabul, it is extremely
difficult to imagine any such moderate element
wishing to support the peace process.
Those representatives participating in the Rome
process believe that Kabul must be demilitarized
and that a small US-backed international
peacekeeping force would probably be necessary
to avoid a power vacuum and to shield the future
government in Kabul. However, how to go about
such a mission still needs to be further discussed.
Should a force be composed of UN peacekeepers?
Should they be troops from neutral or friendly
Muslim countries such as Turkey or Jordan, but
under the auspices of the UN? Would Afghan
forces under the UN be a feasible option?
Can neighboring countries such as Pakistan and
Iran, and other such as Russia, be neutralized to
prevent their interference in a post-Taliban
Afghanistan?
We hope that today’s hearing will further lift the
heavy veil which shrouds the Afghan people, and
will allow the truth and the suffering that they
have endured to step and creep out into the light.
As Surah 5 of the Holy Koran reads, the Congress
and the United States must act to save one life at a
time, and by that, do what we can to save
Afghanistan.
And now I am proud to yield to a Ranking
Member of our Sub- committee, my friend
Cynthia McKinney of Georgia.

27
28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

Review the Afghan king
got to power.
Connections to Karzi.
(footnote); the many
ethnic groups that make
up Afghanistan need to
be represented in a
government.
The representatives of
the people?

Does this represent the
people?

Only citizens who want
peace.

RAWA as pacifists – work as
citizens supports their claim

?

Afghans can’t provide
peace without the UN.

interfering with citizens

More negative veil references
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36

37

38

39

40

41

42

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ros-Lehtinen
follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE
HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND
CHAIRWOMAN, SUB- COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you Madam Chair. I
would like to thank you for agreeing to hold this
very important hearing on Afghanistan. And I also
agree with the very important questions that you
have posed, and I hope that our witnesses today
will be able to provide some answers.
I am extremely concerned about the humanitarian
disaster that we hope to prevent from unfolding.
The World Food Program reports today that there
are 7.5 million civilians in urgent need in
Afghanistan. Of those some 6 million are inside
Afghanistan and 1.5 million are refugees. They
need U.S. $257 million to get them through the
winter months. That amounts to 493,000 metric
tons of food aid.
Now, this might sound like a lot, but in realty it is
almost nothing compared to what is being spent in
Afghanistan right now every day to, in the words
of our Secretary of Defense, ‘‘drain the swamp.’’
And in fact, it is about one-tenth of one B–2
bomber.
We know what they need to survive. The world
can and must deliver this much needed aid. We
are in danger of letting this situation in
Afghanistan become another Rwanda. I shudder
to think what the consequences will be if the 1.2
billion members of the Islamic world believe that
we allowed millions of innocent Afghan women
and children to needlessly die in the next few
months.
Images of burning Red Cross and UN buildings
struck by U.S. bombs contrasted with images of
thousands of desperately poor Afghan women
carrying sickly and starving children out of
Afghanistan as they flee the might of the U.S.
military is tearing at international public
confidence in our war against terrorism.
Medecins Sans Frontieres called our food drops to
the Afghan nothing more than a propaganda
campaign seeking to assuage public concerns over
the starving millions in Afghanistan. Senator Joe
Biden has warned us that we could be seen as the
‘‘high tech bully’’ by attacking one of the poorest
nations in the third world.

Written statement;
duplicate of verbal
statement; edited out

What needs to be done
to help the people.
(Refugees are probably
in Pakistan) Check out
the info from WFP.

frames people

find MSF report
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43

44

45

46

47

48
49

50

The New York Times reports today that even
Britain, our staunchest supporter in this war
against terrorism, is concerned that we may be
losing the battle for international public opinion in
the Islamic world and that this loss of confidence
is now even spreading to Western Europe. Large
riots against the United States are being reported
in Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, and
even Turkey.
This time, the infamous Clinton defense of ‘‘We
didn’t know,’’ which was used to justify U.S.
inaction in the face of the Rwanda genocide and
its bloody aftermath will not work now. We are
on clear notice. The world is watching us.
The current humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan
needs our most urgent attention. If left unresolved,
and if millions of innocent of Afghans die, then
the hatred against the U.S. will only grow. We
have an opportunity to be a force for good in
Afghanistan. And I hope and pray that we do not
fail.
Madam Chair, I was also pleased to receive in my
office and invite to testify today a representative
of a very important group in Afghanistan; a group
that represents the voice of women who have been
mistreated by those in authority, and who want a
better life for themselves and their children, and
for all the people of Afghanistan. Women can and
just play a future role in rebuilding Afghanistan.
The international community must ensure that this
happens.
The current crisis in Afghanistan has long been in
the making. The Heritage Foundation has called
U.S. policy toward Afghanistan over the past 20
years one of our colossal failures. President Bush
recognized this failure when he acknowledge in
an October 11, 2001 press conference that we
should not have just left after the military
objective had been achieved in Afghanistan.
History has not judged us well, nor have the
people of the region.
Now, Afghanistan has captured our attention once
again. The people of Afghanistan cannot endure
yet another one of our foreign policy failures. We
must bring peace and hope to the region, not more
suffering and death.
But, Madam Chair, Medecins Sans Frontieres
warns us today as we speak that Iran, Pakistan and
Tajikistan are facing desperate humanitarian
situations as well. The entire region has become
one great humanitarian crisis.

NYT – lack of support
for the US, but what
does this say about the
people.
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56

57

I have visited the refugee camps in the Pakistan
region. I have spoken to women from all the
different ethnic groups. I have had to plead for
plastic for one women and an extension of space
in one refugee camp for another. The things that
we take for granted over here are life and death
issues for the women and their children over there
in those camps.
I asked the women in New Shamshatoo camp, do
you know what capitalism is? Do you know what
Communism is? They shook their heads. They did
not know about global politics and super power
conflicts. But they did know about bombs. They
knew about war. They knew about men fighting.
They knew about their children dying. They knew
about trying to defend themselves from cruel men.
They knew about trying to defend their children.
And they knew they wanted more from life for
themselves and their country than they are getting
now.
That is the legacy we left there in Afghanistan
when we exited the scene as quickly and
unceremoniously as the Soviet that we had
repelled. And look at what we are doing now.
Madam Chair, the BBC reported in the last few
days that our cluster bomb munitions are almost
indistinguishable from the food canisters that we
are dropping.
How shameful is it that the Pentagon is now
having to send messages to the Afghan people to
be careful not to pick up packages that look like
this cluster bomblet and to make sure that they
only pick up packages that look like this food
packet.
Madam Chair, how in the world can a 300 billion
dollar a year military machine not see to it that the
food packets and the bomblets from the cluster
bombs they are dropping are not the same color?
Is it that they just really do not care?
Because that is what is fast becoming the
conclusion through the world. Many people are
now concluding that we really do not care about
the innocent people in Afghanistan. Madam
Chair, we must care, and the world must see that
we care.
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We must solve the humanitarian crisis in
Afghanistan and the surrounding regions
immediately. We must help put an end to the
human rights abuses in Afghanistan. It is not our
place to decide who will be the next ruler of
Afghanistan. And we certainly should not be
supporting any group that does not respect the
rights of women. Our role must be to promote
democracy. Through their own process of Loya
Jirga, the Afghan people are perfectly capable of
deciding their own fate.
The United States role ought to be that of an
honest broker to facilitate an authentic Afghani
Loya Jirga that will lead the Afghan people into
peace and dominion over their land and their own
resources.
Madam Chair, I would like to submit for the
record this document.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection.
Ms. MCKINNEY. Afghan, World’s Largest
Forgotten Tragedy, which is a publication of the
Revolutionary Association of the Women of
Afghanistan.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McKinney
follows:]
[The prepared statement of Ms. McKinney
follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE
HONORABLE CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF GEORGIA
Ms. MCKINNEY. I would also like to submit for
the record a statement——
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection.
Ms. MCKINNEY [continuing]. By The Feminist
Majority which is testimony that would have
been given by Eleanor Smeal if she had been
able to be here today.
[The information referred to follows:]
TESTIMONY BY ELEANOR SMEAL
PRESIDENT, THE FEMINIST MAJORITY
AND FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUNDATION
BEFORE THE JOINT HEARING OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND TERRORISM AND
THE SUBCOMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN
AND SOUTH ASIA AFFAIRS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS U.S.
SENATE

Through their own
process of Loya Jirga,
the Afghan people are
perfectly capable of
deciding their own fate.

Through their own
process of Loya Jirga,
the Afghan people are
perfectly capable of
deciding their own fate.

written statement
duplicate of verbal
statement; edited out

no oral statement
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Since early 1997, the Feminist Majority and its
sister organization the Feminist Majority
Foundation have led the Campaign to Stop
Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan in order to raise
public awareness about the treatment of women
and girls in Afghanistan and to urge the U.S. and
the U.N. to do all in their power to restore the
rights of women and to address this humanitarian
disaster. Throughout this campaign, we urged
non-recognition of the Taliban by the United
States and the United Nations, designation of the
Taliban as an international terrorist organization,
pressure on Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE
to withdraw their support for the Taliban, and that
the construction of an oil and gas pipeline through
Afghanistan that would have supplied millions of
dollars in profits to the Taliban be stopped. As
you know, the U.S. and the U.N. did come out
against the recognition of the Taliban in an event
at the White House on March 11, 1998 in
commemoration of International Women’s Day
(March 8) and UNOCAL did stop the pipeline.
But to this date, the U.S. has still not designated
the Taliban as an international terrorist
organization. To date, over 200 women's rights
and human rights organizations are co-sponsoring
our national campaign chaired by Mavis Leno.
Hundreds of thousands of individuals have written
letters, signed petitions, and sent e-mails to urge
both the Clinton Administration and now the Bush
Administration to do everything in their power to
restore the human rights of Afghan women. We
have formed over 800 Action Teams to Help
Afghan Women nationwide. These teams, which
include girl scout troops, community
organizations, classrooms, and groups of family,
friends, and co-workers, are organizing petition
drives and raising funds to support schools and
clinics run by Afghan women in Pakistan for
refugees. In both 1999 and 2000, officials at the
U.S. State Department told us that we had
successfully mobilized a U.S. constituency on a
foreign policy issue and that they had received
more mail from Americans on restoring women’s
rights in Afghanistan than on any other foreign
policy issue.

frame apartheid; outside
recognition of
citizenship in
relationship to
government.

women’s rights; humanitarian
disaster affects citizenship

U.S. to save Afghan women;
U.S. citizens / women to save
Afghan women.
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In the wake of the tragic events of September 11,
we have seen an overwhelming outpouring of
public support for Afghan women. People have
responded to our message that humanitarian aid
must be dramatically increased and that Afghan
women must be freed. With the nation’s focus on
Afghanistan and increased visibility about the
plight of Afghan women, Americans want to
know how to help. In the past few weeks, tens of
thousands of individuals have used our website to
send messages to the Administration and to
Congress urging that Afghan women not be
forgotten. Action teams are now forming at the
incredible pace of more than 100 per week.
People are outraged about the Taliban’s brutal
treatment of women. Women were the first
victims of the Taliban, and the public is becoming
increasingly aware of this fact. The public has
now seen broadcast on television again and again
film footage of women being beaten and executed
for violating the Taliban’s decrees banning
women from employment, from attending school,
from leaving their homes without a close male
relative and without wearing the head-to-toe
burqa shroud.
Before September 11, the tragic conditions of
Afghanistan including the worst drought in 30
years, 23 years of military fighting, and the
barbaric treatment of women and minorities by
the Taliban had resulted in massive numbers of
Afghan refugees. Some 3.5 million Afghan
refugees had fled to Pakistan alone, 2 million in
the refugee camps and 1.5 million in the cities and
villages. Another 1.5 million refugees are in We
applaud the work of the United Nations agencies,
especially the World Food Program, in
Afghanistan. But for years they have been forced
to underestimate the needs of Afghan refugees
and Afghan people because of the lack of donor
nation response. Prior to September 11, we heard
constantly of donor nation exhaustion.
Consequently, the United Nations appeals have
tended to be very modest. Although the most
recent consolidated appeal is considerably more
than in the past, we believe it still underestimates
the real needs in several important respects:

freedom – more u.s. free
women; what does support
mean? What does it look like?

employment, schools and
freedom of movement is
important; burqua shroud –
death shroud
connect to CNN
footage/documentary; giving
emphasis to veil as bad

Expat – nit citizens
active in Afghanistan
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First, the United Nations only counts as refugees
and provides assistance to those who live in the
refugee camps. However, almost half of the
refugees in Pakistan approximately 1.5 million
live outside of camps. These desperate refugees,
who live in cities and villages in Pakistan, mostly
belong to the Hazara, Uzbek, and Tajik ethnic
minorities who have been most persecuted by the
Taliban and who fear the Pashtun-dominated
camps in which the Taliban has had influence.
These urban refugees receive virtually no
assistance from the UN, and are in desperate need
of food, health care, and education programs.

refugees - no
recognition outside the
country / in the camps

Second, the current appeal provides very little for
health or education. Only 3% of the United
Nations appeal is devoted to health. Nor are
sufficient funds for education inside and outside
of the camps being requested in the appeal.
Education is less than 1% of the United Nations
appeal. Education is not a luxury, but a core
component of ending terrorism and promoting
democracy. We cannot lose a generation of
Afghan girls and boys. Education for refugee girls
is necessary to make up for the denial of
education under the Taliban, and to make possible
the participation of young women in the
reconstruction of Afghanistan. The availability of
education for boys is necessary to counteract the
madrassas (so-called religious schools) which are
the source of foot soldiers for the Taliban.
Finally, the UN Appeal provides only 6 months of
bare subsistence rations. Of the food and support
needs of $188 million, the commodities included
are only wheat, vegetable oil, pulses (lentils), salt,
wheat/soy blend, sugar, and high energy biscuits.
We appreciate that on October 4th President Bush
announced a commitment of an additional $295
million in U.S. emergency humanitarian aid to
suffering people in Afghanistan and to Afghan
refugees. This emergency humanitarian package
is a critically needed escalation of aid that will
help save the lives of millions of innocent
Afghans, especially women and children, many of
whom are near starvation in pre-famine condition,
without shelter, and without healthcare.
The United States' leadership in meeting a
significant portion of the United Nations $584
million appeal for emergency assistance is very
heartening. However, we believe that the needs of
Afghan refugees are even more massive and that
our government must do even more to meet them.

Health care and
education is important
part of citizenship

Women are important part of
the process; young women,

Issues of innocence (frames
of guardianship.)
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We commend and support the call of the
Chairman of this Committee, Senator Joseph
Biden, for a multi-billion dollar infusion of
humanitarian relief for Afghanistan and for the
surrounding region to address refugees
humanitarian needs and to sustain long-term
reconstruction efforts. His leadership and vision in
this call are timely and extremely needed.
Our understanding is that of the funds that have
recently been announced by President Bush, a yet
to be determined portion will go towards the UN
appeal for UN sponsored humanitarian aid and
another portion of funds will go to programs
carried out by other international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
No funds, however, are scheduled to be granted
directly to women-led NGOs. I would like to
stress the importance of the U.S. providing direct
funding to Afghan women led NGOs.
Humanitarian funds from the United States and
the United Nations
We cannot be fooled by those who would use
culture and religion as an excuse for the
marginalization or exclusion of women in the
reconstruction of Afghanistan. The Taliban's
decrees are foreign to Islam, to the culture, and to
the people of Afghanistan. Since the 1950s,
women and girls in Kabul and in many other parts
of the country attended schools as did boys.
Before the Taliban gained dominance in
Afghanistan, women were a crucial part of the
workforce. Afghan women have a history of
public service leadership and were believed to be
30% of its civil bureaucracy. For example, in
Kabul, before the Taliban took over, women were:
· over 70% of teachers were women;
· 40% of doctors and the vast majority of health
care workers were women; and
· over half the university students.
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If civil society is to be rebuilt in Afghanistan and
the rogue state that has been sustained by drug
trafficking is to be brought to an end, all citizens –
especially those in the healthcare and education
fields – must be utilized. The employment of
these workers – who are mostly women – is
essential to the rebuilding of the country’s social
infrastructure and civilization itself. The
restoration of the rights of women is crucial both
for the sake of human rights and to make possible
the return to civil society. The United States
would be repeating a tragic mistake if it again
turns to another set of extremists as it did to repel
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and chooses a
dictatorship as the most expedient strategy to
replace the Taliban. The restoration of a broadbased democracy, representative of both ethnic
minorities and women, with women at the table, is
necessary to break the back of a terrorist and a
war-torn existence. We urge you to think longterm – in this case, the right thing to do is also the
best thing for global security, human rights, and
economic development.
In a discussion at the State Department, we were
asked would the U.S. people support a massive
reconstruction of Afghanistan or would the U.S.
people rather support simply sustaining a tolerable
subsistence economy in Afghanistan. We often
hear today (á la Tom Brokaw) the World War II
generation of Americans referred to as the
“greatest generation.” We are proud we fought
fascism, rebuilt the economies of Germany and
Japan, and helped to establish democracies in
these nations with women’s rights. We helped to
establish in post WWII, a United Nations and
under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt, the
U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If
this declaration is to mean anything, we must help
to restore women’s rights in this most abused
nation – Afghanistan – and we must restore its
democracy. Afghanistan first adopted a
constitutional democracy in 1964 that included
full universal suffrage, an equal rights amendment
for women that even included equal pay
provisions, and a separation of powers with an
independent judiciary. Women were members of
the Parliament and were judges.
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We know today that literally millions of
Americans are appalled at the Taliban’s treatment
of its own people, especially its women. We know
from our work at the grass roots level in 49 states
of the union that Americans want women’s rights
restored in Afghanistan and for this society to
return to normalcy. We as Americans do feel a
moral obligation to Afghanistan because it was
the last stop in the Cold War. We can be the
“greatest generation” today. We must meet the
challenge and as our parents, not settle for
expediency but strive for the dream of democracy
and human rights for all – and in Eleanor
Roosevelt’s memory, we cannot forget the
women.
Ms. MCKINNEY. I would like to thank you
Madam Chair for calling this important hearing,
and I look forward to hearing from witnesses
today. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much.I
am so pleased to recognize the real Subcommittee
Chairman, Mr. Smith, who headed this
Subcommittee for many hears.
Mr. SMITH. Madam Chair, thank you very
much. And I want to thank you for your very
strong statement and associate myself with your
remarks.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.
Mr. SMITH. You have comprehensively laid out
the issue that we are facing. Perhaps nowhere else
in earth is gender apartheid practiced so
egregiously and so maliciously than by the
Taliban. It is as if hatred of women is at the core,
certainly control, but hatred of women is at the
core of what they do.
There is no question, as we all know, that the
Taliban systematically and with impunity
commits despicable acts of cruelty and violence.
You know, as some of our very distinguished
witnesses will point out, including Amnesty
International, Taliban guards beat and humiliate
women for defying their rules, even for acts as
seemingly insignificant as showing one’s ankle.
The Taliban’s Ministry for Preventing Vice and
Fostering Virtue vigilantly enforces the
restrictions on women; stoning, public executions,
all of these barbaric behavior continue unabated
by the Taliban. And I think it is important that the
world know with even greater detail the kinds of
extreme measures that have been taken against
women by this repressive regime.
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We also know the devastating impact that has
occurred with regards to displaced personally,
internally displaced as well as refugees who are
now at dire risk of losing their lives, many have
already, and hopefully the Administration, and I
am sure it has stepped up to the plate, will give us
additional details as to what is being done to
mitigate that suffering as well.
Again, I want to thank you for holding this
hearing. I would ask that a statement be made a
part of the record.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection.
Mr. SMITH. But in the interest of time, again, I
think it is very important that we document. You
know, after the fall of the Third Reich when there
was thoughts given to burning down the terrible
concentration camps, Eisenhower, in his wisdom,
said, ‘‘No, preserve it so that all will see what
brutality occurred here.’’ This hearing and this
kind of systematic documentation of these abuses
hopefully will reveal to the world just how
horrific this behavior is and why it must be
stopped, and replaced with a democracy.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr.
Smith.And now I pleased to yield to Mr. Pitts for
his opening remarks.
Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman,
and thank you for holding this timely and
important hearing on the Afghan people and the
Taliban and the struggle for freedom.
As has been clearly documented, the people of
Afghanistan have suffered terribly under the
Taliban regime that claimed that it would make
the nation a place of security and safety for the
people. There has been no safety for ethnic
minorities. Instead there have been massacres
conducted against them.
Contrary to Taliban claims, there has been no
safety or dignity restored for women. Instead
there is increased exploitation, prostitution, more
women begging than anytime before the Soviet
invasion. The Taliban claim that they restored
peace and security, but women are not allowed
outside their homes because of security concerns.
The Taliban took away women’s rights to
education, to employment. Yet the Prophet
Mohammed’s first employer was a female. The
contradictions in the Taliban’s claims are rife. The
tragic irony is that the only people for whom the
Taliban have made Afghanistan safe are bin
Laden and his terrorists.
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100 It is vital that our nation restore our credibility in
the eyes of the people of Afghanistan and the
surrounding region. We must tell the people of
Afghanistan that even though our government
abandoned them after their war with Russia and
their loss of at least 1.5 million lives, the
American people have not forgotten their
sacrifice.
101 The people of Afghanistan need to know that the
international community is clearly aware that their
suffering is caused by the Taliban, and that
regime’s wasting of the tremendous resources of
the nation and people of Afghanistan.
102 The Taliban have not provided the people of
Afghanistan with basic necessities, such as food
and shelter, but have increased their suffering so
that more people than ever are starving, freezing
and dying from easily preventable medical
problems.
103 The Taliban callously allow the Afghani people to
die. It is the international community and aid
organizations who have given food and medicine,
who have helped build wells and shelters. The
Taliban and its commitment to conflict has used
the resources of the Afghan nation for its own
selfish and destructive aims.
104 Numerous reports and analysis reflect that the
battle in which we currently are engaged is not
only a military battle, but also a battle to win the
hearts and minds of the people of Afghanistan.
We cannot let the Taliban and Osama bin Laden
win the battle by effectively spreading the
propaganda that the United States will again
abandon the Afghan people.
105 Key steps in combatting the Taliban’s claims
against the United States and our taking the
offensive are to increase our ability to get more
accurate information to the people, increase our
humanitarian assistance to the suffering refugees
and internally displaced people, and clearly and
deliberately support the Loya Jirga.
106 Some governmental and extra-governmental
bodies around the world have their plans for the
people of Afghanistan. All of these bodies,
however, seek to impose their own views on the
Afghan people. History clearly shows that this
will never work. The people of Afghanistan need
to be free to choose their own leaders.
107 The convening of a Loya Jirga, our a Grand
Assembly, so that the Afghan people can come
together and coordinate their plans for their own
government is the only way to bring lasting peace
and stability to Afghanistan.
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108 A State Department poll 3 months ago showed
that the Afghan people overwhelmingly support
holding a Loya Jirga, which is the traditional
Afghan method of national reconciliation. It is
vital that the United States people and government
actively support the work of His Majesty, the
former King of Afghanistan and the United
Front/Northern Afghanistan in coordinating the
Loya Jirga. A new structure has been formed by
the Afghan people which seeks to restore peace
and stability in Afghanistan under the symbolic
leadership of His Majesty and the Supreme
Council for Unity of Afghanistan.
109 Madam Chairwoman, there is an urgency to these
matters. News reports detail thousands of
Pakistanis lining up at the borders to join the jihad
of the Taliban against the forces of freedom. Our
nation must work with the Afghan people to
combat the scourge of humanity, the terrorists, so
that Afghanis and Americans and the rest of the
world can live in peace.
110 I look forward to hearing our distinguished
witnesses this afternoon.
111 [The prepared statement of Mr. Pitts follows:]
112 PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE
HONORABLE JOSEPH R. PITTS, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM
THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
113 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr.
Pitts.Mr. Rohrabacher of California?
114 Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you so much. I
remember during the Afghan war with the Soviet
Union, that the Russians dropped— well, they are
bombs. They are little, sort of trick bombs that
were designed to look like butterflies, so that
when children picked them up their hands would
be blown off. And these little bombs were
designed that way so that the families of Afghan
would be so maimed that they would have to take
care of their own young people, that they would
not be able then to spend the time fighting with
the occupation forces.
115 Let me just say that Ms. McKinney is a good
friend of mine, but I think we live in a wonderful
country that even if there is a chance that we are
dropping a bomb that could be mistaken for
something else, we warn the people that it might
be dangerous, and that is not a sign that we do not
care.
116 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ms. McKinney——
117 Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is a sign that we do
care.
118 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If you would like to yield
a second.
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119 Ms. MCKINNEY. Dana, we spent $300 million a
year on a military enterprise that cannot produce
at least a food packet in a color——
120 Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have been at war——
121 Ms. MCKINNEY [continuing]. Different from—
—
122 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank
you, Ms. McKinney. Mr. Rohrabacher is giving
his statement.
123 Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am reclaiming my time.
I would just say if you take a look, we have been
at war for 30 days. I am sure we did not know that
we would be in Afghanistan dropping food
containers to people who were subjugated by an
enemy.
124 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ms. McKinney.
125 Ms. MCKINNEY. Unfortunately, Dana——
126 Mr. ROHRABACHER. If I could——
127 Ms. MCKINNEY [continuing]. There is really no
excuse——
128 Mr. ROHRABACHER. Cynthia, if I could——
129 Ms. MCKINNEY [continuing]. For—there really
is no excuse——
130 Mr. ROHRABACHER. Cynthia, if I can have my
time.
131 Ms. MCKINNEY. I am not taking your time.
132 Mr. ROHRABACHER. Cynthia.
133 Ms. MCKINNEY. I am just getting——
134 Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, you are, Cynthia.
135 Ms. MCKINNEY [continuing]. Additional time.
136 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ms. McKinney, we will
give you 1 minute to continue and then I will
recognize Mr. Rohrabacher to finish his re- marks.
137 Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you. See, I am not
taking your time, Dana. I would never take your
time.
138 Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right.
139 Ms. MCKINNEY. But there is no excuse for us
not being able to at least put the food packets in
orange and the—and if the cluster bombs—we
should not even be using cluster bombs to start
with. The Humans Rights Watch has said today
that we should not be dropping cluster bombs in
Afghanistan.
140 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms.
McKinney.Mr. Rohrabacher.
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141 Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now if I could reclaim
my time.I think it is wonderful that we are
dropping food packages. I am sure we had no idea
6 weeks ago that there might be starvation going
on in Afghanistan, a country that has been
occupied by our potential enemy. The fact that we
dropped food package at all says good things
about us. The fact that we go out of our way to
warn people that, watch out, because there are
some other things that are part of our war machine
that might be mistaken, it says something good
about us.
142 And the fact is the Russians and almost every
other power of the world in the situation where
6,000 of their own people had been slaughtered
would not be taking such precautions with the
people of the country that offered the base, the
home base that was used to slaughter our own
people It just would not happen.
143 And again, in terms of cluster bombs, I would
hope that cluster bombs kills many Taliban
leaders and Taliban soldiers as they possibly can.
There is nothing that we could do better for the
people of Afghanistan than to kill as many
Taliban soldiers who have been repressing them
and murdering them as they have been.
144 So let us—if it takes cluster bombs, that is fine. If
it takes, you know, Samari swords, or pistols, I do
not care what it is, let us get rid of these Taliban
because they are Nazis, they are the Muslim
Nazis, and all the good Muslims of the world
understand that. They are not associated with the
Taliban, and that this is aimed at these human
rights abusers.
145 Now, we have made a lot about women’s rights
here today, and rightfully so, because obviously
the Taliban are to women what the Nazis were to
Jews, but let us also recognize that the Taliban
have been murderous and oppressive to everyone
in Afghanistan. Anyone who did not become part
of their insidious little cult became a victim of this
cult, and freedom of the press and freedom of
speech was not even thought about, much less
freedom of religion.
146 So what we have here is a monstrous regime
which for the last 5 years we could have done
something about, and we did not. And the people
of Afghanistan are our greatest allies in this
endeavor to free them and to free the world from
this monstrous influence that is going on and
centered in Afghanistan.
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147 You know, the Taliban, that terrorist regime, and
bin Laden have killed many more Afghan than
they have Americans, and they have a much
smaller population. So when our hearts ache for
this 6,000 Americans that were slaughtered in
New York, let us re member that those poor
people of Afghanistan proportionally have
suffered way beyond what we have suffered, and
they have been calling out for us for help for all of
these years, and it took the death of our people
before we offered this help to those brave people
who I might say defeated the Russians, and then
again we did walk away, and let us not forget that.
148 So today, I appreciate the fact that we are holding
this hearing, and commend you, Madam
Chairman.
149 But there is one other issue that I would like to
bring up that has not been covered, and it is a very
touchy issue and I would like our witnesses to talk
about it, and that is, the Taliban not only have
served as a monstrous force in killing and
oppressing their own people, and permitting their
country to be used as a source for heroin and
terrorism around the world. This is not Islam.
150 Number one, we expect Muslim leaders around
the world to step up and be counted in this fight
against evil, and not to keep their mouths shut
simply because this evil is posing as a force of
Islam.
151 And number two, I think it is about time that we
understand that, yes, why does this regime hate
women, this regime that hates women also, also
has been involved in the worse type of
molestation of children in Afghanistan. Young
girls in areas that are captured by the Taliban that
are not pro-Taliban areas are sent off to be served
as prostitutes for other parts of the gulf. This is a
disgrace and nobody has talked about it. Young
boys have been molested by the Moula leaders of
the Taliban movement themselves. This needs to
be talked about.
152 And the people of the Muslim world, when they
are trying to analyze what is good and what is bad
that is going on, and is the United States a force
for evil or justice need to take these issues into
consideration, and we need to hear from them.
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153 So I am proud to stand behind our President. We
do not have a perfect—there is no such thing as a
perfect war or a perfect battle. Mistakes will be
made and the containers will be wrapped the
same, and problems. This happened in World War
II, I am sure, where they had lot more time than 6
weeks. But we can be proud, we are trying to rid
the world of an evil force, and we are trying to do
what is right by the people of Afghanistan, and I
think we have every reason to hold our heads
high, and to continue and do everything we can to
win.
154 Thank you very much.
155 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much.Mr.
Hoeffel?
156 Mr. HOEFFEL. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I
am not a Member of your Subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity to be here. No opening
statement except to compliment the Chair for
holding this hearing and thank the witnesses, and
ask them to address, if they could, when they are
talking about what comes next for Afghanistan,
whether we should be thinking about a broad
rebuilding, development program along the lines
of the Marshall Plan after the second world war.
That was a $13 billion, 4-year recovery plan that
helped 14 countries. That 13 billion would be
about 100 billion in today’s dollars, a very
achievable figure, particularly over 3 or 4 years.
157 Of course, the Marshall Plan was rebuilding
economies that had existed in a modern state
before the second world war, and the countries in
Central Asia and the Middle East are far different.
The economies are not nearly as developed, so the
challenges are much greater. But in thinking about
what comes next, let us think on a big scale, and I
would be delighted to hear whatever the witnesses
could address on that score. Thank you.
158 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, and
welcome. You are always welcome to our
Subcommittee.
159 Mr. HOEFFEL. Thank you.
160 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ms. Davis.
161 Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I also
am not a Member of the Subcommittee, but
appreciate the opportunity to be here, and I just
thank you for holding the hearing, and look
forward to hearing from the distinguished
panelists.
162 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We thank you so much
for being with us. You are always invited. Mr.
Delahunt. Unfortunately, we could never get rid
of him. [Laughter.] He is always there.
163 Ms. MCKINNEY. Madam Chair, we do not want
to get rid of Mr. Delahunt.
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164 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. All right, I forget. I
forgot.
165 Ms. MCKINNEY. We love you, Mr. Delahunt.
166 Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I thank Ms. McKinney
for coming to my defense.
167 Ms. MCKINNEY. I love you to, Dana, do not
worry.
168 Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I guess I should not say
very much at all then. [Laughter.]
169 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, you know that——
170 Mr. DELAHUNT. I should quit while I am
ahead.
171 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. I am only
kidding. I am only kidding.
172 Mr. DELAHUNT. I know you are kidding.
173 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We love your opening
statements.
174 Mr. DELAHUNT. I am not going to have an
opening statement, but I just would commend Mr.
Hoeffel who, I think, makes eminent good sense
about our experience in the aftermath of World
War II. Unfortunately, and not just in
Afghanistan, we have disengaged the most
inopportune times, and I think it is very, very
important that we take this tragedy of September
11th, and reexamine and reassess our foreign
policy and our willingness to be a super power in
every sense of that word. Not just militarily, but
morally, spiritually, and in terms of a voice for
democratic values and ideals, and respect for
different cultures, and respect for the dignity of
sovereign nations elsewhere. So Mr. Hoeffel,
thank you for your remarks.
175 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much.
We thank all of our Members for being here, and
we thank those who are not Members for coming.
And if you have full statements to be entered into
the record, they will be placed without objection,
and any other Members who were not here today,
we will enter their statements into the record as
well.
176 Today, we are joined once again by Mr. Lorne
Craner, Assistant Secretary of State for the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.
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177 Prior to his appointment his past June, Lorne
served as the President of the International
Republican Institute, which conducts programs
outside the U.S. to promote democracy and the
rule of law. Leading up to this position, he served
as the Director of Asian Affairs at the National
Security Council, and Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Legislative Affairs. However, prior to
that tour of duty in the executive branch, he
walked the corridors of the Hill as an advisor for
Congressman Jim Colby and Senator John
McCain.
178 Mr. Craner is accompanied by Jeffrey Lundstead,
Senior Advisor and Afghanistan Coordinator for
the Bureau of the South Asian Affairs.
179 Previously Jeff served as the Director of the
Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh
at the same bureau. Throughout the last 20 years,
he has served in various capacities in U.S.
embassies throughout South Asia, and was the
country officer for Sudan in the early nineties.
180 Thank you both for joining us today. We will
enter your statement in full in the record, and we
ask you to briefly summarize them. We do expect
a series of votes soon so we hope that we can do
your testimony and a series of questions before
we break.
181 Mr. CRANER. Okay.
182 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Lorne.
183 STATEMENT OF LORNE W. CRANER,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
184 Mr. CRANER. Madam Chair, Ms. McKinney,
thank you for agreeing to hold this hearing.
185 Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan has one of the
worst human rights records in the world.
Universally accepted human rights, particularly
those of women, are virtually nonexistent as the
Taliban continues to commit numerous serious
and systemic abuses.
186 The Taliban, which controls up to 90 percent of
Afghanistan, has imposed its own radical
interpretation of Islamic law.
187 Summary killings are common in Taliban-held
territories. Since September 11, there have been
rumors of increased summary killings of potential
Taliban opponents and even of persons perceived
of being neutral in the struggle with the United
Front/ Northern Alliance.
188 The human rights of women and girls, ethnic and
religious minorities, and indeed all who do not
share the Taliban’s increasingly radical
interpretation of Islam, continue to be
systemically denied by the Taliban.
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189 The Secretary of State has identified Talibanruled Afghanistan as a country of particular
concern. The rigid policies adopted by the Taliban
have had a chilling effect on adherence of other
faiths and in particular on Afghan Muslims who
do not accept the Taliban’s interpretation of
Islam. Enforcement of Taliban edicts are most
pronounced in the cities, especially in Kabul.
190 The Taliban rely on a religious police force,
which Congress- woman Ros-Lehtinen referred
to, the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and
the Suppression of Vice, to enforce rules on such
matters as appearance, dress, employment, access
to medical care, behavior, religious practices and
freedom of religion.
191 In areas they control, the Taliban has decreed that
all Muslims must take part in five daily prayers.
Those who are observed not praying at appointed
times or who are late attending prayer are subject
to punishment, including severe beatings.
192 There is an ongoing conflict between the Taliban,
who subscribe to a radical interpretation of the
Hanafi school of Sunni Islam, and Afghanistan’s
Shi’a, most of who are Hazaras. In September
1998 and April 1999, over 500 people were
reportedly killed in the struggle for control of the
City of Bamiyan. The UN has reported that after
retaking the town of Yakaolang in January 2001,
the Taliban massacred at least 100 Shiite Muslim
civilians. However, U.S. government sources
believe this figure should be closer to 300. This
massacre followed the May 2000 massacre at the
Robatak Pass of some 31 Hazaras; 26 of whom
were identified as civilians.
193 In early August 2001, the Taliban arrested 24
members of an international relief agency on
charges of proselytizing. The Afghan authorities
were threatening to execute the agency’s Afghan
employees for allegedly converting to Christianity
from Islam. And as we all know, the eight foreign
workers continue to be detained.
194 The Taliban’s war against Afghan culture has
even extended to the flying of kites, the playing of
chess, the possession of dolls and even stuffed
animal toys as violations of their understanding of
the Islamic injunction to make no image of a
living thing.
195 Along those same lines, we understand that
Taliban has also required that medical texts be
reduced to straightforward narratives, without
diagrams or photographs of the body or any of its
part.
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196 Since coming to power in 1996, the Taliban has
shown itself willing to carry out massacres,
usually along ethnic lines, to establish and
maintain control over various parts of the country.
197 In August 1998, they captured Mazar-e Sharif,
and murdered nearly 3,000 civilians. In June, to
strengthen its hold on the providences, Taliban
forces carried out a ‘‘scorched earth’’ program,
burning perhaps 5,000 structures, including
houses, a clinic, mosques and a madrassa. The
June program also entailed the killing of
numerous fleeing civilians as well as those too ill
or too in- firm to flee.
198 Current conditions in Afghanistan make reporting
of such activities by the Taliban difficult, but we
do know of increased repression, as I mentioned,
and increased murders.
199 The promotion of human right, particularly the
human rights of women and girls, remains a high
priority for us in Afghanistan.
200 When the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996, they
began to enforce a series of discriminatory social
strictures. The Taliban forbade women to work
outside the home. They have stated that widows
could work outside the home to support their
families, but even this benefit is granted
sporadically. In urban areas, women are forbidden to leave home unless accompanied by a
male relative. Particularly in cities, women must
wear the burqa. While many Afghan women wore
the burqa before the Taliban took control, it is
now part of a legally enforced dress code by the
Taliban.
201 The Taliban also restrict education for girls,
particularly in urban areas such as Kabul. Private
home-based schools were ordered closed in
Kabul. By some estimates, only 3 percent of
Afghan girls have access to any form of primary
education. Women and girls have access to
medical services and some hospital in Kabul, but
in practice, women are usually excluded from
treatment by male physicians. The requirement
that women be completely clothed when treated
by a male medical personnel is clearly a severely
limiting factor.
202 Promoting human rights in Afghanistan remains a
high priority for U.S. diplomacy. Even before
September 11th, we tried to keep the international
spotlight focused on the Taliban’s human rights
abuses. At every opportunity, we have called on
the Taliban to cease their persecution on the basis
of religion, and to lift restricts on access to health
care, employment and the education of women
and girls.
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203 In February, the State Department again
documented the Taliban’s human rights abuses in
our human rights report. The Re- port on
International Religious Freedom released last
week again details the gross violations of religious
liberty by the Taliban regime. In April, the U.S.
and other nations introduced and adopted a
resolution at the UN Commission on Human
Rights, strongly condemning human rights in
Afghanistan, particularly discrimination against
women and girls.
204 During the fiscal year 20001, we have provided
over $170 million in aid for Afghans.
Additionally, there is 165,000 tons of wheat from
the U.S. currently on ships headed to the region.
President Bush recently announced an additional
$320 million in humanitarian assistance for the
Afghan people. This assistance helps support the
weakest and most vulnerable Afghans, women
and girls, and ethnic minorities. Last year, the
Department provided $3.8 million specifically for
programs targeted at Afghan women and girl
refugees, and USAID provided an additional $1
million. We expect to provide at least this amount
this year.
205 The U.S. remains committed to improving human
rights situation in Afghanistan. We have called for
a broad-based, representative, multi-ethnic
government, one that accepts international norms
and practices, particularly regarding human rights,
particularly religious freedom, and issues
concerning women, and that facilitates safe
delivery of humanitarian and economic assistance.
We are working with other countries and the UN
to bring about this change.
206 And I would ask your indulgence if I could turn
for a moment to Jeff——
207 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes.
208 Mr. CRANER [continuing]. To outline some of
the plans we have.
209 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Please do.[The prepared
statement of Mr. Craner follows:]
210 PREPARED STATEMENT OF LORNE W.
CRANER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
211 ‘‘People who had the power to leave—young men
and women—fled. Old men and children who
couldn’t escape were all killed. At night, I came
down and buried the people with my hands. Most
of the dead bodies were found in the mosque, but
some were found around and inside their homes.’’
Comments of a refugee from a Taliban attack on
Sar-e Qazu, Bamiyan val- ley—Summer 2001.
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212 OVERVIEW:
213 Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan has one of the
worst human rights records in the world.
Universally accepted human rights, particularly
those of women, are vitually nonexistent as the
Taliban continues to commit numerous serious
and systemic abuses.
214 Afghanistan is experiencing its twenty-third year
of civil war and instability. There is no
functioning central government; no nationallyrecognized constitution, and no independent
judiciary. The Taliban, which controls up to
ninety percent of the country, has imposed its own
radical interpretation of Islamic Law.
215 Summary killings are common in Taliban-held
territory. Political and other extra- judicial
murders, summary executions and deaths in
custody occur. Since September 11, there have
been rumors of increased summary killings of
potential Taliban opponents and even of persons
perceived of being ‘‘neutral’’ in the struggle with
the United Front/Northern Alliance.
216 The human rights of women and girls, ethnic and
religious minorities, and indeed all who do not
share the Taliban’s increasingly radical
interpretation of Islam, continue to be
systemically denied by the Taliban.
217 Lack of Religious Freedom and Ethnic Tolerance
218 The Secretary of State has identified Talibanruled Afghanistan a ‘‘country of particular
concern.’’ The rigid policies adopted by the
Taliban have had a chilling effect on adherents of
other faiths and in particular on Afghan Muslims
who do not accept the Taliban’s interpretation of
Islam. Enforcement of Taliban edicts are most
pronounced in the cities, especially in Kabul; less
so in rural areas, where local customs are more
prevalent, and where there may be less of a
Taliban presence.
219 The Taliban rely on a religious police force under
the control of the Ministry for the Promotion of
Virtue and the Suppression of Vice (PVSV) to
enforce rules on such matters as appearance,
dress, employment, access to medical care,
behavior, religious practice, and freedom of
expression.
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220 In September 1999, the Taliban issued decrees
that forbade non-Muslims from building places of
worship but allowed them to worship at existing
sites. The decrees also ordered non-Muslims to
identify their houses by placing a yellow cloth on
their rooftops and prohibited non-Muslims from
living in the same residences as Muslims. On May
22, 2001, the PVSV proposed that all Hindus be
made to wear an identifying mark on their
clothing to distinguish them from Muslims. This
has been revised to requiring that all Hindus carry
special identification cards at all times and show
whenever needed. Taliban officials claim that the
plan is an effort to safeguard Hindus from
harassment from the religious police.
221 In areas they control, the Taliban has decreed that
all Muslims must take part in five daily prayers.
Those who are observed not praying at appointed
times or who are late attending prayer are subject
to punishment, including severe beatings. PVSV
members in Kabul reportedly have stopped
persons on the street and quizzed them to
determine if they knew how to recite various
Koranic prayers.
222 Licensing and registration of religious groups do
not appear to be required by the authorities in any
part of the country. The small number of nonMuslim residents who remain in the country may
generally practice their faith in private, but are
prohibited from an attempt to convince Muslims
to convert. Conversion from Islam is considered
apostasy and is punishable by death.
223 There is an ongoing conflict between the Taliban,
who subscribe to a radical interpretation of the
Hanafi school of Sunni Islam, and Afghanistan’s
Shi’a, most of whom are Hazaras. In September
1998 and April 1999, over 500 persons were
reportedly killed in the struggle for control of the
city of Bamiyan. The United Nations has reported
that, after retaking the town of Yakaolang in
January 2001, the Taliban massacred at least 100
Shiite Muslim civilians (USG sources believe this
figure to be closer to 300). This massacre
followed the May 2000 massacre at the Robatak
Pass of some 31 Ismaili Shi’a Hazaras (26 of
which were positively identi- fied as civilians).
224 In early August 2001 the Taliban arrested 24
members of an international relief agency—16
Afghans, 4 Germans, 2 Americans, and 2
Australians—on charges of proselytizing. Taliban
authorities were threatening to execute the
agency’s Afghan employees for allegedly
converting to Christianity from Islam. The eight
foreign workers continue to be detained.
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225 This February the Taliban ordered the destruction
of all statues in Afghanistan, claiming that
‘‘Islamic beliefs’’ condone such actions. Afghan
museums contain ancient and culturally priceless
statuary from the Greek, Buddhist, and other eras
of the country’s rich and varied history. The
Taliban claimed to have destroyed statues in these
collections and elsewhere. Two massive secondcentury statues of the Buddha, located in the
central province of Bamiyan and considered
among the world’s great cultural treasures, were
totally destroyed in March 2001. This war against
Afghan culture has extended to the Taliban
forbidding the flying of kites, the playing of
chess, possession of dolls and stuffed animal toys
(as violations of their under- standing of the
Islamic injunction to ‘‘make no image of a living
thing’’). Along these same lines, we understand
that the Taliban has required that medical texts be
reduced to straight-forward narratives, without
diagrams or photographs of the body or any of its
parts.
226 Rule by the Sword—Taliban Massacres
227 Since coming to power in 1996, the Taliban has
shown itself willing to carry out massacres,
usually along ethnic lines, to establish and
maintain its control over parts of the country.
228 In August 1998, they captured Mazar-i Sharif,
• a
major city in north-central Afghanistan, and
murdered nearly 3,000 civilians. Most were
Hazaras, who, as Shias, were characterized as
‘‘infidels’’ by the region’s Taliban governor
Mullah Manon Niazi. In January 2001, Taliban
forces recaptured Yakaolang district in Bamiyan
province and summarily executed approximately
170 male Hazara civilians.
229 In June, to strengthen its hold on the province,
•
Taliban forces carried out a ‘‘scorched earth’’
program, burning perhaps 5,000 structures,
including houses, a clinic, mosques and a
madrassa. As one returning villager noted, ‘‘there
was nothing left.’’ The June program also entailed
the killing of numerous fleeing civilians as well as
those too ill or infirm to flee.
230 Current conditions in Afghanistan make reporting
•
of similar activities by the Taliban difficult, but
given the history and proclivities of the group, we
should not be surprised to learn of similar
activities, perhaps even more brutal, in the
ensuing weeks. 
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231 Womens’ and Girls’ Rights The promotion of•
human rights, particularly the human rights of
women and girls, is a high priority for us in
Afghanistan today. Afghan women traditionally
suffered disadvantages in many areas of Afghan
society prior to the civil war. However a limited
but growing number, primarily in urban areas,
worked outside the home in nontraditional roles.
There were thousands of female lawyers,
government officials and doctors in Kabul in the
early 1990’s. Despite the efforts of the U.S.
Government, the UN and the NGO community,
the situation of women and girls in Afghanistan
remains largely unchanged and indeed has
worsened as Taliban has intensified its
enforcement of its radical beliefs. When the
Taliban took over Kabul in 1996, they began to
enforce a series of discriminatory social strictures,
many of which impacted women and their
position in society. The Taliban forbade women to
work outside the home, but soon allowed
exceptions for female doctors and nurses in
restricted circumstances. They have stated that
widows could work outside the home to support
their families, but this benefit is granted
sporadically. In urban areas, women were
forbidden to leave home unless accompanied by a
male relative. Particularly in cities, when women
go out they must wear a traditional long robe, the
burqa, covering them from head to toe and
obscuring their vision. While many Afghan
women wore the burqa before they took control, it
is now part of a legally enforced dress code
decreed by the Taliban. (The Taliban also enforce
a dress code for men, which includes an
obligatory wearing of beards of a certain length.
Men who violate the dress code risk beatings,
imprisonment and religious indoctrination
courses, women risk being stoned, though more
often the male elders of their family are
beaten.) The Taliban restrict education for girls,
particularly in urban areas such as Kabul. Private
home-based schools were ordered closed in
Kabul. By some estimates, only 3 percent of
Afghan girls have access to any form of primary
education. Nearly one-quarter of male children
receive education (albeit this is often limited to
memorization of the Koran in Arabic, not a
language widely spoken Afghanistan). Women
and girls have access to medical services and most
hospitals in Kabul, but in practice women are
usually excluded from treatment by male
physicians. The requirement that women be
completely clothed when treated by male medical
personnel is clearly a severely limiting factor.
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232 The Taliban’s unwillingness to tolerate educated
women is reflected in the country’s infant
mortality figures. In Afghanistan, over 150 of
each 1,000 children die before the age of five. In
Pakistan, the number is 80; in India it is 63, in
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 73 children of
every thousand die before the age of five.
233 What the USG is Doing
234 Promoting human rights in Afghanistan,
particularly religious freedom and the rights of
women and girls, is a high priority for U.S.
diplomacy. Even before September 11th, we kept
the international spotlight focused on the
Taliban’s human rights abuses. At every
opportunity, we have called on the Taliban to
cease its persecution on the basis of religion, and
to lift its restrictions on access to health care,
employment, and education of women and girls.
We have raised human rights questions with other
factions as well. In February, the State
Department again documented in its human rights
report human rights abuses in Afghanistan. This
year’s Report on International Religious Freedom
again details the gross violations of religious
liberty by the Taliban regime. In April, the United
States and other nations introduced and adopted a
resolution at the UN Commission on Human
Rights which strongly condemned human rights
abuse in Afghanistan, particularly discrimination
against women and girls.
235 Along with working for improvements in human
rights in Afghanistan, we con- tinue to support the
Afghan people through our humanitarian
assistance programs. The United States is the
largest provider of humanitarian aid to Afghans.
During Fiscal Year 2001, we have provided over
$170 million in aid for Afghans. Addition- ally
there is 165,000 tons of wheat from the U.S.
currently on ships headed to the region. The
President recently announced an additional 320
million dollars in humanitarian assistance for the
Afghan people. This assistance helps support the
weakest and the most vulnerable Afghans—
women and girls and ethnic minorities. Last year,
the Department provided $3.8 million specifically
for programs targeted at Afghan women and girl
refugees, and USAID provided an additional $1
million. We expect to provide similar amounts
this year.

edu=child survival

religion and rights for
women & girls

U.S. deciding terms in
international frame.

191

weak women; powerless,
need assistance

236 The United States remains committed to
improving the human rights situation in
Afghanistan. We have called for a broad-based,
representative, multi-ethnic government, one that
accepts international norms and practices,
particularly regarding human rights in general, but
in particular religious freedom and issues
concerning women, and facilitates safe delivery of
humanitarian and economic assistance. We are
working with other countries and the United
Nations to bring about change.
237 STATEMENT OF JEFFREY J.
LUNDSTEAD, SENIOR ADVISOR AND
AFGHANISTAN COORDINATOR, BUREAU
OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
238 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. Madam Chairperson, Ms.
McKinney, thank you.
239 Since I was asked to join this hearing at a late
moment, I do not have a prepared statement, but I
would like to comment on two subjects which
came up in the statements by the various
Members.
240 The first is the preparations for a political
alternative to the Taliban. We are in constant
contact with Afghans around the world, including
a number of the witnesses who will be appearing
afterwards, who are good friends of mine, to
encourage and support them in their efforts to
build a political structure to take over when the
Taliban are gone.
241 We do not tell them who should run Afghanistan.
That is for Afghans to decide. But we do set out
principles that we think any follow-on political
structure will have to encompass. These include:
242 It must be broad-based, and representative of
Afghan. It must include religious minorities, all
ethnic groups in the country. It must rid Afghan
territory of terrorism and supporters of terrorism.
It will have to respect human rights, especially the
rights of women and girls, including also ethnic
and religious minorities. It will have to take
strenuous efforts to rid the country of the problem
of narcotics, and it should seek friendly relations
with its neighbors.
243 These are the principles we lay out day after day. I
am happy to say that most of the Afghan contacts
that we have agree with those principles. That is
what they are working for, and that is what we are
working for.
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244 Mr. Hoeffel raised the question of economic
reconstruction for Afghanistan. The President did
say in his press conference that Afghanistan will
need to be helped after this effort against the
Taliban and al-Qaeda was over. The
Administration has been working on this issue for
quite some time. We are developing a plan for
reconstruction for the future of Afghanistan. It
will involve many countries, many institutions. It
will be a multi-year effort.
245 I cannot give you a figure, but the goal is to see a
stable prosperous Afghanistan which can deal
with all those issues which I outlined before,
because there is a connection here. If we have a
stable, prosperous Afghanistan, if it is a
representative government, if people have a stake
in their society, then they will not sup- port
terrorism and will not have to grow drugs and
they will not be oppressing each other.
246 Thank you.Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you
very much. We appreciate it.I am going to begin
our questions now, and we expect a series of vote
at 4:30, and I know that one of the panelists in the
second private panel, from Amnesty International,
needs to leave, so we will begin with him when
we begin that series.
247 We have seen videos and we have received
information about the use of child soldiers by the
Taliban. Can you elaborate on this practice? Has
the recruitment intensified in the aftermath of U.S.
military strikes? And what have we done in the
U.S. to ensure that Pakistan, for example, does not
afford the Taliban the facilities to train these
children for battle?
248 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. We have seen numerous
reports that since the hostilities began that the
Taliban are desperate for soldiers and are trying to
get as many people as they can. I assume that
includes taking children into the military.
249 With regard to Pakistan, Pakistan is cooperating
with us in the campaign in Afghanistan. Pakistan
is making strenuous efforts to close its borders, to
prevent people from moving in. We are very
gratified with that. Nonetheless, it is a 1200 mile
border. It is the equivalent of a border from
Chicago to Texas. They cannot shut- down every
piece of that border.
250 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Craner,
if you have anything to add to that. We are
adhering to the 5-minute question rule too, and I
would like to tell our Members that.
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251 What steps is the Department taking to help
ensure that women are included in the Rome
process and in a future Afghan government? Can
you confirm that the funds that the Department is
allocating to NGOs promoting the development of
a broad-based representative government in
Afghanistan will include safeguards and
requirements, ensuring a pivotal role for women
and the issue of women’s rights in these
discussions?
252 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. Well, that fits very much into
the principles for a future Afghan government that
I was just mentioning. One of them is—both the
broad-based part and the human rights part, both
of those cover the participation of women. We
have laid this out many times, that the structure
that develops will have to have women’s
representation if we are to approve of it, and I
think that has been heard.
253 Rome, for instance, has included Afghan women
in its deliberations up till now, and I am sure it
will in the future.
254 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Craner?
255 Mr. CRANER. I think the short answer on the
grants is that that is exactly among the things we
want to see it go for so that we reach the
objectives Jeff was talking about.
256 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And is the DRL Bureau
considering allocating separate funds to support
the process, and would the funds be used in the
same manner as in the plan put forth by the South
Asia Bureau in their transmittal letter of October
26? Are we asking allies to match U.S.
contributions to the Rome process? And what has
been the response from the international
community?
257 Mr. CRANER. DRL is considering a number of
efforts that could aid both within Afghanistan,
also in the surrounding countries on these issues.
There will be a series of steps that are necessary
to bring about our ultimate goal, and we will be
involved, and I have no doubt, helping out on the
funding and also on the advice of all those steps.
What you saw from South Asia is just the first, I
think, of what you are going to be seeing.
258 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much.Ms.
McKinney.
Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you, Madam Chair.Mr.
Craner or Mr. Lundstead, has the United States
publicly stated that human rights abusers or war
criminals will not be allowed to participate in any
future Afghan government?
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259 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. I do not know if there has
been a specific public statement to that effect, but
the principles we have laid out for what an
Afghan government should look like would
exclude such people.
260 Ms. MCKINNEY. I did not hear it in the
principles that you enunciated. You did speak to
respect the human rights, but I did not hear a
specific reference to the fact that human rights
abusers or war criminals would not be allowed to
participate in any future Afghan government.
261 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. No, I think that is implicit in
the idea that this will be a government that
respects human rights. You cannot have abusers
in a government that is respecting them.
262 Ms. MCKINNEY. Does that mean——
263 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. I do not know if there has
been a specific statement. I will take that under
advisement and look into it.
264 Ms. MCKINNEY. Great. Thank you. And if there
has not been such a statement, do you think this
Administration, or would you advocate making
such a statement so that it will be not implicit, but
explicit?
265 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. I would have to ask other
people in the State Department what they think.
266 Ms. MCKINNEY. I understand. Thank you.Did
you want to say something, Lorne?
Mr. CRANER. No. I just—it is something that we
are talking to everybody that we talk to in Afghan
about is if they expect to be part of the future of
Afghanistan, that is not something that is going to
be tolerated.
267 Ms. MCKINNEY. Let me ask you about the
specific organization of the Revolutionary
Association of Women of Afghanistan. Are
they—have they been talked to and received at the
State Department? Are you familiar with them?
268 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. Yes, very much so. In fact,
the witness who will be testifying later, I met
about 2 weeks ago in my office, and I have met
people from RAWA, other members of RAWA
over the past 2 years, along with other Afghan
women’s groups. There are other groups in this
area, and we have always met with them because
they have a very important role to play.
269 Ms. MCKINNEY. Great. And you can remind me
if we have made public statements about the role
of women, not just in the discussions leading up
to the government of Afghanistan, but also
actually participating in meaningful positions
inside the government?
270 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. Again, I would have to check
on what public statements have been made.
271 Ms. MCKINNEY. Great. Gotcha.
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272 I have got a couple of newspaper articles I would
like some comments on. One is about huge
demonstrations occurring across the world, and
we had 20,000 people to demonstrate against the
bombing in London, 30,000 in Berlin, 5,000 in
Berne, 4,000 in Stutgaard. We have also had antiU.S. bombing to take place—protests to take
place in Scotland, and in Australia, as well as
those other countries that I have mentioned
before. Do you think we are losing the public
opinion war, and if so, why?
273 Mr. CRANER. I do not—I do not think we are
losing the public opinion war, and I do not think
that the governments we are dealing with feel that
we are. I understand, I am heading the DLR
bureau, I am all for people demonstrating, but I do
not think that the accurately reflect the totality of
feeling in their countries.
274 I noticed you—was it 10,000 in Britain?Ms.
MCKINNEY. No.Mr. CRANER. Twenty?Ms.
MCKINNEY. Twenty thousand in London.Mr.
CRANER. Having lived there, that is not a very
large demonstration in London for some of these
issues.Ms. MCKINNEY. That is pretty big in
America.
275 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ms. McKinney, if I
could——
276 Mr. CRANER. And finally, I would tell you——
277 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. Ask you to
yield for a second.
278 Ms. MCKINNEY. Sure.
279 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. There is an interesting
article here from the London Telegraph today that
says, ‘‘Afghans cheer as U.S. jets hit Taliban,’’
and I would just like to share that with you.
280 Ms. MCKINNEY. Okay. Great.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I think those are the
people most affected.
281 Ms. MCKINNEY. Well, if we got into a battle
about newspaper articles, we could also submit
one that says that the Afghan people are stuck in
their homes for fear of going out from the cluster
bombs. I have got—Human Rights Watch issued
a statement today, U.S. should stop using cluster
bombs, and it gives an in depth analysis, citing the
hazard to civilians. What is the position that—in
light of the criticism—that we are taking by using
these cluster bombs? What is the position, Mr.
Craner, that you are going to take as we—on this
particular issue on the continued use of cluster
bombs, recognizing that cluster bombs were ruled
out in 1995 in Bosnia?
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282 Mr. CRANER. They were ruled out in 1995. They
may have been ruled out in 1995 in Bosnia. They
were used in Kosovo. I have not seen the
statement by Human Rights Watch.
283 Ms. MCKINNEY. It just came out today.
284 Mr. CRANER. Okay, yes, that is why I have not
seen it because I was out of the building most of
the day. But the U.S. Government believes there
is a legal basis to continue to use these weapons. I
know it has been in the past a controversial issue,
but they U.S. Government believes it has a legal
basis to use these
285 Ms. MCKINNEY.
286 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms.
McKinney, and we will re- turn for a second
round of questions.
287 Ms. MCKINNEY. Oh, we will.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I am sorry, the 5 minutes
are up.Mr. Smith?
288 Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Madam
Chairwoman, and again I want to thank our two
distinguished witnesses for their testimony, for
underscoring the fact that we are the largest
provider of humanitarian aid to the Afghan
people. And I was wondering if you could tell
us—obviously, food and medicines are absolutely
essential, and the hope is that even that will
accelerate and be expanded, and get to the people.
I want to commend our pilots who are flying very
dangerous trips each and every day to drop those
important food stuffs to the people, and to allow
them really to continue living. It is an operation
lifeline if ever there was one, and our brave pilots
and air crews are to be commended for that.
289 I would like to ask you, if you would, obviously,
there is going to be other kinds of concerns for the
people of Afghanistan as well, particularly the
children. We have known that there is a great
need for prosthetic devices. Obviously, the cutting
off of hands and feet, an atrocious practice,
routinely engaged in by the Taliban; posttraumatic stress disorder. Obviously, that may not
seem like it should be important right now, but it
seems to me the people we care so deeply about
are going to have enormous emotional health
problems that will manifest themselves.
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290 We on this Committee time and again have
documented that torture victims suffer
immeasurable hurt and horror that lasts a lifetime. Maybe it cannot be rectified, but it can be
mitigated. And I hope that the Department will
look at that very carefully, as to how we can help
these people with that, as well as with prosthetic
devices going forward. Obviously, some of this is
a little bit further down the line, but hopefully we
are thinking about that very carefully
291 Mr. Secretary, did you want to comment on that?
292 Mr. CRANER. Yes. We are already thinking
about it. As Jeff indicated, this is going to be a
huge effort, and that is why it is important that we
involve not only other countries but also
international organizations to help out, because it
is going to be such a—there is such trauma in that
society and there is so much to be done, but we
are already thinking about that far ahead.
293 Mr. SMITH. I do appreciate that. Let me just—
you know, obviously, we are all concerned about
what a post-Taliban government would look like,
and I share the views of the distinguished
Chairlady of this Committee as to the importance
of human rights, and again, Amnesty will testify
later that they think it is central, as do I.
294 We know that Dr. Abdullah, the minister of
foreign affairs of the Northern Alliance
underscored their support, and I quote him, ‘‘. . .
for an institutional framework based on moderate
Islam and democracy to embody human rights and
fundamental freedoms of individuals, including
those of women, political pluralism, devolution of
power to local administration to local elections on
a provential and lower levels.’’
295 We need to keep in mind, however, that between
1992 and 1992, the Northern Alliance itself was
responsible for human rights problems, and our
hope is that there will be a major league lessons
learned to preclude any kind of reactivation of
that kind of behavior. Obviously, we are their
allies, and perhaps you might want to comment on
our hope that they will be faithful to a postTaliban regime where human rights are central.
296 Mr. CRANER. Having lost power once, and
having seen what has become of Afghanistan
afterwards, I know that they understand the need
for exactly what you were talking about, and that
is, what we continue to underline to them, and
especially in terms of cur- rent conduct, that our
expectations are what your said.
297 Mr. SMITH. I do appreciate that.
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298 And finally, just let me—I read with great interest
the Inter- national Religious Freedom Report
because obviously this Com- mittee and I, in
particular, and people like Frank Wolfe are very
concerned about that. And I would hope, and just
would raise as an issue that some countries, like
Saudi Arabia and Uzbakistan, about which I have
had hearings myself, particularly in the area of the
Helsinki Commission on Uzbakistan, for example,
believe that they do rise to the level of countries
where there is a par- ticular interest by the United
States. And I hope that we would in no way
diminish our concern about human rights as we
build this coalition of countries who are united
against terrorism.
299 Mr. CRANER. A great deal of concern has been
expressed to me about that, both from up here and
from a lot of my former com- patriots in the
human rights and democracy organizations.
300 I think there is a fear that the U.S. will return to a
1950s to 1970s version of national security, where
we stayed with some folks that we should not
have till the bitter end, and it was a very bitter
end, and afterwards people in the country were
quite bitter in those countries.
301 The people who are at the highest levels of this
government lived through that. They do not think
that is the way to go.
302 And so I have been—I cannot tell you I was
surprised because I thought it would happen that
way with people like Colin Powell and Rich
Armatage, and Paul Wollack and others who
worked on those issues in those days, but it really
does come from the top, from the President who,
as you know, in China raised these kinds of
issues. It is not looked upon as an inconvenience.
It is looked upon, as was stated before by one of
your colleagues, as an integral part of the fight
against terrorism; that there is a reason that people become terrorists, and it is not the only reason,
but it is some- thing that needs to be worked on.
303 Mr. SMITH. Thank you. My time is over, but I
thank you. Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr.
Smith.Mr. Pitts? No, sorry, Mr. Hoeffel. I
apologize.Mr. HOEFFEL. Thank you, Madam
Chair.
304 I certainly agree with all of my colleagues about
the need for human rights abuses to be ended and
to put a huge focus on that in any post-Taliban
government.
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305 I come back to the economic issue as something
that perhaps is needed to ensure that human rights
can flourish. My worry is, as everyone is well
aware, is that impoverished people of Afghanistan
and Central Asia generally do not have
alternatives; feel that the religious hatred
espoused by some of the fanatical clerics is the
only option out there offering them any hope.
306 And Mr. Lundstead, you have said that the
Administration is fo- cused on aid for
Afghanistan. I hope that it is an aid program much
larger than Afghanistan, but obviously the focus
of this hear- ing is Afghanistan.
307 What components are needed? There is
educational, there is eco- nomic, there is a variety
of things. And what sort of components is the
Administration looking at?
308 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. Well, my colleagues in
Treasury and AID and the Department’s Bureau
of Business Affairs are working on all these
issues. They have been working for several
weeks. I would say, without prejudging a final
plan, that there are a number of different aspects.
309 One is allowing people to feed themselves, first
and foremost. Afghan are farmers. They will need
seeds, fertilizer, tube wells, roads so they can
move their produce. There will be a major
agricultural component to this.
310 They will need assistance in setting up an
education system. They will need assistance in
human rights and democracy, what- ever
government is set up. There will be a huge need to
rebuild infrastructure: water, electricity, roads I
mentioned before. There is so many needs. We
could make a list as page long, but those are just a
few of the most important and obvious ones that
we will be working on.
311 Mr. HOEFFEL. Regarding agricultural
development, how serious is the problem with
land mines in Afghanistan?
312 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. I should have land mines
because that is on the list too. It is a long list.
Afghanistan is probably the most heavily mined
country in the world. There has been an ongoing
de-mining effort for a number of years. It is very
successful.
313 Hopefully, with the Taliban removed form power
and a representative government in place, that
program will be able to be expanded, and to clear
as much land as possible.
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314 Mr. HOEFFEL. You spoke about human rights
and democracy, assistance in trying to develop
that. How do you do that in a country that does
not have an educational system, the public
institutions are weak or nonexistent? How do you
go about doing that?
315 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. You have indicated it really.
The Afghan will need assistance in institution
building, in building their edu- cational system, in
building a judiciary, in setting up types of laws
and procedures, how does a parliament work.
They have not had a parliament for almost 30
years now. There is a whole variety.
316 But Assistant Secretary Craner knows a lot about
democracy as- sistance. He does it all the time.
317 Mr. CRANER. As you indicated, without the
institutions existing now, and while we will be
working to build those up, it is going to have to
come from the top down. The government will
have to set the standards and live by those
standards, and the war powers decentralize the
authorities in those area will have to live by those
standards, and then it will begin to diffuse through
the society.
318 Mr. HOEFFEL. And what kind of help can we
give? Is it financial? Is it technical assistance on
writing a constitution?
319 Mr. CRANER. I think, initially, it would be some
technical assistance where we will—we and
others will have our and other exam- ples for them
to examine, to look and see what they think is
useful to them.
320 One thing that I have found in doing this work is
that no country can be a mirror image of ours, and
that it is most useful to show people different
examples from around the world and allow them
to, you know, pick elements and work with them
to see if all of that will work together.
321 It will be technical and financial.Mr. HOEFFEL.
Thank you, Madam Chair.Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN.
Thank you. Mr. Pitts?Mr. PITTS. Thank you,
Madam Chairman.Mr. Craner, Mr. Lundstead, I
am very grateful for the Pakistani
322 government standing with us and cooperating
with us. But I am wondering, are there other steps
that the government of Pakistan can take to
further curb the activities of the Taliban and their
co- horts in Pakistan who continue to supply the
Taliban with weap- ons.
323 Has the government of Pakistan done anything to
stop the re- cruits from reportedly crossing their
border? Have they done any- thing to stop the use
of facilities in Pakistan so that they are not used as
training camps for recruits? Can you respond to
that?
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324 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. Yes. The government of
Pakistan has been fully supportive of our
campaign in Afghanistan. Amongst other things,
the government has attempted to stop recruits. As
I indicated be- fore, it is a long porous border.
They cannot stop everyone, but they have turned a
lot of people back. That has been reported in the
press. They have closed down facilities. They
have arrested rebel- rousing leaders who are
trying to stir up trouble. They are helping us out.
325 Mr. PITTS. Mr. Craner?
326 Mr. CRANER. Nothing to add.
327 Mr. PITTS. Concerning the humanitarian drops,
can you give us any information on the effect of
this, of these drops? Are they being utilized by the
Afghani people? Are they being dropped near refugee encampments or routes? Is there more that
we can do to make sure that the refugees, the
innocent people of Afghanistan get the aid that we
are trying to give them?
328 Mr. CRANER. We have a fair amount of
evidence that the food is being used, but I
would—there is a gentleman named Alan
Kreczko who works on refugee issues. He is
going to be in front of your Committee tomorrow,
and I think that question could best and most ably
be directed to him.
329 Mr. PITTS. Okay . And finally, what do you
know about the Taliban permitting or encouraging
the trafficking in heroine, in drug, in order to
finance their regime?
330 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. Well, Afghanistan in the year
2000 had the du- bious honor of becoming the
world’s largest producer of heroine. The
following year, Omar announced a ban on
planting of opium poppy. Much to the surprise of
everyone, that ban was largely ef- fective.
However, there was a stockpile of several hundred
tons of opium already in country, and little or
nothing was done to stop the trafficking of that
already existent stockpile. Prices went up so the
stockpile became more profitable.
331 Mr. PITTS. We still have some time.
332 Do you believe that the Loya Jirga can be put into
motion quick- ly enough to avoid a chaotic
situation inside Afghanistan once the Taliban is
defeated? Do you believe that the rivalries, the
ingrained factualism, the interference from many
of Afghanistan’s neighbors can be overcome in
time?
333 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. Well, we certainly hope so,
and that is the goal.
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334 I must say, in my contacts recently with Afghans
from different factions all around the world, I see
a new seriousness and a will- ingness to
compromise, to work with each other, perhaps
because the goal is now real. Everyone can see
that it is coming.
335 They are trying to put together some type of an
interim struc- ture. At what point a Loya Jirga will
be held is still not clear. That could come some
time down the road. But the important thing is to
produce a structure, a political structure that all
Afghans, or the majority of Afghans can agree on
which can be in place and lead to that Loya Jirga.
336 Mr. PITTS. Would you respond to the concerns
that have been raised about the disconnect
between the Department of Defense and the
intelligence agencies on the one hand, and the
State De- partment on the other whereby it seems
the agencies are giving mixed signals or
presenting different views to opposition forces or
to participants in their own process?
337 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. I do not think anyone is
presenting mixed views. We are all on the same
wavelength. We all work for the same
Administration.
338 Mr. PITTS. All right, we will question the next
panel on that. Thank you.
339 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.
340 Have I told you lately what a joy it is to have you
here, Mr. Delahunt?
341 Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, you have, Ileana, and I
really appreciate it.
342 I think I heard my friend from California
chuckling. Did I hear that? [Laughter.]
343 I thank the gentlelady.
344 There has been a lot of discussion about involving
moderate ele- ments of the Taliban in any
coalition government after the fall of the existing
regime.
345 Can you give me a definition of a moderate
Taliban?
346 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. Well, I think the Secretary
addressed this issue last week before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and noted that he
had not used that term, ‘‘moderate Taliban.’’
347 Mr. DELAHUNT. So do you have a definition?
348 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. Well, rather than define it,
what I would say is that there are many Afghans
who have accommodated themselves to Taliban
rule for lack of an alternative. We want them to
turn away from the Taliban and to look for an
alternative. They are not really Taliban. They are
people who have to exist in Afghanistan as it is.
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349 Mr. DELAHUNT. I accept your definition, and I
would prefer that in the future that we all get on
the same page, because I do think that sends a
mixed message. I think it was Mr. Pitts that mentioned that, but I do not want to dwell on that.
350 Someone posed a question in terms of losing the
public relations war, if you will. And I think that
is a serious concern and one that I hope that we
can address.
351 Has the Department considered initiatives to be
able to present in the appropriate public fora,
particularly the TV station in Qatar, Al-Jazeera.
Those Afghan Muslims who decry what has
occurred since the advent of this particular
regime, I think it is very, very important that we
put that face out there.
352 We see CNN and Fox and the networks
continually presenting a face that I think is
distorting, hopefully distorting, a view of what
most Muslims believe in and what their
perception and under- standing of American
intentions.
353 Mr. CRANER. We are not only considering that,
we have begun a—in particular, between us and
the White House, there is an un- dersecretary
named Charlotte Veers, who was an extremely
suc- cessful executive up in New York with
advertising.
354 Mr. DELAHUNT. She did testify before this
Committee, and I must say I was very impressed.
355 Mr. CRANER. Yes, she is outstanding.
356 Mr. DELAHUNT. We need real people out there.
357 Mr. CRANER. Yes. Yes.
358 Mr. DELAHUNT. We do not need
undersecretaries and——
359 Mr. CRANER. No, no, no.
360 Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. Members of
Congress.
361 Mr. CRANER. No.
362 Mr. DELAHUNT. Or flacks.
363 Mr. CRANER. No, no, no. And part of the effort,
she, believe me, understand that, and part of the
effort is going to be working and involving people
in the Muslin world, and understanding that the
face that we show on these issues means
something in the Muslin world, and that is why,
for example, it was received very well in the
Muslin world that the President just a few days
after September 11th went to the Islamic Center,
not for photo op, but for over an hour to spend
time ensuring the people overseas understand——
364 Mr. DELAHUNT. Right.
365 Mr. CRANER [continuing]. We have a very
tolerant society.
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366 Mr. DELAHUNT. I would suggest to you that one
of the finest moments in my experience in this
body was, and I think Mr. Hoeffel was there that
evening, when Congress, in the very late hours,
after passing the resolution authorizing force,
spoke in a very elo- quent, in a very profound and
in a very moving way about the need for all
Americans to ensure that our fellow citizens and
people all over the world who are adherents of
Islam be treated with respect and with dignity.
You might want to secure that particular segment.
367 But I have one other question. We are speaking
about Afghani- stan today, and I do not want us to
fall in the same trap. Mr. Hoeffel, I think, is really
giving you a vantage point of what the sentiment
is now in this institution about the need to stay
engaged.
368 But we have to have a more holistic perspective,
because I would submit that what we are really
talking about is all of South Asia, Central Asia
here, and I think it is important that we start to
speak and start to discuss and start to create, if
you will, a plan not just for Afghanistan, not just
to reengage in Afghanistan, but for the
surrounding countries in Central Asia, and make
our senti- ments known, and our willingness to do
exactly what Mr. Hoeffel and your response
described, to nurture democracy and to help these
people. I think it is very, very important. I just
make that observation. And also——
369 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. A quick observation
because your time is up, Mr. Delahunt.
370 Mr. DELAHUNT. If I do not take a second round,
could I get an- other minute?
371 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Unfortunately, I thought
we were going to have a second round, but two of
our panelists have to go. So after they go, we will
have to move on to the private panel.
372 Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay.
373 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. But go ahead for a minute.
374 Mr. DELAHUNT. I note what I really found a
thoughtful and articulate and eloquent statement
by the gentleman representing the United Front,
and I think he said something in his statement
where it says,
375 ‘‘It is dire time to compensate for past negligence,
fulfill the re- sponsibility that America abrogated,
and finally give the Af- ghan people the kind of
institutions with which you are blessed,
democracy and human rights.’’
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376 At the same time I find something in his statement
disturbing, and that is, it is laced with a certain
animosity toward Pakistan, and it might very well
be justified. I am not rendering a judgment on
that.
377 But I think it is important for the United States
now, if there is going to be stability in the region,
to start to mediate and broker between those
whom we support, including Pakistan and others,
in an attempt to start a reconciliation process, and
I hope this is hap pening: But I would hope that if
it is not, that it is being consid- ered so that we
start a dialogue, because we do not ever again
want to see what happened happen.
378 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr.
Delahunt.
379 Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, Mr. Delahunt, left
me—on that note I will just suggest that we have
been far too sensitive to the Paki- stanis. I think
we have been bending over backwards to a regime
and to a country that after all created the Taliban,
and did every- thing to keep the Taliban in power
for about 5 years.
380 No wonder there is some suspicion about Pakistan
and its mo- tives in trying to build a post-Taliban
regime in Kabul. Of course, they are suspicious in
Afghanistan because the Pakistanis were the ones
that hoisted the Taliban on them in the first place.
381 So, number one, I think the State Department
should forget about being sensitive to Pakistan,
and get on with winning the war, and defeating
the Taliban militarily, and getting rid of the
terrorists like bin Laden who has been using
Afghanistan as a safe haven. And when we do
that, we will have the respect of the people of
Pakistan and every other country in the region.
382 But if we carry this one, if we let this thing stretch
out, trying to be sensitive to everybody——
383 Mr. DELAHUNT. Will the gentleman yield?Mr.
ROHRABACHER. Not until I finish.Mr.
DELAHUNT. Okay.Mr. ROHRABACHER.
Because I need to finish this one point. That
384 if we are trying to be too sensitive to this and
things stretch out because we are not going to,
you know, provide too much ammuni- tion for the
people in the north or too much support for the
people over here who the Pakistanis do not like,
this thing will stretch out, and that will be a PR
disaster. Let us get this over with, let us win the
battle, and then we will be respected. Yes.
385 Mr. DELAHUNT. Will the gentleman yield?Mr.
ROHRABACHER. I certainly will.Ms. ROSLEHTINEN. Mr. Delahunt.Mr. DELAHUNT. I
thank my friend for yielding. I do not want you
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386 to misinterpret my comments and my
observations.I concur, it is time for the Taliban to
go. We have seen what
387 havoc they have reaped. What I was referring to,
however, was a statement that I thought was very
moving and well thought-out, and again laced
with criticism of Pakistan, I am not rendering a
judgment on that, but in the aftermath of the
Taliban going, what I suggest, it is time to start to
mediate and start a process of rec- onciliation
between the peoples and to use our good offices.
388 I thank the gentleman.
389 Mr. ROHRABACHER. And I am reclaiming my
time.
390 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Rohrabacher.
391 Mr. ROHRABACHER. That leads right into the
next point which is
392 important.Yes, when the Taliban are gone, let us
help the people of Afghanistan rebuild their
country, and the most important thing we can do
is work with them to help to develop the court
system and the election processes and the civil
processes they need so that they can make their
own decisions.
393 Luckily, we have right now an alternative. His
name is Zahir Shah. He is the former King of
Afghanistan. If you want to take a look at
someone who has done something for women’s
rights in Afghanistan, take a look at what he did
during his reign for the women’s rights of the
people of Afghanistan. He and his family did
more for human rights and women’s rights in
Afghanistan than all the rest of those people
jabbering away for the last 10 years. And I will
tell you right now Zahir Shah wants to be a person
who makes a contribution, heads a transition
government, and will then just help set up a
democratic process so the Pakistanis do not run
Afghanistan, the Iranians do not run Afghanistan,
the Russians do not run Afghanistan, and the
United States does not run Afghani- stan, but the
people of Afghanistan run Afghanistan. Let them
con- trol their own destiny, and we will not have
peace until that hap- pens.
394 With this said, let me just say this, which I repeat
the one point I made early on. The people of
Afghanistan do not support the Taliban. Am I
correct in that assumption?
395 Mr. CRANER. Correct.
396 Mr. ROHRABACHER. They have been
victimized more than anyone else, including when
you take into consideration the 6,000 Ameri- cans
that have been slaughtered.
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397 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr.
Rohrabacher.Ms. MCKINNEY. I do not think
anybody is——Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ms.
McKinney, you are not recognized.Ms.
MCKINNEY [continuing]. Supporting the
Taliban except
398 maybe some——Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ms.
McKinney, you are not recognized.Ms.
MCKINNEY [continuing]. Elements of the State
Department
399 and the CIA.Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You are not
recognized, Ms. McKinney.
400 Thank you.Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.Ms.
ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Rohrabacher, I will
have—I will have
401 the panelist answer your question in the remaining
30 seconds, and I would like to then ask Ms.
Davis for her 5 minutes, and then we will have
to——
402 Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.
403 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. Recess for
three votes, so we will be gone awhile.
404 Mr. Craner.
405 Mr. CRANER. I do not think there is any question
about the sup- port for the Taliban in Afghanistan.
406 Mr. ROHRABACHER. Meaning that they do not
support it. Great. Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank
you very much.Ms. Davis is recognized for 5
minutes.Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Madam
Chairman.
407 Has the State Department coordinated with the
Department of Defense as to what will be done
with any prisoners we take who may have been
engaged in war crimes? And is the State preparing
any contingencies for war crime trials?
408 Mr. CRANER. The answer I know is yes on the
first question. On the second question, I have with
me Andre Surena who is from our
409 legal affairs office, who I think can give you a full
answer. But we have been walking through this.
410 Mr. SURENA. Thank you, Madam Chair.
411 I am in the section of the State Department that
deals with human rights and refugees, so I am not
most essentially situated to respond to your
question. But I feel confident that the U.S. Government, the Department, together with other
relevant agencies in the government is in fact
looking into the kinds of contingencies that you
mentioned.
412 Ms. DAVIS. We know that the State Department
has attempted to influence Afghanistan in the
past, but what practically can the State
Department be doing right now during this
wartime?
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413 Mr. CRANER. Can you elaborate on what you
mean by ‘‘influ- ence’’?
414 Ms. DAVIS. What can you be doing now during
the war over in Afghanistan? How can you be
influencing the people over there right now with
what is going on with the war?
415 I mean, in the past, you have been over there and
tried to influ- ence them, and I guess we have not
been very successful, so I guess I am wondering
what can you really practically be doing right now
during the war?
416 Mr. LUNDSTEAD. Well, we are doing a number
of things. There are radio broadcasts into
Afghanistan which are getting our point of view
across. We are continuing the humanitarian relief
effort de- spite the obstruction of the Taliban who
are hindering it greatly. We are talking to Afghans
all around the world. We are about to provide a
grant of money to King Zahir Shah’s group to
help them build a political process. We are doing
a number of things.
417 Ms. DAVIS. Is our food aid really working? You
sort of touched on that, and I guess that is a
concern of mine. We continually keep throwing
money out there and sending the food, but do we
really even know actually how much food is
needed? And is it, in fact, getting to the Afghans?
418 Mr. CRANER. I think we have a good sense of
how much is need- ed. I think we have been very,
very clear that the air drops are not the only thing
that is needed in Afghanistan. But part of the
prob- lem has been the Taliban interference with
the relief supplies in- side, ground relief supplies
inside Afghanistan.
419 I notice everybody had newspapers before. This is
by Mr. Lub- bers, the head of the UN Refugee
Agency,
420 ‘‘Sought assurances for the safety of his staff in
Afghanistan and a halt to what the UN said had
been looting of some of its offices and
warehouses. He said he told the Moulah with
whom he met ‘don’t loot our property, respect our
people. Don’t threaten them and let them do their
work.’ Despite repeated complaints about
Afghans being subjected to terrorism and
genocide by the American bombing, the Taliban
have halted virtually all relief work by the UN and
other organizations and have appropriated many
of their vehicles and other equipment for military
use.’’
421 But I would again direct you to my colleague,
Alan Kreczko, who is going to be here tomorrow,
I think in front of the Full Com422 mittee, who can address your question more
directly and more knowledgeably.
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423 Ms. DAVIS. You may direct me back to him
again. But if that is the case and you know that it
is not working, that the Taliban is blocking the
food that we are sending in, are we looking at
other ways to get the food to the Afghans to help
them out, rather than continuing to do something
that is not working?
424 Mr. CRANER. Again, I would direct you to Alan.
I think it is fair to say that the air drops are
working, but again, they are not all that is
required, but we are always looking for better
ways to do
425 it.
In fact, the guy that runs AID now, Andrew
Nautcious, this was his specialty for many, many
years, and he is very innovative in figuring these
things out.
426 Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, sir.Ms. ROSLEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ms. Davis.In
the interest of time because we have a private
panelist who
427 does have to go. Thank you, Lorne. Thank you,
Jeff. Scooting you out.
428 Mr. Kumar, we will give you the proper
introduction later, and I would like to recognize
you for 2 minutes. We will enter your full
testimony into the record, but we know you have
a flight to catch. Do not get too cozy. Go right in
there, come on, slam your way into that witness
chair.
429 Ms. MCKINNEY. And Madam Chair——Ms.
ROS-LEHTINEN. Go ahead, Cynthia.Ms.
MCKINNEY. Before Lorne gets away, there will
be some addi430 tional questions that we will submit, and we
certainly look forward to your response.
431 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You know he is waiting
for that.Ms. MCKINNEY. Great. Thanks.Ms.
ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.Mr. Kumar, is
Advocacy Director for Asia and Pacific for Am432 nesty International. Mr. Kumar, please sit down
and we will give you 2 minutes, and we will enter
your testimony into the record. Thank you so
much.
433 He has debated with Taliban representatives, and
testified before the House and Senate concerning
conditions there. He himself has been a victim of
human rights violations. He has been imprisoned
and tortured in Sri Lanka for his student human
rights activities. Thank you.
434 STATEMENT OF T. KUMAR, ADVOCACY
DIRECTOR FOR ASIA & PACIFIC,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA

210

435 Mr. KUMAR. Thank you very much. Madam
Chair, Amnesty International is extremely pleased
to testify in this hearing.
436 When we talk about Afghanistan, one thing that
comes to our mind is that the suffering of Afghan
people has been neglected by everyone for the last
20 years. So I would like to address what happened for the last 20 years, what is happening
now, and what should happen in the future.
437 We heard testimony so far about the past human
rights abuses against women, children, civilians,
and refugees. One thing I would like to stress is
that every Afghan is a victim of human rights
abuse. There is no competition of who were
abused more, who were abused less.
438 This country have gone through hell for the last
20 years. They have lost more than 400,000
children during the war. Thousands and thousands
of women were treated like spoils of war. Then, of
course, under the Taliban, their fundamental
rights were taken out. Almost one-third of the
population became refugees, and they have been
living for the last 20 years as refugees, and treated
like dirt by everyone around the world.
439 What is happening today? Today, unfortunately,
the country is in the middle of the war, of no fault
of them. We would urge that humanitarian law be
respected, civilian targets be avoided, and above
all, the refugees being taken care by every country
in the neighbor- hoods.
440 We would like to recognize that Pakistan and Iran
have shouldered enough responsibility for the last
20 years. We would urge them to open their
borders and also other Central Asian countries to
open their borders for Afghan refugees.
441 We also would urge that every party in this
country avoid recruiting children as soldiers.
Afghan children need something for them in the
future.
442 The future is the challenge that we all should be
concerned about. We should not allow human
rights to be a victim again in future for Afghan
people. Human rights should be central to any
future considerations.
443 [The prepared statement of Mr. Kumar follows:]
444 PREPARED STATEMENT OF T. KUMAR,
ADVOCACY DIRECTOR FOR ASIA &
PACIFIC, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA
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445 Thank you Madam Chair and distinguished
members of the Committee for pro- viding
Amnesty International the opportunity to testify at
this important hearing. Madam Chair, the attacks
of September 11th shocked the world. Thousands
of inno- cent people from 80 nations were among
the victims. The attacks represented noth- ing less
than a massive violation of human rights.
Amnesty International has ex- pressed our grief
and solidarity with the victims and their families.
We also have expressed our outrage at those
responsible and reiterate here today our demand
that they be brought to justice. We can best honor
the victims of these heinous at- tacks by not
forgetting the human rights of other innocent
people in the United States and around the world.
We have united to demand justice, but we also
should unite to protect the human rights of all.
446 Among the innocent are the vast majority of the
long suffering Afghan people. The human rights
situation in Afghanistan has been of consistent
and grave concern to Amnesty International for
decades. We have documented human rights
abuses perpetrated by all sides in the conflict. We
have sought to increase awareness and to bring
attention to the continuing suffering of the Afghan
people. We have characterized what has happened
there as the World’s largest forgotten tragedy. We
have documented widespread human rights
violations by both the Taleban and the Northern
Alliance.
447 A history of abuse against civilians
448 But human rights abuses committed by the
Taleban and Northern Alliance represent only the
latest tragedy in the sad history of Afghanistan.
Throughout the 1980s, Afghanistan was a Cold
War battleground. Following the Soviet Union’s
invasion in 1979, the United States supported and
trained the Mujahideen resistance forces. Those
trained by the U.S. now can be found among those
fighting with the Northern Alliance, as well as
among those fighting with the Taleban.
449 In 1989, the Soviet withdrawal and U.S.
disengagement left a power vacuum that plunged
Afghanistan into civil war with warring factions
vying for control of the country. In 1996, Taleban
forces captured the capital city of Kabul and soon
took control of most of the country. The opposing
Northern Alliance lost ground, control- ling about
5 to 10 percent of the country’s territory by
September 2001.
450 Taleban
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451 Many of the Taleban leadership received religious
training in Islamic schools in Pakistan. They
emerged as a new military and political force in
November 1994 when they captured the city of
Kandahar from Mujahideen groups. In September
1996, Taleban forces entered Kabul. Among their
first acts was to hang former President Najibullah,
who since the fall of his Soviet-backed
government in April 1992 had received refuge in
a UN compound.
452 Pakistan is the only country that recognizes the
Taleban as the government of Afghanistan. Saudi
Arabia and United Arab Emirates withdrew their
recognition after the September 11th attack.
453 The Taleban have imposed harsh restrictions on
personal conduct and behavior to enforce its
particular interpretation of Islamic law and were
responsible for continuing numerous and
widespread human rights abuses, especially
against women. The Taleban has reportedly
committed political and other extra-judicial
executions that include targeted and mass killings,
summary executions, torture, and death in
custody. Taleban Shari’a courts and religious
police apply procedures that fall short of
international fair standards and that impose cruel,
inhuman, and degrading punishment, such as
public executions for adultery or murder,
amputations for theft, and beatings for lesser
infractions. Thousands of people are reportedly
held without charge or trial, including members of
ethnic minority groups held on suspicion of
supporting the Northern Alliance. In 1998, the
Taleban prohibited satellite dishes as part of an
effort to ban music, television, and movies, and to
create an environ- ment free of any external
influence or culture.
454 Women under the Taleban
455 The Taleban imposed especially severe restriction
on women. Its policy of ‘‘gender apartheid’’ is
unlike anywhere in the world. The Taleban’s
policies deny basic and fundamental rights to
women, including freedom of association,
expression, and movement. Under the Taleban’s
strict rules, women are not allowed to study,
work, or move around without wearing the allenveloping ‘‘burqa.’’
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456 One of the most consistent policies of the Taleban
is to punish women for defying their draconian
edicts. Taleban guards beat and humiliate women
for defying their rules, even for acts as seemingly
insignificant as showing one’s ankle. The
Taleban’s ministry for ‘‘preventing vice and
fostering virtue’’ vigilantly enforces the
restrictions on women. Women are regularly
rounded up and punished for allegedly violating
the Taleban’s rules on clothing. On one occasion,
the Taleban reportedly cut off the end of a
woman’s thumb for wearing nail polish.
457 Women continue to be subjected to death by
stoning and public executions. One married
woman was accused of attempting to leave her
husband to be with another man. An Islamic
tribunal reportedly found her guilty of adultery
and, as punishment stipulated her to death by
stoning.
458 Under the Taleban, women are required to remain
out of sight. In March 1997, the Taleban ordered
Kabul residents to block the windows in their
homes at the ground and first floor levels to
ensure that women could not be seen from the
street. A Taleban representative speaking from the
Attorney General’s office in Kabul, told
journalists that the face of a woman is a source of
corruption for men who are not related to her.
459 Whenever the Taleban captures territory, among
the first steps they have taken is to enforce their
‘‘gender apartheid’’ policies. On May 24, 1997
when the Taleban briefly captured the northern
city of Mazar-e-Sharif, they announced through
loud- speakers that women were to stay indoors
and that they were only to be allowed outside in
the company of a male relative and wearing a
burqa. Women were told not to report for work
and the Taleban stopped education for girls and
women.
460 The Taleban’s restriction on education and
employment has had devastating affects on
thousands of university students and professional
women. In 1996, the Taleban closed Kabul
University, which reportedly had about 8,000
women students. In Herat an estimated 3,000
women lost their jobs after the Taleban took
control.
461 Women suffer extreme repression and effectively
live under house arrest. Among the women, tens
of thousands are widows who without a man are
the sole bread- winners for their families and do
not have a close male relative to accompany them
in public. Severe depression and desperation is
rampant.
462 Northern Alliance
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463 Unfortunately, conditions under Northern
Alliance are not much better. The United Nations
and several countries recognize the Northern
Alliance as the government of Afghanistan.
During their rule in Kabul from 1992 to 1996, the
Northern Alliance was responsible for numerous
human rights abuses against Afghan civil ians.
Violations were widespread and included rape,
extra-judicial executions and torture, as well as
long-term detention of prisoners of conscience. In
1996, the Northern Alliance lost Kabul to the
Taleban and subsequently lost most of their territories to the Taleban. Although the abuses by the
Northern Alliance continued, the reports of such
abuses have declined in recent months. This may
be the result of the Northern Alliance controlling
limited territory. Such abuses could easily increase as the armed conflict spreads.
464 Children
465 The ongoing civil war in Afghanistan also has had
a devastating impact on chil- dren. While the
Taleban denies education to girls, all parties to the
conflict recruit boys as child solders. Many are
orphaned and have lost their siblings in addition
to their parents. Thousands of children die yearly
from malnutrition and respiratory infections. The
only experience of many of these children have is
of war, death, and destruction.
466 Over the last two decades, four hundred thousand
children have been killed due to the war and
thousands more have died of war related injuries.
They were killed in indiscriminate bombings and
shelling of their homes, schools, or playgrounds.
They were victims of both deliberate and arbitrary
killings and in many cases tor- ture.
467 Afghanistan is one of the most heavily mined
countries in the world. Landmines have killed
thousands of children. Many of those who survive
the blast have died later due to lack of medical
facilities. Others are left blind, deaf or without
limbs.
468 Two generations of Afghan children have been
raised in a highly militarized ‘‘gun culture.’’ In
schools, both inside the country and refugee
camps, textbooks, and teaching methods have
used images of tanks, guns, and bullets in
mathematics and reading classes.
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469 The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
reports that one in every two chil- dren is
malnourished and that one in four Afghan
children die before the age of five from
preventable causes. The child mortality rates
within the camps for internally displaced are even
higher with one in every three children dying
before the age of five. In May 2001, the UN
reported that 25 children had died in an Afghan
refugee camp in Pakistan due to heat stroke.
470 According to UNICEF, almost all the children
they interviewed witnessed acts of violence. Two
thirds of them had seen dead bodies or body parts
and nearly half had seen people killed during
rocket and artillery attacks. A disturbing 90
percent of the children believed that they would
die during the conflict. UNICEF’s research also
indicates that the majority of children from Kabul
suffer from serious traumatic stress.
471 Humanitarian situation
472 The large displacement of Afghans between late
2000 and mid 2001 was accompanied by a lack of
resources of humanitarian organizations and
outbreaks of dis- ease that killed many,
particularly children, and the elderly. For
example, during the last week of January 2001,
reportedly 480 internally displaced Afghans in a
camp outside Herat, including 220 children, froze
to death due to a lack of shelter and blankets.
Threat of a military attack and restrictions
imposed by the Taleban on humanitarian activity,
including detention of aid workers, have forced
UN and other aid agencies in Afghanistan to
withdraw their international staff. The pullout has
come at a time when Afghanistan is facing a
deepening humanitarian crisis.
473 The ongoing civil war and continuing drought has
left between 5.5 and 6 million people in desperate
need of aid, and the deteriorating situation and
severe disrup- tion in food distribution is likely to
further increase this vulnerable population to 7.5
million, of which an estimated 70 percent are
women and children. With such a large number of
people suddenly deprived of humanitarian
assistance from aid agencies, the UN have warned
that starvation may occur in parts of Afghanistan.
474 In spite of security and logistical difficulties,
limited deliveries of aid into Afghani- stan were
resumed between September 29 and October 8.
During this period, the WFP reported that it
delivered an average of 500 tons of aid per day. In
addition, Oxfam and UNICEF were able to
deliver both food and non-food aid, including
blan- kets and basic health kits.
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475 The amount of aid reaching the country is far less
than the 52,000 tons per month that the WFP
estimates it will take to feed the 6 million Afghans
at highest risk, and falls short of pre-crisis
deliveries, which amounted to 5,000 tons per
week. Aid agencies were particularly concerned
about the situation in the hardest hit northern
provinces of Balkh and Faryab where it was
estimated that 400,000 people were ex- pected to
have run out of food supplies during the week of 5
October. One challenge is the delivery of food
before the onset of winter, which usually occurs
around mid November. The WFP are planning to
airdrop food to some 100,000 families in the
mountainous central highlands region, who risk
becoming cut off once winter sets in. However,
the Taleban had closed the airspace under their
control and WFP has been attempting to negotiate
with them for air corridors to be opened so that
air- drops can be made by the organization.
476 Relief agencies indicate that women and children
remain particularly at risk dur- ing the current
crisis. The UN Population Fund has expressed
particular concern about the thousands of
pregnant women among those who have been
recently dis- placed who will be particularly
affected by the lack of food, shelter, and medical
care as well as unsanitary conditions that have
only worsened during the current crisis. On 25
September, UNHCR reported that, in at least two
cases, pregnant women waiting on the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border were permitted to
enter Pakistan to give birth and were given
medical treatment but were then subsequently sent
back to Afghanistan.
477 Displacement of Afghans since 11 September
2001
478 Initially, the threat of a US-led military strike on
Afghanistan and increased Taleban repression
caused hundreds of thousands of people to flee
their homes, par- ticularly from major cities. A
quarter of the population of Kabul and half the
popu- lation of the southern Afghan province of
Kandahar, the headquarters of the Taleban,
reportedly have evacuated. Prior to the threat, the
already large number of internally displaced
persons was estimated to have grown to a total of
1.1 million. The UNHCR predicts that the number
of internally displaced persons could rise to 2.2
million by March 2002.
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479 Reports indicate that the Taleban prevented some
refugees from leaving Afghani- stan or from
moving towards the borders. In one incident, the
Taleban reportedly stopped 30 to 40 Afghan
families from Herat on their way toward Iran and
pre- vented the men in the families from
continuing, saying that they had to join the
Taleban forces and fight. It was reported that the
women and children in these fam- ilies turned
back as well because they did not want to be
separated from their male family members.
480 Following the most recent displacement of
Afghans, Pakistan authorities have strengthened
their efforts to prevent new Afghan refugees from
entering Pakistan, citing security concerns and
their inability to support additional refugees. On
Sep- tember 18, Pakistan closed its border with
Afghanistan, reportedly due in part to a US
request; the authorities are reportedly allowing
only vehicles with Afghan transit goods and
Pakistani nationals to enter.
481 The Refugees
482 During the 22 years of civil war in Afghanistan,
millions of Afghan men, women, and children
fled the country as refugees because of gross
human rights abuses and fighting between armed
factions.
483 Most of the refugees fled between 1979 and 1992.
During that time period, more than a fifth of
Afghanistan’s population—over six million
people—fled the country in search of safety to
Pakistan and Iran. Currently there are 1.5 million
Afghan refugees in Iran and 2 million in Pakistan.
484 While millions of Afghans fled the country, many
are internally displaced within Afghanistan’s
borders and are too poor to obtain transport or too
weak to move. They languish, without proper
food, medicine, housing, or security. The
internally displaced seek safety in remote areas, in
the mountains or in camps. Thousands of families
in Afghanistan relocated several times over the
last 23 years to escape fighting in different areas.
485 Afghans who leave the country do not necessarily
escape danger. In Pakistan, Afghans continue to
be at risk of violence from combat groups that are
active along the border areas and at times exercise
effective control over the refugee camps. Scores
of refugees have been murdered in the very place
they fled for safety.
486 Many Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran
endure hardships. Although refugees have been
allowed to work in these countries and have
received a degree of support, most are barely able
to sustain a meager living conditions for
themselves and their families.
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487 Over the last few years, the United Nations
Consolidated Appeal for Afghanistan, the UN
inter-agency mechanism for coordinated
fundraising supporting Afghan re- lief projects,
has received far less funding from donor
governments than it has re- quired to maintain the
necessary priority assistance programs.
488 Pakistan continues to keep its border with
Afghanistan closed admits only seri- ously ill
individuals. However, the UNHCR is preparing
for 1 million additional Af- ghan refugees in
Pakistan. Tajikistan also keeps its borders with
Afghanistan closed. The UNHCR is preparing for
an influx of approximately 50,000 Afghan refu
gees into Tajikistan, another 50,000 into
Turkmenistan, and up to 10,000 in Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have also
effectively sealed their borders with Afghanistan.
489 Although Iran closed its borders on 15 September,
there are reports that it has opened its borders
recently and that the UNHCR is preparing to
receive an influx of up to 400,000 new Afghan
refugees in Iran.
490 Amnesty International has expressed concern both
about the failure of neigh- boring states to provide
protection to Afghan refugees and about the
failure of the international community to provide
adequate support to countries hosting this population.
491 Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
China Uzbekistan should immediately open their
borders to refugees. The international community
must share the responsibility of protecting these
refugees. These host states should respect the
refugees fundamental civil rights and should
ensure that they have the basic necessities of life.
Particular attention should be given to groups with
special protection needs, such as women, children,
and the elderly. Refugees should be provided with
means to stay in a place of safety that is not close
to dangerous border areas. UNHCR must be able
to implement in full its protection mandate.
492 The arms transfers
493 Throughout the world, Amnesty International
opposes the transfer of military and security
equipment and expertise in cases in which one can
reasonably assume is contributing to grave human
rights violations. Amnesty International is
extremely concerned that unconditional transfers
of weapons and other military equipment and
expertise to the warring parties in Afghanistan
will increase the clear and sus- tained pattern of
unlawful killings, torture and other serious human
rights abuses and war crimes, that have occurred
in Afghanistan since 1979.
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494 Amnesty International remains opposed to
transfer of arms or security equipment and
training to the Taleban, the Northern Alliance and
other armed groups in Af- ghanistan that have a
record of committing gross human rights abuses.
As there appears to have been a degree of
structural integration, both the combatants of the
Taleban and of al-qa’ida may be considered as
belonging to the same military force. Since 1994,
the main supplies of arms and related items to the
Taleban have come from official stocks in
Pakistan or from Chinese and other sales through
private dealers based in Pakistan, and with major
funding from Saudi Arabia.
495 Following the August 1998 bombings of the US
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the UN
Security Council imposed progressively more
comprehensive sanctions on the Taleban under
Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), and 1363
(2001), including an arms embargo. These
sanctions are binding on all members of the
United Na- tions under. Amnesty International
appeals to the government of Pakistan to make
every effort to halt such transfers from its
territory, and to the government of Saudi Arabia
to halt financial support from its residents.
496 Amnesty International also is deeply concerned
about proposed arms transfers to the Northern
Alliance from the United States, Russia, Iran, and
other states. Am- nesty International is concerned
that the supply of arms and related equipment and
expertise to the Northern Alliance would fail to
take account of the serious viola- tions of human
rights and humanitarian law perpetrated by those
forces.
497 Impunity
498 To Amnesty International’s knowledge, there
have never been any accountability for these
abuses against women and children and other
serious human rights abuses committed in
Afghanistan since the war began in 1978. No state
has brought to justice Afghans within their
jurisdiction suspected of serious human rights
abuses. If the cycle of abuses is to be broken,
there must be a concerted inter- national effort to
end impunity in the country. Any political
settlement must exclude the granting of preconviction amnesties for alleged perpetrators of
serious human rights abuses. Perpetrators should
be brought to justice regardless of rank or other
status. States should take steps to ensure that
universal jurisdiction is exercised by their national
courts for war crimes and other serious abuses of
human rights com- mitted in Afghanistan.
499 Prospects for peace
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500 Over the last twenty years, efforts to secure peace
in Afghanistan have failed. If Afghanistan is to
experience peace in the future, it must begin with
a foundation that provides all it’s residents—
including all women and all children—with the
human rights protection, as enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. With
human rights principles as the cornerstone,
Amnesty International be- lieves that:
501 All parties in the current conflict must take every
•
measure to ensure that international human rights
and humanitarian law is upheld.
502 Congress and the Administration should ensure
•
that any military assistance be accompanied by
clear commitments on human rights and effective
mecha- nisms to monitor use of weapons.
503 The Administration should urge the countries•
neighboring Afghanistan to keep their borders
open to Afghan refugees and the Administration
should ex- plore the possibility of emergency
resettlement of Afghan civilians in the U.S. and
other countries, as was done during the Kosovo
refugee resettlement pro- gram. Amnesty
International recommends that women and
children be given priority.
504 Congress should support efforts by the
•
Administration and appropriate inter- national
relief agencies to provide food, shelter, and
medical assistance to ref- ugees and internally
displaced people and that the Administration work
with appropriate international relief agencies to
prevent further human rights vio- lations in the
refugee camps, and create an atmosphere of
personal security, and, to the extent possible,
provide basic education and employment training.
505 The Administration should ensure that any •
political settlement must exclude the granting of
pre-conviction amnesties for alleged perpetrators
of serious human rights abuses.
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506 The Administration ensure that Afghan women
•
are adequately represented in any peace process,
as well as in any future government. Madam
Chair, Human rights must be central to the
negotiation of any settlement to the conflict in
Afghanistan. Any political settlement should
contain explicit guar- antees from the parties on
immediate ending of serious abuses, including
extrajudicial killings, torture and arbitrary
detention. Specific protection should be sought
against retaliation and discrimination against
ethnic and religious groups. The parties to any
political settlement should undertake to end
systematic dis- crimination against women and to
ensure full respect for their fundamental human
rights, including their rights to freedom of
movement, expression, association, edu- cation,
employment and health. A political settlement
must be based on broad consultation and
participation by the widest possible cross section
of Afghan society. The aim of negotiations should
be to help create institutions of governance
committed to and capable of effectively protecting
human rights. Particular emphasis should be
placed on adherence to the fundamental principle
of non-discrimination, so as to ensure the full
protection and meaningful participation of women
and all religious and ethnic groups. Measures for
the effective protection and verification of human
rights should be incorporated into any settlement
of the conflict.
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507 International human rights field monitors should
•
be deployed throughout Afghanistan as soon as
possible. The monitors should include experts on
women’s rights. Impartial human rights
monitoring would assist in protecting human
rights as well as building confidence in the
process towards peace. Pending their deployment
in Afghanistan, the monitors could be placed in
neighbouring countries to collect and analyse
information to assess the prevailing human rights
situation in Afghanistan, to publicly report on
their findings and to inform the peace making
process in Afghanistan. Those entrusted with
positions of leadership in a post-conflict
Afghanistan must be individuals with a genuine
commitment to the protection and promotion of
human rights for all. The past human rights record
of such people should be taken as a measure of
their integrity. Particular consideration should be
given to including those who have been denied
participation in the past because of systematic
discrimination, such as women. The national
reconstruction of Afghanistan must include the
development of institutions for the promotion and
protection of human rights, including law
enforcement agencies trained in international
standards and able to promote and protect human
rights, and a judiciary capable of conducting fair
trials. This task must be included at the outset of
any program of institution-building in the country,
as it is central to the effective protection of human
rights. An expert commission should be
established to examine and advise on how to rebuild the criminal justice system in Afghanistan in
line with international human rights standards.
The commission could also advise on the
mechanisms best suited to address past human
rights abuses in Afghanistan, the abuses
committed during the present conflict, as well as
abuses taking place during the transition to a
fully- fledged, functioning and fair
judiciary. Thank you Madam chair for holding
this hearing at this crucial time.
508 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.Mr. KUMAR.
On this note——Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank
you, Mr. Kumar. We sincerely apologize, but we
have a series——
509 Mr. KUMAR. Thank you.
510 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. Of four
votes, and your testimony will be placed entirely
into the record, and will submit to you our
questions.
511 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ms. McKinney, if you
have any remarks for Mr. Kumar before we
recess.
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512 Ms. MCKINNEY. The only thing I can say is that
I wish we had more time because your statement
is most eloquent, and I just want you to know that
I fully respect the work that you do and the
position that Amnesty International has taken and
the statements that you have made here today may
be a little shocking, but they are no more shocking
than what you actually see when you go over
there and you talk to those women who have been
totally dispos- sessed of everything.
513 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms.
McKinney.
514 Ms. MCKINNEY. Including their dignity.
515 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The Subcommittee will
recess——
516 Mr. KUMAR. Thank you very much.
517 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. Until we
come back. Thank you so much, Mr. Kumar.
518 Mr. KUMAR. Thanks.[Whereupon, a recess was
taken.]
519 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The Subcommittee will
come to order again. We are proud to have with us
a representative of the Revolutionary
Association of the Women of Afghanistan,
RAWA. She comes to us today under the
pseudonym of Tahmeena Faryal. Be- cause she
is an active member of RAWA in the region, she
does not want her identity nor her location
revealed.
520 The RAWA was established in Kabul in 1977 as
an independent political-social organization of
Afghan women fighting for human rights and for
social justice. And we thank her for joining us
today, and we will be hearing from her.
521 We will then be hearing the testimony of Quadir
Amiryar, born in Afghanistan. He is a
professor with the Elliot School of
International Affairs at the George
Washington University, and also serves as the
executive director of the Central Asia Research
and Development Center at GW.
522 A member of the Advisory Board of the
Afghanistan Foundation, Dr. Amiryar takes part
in the Cyprus Process, which has long looked at
the problems in Afghanistan.
523 Lastly, we will hear from Mr. Haron Amin, and
Afghan diplomat at the UN who has been
appointed to serve as the principal spokes- person
for the Northern Alliance/United Front. He and
his family fled Afghanistan and settled in the U.S.
However, he returned to fight Soviet occupation
under his mentor, Commander Massoud, recently
assassinated by Taliban forces. In the U.S., he has
continued to work with the Afghan government in
exile at the UN, and in other capacities.
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524 Thank you for joining us today, and we look
forward to your testimony. We will begin with the
representative of the Revolutionary
525 Association of the Women of Afghanistan, and
we will have our media specialists help us set that
up.
526 [Pause.]
527 STATEMENT OF TAHMEENA FARYAL,
REPRESENTATIVE, REVOLUTIONARY
ASSOCIATION OF THE WOMEN OF
AFGHANISTAN
528 Ms. FARYAL. Thank you, Madam Chair.
529 The basics of Afghanistan’s situation have
become more known in the past weeks, in the
U.S. and across the world. After years of neglect,
the desperate situation of the Afghan people is
receiving much needed attention. However, the
peoples’ voices are rarely heard, and are at risk of
being drowned out entirely by the horrific crash of
war and global geo-politics.
530 Founded in 1977, the Revolutionary Association
of the Women of Afghanistan is the oldest
women’s humanitarian and political organization
in Afghanistan. Based inside Afghanistan and in
neigh- boring Pakistan, RAWA is an independent,
all-volunteer, non-violent organization calling for
multilateral disarmament and the establishment of
a secular democratic government in which women
may once again participate fully in public life.
531 Currently, RAWA provides refugee relief,
underground medical care and education, incomegenerating projects, orphanages, documentation of
Taliban and other Jehadis’ atrocities, protest
demonstrations and events, and other initiatives in
both countries. RAWA members in Afghanistan
have stayed to continue our work during many
past crises, and we remain there today.
532 The RAWA’s work is also aimed toward giving
voice to our down- trodden people, especially the
women—and empowering women and men not to
forget that they—we all—deserve human rights
and freedoms and to look toward a day when the
guns and rockets will stop and we can begin to
rebuild.
533 The current humanitarian situation is grave, and
being made worse each day by the continued
fighting, the U.S. bombing, and the destruction
and fear both continue to cause. Winter is coming
and starving people are, of necessity, fluid in their
alliances.
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534 The political situation is made even more
precarious by what many Afghans perceive to be
U.S. aggression against our country and our
civilians, even as we cheer the possibility of the
Taliban’s demise. And continued and increasing
foreign assistance to the reviled Northern Alliance
has plunged our people into a horrific anxiety and
fear of re-experiencing the dreadful years of the
Jehadis’ emirate of the 1990s. In the words of one
refugee in Peshawar, September 25th of this year,
many of the people say that, ‘‘All of them,
Taliban and Taliban opposition, are criminals, and
we don’t want them ruling Afghanistan. For the
past 20 years they have all given the people only
bullets instead of food and graves instead of
houses.’’
535 The Afghan people want what any people in this
earth would want—the cessation of wanton
violence and establishment of basic stability so
that we may re-establish civil society. What is
going on now, and has for decades, is not our
religion, our culture, nor our traditions—it is an
abomination of Islam and all other peaceful
religions, and a violation of our people who are
being held hostage by fanatics.
536 As another long-time Afghan refugee said this
October, ‘‘The people of Afghanistan want peace,
security, and the opportunity to rebuild under a
government established by legitimate elections
where the people vote without a gun to their
heads.’’
537 The RAWA sees the former king, Zahir Shah, as a
viable non- monarchical central figure around
which an interim government could form.
However, if he comes to the scene while relying
on the Northern Alliance and so-called
‘‘moderate’’ Taliban elements, he will not only
betray his reputation among the Afghan people,
but will also undermine the stability and viability
of whatever structure he forms.
538 So many of those now involved in what has come
to be called the Northern Alliance have the blood
of our beloved people on their hands, as of course
do the Taliban. Their sustained atrocities have
been well documented by independent
international human rights organization such as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,
and others. Those in the Taliban and the Northern
Alliance have also proved themselves to be
incompetent and corrupt as governing forces.
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539 Our people have not forgotten the years after the
collapse of the Soviet puppet regime of Najib—
the most horrible years of terrorism and
unchastity—and as well we do not forget the time
not so long ago when the Jehadis’ themselves
were the cheap servants of Osama bin Laden as
the Taliban are today.
540 Currently, RAWA and many other Afghans fear
that the Northern Alliance groups now lie in
ambush, waiting to ride the guns of the U.S. into
Kabul and working to gain western backing to
establish their second emirate. They have yet to
prove, or even to offer, a single shred of reason or
credible evidence suggesting that they would not
repeat their prior atrocities.
541 In its 1995 report on the Mujahadeen wars that
followed the Soviet withdrawal, Amnesty
International documented that ‘‘Thousands of
unarmed civilian women have been killed by
unexpected and deliberate artillery attacks on their
homes . . . They have been blown up or hit by
rockets or bullets while walking in the streets,
waiting at bus stops, working in their houses, or
sheltering in large buildings. Many have died or
been injured in attacks aimed at mosques, schools,
and hospitals. These attacks were justified on the
grounds of fighting rival groups, but the nature of
their attacks, especially on residential buildings,
revealed a deliberate policy of terror by the
Mujahadeen against Afghans.’’
542 In addition, Mujahadeen forces, armed and trained
by the U.S. government and now part of the
Taliban and the Northern Alliance, wage a brutal
war against women, using rape, torture,
abduction, and force marriages as their weapons.
Many women com- mitted suicide during this
period as their only escape. Given their past
record, we see no possibility that any of these
Jahadis will change their nature.
543 Therefore, any U.S.-Rome process or multilateral
initiatives to establish a broad-based government
must exclude all Taliban and other criminal Jahadi
factions from political power, unless and until a
specific faction or person has been absolved of
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Else the
people will again be plunged into the living hell
that engulfed our country from 1992 to 1996
under the elements now involved in the Northern
Alliance and continues to the present under the
Taliban and other factions.
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544 The RAWA, on behalf of more than half of the
population of Afghanistan, also must insist that
any Loya Jirga or interim government
development process is not legitimate unless it
includes and heeds women’s voices from
beginning to end in substantial and meaningful
ways. We ask the unequivocal support of the U.S.
and other democracy- and justice-loving countries
for this and our other standpoints.
545 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If we could ask you to
wrap up. It is 1 minute and 44 seconds——
546 Ms. FARYAL. Okay.
547 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing]. After the 5minute statement. Thank you.
548 Ms. FARYAL. Afghanistan of course needs
substantial help from the international
community, but we cannot tolerate external
control, and even starving Afghans would resist
foreign domination. RAWA as an organization
does support the intervention of a multi-national
UN or other peacekeeping force to assist in
disarming the warring factions, establishing basic
securities, and setting the stage for the
establishment of an interim government.
549 We know that such an interim government will
likely fall short of democracy, and we strongly
insist that the world community assist our people
in making certain that such an interim government
is only that—a temporary stepping stone toward
full establishment of citizenship rights—including
equal rights for women in all spheres—and
democracy in a new Afghan constitution and
governmental structure.
550 Based on historical evidence, we gravely fear that
continuation of the U.S. attacks and the resulting
civilian lives lost give excuses to the Taliban and
Northern Alliance to wage war, and will also
empower and embolden fundamentalist forces in
the region and across the world—endangering not
only Afghans, but further American lives, and the
citizens of many countries.
551 After the horrific terrorist attacks of September
11th here in the U.S., Afghan and Americans——
552 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. We will give
you one more minute.
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553 Ms. FARYAL [continuing]. Like too many other
peoples across the globe share a common
experience of living under the rule of fear and
death. Let us make the best of this tragic
commonality; join us in advocating for U.S. and
international policies and initiatives that will help
build a lasting peace in our country; re-establish
internationally recognized human rights for the
women, children and men of Afghanistan; pave
the way directly to a secular, broad- based,
democratic government welcoming to all who are
innocent of crimes against our people; and bring
all fundamentalist and other terrorists to justice
under the rule of international law.
554 Thank you.[The prepared statement of Ms. Faryal
follows:]
555 PREPARED STATEMENT OF TAHMEENA
FARYAL, REPRESENTATIVE,
REVOLUTIONARY ASSOCIATION OF THE
WOMEN OF AFGHANISTAN
556 1
 Women in Afghanistan: a human rights
catastrophe, Amnesty International report,
London, 1995. AI Index: ASA 11/03/95. 
557 2 RAWA. Marginalised Women: Documentation
on Refugee Women and Women in Situations of
Armed Conflict. A publication of the Asian and
Pacific Development Center, 2000 
558 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very
much. Now we are very proud to hear from Mr.
Quadiar Amiryar. Dr. Amiryar, I am sorry if I
super-mangle your name. 
559 Mr. AMIRYAR. Thank you.
560 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.
561 STATEMENT OF A. QUADIR AMIRYAR,
Ph.D., EXECUTIVE DI- RECTOR,
CENTRAL ASIA RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
562 Mr. AMIRYAR. And I will try to thank the
Committee and the Chair for this opportunity in
opening this hearing for Afghanistan. On the
violation of human rights by Taliban, I would like
to say that one major aspect of the tragedy in
Afghanistan is the existence of a wide separate in
an officially sanctioned discrimination against
women, girls, and minorities in the areas that are
controlled by the Taliban.It is necessary to
establish an independent international inquiry into
the massacres and other grave human rights
violations com- mitted by parties to the armed
conflict in Afghanistan.
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563 On religious intolerance, the Human Rights
Committee in Gene- va, in September 25, this
year, announced, ‘‘It has extremely grave concern
about the implementation of the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights in
Afghanistan, especially as related to the situation
of women, public and summery executions, and
religious intolerance.’’
564 What would be the shape of the post-Taliban
administration?
565 Here, I would like to share with the Members,
distinguished Members of the Committee and the
Chair, that last week I was in Cyprus, our annual
meeting was held there. And then for the sake of
formation of national unity, in cooperation with
among various Afghanistan groups from the
formation or structure of the future entity for
political and administrative needs in Afghanistan,
they sent a delegation.
566 The Cyprus group assigned a delegation to visit
Rome, and I had the privilege of being a member
of that delegation, and I had audience, or the
delegation had audience with the former king.
And among those issues that was raised, the King
himself, His Majesty, referred to the era of his
administration and the role of women under his
administration: their participation in congress, in
parliament, in the executive, and including in
judiciary. These were the words that he
mentioned, and he was proudly referring to these
words.
567 And therefore, I think on my testimony I would
like to say that in the post-Taliban administration,
the former king, his Majesty Zahir Shah would be
able to lead and facilitate the transitional
administration. He enjoys a good deal of respect
and serves as a reminder of the democratic era in
Afghanistan. Also, he expressed his desire to
serve the people of Afghanistan in that capacity.
568 What can the U.S. do? In the meantime, I would
like to emphasize certain elements that they
consider, if possible, for the future administration
in Afghanistan. It is the rule of law and
democracy, an institution of democracy; revival of
traditional institutions, among them the Loya Jirga
in Afghanistan would be the most appropriate
thing to do.
569 In a chapter in the constitution that entails and
enumerates the basic civil rights of the people is
imperative because the lack of ad- ministration,
lack of enforcement of these rights, civil rights
and civil liberties and human rights brought
Afghanistan to this extreme status of fears.
570 What can the U.S. do?
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571 The U.S. should address the basic causes of
terrorism and support Afghans who are willing to
destroy the terrorist networks that have turned
Afghanistan into a launching pad for the extremist
movements.
572 It is important for the U.S. and the coalition
partners to define their objectives clearly, and to
select the means compatible to their objectives.
573 The U.S. must begin to coordinate its military,
political and humanitarian strategies, especially as
an alternative administration to the Taliban takes
shape. It will be important that that entity have
popular support within Afghanistan.
574 To the extent Afghans associate that entity with
bombing of urban areas and the disruption of vital
humanitarian relief operations, it will not win
popular support and sympathy.
575 The U.S. and the coalition forces must encourage
the UN to play an active role in the post-Taliban
administration by assisting them with the training
and attracting the most qualified Afghan compatriots to participate in the reconstruction of the
state.
576 Critical to the success of this effort would be to
design a mecha- nism for accountability and
transparency of management and re- sources to be
provided for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
Paki- stan and the neighboring states should be
persuaded to accept and support the creation of a
broad-based Afghan government.
577 The role of the UN should be enhanced to help to
establish a transitional government composed of
the cross-section of Afghans that include—that
ought to include all minorities and entities in
Afghanistan, including women and religious
minorities.
578 The details of this is included in my full paper that
will be left for the record.
579 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, it will be placed in
the record.
Mr. AMIRYAR. Thank you.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And if you could
summarize, Doctor.
Mr. AMIRYAR. Thank you.
580 [The prepared statement of Mr. Amiryar follows:]
581 PREPARED STATEMENT OF A. QUADIR
AMIRYAR, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
CEN- TRAL ASIA RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIVER- SITY
582 GRAVE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
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583 The latest report of the UN Secretary General
H.E. Mr. Annan to the General Assembly and
Security Council on Afghanistan that was issued
on August 17, 2001 clearly refers to a number of
gross violations of human rights by the warring
fac- tions in general and by the Italian’s militia in
particular.
584 ‘‘In the sphere of HR there has been no
improvement in the policies, practices and
circumstances that undermine the ability of
Afghans to enjoy their most funda- mental rights.
As noted in previous reports, combination of war,
weak and unrepre- sentative government
mechanism and widespread and deep-rooted
poverty coupled with the drought and profound
underdevelopment is a deadly mixture for a
growing number of Afghans’’
585 Another aspect of the tragedy in Afghanistan is
the existence of a widespread and officially
sanctioned discrimination against women, girls,
Shiia and Hazars in the areas that are controlled
by the Taliban,
586 In spite of several well documented reports by the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and
the existence of an established pattern of repeated
and massive violations of human rights and
humanitarian laws it was only the terrorists attack
on New York, Washington and Pennsylvania that
brought Afghanistan into the headlines.
587 Dr. Kamal Hussain, Special Raportuer and the
author of several reports on human rights in
Afghanistan had called upon the international
community to estab- lish an independent
international inquiry into the massacres and other
grave human rights violations committed by
parties to the armed conflict in Afghanistan.
Concerning the violations the reports were very
specific such as summary execution of civilians
by Taliban forces in the Yakawlang district of the
province of Bamyan in January 2001. More
information became available about massacres
from reports published by a number of
organizations, for example the UN Secretary
General, H.E. Mr. Annan’s report of 17 August
2001 to the Security Council and the most
detailed of these reports being one dated 19
February 2001 by Human Rights Watch.
588 In addition
589 INTL. CRIMINAL LAWS: CRIMES OF
GENOCIDE
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590 All parties in the Afghan Civil War are guilty of
grave breaches of international humanitarian law.
The arms, cash and supplies provided by the
neighboring states and other outsiders have been
directly contributed to serious violations of international criminal and humanitarian laws such as
aerial bombardments of civilian population,
indiscriminate bombings, rocketing and other
military attacks on civil- ian populated areas,
massacres, killing of civilians, summary
executions of prisoners and crime of torture.
Several cases of crimes of genocide are recorded
by the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights,
in Mazar, Bamian, Yakawlang, Samangan,
Rubatak and Pul-I-Khumri.
591 War Crimes:
592 In his latest report the Commissioner called on the
UN members and the Inter- national Community
to take the initiative to expose make the
accountable and re- sponsible for war crimes,
breaches of international humanitarian law and
gross vio- lations of human rights.
593 Torture:
594 Afghans civilians struggling running for their life
in search of a shelter for sur- vival caught in the
middle of a war, closed gates of the neighboring
states, the aerial bombardments of Allied Forces
in search of Bin Laden, added to their pain
suffering and a sense of fear and misery, a feeling
of being abandoned physically and men- tally
exhausted and tortured.
595 The new flows of refugees into Pakistan, Iran and
Central Asia require additional resources to be
mobilized so that those fleeing for security,
hunger and the war and Arial bombardments are
not treated inhumanly as has been experience of
many of the refugees in the past.
596 Terrorism:
597 For many years terrorism and training camps to
promote acts of terror have been organized and
funded by their foreign supporters. For example
Several months be- fore the latest terrorist acts in
New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, on
May 29, 2001 a Federal Court in New York found
four men, guilty of conspiracy in the bombing of
the U.S> Embassies in Nairobi and Dar as Salam
in August 1998. The Court found that three of the
perpetrators had received training in camps run by
al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan. Other suspects
linked to al-Qaeda who were al- legedly linked to
al-Qaeda have been arrested are in France,
Germany, Italy, Spain the UK and the U.S.
598 Religious Intolerance:
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599 The Human Rights Committee, in Geneva, on
September 25, 2001 announced ‘‘it has extremely
grave concerns about the implementation of the
International Cov- enant on Civil and Political
Rights in Afghanistan, especially as related to the
situa- tion of women, public and summery
executions, and religious intolerance’’.
(UNHCHR R. 25 sep 2001)
600 In the absence of a government or international
managerial structures on the ground following the
completion of the mission by the Allied Forces
human rights violators may feel emboldened to
commit further crimes against the civilian population with impunity.
601 Therefore it is very important to have a
representative government in Afghani- stan that
would be recognized by the neighboring states is
essential.
602 Post-Taliban Administration:
603 Reasons for prolongation of war and grave
violations of human rights in Afghanistan were
various. Lacking of a legitimate government
capable of enforcing civil rights and protecting the
basic liberties of its citizens. . Failure of the UN to
implment the Geneva Accord, following the
defeat and withdrawal of the former Soviet Union
and the renewal of additional foreign interference.
Imposing of various unrepresentative
governments over Afghans by outsiders. Absence
of trust between the rulers and the ruled, and
destruction of the national, social, political and
cultural institutions
604 The role of international community and the UN
in the transitional era of the process is critical
because the main causes of the war in Afghanistan
are external. It is the UN and the Security
Councils obligation to protect the people of
Afghani- stan from external interference and from
the destructive armed conflict, which con- tinues
to be externally supported. *(HCHR Feb. 2001).
605 All segments of the Afghan population are united
on the imperative need for change of the
prevailing situation. In order to introduce change
a comprehensive strategy is needed in which
carefully orchestrated and coordinated moves are
made both at the internal and external level.
606 The need is clear for initiating and sustaining a
process in which all segments of the Afghan
population inside and outside Afghanistan should
be able to revive their traditional sociopolitical
institutions and to establish a representative,
pluralistic, participatory form of government and
constitution, The philosophy of the future
administration must be based on the rule of law
and equality of citizens in front of the law.
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607 The international community, in particular acting
through the Security Council, is expected to
discharge its fundamental obligation to protect the
people and terri- tory of Afghanistan from
external interference and from the destructive
armed con- flict, which continues to be externally
supported. The new flows of refugees into
Pakistan and Iran call for additional resources to
be mobilized so that those fleeing from threats to
their life and security from drought, hunger and
conflict are not treated inhumanely as has been
experience of many of the refugees.
608 Road Maps:
609 Post-Taliban Administration can be formed into
two separate stages, first the transitional structure
or entity and second the regular and permanent
structure that shall be based on the basic
principles of democracy, separation of powers,
inde- pendent judiciary, an elected House of
representatives and an elected Senate. The
responsibility for the management of
610 State and public policy should be shared between
the executive and legislative or- gans of the state. .
611 The term of the transitional entity shall be limited
to three years with no renewal.
612 The composition of the transitional administration
should represent the socio-political fabric of the
Afghan society. Every effort should be made that
this entity will be inclusive, proportional and
pluralistic. In other words members of every
ethnic, social, religious, and languages are
included.
613 After 23 years of occupation, loss of fundamental
freedoms, foreign interference and civil war the
people of Afghanistan deserve to insist on
retaining a large meas- ure of autonomy over their
lives. Because this is essential for a constitutional
sys- tem dedicated to the rule of law.
614 The system of the future government shall be
based on the rule of law and must be defined by a
constitution. Sovereignty belongs to the people.
People delegate a portion of their rights to the
state, only for the enforcement and
implementation of their civil rights and liberties.
A significant portion of the constitution must be
dedi- cated to specify citizen’s civil rights and
human rights.
615 In the Post-Taliban Administration the former
King H.M. M. Zahir Shah would be able to lead
and facilitate the transitional administration. He
enjoys a good deal of respect and serves as a
reminder of the democratic era in Afghanistan.
Also, he expressed his desire to serve the people
of Afghanistan in that capacity.
616 What the U.S. Can Do?
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617 The US should address the basic causes of
terrorism and support Afghans who are willing to
destroy the terrorist’s networks that have turned
Afghanistan into a launching pad for the extremist
movements.
618 The US should coordinate its activities in
Afghanistan and the formation of the transitional
Administration, including activities related to the
reconstruction with UN and its specialized
agencies and the Coalition of the Alliance.
619 The US must begin to coordinate its military,
political and humanitarian strate- gies. Prioritizing
of military strategy and military objectives may
contribute to a negative image for political and
humanitarian strategies. Specially, as an alternative Administration to the Taliban regime takes
shape, it will be important that that entity have
popular support within Afghanistan. To the
extent, Afghans asso620 ciate that entity with bombing of urban areas and
the disruption of vital humani- tarian relief
operation; it will not win popular sympathy.
621 Assist Afghanistan with the reconstruction of
state, restoration of a legitimate government,
accountable to it citizens and meet the minimum
requirements for rec- ognition by Afghanistan’s
neighbors and international community.
622 To advance the formation of a popular alternative
to Taliban rule, to end the suf- fering of innocent
Afghans living in the vicinity of US military
targeting and to ex- pedite humanitarian relief, the
U.S should divert its attacks away from urban
areas and transport facilities needed to move
humanitarian supplies. It should also avoid
targeting electric generating facilities, which are
vital to water pumping in drought stricken areas
or other installations essential to the provision and
utilization of water.
623 The US should allocate funds and empower the
UN to search for a Talent-search within the
Afghan Diaspora to identify critically needed
technical, administrative, and other skills to be
located to the new Administration. Funds should
be made available to support Diaspora Afghans on
extended sabbaticals in services of the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
624 Conclusion:
625 Given the status of civil war, power of the warlords, absence of a centralized le- gitimate
government I can not see any improvement in the
implementation or en- forcement of human rights.
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626 The most imperative task for Afghans in
collaboration with the international com- munity
is the configuration of a legitimate government,
political independence, terri- torial integrity and
the institution of a constitution that should
emphasize pro- motion of the rule of lam and
equality of all citizens before the law.
627 The US working through the UN should provide
funds to the transitional Afghan Administration to
be used in building a cadre of commanders who
would be paid to ensure security in their areas and
pledge loyalty to the new Administration.
628 US and the coalition of Alliance must encourage
the UN to play an active role in the post-Taliban
administration of Afghanistan, by assisting them
with the train- ing, and attracting the most
qualifies Afghan compatriots to participate in the
re- construction of the state.
629 Irrespective of who is assigned to train the trainers
no one can deny the impor- tance and relevance of
this issue to the mission of state building for
Afghanistan. Therefore the sooner the UN and its
specialized agencies such as UNICEF, UNISCO,
WHO, WFP, and in collaboration with the Allied
Coalitions must resume the planning for it the
smoother the transition may be.
630 Critical to the success of this effort would be to
design mechanisms for account- ability and
transparency of management of resources to be
provided for reconstruc- tion. Pakistan and the
neighboring states should be persuaded to accept
and support the creation of a broad-based Afghan
government. The role of the UN should be enhanced to help establish a transitional government
composed of a cross-section of Afghans.( Ghani,
FT 9/27/01
631 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr.
Haron Amin. Thank you.
632 STATEMENT OF HARON AMIN, SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE/ SPOKESPERSON,
UNITED FRONT (NORTHERN ALLIANCE)
633 Mr. AMIN. Thank you, Madam Chair.
634 At the outset permit me to thank you for having
convened this august gathering here and to
address the plight of the Afghan woman in
particular, but at large, the issue of Afghanistan.
635 Indeed, the issue is women’s rights, but I think
beyond that the issue is human rights, of which in
Afghanistan over 55 percent constitute woman.
636 The plight of the suffering of the people of
Afghanistan has gone unheard for years, and the
question ought to be are the women better off
under us or are the women better off today under
the Taliban.
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637 When we controlled Kabul in 1992 through 1996,
according to the UN, and I am citing here the
United Nations documentations, 75 percent of all
teachers were women, 50 percent of all civil
servants were women, 40 percent of all medical
documents were women, and 50 percent of Kabul
University students were women. Women were
also in position to hold diplomatic posts, as they
were also faculty chairs at the University of
Kabul.
638 According to Mary McMakkon of PARSA,
[Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Services for
Afghanistan] she is an American went—and she
was in Afghanistan and helped with women over
25 years, and she has been stationed in
Afghanistan since 1992, 80 percent of all teaching
positions of Kabul during Rabani’s rule, as she
says, were women; and that young men and
women were at- tending the university until
fighting and rocketing around Kabul did occur.
639 But what went wrong in 1992? That is also
another question. In 1992, we had Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, who started cutting the electricity into
the city, reigned as many as 600 rockets a day into
the capitol. With electricity gone, with law and
order disappearing during the night, with fighting
which he raged in the city, he certainly would
have problems.
640 But the state as a policy, in principle, has never
sanctioned, advocated or condoned human rights
violations. And certainly there are human rights
violations that may have taken place in our
territories by villagers or other people. These have
been acts of reprisal on a local level. Let me give
you an example.
641 Three years ago Sherifa, this woman, in
Kalalihoja, north of Kabul, killed 25 Taliban
members. Now, certainly certain human rights
organizations would have had a problem with
that. But did she do the right thing by killing
Taliban? Indeed, that again was in our territory,
and in our territory women have the right to bear
arms and defend themselves. That is not the case
under the Taliban. So it is a question of really
what is happening in Afghanistan.
642 Having said this, I would like to address other
issues, and I think the biggest plight right now in
light of what is happening in Afghanistan is the
issue of these starving people in Afghanistan, 80
percent of whom or 80 percent of 8 million
people, mostly scattered throughout northern
Afghanistan.
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643 Let us also not forget that almost all of the
internally displaced people, persons have been
forced into the territory controlled by United
Front. People in Yakolang as we speak are
starving, and for the last maybe 25 days or so
have only been feeding themselves on plain grass.
644 We appealed to the United States on behalf of the
Afghan people to request Afghanistan’s neighbors
to open the borders for those that are fleeing
currently. We also believe that the donor states
recognize the severity of the situation and they
should be much more magnanimous than they
have been thus far, and also for the international
agencies to streamline a common humanitarian
strategy.
645 On the political level, since the international
community, the military initiative has not been
able to provide a clear cut political road map, we
have taken the initiative in our own hands, and
luckily blessed by the fact that the former
monarch of Afghanistan is still alive in and in
Rome, and someone who can make an appeal to
all the different Afghan segments in Afghanistan,
and the ethnic groups that he is in a position,
hopefully, to call up on the Loya Jirga.
646 But before the Loya Jirga, there needed to be the
convening or the establishment of the Council of
National Unity. That is going forward. We are
happy that that is making progress. Certainly we
believe that that is the way to go out, out of the
current situation or the conundrum in
Afghanistan.
647 Let me emphasize here that on behalf of the
United Front, I am pledging that a future
Afghanistan will have no role whatsoever with
terrorism; that in the future of Afghanistan, there
will be pledge to fight against drug trafficking;
that in the future of Afghanistan there will be
respect for human rights, including women’s
human rights.
648 Let me also pledge for a pro-democratic society in
Afghanistan, one which will have political
pluralism as one of its tenets.
649 And let me conclude by saying that none of these
issues, one through four, would be made feasible
without the international community’s assistance.
A neglected Afghanistan has paid a very high
price, both for the Afghans as well as the
international community. Many nationalities were
killed in the incidence of September 11th. We
strongly believe that the Afghans deserve a
chance for peace.
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650 First, they fought vehemently and strongly against
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which
destroyed the entire infrastructure. Now, against
terrorism. The Afghanistan people have a right
and the international community has a
responsibility toward that. And let us hope that we
can go about the reconstruction, rehabilitation and
new patriation of Afghanistan all together.
651 Thank you, Madam Chair.[The prepared
statement of Mr. Amin follows:]
652 PREPARED STATEMENT OF HARON AMIN,
SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE/SPOKESPERSON,
UNITED FRONT (NORTHERN ALLIANCE)
653 On behalf of my Government and the people of
Afghanistan, I seek your indulgence at the outset
in permitting me to express my appreciation for
this hearing. The Taliban are as despised by the
international community as they are despised by
the people of Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the
Taliban have engaged in reign of terror, genocide,
ethnic cleansing, scorched-earth policy, crimes of
war, crimes against humanity, forced deportation
of civilians, forcible displacement of hundreds of
thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs),
the separation of women from their men-folk.The
Taliban have implemented misogynistic practices
such as gender apartheid and feminization of
poverty, contamination of water wells,
indiscriminate targeting of civilians based on
ethnic, religious and gender origins, forced
display of yellow lapels for Hindu nationals,
random executions, political and other extrajudicial executions that include targeted and mass
killings, cruel, inhuman and degrading
punishment.
654 The Taliban have impeded access to humanitarian
aid, non-cooperation with international aid
agencies and open defiance of related
international instruments, roundup of foreign or
domestic aid workers, cultural genocide such as
the destruction of the colossal 5th Century A.D.
Buddha statues in Bamyan as well as the complete
destruction of Afghanistan’s national heritage in
the Kabul Museum.
655 Finally, the Taliban have institutionalized the
world’s most rigid interpretation of ‘Islam’ . . .
one which no educated Muslim would recognize
as the merciful Islam of our Holy Prophet
Mohammad (peace and blessing be upon him).

crimes against citizens

culture, access to
international aid

240

656 No Afghan entity and certainly no Muslim to
date—regardless of origin—has ever so
systematically engaged in these practices, as has
the Taliban militia. A scrutiny of their behavior
clearly manifests their close adherence to the
Deobandi and Wahabi interpretations of Islamic
teachings. The former is widely practiced in
Pakistan, the latter in Saudi Arabia. In fact, the
people of Afghanistan, never followers of either
of the aforementioned Islamic interpretations,
have been held as slaves of the Taliban’s
primitive world view and, believe me, will
welcome their liberation by International
Community when Afghanistan is freed.
657 But let me stress to you that America’s role in this
International force currently embroiled in ousting
bin Ladin, is crucial on several fronts. Most
Afghans are hesitant to trust the United States
right now because they feel betrayed. They feel
betrayed because we fought a protracted war on
the same side as the United States and when the
Soviets withdrew in 1989, we suddenly lost
significance, just when we needed you the most.
And in that period of time, of massive instability
from 1992 through 1996, because of Pakistan’s
backing for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who recently
joined the Taliban, Kabul was shelled with as
many as 600 rockets a day.
658 During that period of time in Kabul, Hekmatyar
cut the electricity and destroyed the turbines at the
Sorubi hydroelectric damn. He totally annihilated
several areas in Kabul proper, which came to
resemble Downtown Manhattan after September
11. Instability during this period of time caused
the disintegration of law and order, allowing
incidents of looting, rape and bloodshed. Let me
stress at this point that this was never state
sanctioned and came about in the vacuum created
when the United States and the rest of our allies
ignored what Pakistan saw as an opportunity to
extend its hegemonistic intentions in the region. It
was during this time that the Taliban marched into
Kabul with weapons supplied by the InterServices Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s military
intelligence services, which as you know by now
is a state within the Pakistani State, with the full
blessing of Ossama bin Laden. This should not be
allowed to happen again.
659 It must be stressed with emphasis that there are
two realities about Afghanistan: the international
vs. the Pakistani reality. Leading experts on
Afghanistan will ascertain that Pakistan is the
prime reason for the instability in Afghanistan.
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660 Among them, the noted Pakistani journalist and
scholar on Afghanistan, Ahmad Rashid, who in
March of this year stated: ‘‘In fact since Kabul
fell to the Mujahideen [resistance fighters] in
1992 our policies have created a wave of criticism
and even hatred for Pakistan amongst many
Afghans. The majority of Afghans blame us for
being the single biggest contributor to the
continuing war in their homeland. Today we stand
isolated in the community of nations due to our
Afghan policy . . . In my personal and humble
capacity I would like to apologize to the brave
Afghan people for the consequences of Pakistan’s
recent policies in Afghanistan. I would like to
unconditionally apologize for deaths of countless
Afghans, which have been caused by Pakistani
interference. I would like to apologize for the part
that we have played in the destruction of your
cities, your culture, your traditions and your
freedom to choose your own government.’’
661 In order to stop this from happening again and to
install a government that truly represents the
people of Afghanistan, which will halt the export
of terrorism such as the attack on New York and
Washington on September 11, the United States
must commit itself to the long-term process of
bringing peace, rebuilding Afghanistan’s
infrastructure, the institution of long-term
demining programs, political support for a truly
democratic process and logistical and material
support. You cannot assume that, when
Afghanistan is finally freed of the terrorists we
both wish to de- feat, your role will be finished
short of the institution of a pro-Democratic
government. Your long-term friendship will be
just as important as our current, immediate goal.
662 Our national hero, Ahmad Shah Massoud, the
legend of anti-Soviet Afghan resist- ance as early
as 1990, instructed me to convey—upon having
volunteered and fought two years of Jihad under
his command—that three things will happen if
Afghanistan were abandoned by the United
States: drugs, terrorism and human rights
violations in Afghanistan. On December 14, 2000,
Massoud wrote to Vice President Richard
Cheney: ‘‘We believe the international
community’s ineffective response to Pakistan’s
hegemonic adventurism through the ISI-led
coalition of Pakistani religious orga- nizations, the
Taliban and extremist cliques and figures such as
the renowned Ossama bin Laden, set a horrible
example for petty despots and terrorists around
the world.’’
663
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664 Sadly, Commander Massoud was assassinated by
two Al-Qaeda suicide-bombers posing as
journalists just two days before the terrorist acts
of September 11. The two incidents were not
coincidental.
665 As we see, all these have come to pass. And today
we are here in this hearing to specifically discuss
the abolition of human rights, which Commander
Massoud predicted. But rather than look back,
let’s look forward and work together to finally
666 put a halt to the systemic matricide, gender
apartheid, rampant racism and persecu- tion of
Hindus, Sikhs, Jews and Christians and total
degradation of any form of human rights that have
become the hallmark of Taliban rule.
667 To bring about a government that would rebuild
Afghanistan, respect human rights and truly
represent our countrymen and women, we need
your political help in bringing about a traditional
Loya Jirga, or grand council, which is a tradition
in our country since the 18th Century. It is widely
honored and accepted by all Af- ghans and the
best means of selecting a new government in
Afghanistan.
668 On October 1, 2001, a delegation of the United
Front visited Rome to meet with former King
Zahir Shah, and concluded an Agreement. The
main points of the agreement are:
669 —‘‘The formation of a new structure entitled The
Supreme Council for Na- tional Unity of
Afghanistan;
670 —‘‘In light of current national and international
realities, this Council will convene an emergency
Loya Jirga which will elect a head of state and a
transi- tional government; and
671 —‘‘In the case of a dire situation, whereby an
emergency Loya Jirga cannot be convened as
agreed, this Council will have the authority to take
appropriate measures to execute the points stated
under article (2) above.’’
672 It is important to note that nominations to the
Council of National Unity have been made in
light of ethnic parameters, not political or military
realities, in an aim to truly bring national unity.
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673 A broad-based government will develop if this
Loya Jirga under the auspices of our former King,
Zahir Shah—as a unifying figurehead and not as a
monarch—is allowed to convene. In order to
convene the Loya Jirga, several things must take
place. First and foremost, the Loya Jirga must be
convened without any outside interference.
Second, it shall aim to achieve the widest possible
representation from across Afghanistan in a fair
and just manner, including Afghan refugees and
elements from among the Afghan Diaspora and
others who have been previously alienated.
674 All of Afghanistan’s major ethnic groups i.e.
Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek must be justly
represented in all future political institutions and
government bodies. This, however, is not to be
construed as either preclusion and/or exclusion of
other smaller groups such as Turkman, Baluch,
Nooristani, and others from their admin- istrative
share. Finally, the Loya Jirga must be convened
under present conditions and inside Afghanistan.
Hence, America must involve itself in
Afghanistan’s polit- ical evolution by throwing its
full weight behind the Council of National Unity
and, later, the Loya Jirga.
675 The United States should also try to encourage the
participation of the United Nations in a key role in
the Council of National Unity to assist the
convening of the Loya Jirga. In this context,
inclusion of so-called moderate Taliban in the
Loya Jirga would be like the imposition of socalled moderate Nazis in the post-Hitler German
state. Abdul Haq, the legendary anti-Soviet
Commander, who was recently murdered by the
Taliban inside Afghanistan, was in the process of
working for the Loya Jirga.
676 We wish for the people of Afghanistan to have the
right of self-determination and the right to local
elective administrations; observation of the rights
of the Shi’a com- munity; the observation of the
rights of all ethnic and religious minorities; the
re- spect and observation of the rights of women,
including their rights to education and to work as
well as their right to elect themselves to office.
677 We Afghans seek your support for this process
and request appropriate dispensation of political
support and material and financial assistance with
the goal of convening the Loya Jirga at the earliest
plausible time.
678 Permit me in this context to refer back to
Massoud’s letter to Vice President Cheney:
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679 ‘‘The United States has a moral responsibility
towards Afghanistan which shall address key
issues, i.e. democracy, political pluralism, human
rights—especially including women’s and girls’
human rights—and advocacy of moderation and
tolerance in Afghanistan . . . Meanwhile, stationed
at the forefront of the resistance against religious
extremism, our goals remain clear. Afghans—
being multi-ethnic—want to gain their right to
self-determination through a democratic
mechanism acceptable to our nation. No one
group, party or individual has the right to dictate
its will by force or proxy on others. But first, the
obstacles have to be overcome, the war has to end,
a just peace established and a transitional
administration set up to move us toward a broadbased representative government.’’
680 Massoud had facilitated the ‘‘The Declaration of
Principles’’ by the United Front adopted on 20
September 1997 by the Government of the Islamic
State of Afghani- stan and recorded as official
document of the United Nations (A/52/384–
S/1997/733 on 23 September 1997), which are as
follows:
681 The principle of Islam;
•
682 The principles of independence and international
•
cooperation;
683 The principles of democracy and political •
pluralism;
684 The principles of election and delegation of •
authority to local administrations; and
685 The principle of human rights, including the •
rights of women and the right of selfdetermination.
686 And let me elaborate on the role of women in a
future government, because this is paramount to
the establishment of a future government that will,
indeed, respect human rights. Commander
Massoud last year met with a group of French
women’s rights advocates, who presented him
with a petition for his signature guaranteeing
rights for women in a future Afghan government.
When Commander Massoud read the petition,
which called for the right of Afghan women to
work, receive an edu- cation, function in society
as full partners and vote, he called attention to one
miss- ing factor—the right to run for public office.
That philosophy we still retain.

•
•
•
•
•
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687 Afghan women have historically received
educations abroad, driven cars, dressed in modern
fashions and were leaders in our society such as
ministers in the govern- ment and members of the
parliament. We strongly believe that without the
active participation of women, the task of
reconstruction, rehabilitation and repatriation of
Afghanistan cannot be achieved. To cite one
example, the UN reported when the Islamic State
of Afghanistan controlled Kabul, more than 50
percent of all civil serv- ants, doctors and nurses,
and students were all women. When I was
working with Massoud in Kabul in 1995–6, we
made certain that women played a significant role
in the composition of the civic society. Even
today, women enjoy employment and education
rights in our territories working side by side with
their male counter- parts. The Taliban have thrust
on our society a Deobandi/Wahabi influenced
gender apartheid, which is alien to our culture. It
has never been an intrinsically Afghan concept.
We categorically reject it for a future Afghanistan.
688 The United Front has never, as a matter of
principle, sanctioned, advocated or condoned
human rights violations. Any human rights
violations that have taken place in United Front
territories have been personal reprisals on a local
level. The United Nations Charter and all major
world legal systems recognize the inherent right
of self-defense against armed attack. The Islamic
State of Afghanistan, which is the political
extension of the United Front, as a globally
recognized Government personifying an
independent and sovereign State, has been in a
state of self-defense against Pakistani proxies,
first Hekmatyar and, later, the Taliban and their
inter- national terrorist allies like bin Ladin.
689 As the Government of the Islamic State of
Afghanistan, we have the right to de- fend out
sovereignty and independence against all ongoing
cross-border aggression and take appropriate
measures in full conformity with the UN Charter
and inter- national law of the past and the present
century. There needs to be a distinction between
righteously fighting for independence, resisting
aggression and upholding noble human principles
vs. those of obscurantist and extremist forces
engaged in a war of aggression and reign of terror.
On the contrary, widespread and systematic
violations of human rights, including rights of
women and girls, perpetrated in the occupied parts
of Afghanistan under the military control of the
Taliban and their foreign guests, are a daily
practice.
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690 The United Front has never institutionalized
taxation on drugs or engaged in drug cultivation
or trafficking. The Taliban, despite having issued
a decree banning poppy cultivation, continue to
champion drug cultivation, processing and
trafficking. Of course, after a three-year draught,
banning poppy cultivation is not a difficult
measure. And, having surpassed the Golden
Triangle in poppy cultivation, the Taliban
produced 4,700 tons of illicit drugs in 1999.
Purely a calculation of supply vs. demand, the
Taliban banned poppy cultivation as un-Islamic,
thus driving up international prices. Conveniently,
in previous years it was ‘‘Islamic’’ according to
the militias. Current stockpiles of Taliban
narcotics constitute seven year’s annual global
consumption of heroin. By the way, these
stockpiles exist in warehouses and have not yet
been targeted by American bombers.
691 This hearing is just not any hearing. In many ways
the seeds of hope for millions of Afghans will be
planted here in this hall. It is dire time to
compensate for past negligence, fulfill the
responsibility that America abrogated and, finally
give the Afghan people the kind of institutions
with which you are blessed: democracy and
692 human rights. In our mind, a neglected
Afghanistan has paid a high price both for you as
well as for us. There are two paths to be taken:
one of repeating September 11 and the other to
prevent a recurrence of September 11. Our people
pray for the latter so that our nations will not be
victimized again. A first step is the total re- moval
of the Taliban.
693 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much.
694 Mr. Amin, I will start with you. Is there anything
in the Holy Koran which would preclude a
continuation of the fighting against the Taliban
during Ramadan? What would be the impact of
halting the military strikes at this time? And
would continuing the strikes have negative
political consequences for the U.S.? That is, will it
antagonize Afghan people, and Muslim members
of the coalition of Arab-American community as
well?
695 And conversely, would halting the strikes provide
the Taliban with time to consolidate, to expand its
forces? How would such a halt be perceived by
the Afghan people from all angles?
696 Mr. AMIN. Madam Chair, the issue is that the
Taliban have used the holy month of Ramadan in
the past to persecute the Afghan nation, to
institutionalize daily reign of terror on the Afghan
na- tion.
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697 To just cite an example, it was during Ramadan of
1998 that the Taliban forcibly displaced as many
as 150,000 people from their home. So certainly
the sanctity of the holy month of Ramadan is an
issue not applicable to the whole Taliban
Draconian world view.
698 The question is in the Islamic teachings there is no
clear cut dis- position which prevents Muslims
from waging a war or declaring war or continuing
the state of war at anytime. You can check this
with any Muslim scholar. There is nothing
specifically that says for that not to occur.
699 But we strongly believe that the Taliban—that the
holy month of Ramadan is a month during which
you can indeed fast and not drink any fluids or not
eat any food, any kind of sustenance. But the holy
month of Ramadan is a month during which you
do not stop fighting terrorism, and that is
something that we will do in Afghanistan because
we strongly believe that the international coalition ought to keep that coalition together, and the
reason is that, despite the fact that certain quarters
in Pakistan might still want to somehow convince
the international community’s resolve that maybe
this is the time to stop, that that is a venue to
create a hur- dle and to thwart the international
community’s resolve at effec- tively combating
terrorism.
700 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.
701 Mr. AMIN. And hence, we hope that the
international community will not stop during this
month. Islamically, there is nothing that
specifically states that, and that would only give
the opportunity, should the international
community stop, the opportunity for Taliban to
mobilize, to gather strength in any way that they
can, and to openly persecute the Afghan nation.
What is certain is that we will definitely continue
our combat against the Taliban.
702 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.
703 And how long will the Northern Alliance agree to
postpone an as- sault on Kabul to allow a broadbased government to be created and established?
704 Mr. AMIN. Madam Chair, in that context, no
quarter, no political quarter has ever indicated to
us that the taking of Kabul should
705 not be in our agenda. That is an issue that we have
raised our- selves.
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706 It is our understanding that in order to be
effectively—in order to effectively approach a
political settlement, that a political road map
needs to be in place, and we have taken that
initiative on our own hands. We have contacted
various quarters around the world, and certainly
the King has given his blessing, and there are a lot
of other venues, the Cyprus venue, the people, the
gathering in Bonn and others who are also in
contact, that they want a political road map to be
in place, and that is the reason that we have halted
whatsoever an attempt to re-liberate Kabul.
707 But in this context, let me also emphasize that
should the United States be in a position to
convince the United Nations to also fully back
this plan, that that would be most needed, at the
same time for Kabul to be demilitarized, it
requires hopefully the deployment of some sort of
international force.
708 Now, whether that could be done under the UN
peacekeeping or peacemaking, that is something
that could be subject to debate at the United
Nations level, and it something that Mr.
Abraheme might be in a variable position to do
so. But certainly we make the appeal that if such
situation and such deployment could be made
feasible, we would welcome that, but certainly it
is not in our in- tent to go ahead and to capture
Kabul.
709 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And finally,
how would you respond to Ms. Faryal’s
statements about the Northern Alliance being
reviled by the Afghan people and the U.S. support
for the Alliances plunged the Afghan people into
horrific anxiety and fear of re-experiencing the
dreadful years of the 1990s?
710 Mr. AMIN. Well, certainly I would have wished
for her to have been in this room. Certainly I am
not a member of the Taliban, and I have not
discussed against women whatsoever.
711 But regardless, I can say that the attempt that the
United States have—the initiative that the United
States has right now is aimed at targeting
terrorism, at disseminating and annihilate
terrorism whatsoever. The Afghan nation has been
victimized as has the American nation and so
many other nationalities around the world who
happened to be working at the time in New York.
So that is the aim with which the United States
and the international com- munity is trying to
pursue the course of events in Afghanistan.
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712 If anything, it has been the Islam state of
Afghanistan or the United Front that has been
neglected over the years. We have made
numerous appeals, as early as 1992, in fact,
Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud appealed to
the United States and said that if you do not pay
attention to Afghanistan, that it will—it will have
major ramifications, of which he named three:
terrorism, drug traf- ficking and human rights
violations. Indeed, that is the case in Afghanistan today. That was as early as 1992.
713 Over the years, we made numerous appeals. If
anything, our ap- peals did not go—you know,
went unheard. And what we are ap- pealing right
now is that the future of Afghanistan is something
that we can plan right now. Certainly I think that
the U.S. on be- half of the international
community can play a very productive role in this
context, but we have our oaths and we have had
our ap714 peals—we have had our objectives for years in
place. We have asked for certain things.
715 What are we asking for in Afghanistan? We are
asking that the international community help us
on the human rights issues; that they help us in the
issue of fighting drugs; that they help us in the
issue of terrorism; that they help us on the
rehabilitation and re- construction of Afghanistan.
716 And let me just, in the context of your question,
say that we are the ones—we are, among others,
who want to go about this path, and certainly
Kabul under our control was much better off than
under the Taliban. And had we been given the
assistance the world wants to give to Afghanistan
right now back then, certainly the sit- uation—the
incidence of September 11 would have never
occurred in Afghan.
717 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. I have gone
two and a half min- utes over my time limit, so I
will extend the same courtesy to Cyn- thia, and
then we will ask another round of questions.
718 Congresswoman McKinney.Ms. MCKINNEY.
Great. Thank you, Madam Chair.Well, I guess my
first question ought to be to my witness, who
719 is at a different location, and I would like to ask
her to respond to what Mr. Amin has said, if she
has anything to say with respect to what he said
about the period from 1992 to 1996, and also
about the apparent commitment that has been
made to safeguard the— not only the rights of
women, but participation of women in a fu- ture
government should the Northern Alliance
participate in a fu- ture government of
Afghanistan.
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720 Ms. FARYAL. Thank you, Congresswoman, Ms.
McKinney.
721 I must say that Mr. Haron very simply shied away
from the period between ’92 to ’96, as if nothing
happened in Afghanistan dur- ing that time. But I
think that everyone would remember, everyone
concerned about the human rights and women’s
rights violation, would remember what happened
in Afghanistan at that time.
722 It was during the internal fighting between those
different groups, that some of them now are in the
Northern Alliance, but some are not in the
Northern Alliance, that 70 to 80 percent of the
capitol city Kabul became totally destroyed; that
the hospital, the school was destroyed and looted.
In fact, nothing was left for Taliban to destroy
when they took the power except the statutes; that
they did that.
723 And also, just by saying that women were—they
are in some positions in Afghanistan, they were—
most of the university students were women or 60
percent of the teachers were women, or there were
female doctors does not mean that there were not
human rights or women’s rights violation.
724 First of all, because of all those violation most of
the women preferred not to attend university
anymore, not to go to their jobs anymore, and
there have been many reports, hundreds of reports
not only by our organization but also by Amnesty
International, by Human Rights Watch, as I cited
some of them before. It is true that unlike Taliban,
they did not have any official list of restrictions on
women, but they should also remember that the
first things that they did was to remove women
from appearing on TV.
725 And as I said, because there were cases of
abduction, cases of rape, cases of forced
marriages by the commanders of the different
groups, women did not feel safe to go to
universities or schools or continue with their jobs
anymore.
726 Also, I think a few days ago it was said by United
Nations that Northern Alliance itself was involved
in drug cultivation in Afghanistan. Last year they
cultivated 120 to 150 tons of opium in
Afghanistan.
727 So if they want to be involved in any future
government in Afghanistan, first, they should be
brought on an international court of law because
people of Afghanistan do not want—would never
for- get for the crimes that they committed in
Afghanistan against humanity and especially
against women.
728 Ms. MCKINNEY. Thank you. Okay, I will try
and make these additional questions brief.

NA removed women from
public space on TV

251

729 Mr. Amin, could you tell me then, in light of what
we have just heard, what kind of steps you have
taken or will take in order to ensure that women
will be included in a future government of Afghanistan?
730 Mr. AMIN. Thank you, Ms. McKinney.
731 I would like to read to you a declaration of
principles which the United Front adopted in
1997, and among the five steps or five principles
in that list, one is the principle of human rights,
includ- ing the rights of women and the right of
self-determination.
732 Certainly, the objective, the aim is to end the
menace and the problems in Afghanistan.
733 Ms. MCKINNEY. Does self-determination mean
participation in the political life and decisionmaking of the country?
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734 Mr. AMIN. Yes, indeed. Let me also cite to you
that when a group of Western women from France
went to see Commander Massoud prior to his
assassination, that they had a list of about 10 or 11
items that they wanted to have for women, that
women should be privileged with about 10 or
something of rights, among them one was
missing, which was for the women to have the
right to elect themselves to office, which
Commander Massoud himself brought up, and
then signed the declaration or the document on
behalf of the United Front.
735 We want women in the future of Afghanistan to
have the same kind of rights that women had
under the 1964 constitutional monarchy. And
back then under the 1964 constitutional
monarchy, women had the right to become
members in the cabinet as well as become
members in the parliament of Afghanistan.
736 Ms. MCKINNEY. And so you make a
commitment today that women will serve in the
cabinet in any government of Afghanistan of
which the Northern Alliance is a part?
737 Mr. AMIN. Certainly, I am making that—I am
making that pledge right now, and it is a matter of
the international community keeping us, staying
with us shoulder to shoulder so that we can go
about achieving these things. These have been our
objectives.
738 But Madam, if I may also refer that in light of
again the a restriction of Kabul, that if 80 percent
of Kabul was destroyed, it was destroyed because
Mr. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar stationed 10
kilometers south of the city reigned as many as
600 rockets a day. This has been very well
documented. Despite the fact that all the
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739 destruction did indeed occur and Kabul itself is—
it looks like in many ways like downtown
Manhattan. It occurred not because we wanted to
engage in fighting, but because rockets were
reigning on the city of Kabul, and indeed we were
trying to defend the people of Kabul.
740 Now, if those——Ms. MCKINNEY. Okay.Mr.
AMIN. Now, if those rockets——Ms.
MCKINNEY. Okay.Mr. AMIN. I’m sorry.Ms.
MCKINNEY. Let me, because my time is limited,
let me just
741 get to this other issue of drug trafficking.A New
York Times article dated October 2nd says that
United
742 Nations officials say,
743 ‘‘For most of the past 5 years, the narcotics have
come from areas entirely controlled by the
Northern Alliance.’’
744 I know from news reports that the taking of
Masar-e Sharif is imminent, the taking of Mazar
by the Northern Alliance is sup- posed to be
imminent.
745 Now, it is my understanding from United Nations
that there is a substantial amount of heroin or the
product in which—from which heroin is made
stockpiled in Mazar-e Sharif.
746 Could you tell me what precautions the Northern
Alliance is taking right now to make sure that
narcotics trafficking ceases be- cause those
narcotics end up in Europe and on American
streets? And should Masar-e Sharif be taken by
the Northern Alliance? What is going to happen to
that product of—that narcotics that is there in
stockpile?
747 Mr. AMIN. Thank you, Ms. McKinney. I would
urge you and your colleagues, along with you, and
hopefully you can make this a bill in Congress, to
hopefully have the American airlines going over
Af- ghanistan to also use some of the cluster
bombs to pound these drug stockpiles in the city
of Mazar-e Sharif. That might be an easier way of
getting rid of them before we go into the city.,
748 But certainly our campaign is one of capturing
Mazar-e Sharif. Ms. MCKINNEY. So you are
suggesting that the bombs——Mr. AMIN. If I
may finish. If I may finish, please.Ms.
MCKINNEY. Bomb the stockpiles?
749 Mr. AMIN. I am saying that the best way to get
rid of them and it is something that I even earlier
made during my press con- ference, press
appearances for the last 1 month or so, that one of
the things that has not been targeted enough on
has been these stockpiles, and numerous quarters
run by the Taliban.
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750 We have to remember that under the Taliban
Afghanistan pro- duced as many as 4,700 metric
tons of opium and heroin. That is— that is
scattered throughout the country. We would
welcome ally forces to go about targeting these
stockpiles of narcotics.
751 Ms. MCKINNEY. We know the Taliban are the
bad guys. You do not have to convince us of that.
752 Mr. AMIN. Certainly.
753 Ms. MCKINNEY. However, we want to make
sure you are good guys. And the New York Times
article specifically refers to areas
754 that are in your control and drug trafficking that is
done under your watch.
755 So is there going to be an end to that right now?
And would you invite the Americans to also bomb
your stockpiles?
756 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Over 5 minutes of time
that——
757 Mr. AMIN. We are working on that appeal and
we will work on this very issue. We hope that—
—
758 Ms. MCKINNEY. Great. Thank you.Mr. AMIN
[continuing]. You will not let us down on this
issue. Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so
much.If I could ask any of the panelists who
would like to respond,
759 many would argue that most people in Kabul are
too terrified to fight the Taliban.
760 Do you believe that the Afghan people will rise
against the Taliban in more numbers to join the
opposition forces? Doctor?
761 Mr. AMIRYAR. Thank you. That is possible, but
it depends on techniques and mechanisms that we
will be using or allied forces will be using.
762 Actually, the people of Afghanistan are very tired
of the Taliban and their predecessor. They want to
see that they are liberated, and they achieve their
rights, their natural rights, their human rights,
their civil rights, and their basic rights, and
particularly the first generation of human rights.
We are not concerned now about second or third
generation. And so the people are tired.
763 But what can be done to accomplish this? Maybe
at Kabul, be- cause the war that we are dealing
now, it is a different—by nature, it is different. It
is a combination of terror and politics, and that is
what makes it incumbent upon us to voice and
find methods and mechanism to suit our
objectives.

define “natural”, “basic”
rights
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764 Our objectives ought to be defined a little bit more
precisely, and then the current objective, the
interim objective and the future ob- jective, these
all would be linked in the future, and at the end of
this, the end result will be the formation of that
government, in- terim government or transitional
government that we would base on the ideals of
democracy.
765 And that government needs some support of
goodwill of the peo- ple. So the bombardment
may be one mechanism, but not all. We may need
to come up with ceratin alternatives to cluster
bombs be- cause that may not attract the people to
congregate around the fu- ture government. That
diminishes the support from King Zahir Shah, and
the democratic forces of Afghanistan.
766 And therefore people of Afghanistan are, in
general, they are in support of our policy, and are
extremely against terrorism. They want to fight
terrorism, but they would like to see that we are
fighting on two front in parallel, political as well
as humanitarian.
767 Now, our humanitarian, as Congresswoman
referred to, there is indistinguishable items: food
between the cluster bombs, that is something that
it may hurt our effort while we do not mean to do
that one. We mean well, and we are there
sincerely. We are there. But I think that we may
need to redefine our objectives and use the tools
to meet and suit our objectives, and our war needs
to be fought on two fronts: political—three
actually: military, political and humanitarian. All
of them has to go parallel.
768 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.
769 Mr. Amin. I had asked that the——Mr. AMIN.
I’m sorry.Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [continuing].
Afghan people would—are terri770 fied to fight the Taliban or do you think that they
will rise again——
771 Mr. AMIN. I got it, yes.Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN
[continuing]. To join the opposition forces.Mr.
AMIN. I think that the Afghan nation, as my
statement says,
772 that the international community as despite or the
Afghan nation as despite by the Taliban, and
Osama bin Laden, as they are, as is the
international community, the Afghan nation
indeed has suf- fered over the years tremendously,
and right now hope has been created and hope has
been created because there is these inter- national
communities that does care.
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773 Certainly if given the adequate kind of strategy in
Afghanistan, and given that the international
community is going to have the re- solve, and that
that resolve is going to be steadfast, that the Afghan people are going to be hopeful that
something at the end— that there is light at the
end of the tunnel indeed. And I would say that
they would engage in some sort of uprising in
Afghanistan, but it is just that recipe, that the
ingredients and the prerequisites have to be there.
774 I would presume that should the Taliban be
pushed back in cer- tain quarters in northern
Afghanistan, that that is going to cer- tainly signal
major defections and number ranks of the Taliban
who are going to choose to defect because they
know that they are fighting an evil flight.
775 So Afghan people are not in a position that they
are going to shy away or that they are going to
turn away from actively resisting the Taliban.
That is indeed the case. But I think the appropriate
injection of the prerequisites has got to be there
also, and I think, given that the international
coalition is going to provide such pre- requisites,
that I think it will happen.
776 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And Ms. Faryal, if I could
ask you this. Rep- resentatives of RAWA have
classified U.S. military strikes on Af- ghanistan as
‘‘unbearable for any Afghan,’’ and perceived by
many Afghans as U.S. aggression against your
country. Yet in an article that I alluded to earlier
by Julius Strauss appearing in today’s London
Telegraph, the headline read, ‘‘Afghans cheer as
U.S. jets hit Taliban.’’ And it goes on to quote,
‘‘Afghans yelling ‘it hit, it hit. Thank you
America.’ ’’
777 And if you could explain this contradiction. If not
military strikes, what would you propose that the
U.S. do in response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11th? Do you believe the Taliban
would fall without any type of military action on
the part of the United States and the international
coalition? Are you suggesting that the Afghan
people would prefer a continuation of the
suffering under the Taliban over U.S. military
strikes to precipitate the fall of the Taliban?
778 Ms. FARYAL. Well, we believe that the bombing
in Afghanistan would really not do the job to
eradicate terrorism and fundamentalism in our
country or elsewhere in the world.
779 The people of Afghanistan are already tired of
more than two decades of war and fed up with the
fundamentalist, be the Taliban

256

780 or the Jahadis. And in fact, if on one hand the
people are terrified of the bombing and even
before the bombing they were mentally tortured of
what would happen, and still they are very much
terri- fied about the consequence, and were
witness that we have hun- dreds and thousands of
refugees fleeing the country and coming through
the illegal ways through the mountains to Pakistan
or to other neighboring countries knowing nothing
about their future in these countries, but on the
other hand, they think that if this could root out
the Taliban and fundamentalism and terrorism in
Afghan- istan, they think that that can be a good
side effect.
781 But as I said, bombing would really not root out
the terrorism. It might—it might get rid of Osama
bin Laden or a few Taliban or a few terrorist
camps in Afghanistan, but still that does not mean
that it has done the job.
782 We believe that there should be stoppage of
financial, military, political, then diplomatic or
any other kind of support to the Taliban, as well
as to other groups who are involved in war in
Afghanistan. That is the only way to eradicate
terrorism, and wish a peaceful and prosperous
society for our country.
783 We have to cut the hands of the different
countries, not only the Pakistan that has now
diplomatic relationship with Taliban, but also
Iran, India, Russia, France or any other country in
Afghani- stan.
784 Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.
785 Ms. McKinney, you are recognized to wrap up for
the remaining 8 minutes.
786 Ms. MCKINNEY. Okay.Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN.
Thank you.Ms. MCKINNEY. I only have two
questions.Dr. Amiryar has said that all parties in
the Afghan civil war are
787 guilty of grave breaches of international
humanitarian law. My question is for Mr. Amin.
788 Given the fact that not only does Dr. Amiryar
make this state- ment, but that our own United
States State Department Human Rights Report
makes similar statements, would you agree that
human rights abusers and war criminals should
not participate in a future government of
Afghanistan?

non-citizens
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789 Mr. AMIN. Let me say one thing, and I hope that
here we are going on the same wavelength here.
There are many organizations that the very act of
reprisal that the United States has sought right
now in Afghanistan, which apparently leads to
loss of life, would be condemnable. So in other
words, in the eyes of these orga- nization the very
act that the United States has taken right now
which leads to the death of terrorists, or that leads
to the death of fanatics, or extremists in
Afghanistan, which as the case are get- ting
pounded constantly, and whose numbers are being
reduced as we speak, that would be condemnable.
790 So having said that, and I hope that there could be
a distinction made for just war and unjust war. I
think that the international community is fighting
a just war, and this is a war on behalf of humanity,
on behalf of civilization, on behalf of coexistence
and on behalf of toleration.
791 Ms. MCKINNEY. Okay, we are not——Mr.
AMIN. That is the war that we have fought also—
—
792 Ms. MCKINNEY [continuing]. Talking about
the——Mr. AMIN [continuing]. In
Afghanistan.Ms. MCKINNEY [continuing].
International community. What we
793 are talking about is the future government of
Afghanistan.Mr. AMIN. Yes, if I——Ms.
MCKINNEY. Of which the Northern Alliance
would like to be
794 a part.Mr. AMIN. Yes.Ms. MCKINNEY. And so
my question to you is then, given the fact
795 that there have been these gross abuses of human
rights, then would it be the position of the
Northern Alliance to say we do not want human
rights abusers to be a part of our government?
796 Mr. AMIN. Certainly the political process is
moving in the direc- tion to where an Afghan
assembly could be created with the help of the
former monarch of Afghanistan. Certainly that
gathering has the right to choose whom they want,
or whom they do not want. It is not up to me as a
person to dictate as to who is going to qual- ify or
who is not going to qualify. Certainly that is not
me.
797 But if that is something, a contingency that the
United States on behalf of the international
community could place very well in this whole
process, we welcome it.
798 Ms. MCKINNEY. Well, why would you not put
that contingency on myself?
799 Mr. AMIN. On myself?Ms. MCKINNEY. Yes, on
your own government.Mr. AMIN. Oh, I am
saying—I am saying certainly we are mak-
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800 ing sure that in this entire process——Ms.
MCKINNEY. You as an Afghani——Mr. AMIN.
We as——Ms. MCKINNEY [continuing]. Why
would you not want to have
801 people who have a clean record and respect to
human rights abuses and I——
802 Mr. AMIN. Maybe I was not able to clarify
myself or maybe ex- plain myself very well.
803 Certainly that is the criteria by which we want to
function. That is the criteria by which we want to
nominate the whole process. Certainly that is the
case. But I am going beyond that and I am saying
maybe there could be an international contingency
plan to verify that these individuals who are going
to be selected in this whole process would be the
kind of individuals that you would want to see as
well.
804 Ms. MCKINNEY. I think that there are
probably—oh, Dr. Amiryar?
805 Mr. AMIRYAR. May I add a word, please?Ms.
MCKINNEY. Yes.Mr. AMIRYAR. Thank
you.Actually, there are two ways to deal with this
subject. I am very
806 much concerned about that, and sincerely I
mentioned that. How- ever, there are two ways to
deal with that one.
807 One, to wait until the future government of
Afghanistan is formed, and they should be dealt
with them legally. On the other hand, based on the
international law, criteria of international law,
some of these violations are reaching the level of
international criminal law. Once it reach that
level, then we have international
808 jurisdiction. Therefore, there is no need for us to
wait until the fu- ture government of Afghanistan
with that vulnerability would be performed, and
then this big burden should be put upon their
shoulder.
809 Perhaps we could initiate that one as the most
appropriate demo- cratic rule of law. Since we
have jurisdiction on international crimes, and
whoever reach them first, they are entitled to
prosecu- tion and adjudication, and that would
serve as a model for the fu- ture of failed states.
We could make it then, and this is an area that is
moral as a super power. We have a law-abiding
nation. We could serve as a model for the future
developing countries, with the future of
Afghanistan as well as the region because that is
not a problem for Afghanistan alone. Pakistan and
other neighboring states are suffering from that
level as well.
810 Ms. MCKINNEY. Yes.

global citizens, laws
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811 Mr. AMIRYAR. But perhaps this would be an
opportunity for us to resort to certain ways,
prudent ways that always we have done in our
foreign policy.
812 Ms. MCKINNEY. Dr. Amiryar, I would like to
work with you in the future so that we can
definitely take a look at the recommenda- tions
that you have made because I believe that the one
real an- swer and the one real consistency that
ought to exist in U.S. for- eign policy is respect of
human rights and a promotion for abiding by
international law.
813 Mr. AMIRYAR. Thank you. I shall be looking
forward to that op- portunity.
814 Ms. MCKINNEY. Great. Thank you.Mr.
AMIRYAR. Thank you.Ms. MCKINNEY. And
thank you again, Madam Chair.Ms. ROSLEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. McKinney.Ms.
MCKINNEY. This has been a wonderful
hearing.Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so
much. It is always a pleasure working with you.
And I thank the panelists for your patience. It is
wonderful, I always say, to be interrupted by
democracy. It is great to go and vote, and we wish
that for every enslaved person in the world. May
we always be interrupted by votes. Thank you so
much for being here with us.
815 Mr. AMIN. Thank you.
Mr. AMIRYAR. Thank you. It is a privilege.
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.[Whereupon,
at 6:33 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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APPENDIX E: ANALYSIS OF 2002 STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS
TRANSCRIPT
The President's State of the Union Address
January 29, 2002
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/print/20020129-11.html
¶# Quotes by the POTUS

What does this say about
citizenship in general?

1

Thank you very much. Mr.
Speaker, Vice President
Cheney,members of
Congress, distinguished
guests, fellow citizens: As
we gather tonight, our nation
is at war, our economy is in
recession, and the civilized
world faces unprecedented
dangers. Yet the state of our
Union has never been
stronger. (Applause.)

“fellow citizens” creates
commonality/unification
with POTUS, congress, and
public

We last met in an hour of
shock and suffering. In four
short months, our nation has
comforted the victims, begun
to rebuild New York and the
Pentagon, rallied a great
coalition, captured, arrested,
and rid the world of
thousands of terrorists,
destroyed Afghanistan's
terrorist training camps,
saved a people from
starvation, and freed a
country from brutal
oppression. (Applause.)

“our nation” positive terms
for what happens US: we
“rebuild, rallied” together

2

“civilized world..” creates us
vs. them, we are united
against them, consider how
E. Said & Orientalism is
mirrored in this speech

What happens “there”:
“captured, arrested, rid,
destroyed [the bad guys] and
“saved, freed” the helpless
More mirroring of Said &
Orientalism
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What does this say about the
citizenship of Afghan
women?
This creates a foundation for
freeing the other. Men &
women both need to be freed
from the oppression, they
could not resist the “brutal
oppression” independently.

Continues to create the
foundation for freeing
/framing other/Afghan
women

3

The American flag flies
again over our embassy in
Kabul. Terrorists who once
occupied Afghanistan now
occupy cells at Guantanamo
Bay. (Applause.) And
terrorist leaders who urged
followers to sacrifice their
lives are running for their
own.(Applause.)

US flag flying over US
embassy in Kabul, more
language of colonialism.

Continues to create the
foundation for freeing
/framing other/Afghan
women

4

America and Afghanistan are
now allies against terror.
We'll be partners in
rebuilding that country. And
this evening we welcome the
distinguished interim leader
of a liberated Afghanistan:
Chairman Hamid Karzai.
(Applause.)

“allies, partners” Creating a
partnership, attempting to
frame the two as equals

Continues to create the
foundation for freeing
/framing other/Afghan
women

5a The last time we met in this
chamber

“liberated” suggests
colonialism

n/a

n/a

5b , the mothers and daughters
That not everyone is free in
of Afghanistan were captives Afghanistan
in their own homes,
forbidden from working or
going to school.

women were unable to have
agency in their communities

5c Today women are free, and
The US has given citizenship from the previous statements
are part of Afghanistan's new back to women.
about how US saved the
government.
Afghan people, set a
foundation for how women,
because of the US are now
free to work, go to school
and participate in
government
5d And we welcome the new
Creation of a ministry post to Here is the token woman
Minister of Women's
address issues for women
who is serving as a minister
Affairs, Doctor Sima Samar. (contrast to a lack of one in
in the Afghan government
(Applause.)
the US) What does this say if
US does not see a need, but
Afghanistan has a need for
the ministry.
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6a Our progress is a tribute to
the spirit of the Afghan
people,

6b to the resolve of our
coalition, and to the might of
the United States military.
(Applause.) When I called
our troops into action, I did
so with complete confidence
in their courage and skill.
And tonight, thanks to them,
we are winning the war on
terror. (Applause.)

“our progress” frames that
the work of /the war by the
US can only be done with
the agreement of the Afghan
people; in other words, we
could not engage in war
there if they people did not
want it. Colonial argument
for “saving” people
Creating links between the
people of the US and the
people of Afghanistan.

6c The man and women of our
Armed Forces have
delivered a message now
clear to every enemy of the
United States: Even 7,000
miles away, across oceans
and continents, on
mountaintops and in caves -you will not escape the
justice of this nation.
(Applause.)

If the US freed all the people
than the women in
Afghanistan also wanted the
US involvement there (war,
aid, etc.)

Creating links between the
people of the US and the
people of Afghanistan.

That American US women
soldiers are also fighting for
the Afghan women. That
American women have the
freedom to fight for those
who cannot.
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7

For many Americans, these
four months have brought
sorrow, and pain that will
never completely go away.
Every day a retired
firefighter returns to Ground
Zero, to feel closer to his two
sons who died there. At a
memorial in New York, a
little boy left his football
with a note for his lost
father: Dear Daddy, please
take this to heaven. I don't
want to play football until I
can play with you again
some day.

Evoking 9-11 as a unifying
factor; tragedy is unifying
factor for Americans

8

Last month, at the grave of
her husband, Michael, a CIA
officer and Marine who died
in Mazur-e-Sharif, Shannon
Spann said these words of
farewell: "Semper Fi, my
love." Shannon is with us
tonight. (Applause.)

More pathos, family,
husband, solider died for the
cause

9

Shannon, I assure you and
all who have lost a loved one
that our cause is just, and our
country will never forget the
debt we owe Michael and all
who gave their lives for
freedom.

our cause is just: reinforcing
the war,

Lots of pathos used!
Family, daddy, god &
football (American sport)

Continued pathos, gratitude,
There was a reason for US
deaths in Afghanistan
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Silence: Does not address
the issues for women who
are losing their husbands,
fathers, sons and daughters
to the violence / the
collateral damage of the war.

all who gave their lives for
freedom Subtext: Afghan
women/girls be willing to
give up the lives of their
husbands/fathers/son for the
cause.

10 Our cause is just, and it
continues. Our discoveries in
Afghanistan confirmed our
worst fears, and showed us
the true scope of the task
ahead. We have seen the
depth of our enemies' hatred
in videos, where they laugh
about the loss of innocent
life. And the depth of their
hatred is equaled by the
madness of the destruction
they design. We have found
diagrams of American
nuclear power plants and
public water facilities,
detailed instructions for
making chemical weapons,
surveillance maps of
American cities, and
thorough descriptions of
landmarks in America and
throughout the world.

Continued reinforcement for
the use of military action.

11 What we have found in
Afghanistan confirms that,
far from ending there, our
war against terror is only
beginning. Most of the 19
men who hijacked planes on
September the 11th were
trained in Afghanistan's
camps, and so were tens of
thousands of others.
Thousands of dangerous
killers, schooled in the
methods of murder, often
supported by outlaw
regimes, are now spread
throughout the world like
ticking time bombs, set to go
off without warning.

No mention of the hijackers,
killers or outlaw regimes,
throughout the world
citizenship, where they were
from, how they identified

“They”: hatred & madness
unlike the US.
enemies are not identified
explicitly by name or by
group, they are not citizens
of anywhere/any place
(side note: where is the
evidence of the “found”
plans for destruction?)
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These men could be their
husbands/fathers/sons.

12 Thanks to the work of our
law enforcement officials
and coalition partners,
hundreds of terrorists have
been arrested. Yet, tens of
thousands of trained
terrorists are still at large.
These enemies view the
entire world as a battlefield,
and we must pursue them
wherever they are.
(Applause.) So long as
training camps operate, so
long as nations harbor
terrorists, freedom is at risk.
And America and our allies
must not, and will not, allow
it. (Applause.)

The enemies do not have a
home in which is safe, or this
can be complicated to say
that they are active, view
their entire word through the
eyes of global citizenship –
that allegiance to a countries
is not the point.

13 Our nation will continue to
be steadfast and patient and
persistent in the pursuit of
two great objectives. First,
we will shut down terrorist
camps, disrupt terrorist
plans, and bring terrorists to
justice. And, second, we
must prevent the terrorists
and regimes who seek
chemical, biological or
nuclear weapons from
threatening the United States
and the world.(Applause.)

Paragraphs 12, 13, 14
address the issue that the
terrorists do not align
themselves with a nation,
that their citizenship is not
framed through the lens of
nationality, but through their
beliefs.
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14 Our military has put the
terror training camps of
Afghanistan out of business,
yet camps still exist in at
least a dozen countries. A
terrorist underworld -including groups like
Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic
Jihad, Jaish-i-Mohammed -operates in remote jungles
and deserts, and hides in the
centers of large cities.

Paragraphs 12, 13, 14
address the issue that the
terrorists do not align
themselves with a nation,
that their citizenship is not
framed through the lens of
nationality, but through their
beliefs.

15 While the most visible
military action is in
Afghanistan, America is
acting elsewhere. We now
have troops in the
Philippines, helping to train
that country's armed forces
to go after terrorist cells that
have executed an American,
and still hold hostages. Our
soldiers, working with the
Bosnian government, seized
terrorists who were plotting
to bomb our embassy. Our
Navy is patrolling the coast
of Africa to block the
shipment of weapons and the
establishment of terrorist
camps in Somalia.

This is targeting specific
people in specific countries.
These is speaking about
those who are a part of a
country, and working with
governments, othering
terrorists as if they are not
part of the countries in which
they are found.

16 My hope is that all nations
will heed our call, and
eliminate the terrorist
parasites who threaten their
countries and our own. Many
nations are acting forcefully.
Pakistan is now cracking
down on terror, and I admire
the strong leadership of
President Musharraf.
(Applause.)

Again, separating those who
are part of a nation from
those (terrorist parasites
)who are not
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17 But some governments will
be timid in the face of terror.
And make no mistake about
it: If they do not act,
America will. (Applause.)

Countries who do not
address those who are
violent, as a result their
citizens do not have as much
value.

18 Our second goal is to prevent
regimes that sponsor terror
from threatening America or
our friends and allies with
weapons of mass
destruction. Some of these
regimes have been pretty
quiet since September the
11th. But we know their true
nature. North Korea is a
regime arming with missiles
and weapons of mass
destruction, while starving
its citizens.

Governments who support
citizens who are id as
terrorists – again these
citizens do not have as much
value.

19 Iran aggressively pursues
these weapons and exports
terror, while an unelected
few repress the Iranian
people's hope for freedom.

Points out the most extreme
situation of oppressive
governments that ignore the
needs of the citizens. NK
spends money on military
while …
People of NK are frequently
framed as brainwashed by
the government. Without
agency; little is talked about
who has escaped from NK
with the stories of what is
happening.
Questioning the government,
suggesting that it is against
the will of the people;
suggesting that the Iranian
people do not have the
power to change it or are not
making an effort for change.
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20 Iraq continues to flaunt its
hostility toward America and
to support terror. The Iraqi
regime has plotted to
develop anthrax, and nerve
gas, and nuclear weapons for
over a decade. This is a
regime that has already used
poison gas to murder
thousands of its own citizens
-- leaving the bodies of
mothers huddled over their
dead children. This is a
regime that agreed to
international inspections -then kicked out the
inspectors. This is a regime
that has something to hide
from the civilized world.

Pathos!

21 States like these, and their
terrorist allies, constitute an
axis of evil, arming to
threaten the peace of the
world. By seeking weapons
of mass destruction, these
regimes pose a grave and
growing danger. They could
provide these arms to
terrorists, giving them the
means to match their hatred.
They could attack our allies
or attempt to blackmail the
United States. In any of
these cases, the price of
indifference would be
catastrophic.

states like these: Iran, Iraq,
NK & terrorist allies

Again, women unable to care
for their children, families as
the mercy of the regime.

creating a division, in their
values,
US vs them mentality,
hatred is not a part of US
citizenship? Global
citizenship?
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22 We will work closely with
security paramount for
our coalition to deny
citizens of US
terrorists and their state
sponsors the materials,
technology, and expertise to
make and deliver weapons of
mass destruction. We will
develop and deploy effective
missile defenses to protect
America and our allies from
sudden attack. (Applause.)
And all nations should
know: America will do what
is necessary to ensure our
nation's security.
23 We'll be deliberate, yet time POTUS separating himself
is not on our side. I will not
out from the citizens of the
wait on events, while
US
dangers gather. I will not
stand by, as peril draws
closer and closer. The United
States of America will not
permit the world's most
dangerous regimes to
threaten us with the world's
most destructive weapons.
(Applause.)
24 Our war on terror is well
begun, but it is only begun.
This campaign may not be
finished on our watch -- yet
it must be and it will be
waged on our watch.
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25 We can't stop short. If we
stop now -- leaving terror
camps intact and terror states
unchecked -- our sense of
security would be false and
temporary. History has
called America and our allies
to action, and it is both our
responsibility and our
privilege to fight freedom's
fight. (Applause.)

Returning back from the “I”
statements. Our
responsibility/privilege as a
gov and people to go to war
under the guise of freedom

26 Our first priority must
always be the security of our
nation, and that will be
reflected in the budget I send
to Congress. My budget
supports three great goals for
America: We will win this
war; we'll protect our
homeland; and we will
revive our economy.

security=winning war,
protecting homeland,
reviving the economy

27 September the 11th brought
out the best in America, and
the best in this Congress.
And I join the American
people in applauding your
unity and resolve.
(Applause.) Now Americans
deserve to have this same
spirit directed toward
addressing problems here at
home. I'm a proud member
of my party -- yet as we act
to win the war, protect our
people, and create jobs in
America, we must act, first
and foremost, not as
Republicans, not as
Democrats, but as
Americans.(Applause.)

good American citizen =
unity and resolve,
unity behind war, defense &
in the legislation to create
jobs

this involves everyone’s
participation
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28 It costs a lot to fight this war. Money for war=defeating
We have spent more than a
enemy, protecting innocent
billion dollars a month -lives (whose lives?)
over $30 million a day -- and
we must be prepared for
future operations.
Afghanistan proved that
expensive precision weapons
defeat the enemy and spare
innocent lives, and we need
more of them. We need to
replace aging aircraft and
make our military more
agile, to put our troops
anywhere in the world
quickly and safely. Our men
and women in uniform
deserve the best weapons,
the best equipment, the best
training -- and they also
deserve another pay raise.
(Applause.)
29 My budget includes the
largest increase in defense
spending in two decades -because while the price of
freedom and security is high,
it is never too high.
Whatever it costs to defend
our country, we will pay.
(Applause.)

price of freedom & security
the US will pay “we will
pay” universal “we”
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Vague reference to innocent
lives, Afghan lives?
American lives?

30 The next priority of my
vigilance at home=citizens
budget is to do everything
watching other citizens
possible to protect our
citizens and strengthen our
nation against the ongoing
threat of another attack.
Time and distance from the
events of September the 11th
will not make us safer unless
we act on its lessons.
America is no longer
protected by vast oceans. We
are protected from attack
only by vigorous action
abroad, and increased
vigilance at home.
31 My budget nearly doubles
funding for a sustained
strategy of homeland
security, focused on four key
areas: bioterrorism,
emergency response, airport
and border security, and
improved intelligence. We
will develop vaccines to
fight anthrax and other
deadly diseases. We'll
increase funding to help
states and communities train
and equip our heroic police
and firefighters. (Applause.)
We will improve intelligence
collection and sharing,
expand patrols at our
borders, strengthen the
security of air travel, and use
technology to track the
arrivals and departures of
visitors to the United States.
(Applause.)
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32 Homeland security will
make America not only
stronger, but, in many ways,
better. Knowledge gained
from bioterrorism research
will improve public health.
Stronger police and fire
departments will mean safer
neighborhoods. Stricter
border enforcement will help
combat illegal drugs.
(Applause.) And as
government works to better
secure our homeland,
America will continue to
depend on the eyes and ears
of alert citizens.

Benefits of these actions for
citizens:
bioterrorism research =
improve public health
Stronger police & fire dept =
safer neighborhoods
border enforcement = fewer
illegal drugs
citizens spying on each other

33 A few days before
Citizens in action.
Christmas, an airline flight
Reinforcing the citizens
attendant spotted a passenger spying on citizens.
lighting a match. The crew
and passengers quickly
subdued the man, who had
been trained by al Qaeda and
was armed with explosives.
The people on that plane
were alert and, as a result,
likely saved nearly 200 lives.
And tonight we welcome
and thank flight attendants
Hermis Moutardier and
Christina Jones. (Applause.)
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34 Once we have funded our
national security and our
homeland security, the final
great priority of my budget is
economic security for the
American people.
(Applause.) To achieve these
great national objectives -- to
win the war, protect the
homeland, and revitalize our
economy -- our budget will
run a deficit that will be
small and short-term, so long
as Congress restrains
spending and acts in a
fiscally responsible manner.
(Applause.) We have clear
priorities and we must act at
home with the same purpose
and resolve we have shown
overseas: We'll prevail in the
war, and we will defeat this
recession. (Applause.)
35 Americans who have lost
their jobs need our help and I
support extending
unemployment benefits and
direct assistance for health
care coverage. (Applause.)
Yet, American workers want
more than unemployment
checks -- they want a steady
paycheck. (Applause.) When
America works, America
prospers, so my economic
security plan can be summed
up in one word: jobs.
(Applause.)

handout vs. a job (this does
not address the wage of the
steady paycheck; low paying
paycheck how does that
help?)
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36 Good jobs begin with good
schools, and here we've
made a fine start.
(Applause.) Republicans and
Democrats worked together
to achieve historic education
reform so that no child is left
behind. I was proud to work
with members of both
parties: Chairman John
Boehner and Congressman
George Miller. (Applause.)
Senator Judd Gregg.
(Applause.) And I was so
proud of our work, I even
had nice things to say about
my friend, Ted Kennedy.
(Laughter and applause.) I
know the folks at the
Crawford coffee shop
couldn't believe I'd say such
a thing -- (laughter) -- but
our work on this bill shows
what is possible if we set
aside posturing and focus on
results. (Applause.)

Education – NCLB -

37 There is more to do. We
Educating citizens
need to prepare our children
to read and succeed in school
with improved Head Start
and early childhood
development programs.
(Applause.) We must
upgrade our teacher colleges
and teacher training and
launch a major recruiting
drive with a great goal for
America: a quality teacher in
every classroom. (Applause.)
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38 Good jobs also depend on
reliable and affordable
energy. This Congress must
act to encourage
conservation, promote
technology, build
infrastructure, and it must act
to increase energy
production at home so
America is less dependent on
foreign oil. (Applause.)
39 Good jobs depend on
expanded trade. Selling into
new markets creates new
jobs, so I ask Congress to
finally approve trade
promotion authority.
(Applause.) On these two
key issues, trade and energy,
the House of Representatives
has acted to create jobs, and
I urge the Senate to pass this
legislation. (Applause.)
40 Good jobs depend on sound
tax policy. (Applause.) Last
year, some in this hall
thought my tax relief plan
was too small; some thought
it was too big. (Applause.)
But when the checks arrived
in the mail, most Americans
thought tax relief was just
about right. (Applause.)
Congress listened to the
people and responded by
reducing tax rates, doubling
the child credit, and ending
the death tax. For the sake of
long-term growth and to help
Americans plan for the
future, let's make these tax
cuts permanent. (Applause.)
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41 The way out of this
recession, the way to create
jobs, is to grow the economy
by encouraging investment
in factories and equipment,
and by speeding up tax relief
so people have more money
to spend. For the sake of
American workers, let's pass
a stimulus package.
(Applause.)
42 Good jobs must be the aim
of welfare reform. As we
reauthorize these important
reforms, we must always
remember the goal is to
reduce dependency on
government and offer every
American the dignity of a
job. (Applause.)

jobless or living off the
government assistance is a
reduced citizen

43 Americans know economic
security can vanish in an
instant without health
security. I ask Congress to
join me this year to enact a
patients' bill of rights -(applause) -- to give
uninsured workers credits to
help buy health coverage -(applause) -- to approve an
historic increase in the
spending for veterans' health
-- (applause) -- and to give
seniors a sound and modern
Medicare system that
includes coverage for
prescription drugs.
(Applause.)
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44 A good job should lead to
security in retirement. I ask
Congress to enact new
safeguards for 401K and
pension plans. (Applause.)
Employees who have
worked hard and saved all
their lives should not have to
risk losing everything if their
company fails. (Applause.)
Through stricter accounting
standards and tougher
disclosure requirements,
corporate America must be
made more accountable to
employees and shareholders
and held to the highest
standards of conduct.
(Applause.)

Those who have jobs that
provide a 401k = citizen who
has worked hard

45 Retirement security also
depends upon keeping the
commitments of Social
Security, and we will. We
must make Social Security
financially stable and allow
personal retirement accounts
for younger workers who
choose them. (Applause.)

Paragraphs 44 & 45 Work
that is valued is work that is
eligible for SSI or 401K,
other kinds of work is not
valued as contributing to an
active citizenry.

Paragraphs 44 & 45 Work
that is valued is work that is
eligible for SSI or 401K,
other kinds of work is not
valued as contributing to an
active citizenry.
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46 Members, you and I will
work together in the months
ahead on other issues:
productive farm policy -(applause) -- a cleaner
environment -- (applause) -broader home ownership,
especially among minorities
-- (applause) -- and ways to
encourage the good work of
charities and faith-based
groups. (Applause.) I ask
you to join me on these
important domestic issues in
the same spirit of
cooperation we've applied to
our war against terrorism.
(Applause.)

home ownership= good
citizen

47 During these last few
months, I've been humbled
and privileged to see the true
character of this country in a
time of testing. Our enemies
believed America was weak
and materialistic, that we
would splinter in fear and
selfishness. They were as
wrong as they are evil.
(Applause.)

true character of this country
= not weak, not materialistic,
not fearful and not selfish

48 The American people have
responded magnificently,
with courage and
compassion, strength and
resolve. As I have met the
heroes, hugged the families,
and looked into the tired
faces of rescuers, I have
stood in awe of the
American people.

good citizen = courage,
compassion, strength,
resolve
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49 And I hope you will join me
-- I hope you will join me in
expressing thanks to one
American for the strength
and calm and comfort she
brings to our nation in crisis,
our First Lady, Laura Bush.
(Applause.)
50 None of us would ever wish
the evil that was done on
September the 11th. Yet
after America was attacked,
it was as if our entire country
looked into a mirror and saw
our better selves. We were
reminded that we are
citizens, with obligations to
each other, to our country,
and to history. We began to
think less of the goods we
can accumulate, and more
about the good we can do.

citizens=obligations to each
other, to our country, and to
history (leaving a legacy),
doing good works

51 For too long our culture has
said, "If it feels good, do it."
Now America is embracing a
new ethic and a new creed:
"Let's roll." (Applause.) In
the sacrifice of soldiers, the
fierce brotherhood of
firefighters, and the bravery
and generosity of ordinary
citizens, we have glimpsed
what a new culture of
responsibility could look
like. We want to be a nation
that serves goals larger than
self. We've been offered a
unique opportunity, and we
must not let this moment
pass.(Applause.)

citizenship = sacrifice,
brotherhood, bravery,
generosity, responsibility,

not about materialistic
goods,

goals larger than self = war?
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51 My call tonight is for every
American to commit at least
two years -- 4,000 hours
over the rest of your lifetime
-- to the service of your
neighbors and your nation.
(Applause.) Many are
already serving, and I thank
you. If you aren't sure how
to help, I've got a good place
to start. To sustain and
extend the best that has
emerged in America, I invite
you to join the new USA
Freedom Corps. The
Freedom Corps will focus on
three areas of need:
responding in case of crisis
at home; rebuilding our
communities; and extending
American compassion
throughout the world.

Good citizen=4000 hours of
service to community &
nation
USA Freedom Corps

53 One purpose of the USA
Freedom Corps will be
homeland security. America
needs retired doctors and
nurses who can be mobilized
in major emergencies;
volunteers to help police and
fire departments;
transportation and utility
workers well- trained in
spotting danger.
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54 Our country also needs
citizens working to rebuild
our communities. We need
mentors to love children,
especially children whose
parents are in prison. And
we need more talented
teachers in troubled schools.
USA Freedom Corps will
expand and improve the
good efforts of AmeriCorps
and Senior Corps to recruit
more than 200,000 new
volunteers.
55 And America needs citizens
to extend the compassion of
our country to every part of
the world. So we will renew
the promise of the Peace
Corps, double its volunteers
over the next five years -(applause) -- and ask it to
join a new effort to
encourage development and
education and opportunity in
the Islamic world.
(Applause.)

In contrast to the funds for
war.
compassion vs.

56 This time of adversity offers
a unique moment of
opportunity -- a moment we
must seize to change our
culture. Through the
gathering momentum of
millions of acts of service
and decency and kindness, I
know we can overcome evil
with greater good.
(Applause.) And we have a
great opportunity during this
time of war to lead the world
toward the values that will
bring lasting peace.
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57 All fathers and mothers, in
all societies, want their
children to be educated, and
live free from poverty and
violence. No people on Earth
yearn to be oppressed, or
aspire to servitude, or
eagerly await the midnight
knock of the secret police.
58 If anyone doubts this, let
them look to Afghanistan,
where the Islamic "street"
greeted the fall of tyranny
with song and celebration.
Let the skeptics look to
Islam's own rich history,
with its centuries of learning,
and tolerance and progress.
America will lead by
defending liberty and justice
because they are right and
true and unchanging for all
people everywhere.
(Applause.)
59 No nation owns these
aspirations, and no nation is
exempt from them. We have
no intention of imposing our
culture. But America will
always stand firm for the
non-negotiable demands of
human dignity: the rule of
law; limits on the power of
the state; respect for women;
private property; free speech;
equal justice; and religious
tolerance. (Applause.)

Universality of human
dignity/ good citizen = rule
of law, limits on state power,
respect for women, private
property, free speech, equal
justice, religious tolerance
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60 America will take the side of
brave men and women who
advocate these values around
the world, including the
Islamic world, because we
have a greater objective than
eliminating threats and
containing resentment. We
seek a just and peaceful
world beyond the war on
terror.

good citizen = bravery,
advocate the above values
around the world, seek
justice & peace

61 In this moment of
opportunity, a common
danger is erasing old
rivalries. America is working
with Russia and China and
India, in ways we have never
before, to achieve peace and
prosperity. In every region,
free markets and free trade
and free societies are
proving their power to lift
lives. Together with friends
and allies from Europe to
Asia, and Africa to Latin
America, we will
demonstrate that the forces
of terror cannot stop the
momentum of freedom.
(Applause.)

common danger against
peace, prosperity, free
markets, free trade, free
societies
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62 The last time I spoke here, I
expressed the hope that life
would return to normal. In
some ways, it has. In others,
it never will. Those of us
who have lived through
these challenging times have
been changed by them.
We've come to know truths
that we will never question:
evil is real, and it must be
opposed. (Applause.)
Beyond all differences of
race or creed, we are one
country, mourning together
and facing danger together.
Deep in the American
character, there is honor, and
it is stronger than cynicism.
And many have discovered
again that even in tragedy -especially in tragedy -- God
is near. (Applause.)

we should not acknowledge
race/creed= American
character is universal, has
honor and cynical

63 In a single instant, we
realized that this will be a
decisive decade in the
history of liberty, that we've
been called to a unique role
in human events. Rarely has
the world faced a choice
more clear or consequential.

unique role in the world,
good citizenship= taking
advantage of this role

65 Our enemies send other
people's children on
missions of suicide and
murder. They embrace
tyranny and death as a cause
and a creed. We stand for a
different choice, made long
ago, on the day of our
founding. We affirm it again
today.

bad citizenship=killing
children, tyranny,

if one doesn’t see race, it is
racism (who addresses this
issue?)
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66 We choose freedom and the
dignity of every life.
(Applause.)

dignity of every life, subtext:
except of those lives that we
deem a problem (terrorists)
or in the way (collateral
damage)

67 Steadfast in our purpose, we
now press on. We have
known freedom's price. We
have shown freedom's
power. And in this great
conflict, my fellow
Americans, we will see
freedom's victory.
68 Thank you all. May God
bless. (Applause.)
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APPENDIX F: ANALYSIS OF RAWA TEXTS
Page	
  

Text	
  

Title	
  
1	
  

Afghanistan,	
  world’s	
  largest	
  forgotten	
  tragedy	
  
	
  
Revolutionary	
  Association	
  of	
  Women	
  of	
  Afghanistan	
  
8	
  images	
  
(RAWA),	
  the	
  only	
  feminist	
  Afghan	
  organisation,	
  is	
  locked	
  in	
  
1-‐ women	
  in	
  
struggle	
  with	
  the	
  most	
  horrendous	
  fundamentalist	
  regime	
  
burkas	
  
in	
  the	
  world	
  but	
  does	
  not	
  receive	
  any	
  support	
  from	
  any	
  
standing	
  in	
  
government	
  or	
  non-‐government	
  organisation	
  whatsoever.	
  	
  
line	
  
2-‐ baby	
  
Donate	
  to	
  RAWA	
  to	
  enable	
  it	
  to	
  continue	
  and	
  expand	
  its	
  
3-‐ children	
  at	
  
humanitarian	
  and	
  pro-‐democracy	
  activities	
  more	
  effectively	
  
school	
  
amongst	
  the	
  most	
  unhappy	
  women	
  and	
  children	
  on	
  earth.	
  
4-‐ man	
  
Our	
  book	
  account	
  for	
  US$	
  [address]	
  
carrying	
  a	
  
bloody,	
  
amputated	
  
hand	
  from	
  a	
  
“punishmen
t”	
  
5-‐ rubble?	
  	
  
6-‐ Woman	
  
begging,	
  in	
  
burka	
  	
  
7-‐ Afghan	
  man	
  
8-‐ Man	
  
shooting	
  a	
  
woman	
  in	
  
burka	
  	
  
I’m	
  the	
  woman	
  who	
  has	
  awoken	
  /	
  I’ve	
  arisen	
  and	
  become	
  a	
  
background	
  image	
  
tempest	
  through	
  the	
  ashes	
  of	
  my	
  burnt	
  children	
  /	
  My	
  ruined	
   rawa	
  symbol	
  
and	
  burnt	
  villages	
  replete	
  me	
  with	
  hatred	
  against	
  the	
  
women	
  with	
  fist	
  in	
  
enemy	
  /	
  O’compatriot,	
  no	
  longer	
  regard	
  me	
  weak	
  and	
  
air	
  
incapable,	
  	
  /	
  My	
  voice	
  has	
  mingled	
  with	
  thousands	
  of	
  arisen	
  
women	
  /	
  I’m	
  the	
  woman	
  who	
  has	
  awoken,	
  /	
  I’ve	
  found	
  my	
  
path	
  and	
  will	
  never	
  return.	
  

1	
  

1	
  

2	
  

Images	
  

2	
  

Part	
  of	
  a	
  poem	
  by	
  Meena	
  

	
  

2	
  
2	
  

[Caption	
  to	
  photo]	
  Martyred	
  Meena	
  (1957-‐1987)	
  
RAWA	
  was	
  founded	
  by	
  Meena	
  in	
  1977	
  and	
  actively	
  
participated	
  in	
  the	
  anti-‐Soviet	
  resistance	
  movement	
  of	
  the	
  
people	
  of	
  Afghanistan.	
  After	
  the	
  overthrow	
  of	
  the	
  puppet	
  
regime	
  in	
  1992	
  and	
  the	
  catastrophic	
  domination	
  of	
  
fundamentalists	
  in	
  Afghanistan	
  RAWA	
  redoubled	
  its	
  
political,	
  cultural,	
  educational,	
  health,	
  and	
  human	
  rights	
  
activities	
  to	
  attain	
  its	
  overall	
  objective	
  of	
  democracy	
  and	
  
women’s	
  rights.	
  

Image	
  of	
  Meena	
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Citizenship	
  for	
  
afghan	
  women	
  
	
  
Claiming	
  
independence	
  
from	
  gov/	
  self	
  
sustaining;	
  
independent	
  
Providing	
  for	
  the	
  
people	
  /	
  using	
  
democratic	
  ideals	
  
Images:	
  display	
  
tragedies	
  and	
  the	
  
oppression	
  of	
  
women	
  

Challenging	
  the	
  
idea	
  that	
  women	
  
are	
  weak	
  and	
  can	
  
not	
  participate	
  in	
  
society	
  
	
  
Image	
  
demonstrates	
  how	
  
women	
  are	
  
resisting	
  the	
  
oppression	
  
Meena	
  is	
  the	
  
founder	
  of	
  RAWA	
  
she	
  is	
  real	
  
Asserting	
  the	
  
rights	
  in	
  all	
  aspects	
  
of	
  citizenship;	
  
claiming	
  it	
  for	
  all	
  
Afghans	
  /	
  
particularly	
  
women	
  

3-‐4	
  

[Photos	
  with	
  caption]	
  Destruction	
  and	
  terror	
  á	
  la	
  Jihadi	
  and	
  
Taliban	
  fundamentalists	
  

5	
  

Taliban	
  are	
  barely	
  literate,	
  consider	
  photography,	
  
television,	
  cinema	
  and	
  an	
  endless	
  list	
  of	
  modern	
  everyday	
  
needs	
  and	
  practices	
  as	
  Satanic,	
  but	
  love	
  to	
  flog	
  and	
  
humiliate	
  and	
  own	
  expensive,	
  latest	
  model	
  vehicles.	
  

6	
  

7	
  

8	
  

4	
  images	
  
1	
  –	
  2	
  men,	
  one	
  with	
  
rocket	
  launcher,	
  
standing	
  in	
  front	
  of	
  
rubble	
  
2	
  –	
  men	
  among	
  
rubble	
  
3	
  –	
  men	
  among	
  
rubble	
  
rubble	
  
3	
  images	
  
1	
  –	
  armed	
  afghan	
  
men	
  in	
  Toyota	
  truck,	
  	
  
2	
  –	
  man	
  speaking	
  
3	
  –	
  men,	
  traffic	
  

Images	
  of	
  
destruction.	
  	
  

Literacy	
  is	
  
important;	
  as	
  well	
  
as	
  access	
  to	
  
contemporary	
  
needs	
  and	
  
entertainment;	
  
violence	
  is	
  not	
  a	
  
part	
  of	
  society	
  that	
  
RAWA	
  envisions.	
  	
  
RAWA	
  has	
  pledged	
  to	
  fight	
  fundamentalist	
  terror	
  and	
  
1-‐ Men	
  hanged	
   Citizens	
  can’t	
  be	
  
tyranny	
  perpetuated	
  in	
  the	
  name	
  of	
  religion.	
  
2-‐ man	
  
oppressed	
  through	
  
carrying	
  a	
  
religion	
  
bloody	
  
	
  
amputated	
   Images	
  counter	
  
hand	
  from	
  a	
   the	
  texts,	
  of	
  what	
  
“punishmen RAWA	
  is	
  fighting;	
  
t”	
  
images	
  of	
  the	
  
3-‐ carrying	
  a	
  
terror	
  
man	
  who	
  is	
  
hog	
  tied.	
  	
  
Pangs	
  of	
  hunger	
  and	
  want	
  force	
  women	
  in	
  Kabul	
  to	
  
3	
  images	
  
Citizens	
  have	
  the	
  
gradually	
  sell	
  off	
  the	
  family’s	
  belongings	
  down	
  to	
  the	
  bare	
  
1	
  –	
  women,	
  
right	
  to	
  eat.	
  
necessities.	
  Like	
  fundamentalist	
  crimes	
  and	
  infamy,	
  such	
  
marketplace,	
  selling	
   	
  
impoverishment	
  and	
  almost-‐universal	
  pauperization	
  has	
  no	
   belongings	
  
Women	
  seeing	
  
precedent	
  in	
  the	
  history	
  of	
  Afghanistan.	
  
2	
  -‐	
  woman,	
  children,	
   their	
  belongings	
  	
  
cooking	
  on	
  stairs,	
  
public	
  place.	
  	
  
3	
  –	
  women	
  selling	
  
clothes	
  on	
  street	
  
corner	
  
Soaring	
  beggary,	
  prostitution	
  and	
  even	
  sale	
  of	
  children	
  by	
  
1-‐ woman	
  in	
  
Women	
  forced	
  
destitute	
  families	
  is	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  most	
  catastrophic	
  outcomes	
  
burka	
  
into	
  begging,	
  
of	
  fundamentalist	
  domination	
  in	
  Afghanistan.	
  The	
  shame	
  of	
  
begging	
  
prostitution	
  or	
  to	
  
it	
  is	
  an	
  everlasting	
  stigma	
  on	
  the	
  face	
  of	
  fundamentalism	
  all	
  
2-‐ child	
  on	
  
sell	
  their	
  children	
  
over	
  the	
  world.	
  	
  
street	
  
in	
  order	
  not	
  to	
  
3-‐ women	
  
starve.	
  
begging	
  on	
   	
  
bridge	
  
Images:	
  What	
  
happens	
  with	
  
women.	
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9	
  

The	
  fundamentalists	
  aim	
  at	
  terrorising	
  our	
  women	
  into	
  
mute	
  and	
  obedient	
  household	
  slaves	
  through	
  the	
  meting	
  
out	
  of	
  punishments	
  such	
  as	
  flogging,	
  amputation	
  of	
  hands	
  
and	
  feet	
  and	
  stoning	
  to	
  death.	
  But	
  RAWA	
  believes	
  that	
  it	
  is	
  
only	
  through	
  breaking	
  such	
  medieval	
  misogynic	
  
fundamentalist	
  fetters	
  from	
  women’s	
  minds	
  and	
  bodies	
  
that	
  women	
  can	
  contribute	
  to	
  the	
  rehabilitation	
  and	
  
reconstruction	
  of	
  our	
  devastated	
  Afghan	
  motherland.	
  
The	
  fundamentalists	
  have	
  killed	
  their	
  [children’s]	
  parents	
  
and	
  have	
  destroyed	
  their	
  [children’s]	
  homes.	
  She	
  [the	
  child	
  
pictured]	
  and	
  thousands	
  like	
  her	
  are	
  alone	
  and	
  bewildered	
  
in	
  a	
  world	
  of	
  fundamentalist	
  tyranny	
  and	
  gloom.	
  	
  
	
  
nd
Caption	
  for	
  2 	
  photo:	
  Kabul’s	
  orphan	
  girls	
  

women	
  standing	
  in	
  a	
  
line	
  

11	
  

Most	
  Afghan	
  refugees	
  prefer	
  the	
  hell	
  of	
  life	
  in	
  Pakistani	
  
refugee	
  camps	
  to	
  that	
  of	
  the	
  inferno	
  of	
  life	
  in	
  
fundamentalism-‐ridden	
  Afghanistan.	
  

1	
  -‐	
  Refugee	
  camp,	
  
makeshift	
  tents	
  
2	
  –	
  trash	
  in	
  refugee	
  
camp	
  

12	
  

The	
  fundamentalists	
  have	
  turned	
  tens	
  of	
  thousands	
  of	
  
school	
  children	
  into	
  rag	
  pickers	
  in	
  Pakistan.	
  

13	
  

[caption]	
  A	
  member	
  of	
  RAWA	
  bleeds	
  from	
  the	
  impact	
  of	
  
police	
  baton	
  during	
  a	
  protest	
  rally	
  in	
  Islamabad.	
  The	
  
Guardian	
  April	
  29,	
  1993	
  

14	
  

Peaceful	
  RAWA	
  demonstrations	
  in	
  Peshawar	
  [Pakistan]	
  are	
  
attacked	
  by	
  fundamentalist	
  terrorists.	
  But	
  nothing	
  can	
  
deter	
  RAWA	
  from	
  agitating	
  and	
  struggling	
  for	
  democracy	
  
and	
  women’s	
  rights.	
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[photos	
  captions]	
  	
  
[photo	
  1]	
  “Islamic	
  Veil”,	
  a	
  play	
  acted	
  out	
  by	
  students	
  of	
  
RAWA	
  schools.	
  
th
[photo	
  2]	
  Song	
  group	
  [sign	
  in	
  photo]	
  Long	
  Live	
  the	
  8 	
  
March	
  Womens	
  International	
  Day!	
  

4	
  images	
  –	
  children	
  
picking	
  through	
  
trash	
  
1	
  -‐	
  B&	
  W	
  photo,	
  
woman	
  bleeding	
  
from	
  her	
  nose;	
  
headscarf	
  
2	
  –	
  protest	
  rally	
  
women	
  vs.	
  police	
  
1	
  –	
  b&w	
  photo	
  
women	
  protesters	
  
clashing	
  with	
  men	
  
“fundementalists”	
  
2	
  –	
  RAWA	
  women	
  
protesting,	
  carrying	
  
signs,	
  one	
  sign	
  of	
  
Meena	
  
	
  
image	
  of	
  people	
  
performing	
  a	
  play	
  
women/girls	
  
standing	
  on	
  platform	
  
in	
  front	
  of	
  a	
  mic	
  

10	
  

15	
  

15	
  

[photo	
  3]	
  A	
  scene	
  of	
  a	
  RAWA	
  function	
  in	
  Pakistan	
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1	
  -‐	
  young	
  girl	
  looking	
  
through	
  broken	
  
window	
  
2	
  –	
  orphan	
  children	
  
/girls	
  posing	
  for	
  
photo	
  

Women	
  citizens	
  
need	
  to	
  be	
  active;	
  
be	
  seen,	
  heard	
  
free	
  from	
  violence;	
  
have	
  agency	
  in	
  
moving	
  
Afghanistan	
  in	
  a	
  
positive	
  	
  direction.	
  
Children	
  are	
  also	
  
citizens	
  that	
  have	
  
a	
  right	
  to	
  their	
  
families	
  and	
  
homes.	
  	
  
	
  
Images:	
  pathos	
  
Living	
  as	
  a	
  
expat/refugee	
  is	
  
preferred	
  to	
  living	
  
in	
  Afghanistan.	
  
Promoting	
  
citizenship	
  from	
  a	
  
distance.	
  	
  
Citizens	
  have	
  a	
  
right	
  to	
  education	
  
	
  

Women/citizens	
  
willing	
  to	
  
peacefully	
  protest	
  
in	
  the	
  face	
  of	
  
violence.	
  

	
  
	
  

Making	
  
connections	
  with	
  
the	
  larger	
  global	
  
community.	
  
Audience	
  of	
  men	
  and	
   	
  
women	
  (sitting	
  
separately)	
  women	
  
in	
  headscarves,	
  men	
  
in	
  western	
  clothes	
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16	
  

Despite	
  extremely	
  limited	
  resources,	
  RAWA	
  strives	
  to	
  
provide	
  free	
  health	
  services	
  to	
  women	
  in	
  Afghanistan	
  and	
  
Pakistan.	
  Not	
  withstanding	
  the	
  marked	
  scarcity	
  of	
  health	
  
services	
  at	
  best	
  of	
  times,	
  the	
  Taliban	
  have	
  prohibited	
  
women	
  from	
  seeking	
  medical	
  attention	
  in	
  areas	
  where	
  
some	
  form	
  of	
  health	
  facilities	
  do	
  exist.	
  What	
  RAWA	
  can	
  
provide	
  is	
  only	
  a	
  drop	
  in	
  the	
  sea	
  as	
  compared	
  to	
  even	
  the	
  
basic	
  needs	
  of	
  our	
  suffering	
  women.	
  	
  
[photo	
  caption]	
  A	
  mobile	
  RAWA	
  health	
  team	
  inside	
  
Afghanistan	
  

17	
  

Despite	
  tremendous	
  difficulties	
  RAWA	
  organizes	
  in-‐home	
  
literacy	
  for	
  women,	
  children	
  and	
  particularly	
  orphans.	
  

18	
  

The	
  Taliban	
  are	
  the	
  champions	
  of	
  illiteracy	
  and	
  highest	
  
incarnations	
  of	
  ignorant	
  arrogance.	
  RAWA	
  believes	
  that	
  
despite	
  manifold	
  impediments	
  and	
  meagre	
  [sic?]	
  resources,	
  
one	
  of	
  its	
  duties	
  is	
  to	
  carry	
  the	
  torch	
  of	
  literacy	
  and	
  
knowledge	
  among	
  women	
  in	
  defiance	
  of	
  the	
  Taliban	
  and	
  
other	
  enlightenment-‐hating	
  fundamentalists.	
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A	
  number	
  of	
  women	
  working	
  in	
  a	
  RAWA-‐sponsored	
  
workshop.	
  The	
  number	
  of	
  women	
  who	
  have	
  lost	
  their	
  male	
  
breadwinners	
  to	
  the	
  fundamentalists’	
  criminal	
  infighting	
  
can	
  be	
  counted	
  in	
  the	
  hundreds	
  of	
  thousands.	
  They	
  eke	
  out	
  
an	
  existence	
  in	
  conditions	
  of	
  increasingly	
  inhuman	
  Taliban	
  
restrictions.	
  Unfortunately	
  due	
  to	
  extremely	
  meagre	
  [sic?]	
  
resources	
  RAWA	
  can	
  provide	
  income	
  generation	
  support	
  
only	
  a	
  very	
  few.	
  	
  
[photo	
  caption	
  1]	
  A	
  RAWA	
  women’s	
  carpet	
  weaving	
  team	
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[photo	
  caption	
  2]	
  A	
  RAWA	
  women’s	
  handicrafts	
  exhibition	
  

19	
  

[photo	
  caption	
  3]	
  A	
  RAWA	
  sewing	
  center	
  

20	
  

A	
  RAWA	
  activist	
  selling	
  RAWA	
  publications	
  in	
  Islamabad,	
  
Pakistan.	
  The	
  fundamentalists	
  are	
  intolerant	
  of	
  the	
  sale	
  of	
  
RAWA	
  publics	
  and	
  have	
  on	
  more	
  than	
  one	
  occasion	
  
assaulted	
  vendors,	
  mostly	
  women.	
  Sales	
  of	
  publications	
  is	
  a	
  
source	
  of	
  income	
  for	
  RAWA.	
  
For	
  the	
  purpose	
  of	
  exposing	
  the	
  crimes	
  and	
  treacheries	
  of	
  
the	
  fundamentalists,	
  RAWA	
  has	
  published	
  two	
  issues	
  of	
  the	
  
English	
  magazine	
  “The	
  Burst	
  of	
  the	
  ‘Islamic	
  Government’	
  
Bubble	
  in	
  Afghanistan”	
  in	
  addition	
  to	
  publishing	
  regular	
  
issues	
  of	
  Payam-‐e-‐San	
  (Women’s	
  Message)	
  in	
  Dari	
  
(Persian),	
  Pashtu	
  and	
  Urdu.	
  	
  

20	
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women	
  gathered	
  
outside	
  a	
  clinic,	
  
some	
  in	
  burkas,	
  
some	
  in	
  
headscarves,	
  
children	
  

Providing	
  services	
  
for	
  citizens;	
  
replacing	
  the	
  
nation-‐state	
  

a	
  woman	
  (nurse?)	
  
tending	
  to	
  a	
  person	
  
in	
  bed	
  
1	
  -‐	
  adult	
  women	
  in	
  
school,	
  teacher	
  at	
  
blackboard	
  
2	
  -‐	
  adult	
  women	
  
reading	
  
3	
  -‐	
  children	
  (boys	
  and	
  
girls	
  in	
  school	
  
1	
  –	
  boys	
  in	
  school	
  
sitting	
  at	
  desks,	
  male	
  
teacher	
  at	
  
blackboard,	
  	
  
2	
  –	
  girls	
  at	
  school	
  
readings,	
  sitting	
  at	
  
desks.	
  
	
  

Demonstrating	
  
agency.	
  

women	
  weaving	
  

literacy,	
  economic	
  
independence	
  
literacy,	
  economic	
  
independence	
  

2	
  women,	
  standing	
  
at	
  a	
  booth,	
  with	
  
goods	
  
women	
  sewing	
  with	
  
manual	
  sewing	
  
machines	
  
1	
  -‐	
  woman	
  handing	
  
out	
  publications	
  to	
  
men	
  
2	
  –	
  images	
  of	
  
publications	
  	
  
	
  

Education	
  

literacy	
  and	
  
knowledge	
  is	
  
paramount	
  for	
  
citizens	
  

Women	
  able	
  to	
  
provide	
  for	
  
themselves	
  and	
  
families	
  is	
  
paramount;	
  
training	
  

literacy,	
  economic	
  
independence	
  
RAWA	
  self	
  
supporting	
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21	
  

21	
  

21	
  

22	
  

Cultural	
  and	
  Art	
  Committee	
  of	
  RAWA	
  has	
  released	
  11	
  audio	
  
cassettes	
  of	
  patriotic	
  songs.	
  	
  
[caption	
  to	
  photo]	
  ?	
  Hospital	
  

To	
  the	
  Fundamentalists!	
  	
  
If	
  you	
  blow	
  out	
  the	
  candles	
  in	
  my	
  eyes,	
  /	
  If	
  you	
  freeze	
  all	
  the	
  
kisses	
  in	
  my	
  lips,	
  	
  /	
  If	
  you	
  fill	
  my	
  native	
  air	
  with	
  lisping	
  
curses,/	
  or	
  silence	
  my	
  anguish,/	
  Forge	
  my	
  coins,	
  /	
  Uproot	
  the	
  
smile	
  from	
  my	
  sisters’	
  faces,	
  /	
  If	
  you	
  raise	
  a	
  thousand	
  walls,	
  /	
  	
  
And	
  nail	
  my	
  eyes	
  to	
  humiliation,	
  /	
  	
  Enemies	
  of	
  man,	
  /	
  I	
  shall	
  
not	
  compromise	
  /	
  And	
  to	
  the	
  end	
  /	
  I	
  shall	
  fight.	
  
Revolutionary	
  Association	
  of	
  the	
  Women	
  of	
  Afghanistan	
  
/	
  RAWA,	
  P.O.	
  Box	
  374,	
  Quetta,	
  Pakistan	
  /	
  
http://www.rawa.org	
  rawa@rawa.org	
  
It	
  is	
  the	
  agony	
  and	
  the	
  loneliness	
  of	
  these	
  innocent	
  victims	
  
of	
  the	
  fundamentalists’’	
  criminal	
  infighting	
  that	
  is	
  the	
  
driving	
  force	
  behind	
  RAWA’s	
  irreconcilable	
  hatred	
  of	
  all	
  
fundamentalists.	
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Image	
  of	
  a	
  child	
  with	
  
severe	
  injuries,	
  
shaved	
  head,	
  large	
  
stitches	
  	
  on	
  scalp,	
  
black	
  eye,	
  lots	
  of	
  
bandages	
  
	
  

What	
  happens	
  
without	
  help	
  /	
  
awareness	
  

	
  

Women/RAWA	
  
cannot	
  be	
  
silenced,	
  citizens	
  
will	
  find	
  a	
  way	
  to	
  
resist	
  oppression	
  
and	
  advocate	
  for	
  
their	
  rights	
  
	
  

1	
  –	
  image	
  of	
  
What	
  happens	
  
sick/injured	
  man,	
  
without	
  the	
  work	
  
woman,	
  infant	
  
of	
  RAWA.	
  	
  
sitting	
  at	
  his	
  side	
  
2	
  –	
  severely	
  injured	
  
person,	
  elderly?	
  
(gender	
  unknown)	
  
with	
  arm	
  amputated.	
  
3	
  –	
  dead	
  child	
  
4	
  –	
  severely	
  injured	
  
person	
  (from	
  a	
  
bomb?)	
  

APPENDIX G: VEILING AND THE BURQA
The reasons why women wear the Muslim veil are complex and diverse. There are
historical, cultural, legal, religious, political, and class motivations as to why women may choose
to (or not to) wear the veil. The veil can mean “women’s seclusion, invisibility, confinement to
the home… [or] it meant exactly the opposite: it was affirmation of their right to work and to be
in the public world pursuing professional and working lives” (Ahmed, 1999, p. 300).
The political use of the veil shifts “according to different historical and political contexts”
(al-Ani, 2003, p. 103). In Egypt during the early 1900s, women removed the veil as a “sign of
defiance and feminist resistance,” whereas in Algeria during the war against the French
occupation during the 1950s and 1960s, the veil was worn by women “as a symbol of Arab
resistance to French colonial oppression” (al-Ani, 2003, p. 90). These political uses provides a
way for women to use as a form of resistance against their current culture, as in Egypt, or to the
colonizers, as in Algeria.

ILLUSTRATION G.1 WOMEN OF RAWA WEARING HIJABS (REVOLUTIONARY ASSOCIATION OF THE
WOMEN OF AFGHANISTAN, N.D.)
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There are many different styles of veils, all of which are influenced through historical,
cultural, class and legal standards. The most common veil consists of a simple headscarf, known
as the hijab it covers the head, hair and neck, but leaves the face uncovered.
Similar in coverage, the al-amira, shayla and khimar also cover the head, neck, and
shoulders, with varying degrees of coverage. The chador, a more conservative veil worn in Iran,
is a full body cloak that keeps the face uncovered. (Illustration G.2 and G.3).

ILLUSTRATION G.2 (BBC, N.D.)

ILLUSTRATION G.3 (BBC, N.D.)

In countries located on the Arabian Peninsula, some women wear the niqab, which covers the
lower-face but leaves the eyes uncovered. The most concealing is the well-known burqa, which
is only worn in Afghanistan, with a mesh fabric to see through. (Illustration G.4)
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ILLUSTRATION G.4, BURKA (ZOYA, 2002)
Even with this illustrations of women’s veiling, there are exceptions. For example while the
chador is generally worn in Iran and the burqa is worn in Afghanistan, women in Iran or
Afghanistan may also be seen wearing only a shayla.
The cultural contexts of veiling needs to be considered when addressing this issue.
Women from various backgrounds, living in different situations, have a variety of social reasons
why they may choose to veil.
For some women, the veil empowers them by removing their bodies from male scrutiny
and the social judgments of beauty and sexuality and they wear it by choice. For others,
enforced veiling is a political oppression disconnected from Islam…. [but] veiling can
also be a conscious drawing attention to oneself… as a political [being] (Donnell, 2003,
p. 132).
Creating a visual dividing line between the classes is another social reason for veiling. In midlate 20th century Morocco, Fatima Mernissi describes one way the veil signified class.
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While upper and middle class women threw away the veil, the newly migrant peasant
women who would come to Fez after their independence would wear one to proclaim
their “urbanity” to show they belonged to the city and were no longer part of the
countryside where the veil was never, throughout North Africa, worn by women. Even
today, the highly political Islamic hijab, which is a distinct headdress, is an urban,
middle-class, educated phenomenon in Morocco. Peasant and working-class women do
not join in that fashion (Mernissi, 1994, p. 120).
These examples provide only a glimpse of the reasons why women veil. The use of the Muslim
veil is a complicated notion, infused with multiple meanings. For women needing to negotiate
the veil, the outside critique, such as those coming from places like the United States, creates a
more complicated situation when they are advocating for public services for women and
families.
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